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ABSTRACT 
 
Name:   James Akazili 
 
Thesis title:  Equity in health care financing in Ghana  
 
Address:    Navrongo Health Research Centre 
        Ghana Health Service 
                    P. O. Box 114 
                    Navrongo, UE/R 
                    Ghana 
                    www.navrongo.org  
 
Date:     May 2010 
 
Financial risk protection against the cost of unforeseen ill health has become a global 
concern as expressed in the 2005 World Health Assembly resolution (WHA58.33), which 
urges its member states to “plan the transition to universal coverage of their citizens”. 
The study (the first of kind in Ghana) measured the relative progressivity of health care 
financing mechanisms, the catastrophic and impoverishment effect of direct health care 
payments, as well as evaluating the factors affecting enrolment in the national health 
insurance scheme (NHIS), which is the intended means for achieving equitable health 
financing and universal coverage in Ghana. 
 
To achieve the purpose of the study, secondary data from the Ghana Living Standard 
Survey (GLSS) 2005/2006 were used. This was triangulated with data from the Ministry 
of Finance and other ministries and departments, and further complemented with primary 
household data collected in six districts. In addition 44 focus group discussions with 
different groups of people and communities were conducted. In-depth interviews were 
also conducted with six managers of District NHI schemes as well as the NHIS 
headquarters.  
 
 
The study found that generally Ghana’s health care financing system is progressive. The 
progressivity of health financing is driven largely by the overall progressivity of taxes 
which account for over 50% of health care funding. The national health insurance levy is 
mildly progressive as indicated by a Kakwani index of 0.045. However, informal sector 
NHI contributions were found to be regressive. Out-of-pocket payments, which account 
for 45% of funding, are associated with significant catastrophic and impoverishment 
effects on households. The results also indicate that high premiums, ineffective 
exemptions, fragmented funding pools and perceived poor quality of care affect the 
expansion of the NHIS.  
 
For Ghana to attain adequate financial protection and ultimately achieve universal 
coverage, it needs to extend cover to the informal sector, possibly through funding their 
contributions entirely from tax, and address other issues affecting the expansion of the 
NHI. Furthermore, the funding pool for health care needs to grow and this can be 
achieved by improving the efficiency of tax collection and increasing the budgetary 
allocation to the health sector. 
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EXCUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
International health policy debates and research have recently drawn attention to health 
care financing issues. This is due in large part to the mounting evidence on the extent to 
which households (particularly, but not exclusively, poorer households) can be adversely 
affected by direct out-of-pocket (OOP) payments. The pressure to rely more and more on 
user charges for financing health care were for a while given impetus by the World Bank 
policy of encouraging the growth of the private health sector and user fees. The World 
Bank has since retreated on the policy stance of user fees. In Ghana, in 2005/6 OOP 
payments accounted for 45% of total health care financing and, in the absence of 
effective exemption mechanisms, poorer households suffer as a result of having to pay 
user fees (which are a major component of OOP payments). This has prompted interest in 
investigating alternative health care financing systems such as tax-based financing, social 
health insurance and community based health insurance. WHO has recognized this need 
and in its 2005 World Health Assembly resolution WHA58.33, it called on all member 
states to “plan the transition to universal coverage of their citizens”. It is also recognized 
that the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), particularly the 
health related ones, requires sustainable and equitable long-term health system financing 
strategies to improve access to health care, offer greater financial protection and 
potentially achieve universal coverage.  
 
In terms of the first objective, few people would question that universal coverage is a 
desirable policy goal for the health system. However the insufficiency of resources 
needed to finance health care that will provide that financial protection and universal 
coverage in developing countries, including Ghana, remains a major challenge. Universal 
coverage requires that the health system provides all citizens with adequate health care at 
an affordable cost. Achieving such coverage requires that health care be financed 
according to ability to pay and that services are accessible according to need.  
 
 
To improve equity in health care financing and promote the goal of achieving universal 
coverage, first, there is a need to measure the degree of progressivity of existing health 
care financing mechanisms to be able to establish the relative funding burden on the poor 
compared with the rich. This will allow us to identify which health care financing 
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strategies are regressive (i.e. place the burden on the poor) and which are progressive (i.e. 
the rich contribute a higher proportion of their income than the poor). It will therefore 
provide insights into which financing mechanisms best provide financial protection and 
promote universal coverage. Second, the nature and extent of catastrophic payments need 
to be identified and dealt with. For instance, knowing the extent to which direct out-of-
pocket payments are catastrophic and impoverish households will be important evidence 
for policy makers and planners for assessing the extent of financial protection in the 
current health system and hence the degree of urgency of exploring alternative, 
particularly pre-payment, financing mechanisms. Third, if a mandatory health insurance 
scheme is adopted as a mechanism for promoting equitable financing, as has occurred in 
Ghana, an assessment is required of which factors might influence enrolment in or the 
successful implementation of such a scheme. This research, which applies internationally 
accepted tools for critically analyzing health care financing in Ghana, seeks to explore 
these three issues1
 
 with the intention of contributing to strengthening the implementation 
of the NHI in pursuit of an equitable and universal health system.   
The study draws on secondary data in the form of a 2005/2006 national household survey 
(the fifth Ghana Living Standard Survey-GLSS 5)2
 
. The sample size for GLSS 5 was 
8,687 households, covering a total of 36, 488 individuals. The individuals represent 
0.17% of the total population of Ghana. Data collected by a Living Standard Survey 
(LSS) relate to all aspects of household decision-making and well-being. The data contain 
information on household consumption of both durable and non-durable items.  
In order to calculate the incidence of different financing mechanisms (i.e. health care 
funding payments as a percentage of household expenditure), estimates of the revenue 
from different taxes based on the GLSS 5 data were triangulated with actual data from the 
Ministry of Finance and other ministries and departments. To complement the GLSS 
data, a primary household survey (called the SHIELD survey) was conducted in a sample 
of six districts (two districts from each of the three geographical zones) focusing on 
contributions to the NHI and direct health care payments. This is because the key focus of 
government is now on how to extend possible coverage of the NHIS, which was 
                                                   
1 The first two issues (objectives) are explored using the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS), whilst the 
third issue uses the SHIELD survey data 
2 GLSS is five yearly national household survey collected by the Ghana Statistical Service on various issues 
on household living standards. 
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introduced in 2004, as quickly as possible to the informal sector of the population. The 
SHIELD survey (with sample size of 2986 households and covering a total 14,050 
individuals) collected data on household expenditure on health care, household SES 
(socio-economic status), factors affecting health care payments and the impact of out-of-
pocket payments on the ability of lower income groups to access prompt and equitable 
care for major health problems. The SHIELD data were weighted to give a national 
picture. In addition to the quantitative data, qualitative data from forty-four focus groups, 
seven in-depth interviews with managers of district health insurance schemes and the 
headquarters of the NHIS were undertaken.  
 
The study found that generally Ghana’s health care financing system is progressive with a 
Kakwani index of 0.071. These results are quite similar to those for some OECD and 
Asian countries. The progressivity of health care financing is driven largely by the overall 
progressivity of taxes which contribute over 50% of health care funding. The only 
element of tax that is regressive is the fuel levy.  This was largely influenced by the very 
regressive kerosene levy, as kerosene is consumed mainly by the poor. The national 
health insurance levy - an earmarked tax for the NHI (levied on the same goods and 
services on which VAT is levied) - is mildly progressive as indicated by a Kakwani index 
of 0.045. Another key finding was that the NHI contributions by the informal sector were 
regressive largely due to the flat premium payment by those outside the formal sector. 
The income-related graduated premium structure proposed in the NHI design, which 
would make those who are better-off pay more, has not been implemented. However, 
NHI contributions overall are progressive, which is driven primarily by the progressivity 
of the formal sector NHI contributions. OOP payments were found to be regressive, with 
a Kakwani index of 0.070. Such regressivity of OOP payments is consistent with findings 
elsewhere such as in Bangladesh, Thailand and Sri Lanka. 
 
OOP payments were not only regressive but were found to be catastrophic and to have an 
impoverishing effect on households. For instance 11% of households spent more than 5% 
of total household resources on out-of-pocket expenditures. In Malaysia only 7% of 
households spent in excess of 5% of their total household resources on health care (Yu, 
Whynes et al. 2008). Once basic food needs have been met, health care costs can account 
for a large portion of resources for a substantial fraction of the population. In similar 
studies in Asia, households in countries like Nepal, Kyrgyzstan and Bangladesh on 
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average spend in excess of 25% of non-food expenditure as out-of-pocket payments (van 
Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 2007; O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). Results also 
revealed that the poor are more often faced with catastrophic health expenditure than the 
rich. The results of the mean payment in excess of the threshold are also staggering, 
suggesting that there is a high intensity of catastrophic health expenditure in the 
population, especially among the poor, and it is more pronounced with non-food 
expenditure. For instance, among those devoting more than 20% of total expenditure to 
out-of-pocket payments on health care, the average OOP payment share exceeds this 
threshold by almost 44 percentage points, giving a significant OOP budget share of 64%. 
The average budget share for those exceeding the 20% of non-food expenditure threshold 
is much higher; it is 75% OOP budget share. This reflects a higher percentage of food 
shares of total household expenditure especially among the poor.   
 
Comparing the poverty headcount in pre-payment and post-payment periods at $1.25 or 
lower poverty line, it is found that health care payments increase poverty in Ghana from 
17% to 18.6%. This suggests that health care spending increases poverty by 1.6% and, 
given an estimated population in Ghana of 22 million people, translates into about 
352,000 more people being impoverished as a result of spending on health care. There are 
substantial geographical differences in the impoverishment effect of health care payment, 
with northern areas bearing a higher burden of poverty than the southern sectors of the 
country. 
 
Key issues also emerged from examining the factors influencing enrolment in the NHIS 
and these include contribution levels that are regarded as too high, inability to pay, and 
perceived poor quality of care offered to NHI members. The seriousness of NHI 
affordability issues was confirmed through a regression analysis which found that those 
who did not face food shortages in the preceding year were far more likely to be insured. 
The results of the interviews, especially from the focus groups, again emphasised that 
lack of money and high premiums are the main barriers to people joining the NHIS. This 
is consistent with a study entitled “Does the Ghana NHIS cover the poor?” which found 
that over 90% of the uninsured attributed their inability to insure to high premium levels 
and poverty (Asante and Aikins 2008). Interviewees recommended broadening of the 
categories of people who should be exempted from making NHI contributions to cover all 
vulnerable groups.  
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What is apparent from the study is that the goals set for the NHIS are not being realised 
to the extent intended. The evidence presented in this study is clear: Ghana is still far 
from universal access; there is not adequate financial protection for those outside the 
formal sector; and there remains considerable inequity in health care financing. While 
that is disappointing given the aspirational goals of the NHI, the study concludes by 
providing some important insights into what now needs to be done to overcome these 
deficiencies. 
• General tax revenues should be used to meet the costs of premiums for the poor. 
• Government should seriously consider funding the contributions of those outside 
the formal sector from tax funds, given that their NHI contributions are regressive. 
This would be the most reliable way of achieving universal coverage and is in line 
with what other countries are doing. 
• If Ghana is to achieve universal coverage within the existing NHIS framework, 
there is a need to effectively identify and exempt the poor from NHI contributions  
• The current graduated premiums (if premiums are to be maintained for the 
informal sector) should be simplified into the rich, the not so rich and the poor. 
• Quality of care deficiencies, particularly the perceived inferior quality of care 
provided to NHI members, must be addressed. 
• To avoid a potential for consumer moral hazard problems in the NHI, it is 
recommended that a strong gate-keeping system is put in place and this can be 
done by strengthening the primary health care system. 
• The current system of funding health facilities, particularly public sector facilities, 
can entrench resource disparities between facilities to the detriment of poor rural 
facilities, and it is therefore recommended that budget allocations via the 
MoH/GHS to facilities take account of resource allocations via the DHIS/NHI to 
ensure equity and fairness.  
• Currently there exist fragmented district pools of funds to the point that some 
district health schemes have extra funds whilst others are in deficit, and it is 
recommended that efforts are made to pool these funds together. 
• The problems (such as lack of staff, complexity of forms, and bureaucracy in the 
release of funds) leading to delays in reimbursement to providers need to be 
urgently addressed as this has the potential of affecting the quality of services 
provided at the health facilities. 
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• Finally the government needs to embark on a national campaign to acquaint the 
population with these changes, especially the well-off, to help them to recognise 
the need for a more equitable system of health care financing which will be to the 
advantage of all Ghanaians. 
 
The dissertation has identified a number of issues that need further investigation and 
these include: (i) continuous monitoring of the incidence of tax particularly the NHI levy; 
(ii) a comprehensive study on how to identify the poor for exemption; (iii) monitor 
changes in catastrophic expenditure and the impoverishment effect of direct payments; 
(iv) compare the value of premiums from those in the informal sector and the 
administrative cost of collecting such premiums; and (v) evaluation of how to achieve 
universal coverage within the shortest time possible.  
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Chapter one: General Introduction 
“Not until the creation and maintenance of decent conditions of life for all 
people are recognised and accepted as a common obligation for all people 
and all countries—not until then shall we, with certain degree of 
justification, be able to speak of mankind as civilised”(Albert Einstein 
1945)  
 
1.0 Introduction 
Health care financing encompasses the process of collecting and raising revenue and 
pooling this to pay for health care services (Kutzin 2000; Kutzin 2001). Health care 
financing strategies and how ‘best’ to finance health care have once again gained priority 
in international health policy debates and research (World Health Organization 2005; 
McIntyre, Garshong et al. 2008; Yates 2009). In Africa, including Ghana, health care 
financing to provide for the health needs of the population remains a major challenge, due 
partly to insufficient resources. This was particularly so at the time (1980s/90s) when 
African governments were severely hit by macro-economic difficulties that resulted in 
low or negative economic growth and increasing indebtedness which then limited the 
resources available to government for financing health services for the population. Falling 
health care budgets, and the consequent lack of drugs and poor quality of care, created 
severe problems in many African countries (Bennett 1992). Turning to the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF) for loan support, governments were confronted 
with ‘conditionalities’, including structural adjustment programmes which demanded the 
implementation of cost recovery mechanisms in public institutions. All of this led to 
financing strategies (including user fees) that increasingly placed the burden on service 
users (Arhin-Tenkorang 2000; McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005).  
 
African countries were convinced by the World Bank and IMF that user fees (a major 
component of out-of-pocket payments) was the solution to falling health care budgets. 
Such fees are charged at the place and time of service use and paid on an out-of-pocket 
(OOP) basis (McIntyre 2007). 
 
1.1 Impact of user fees   
The effect of user fees particularly in Africa has been devastating. A number of studies 
have shown that user fees have not produced the benefits claimed by supporters of this 
financing (Waddington and Enyimayew 1990; Creese and Kutzin 1995; Kipp, Kamugisha 
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et al. 2001). For instance, revenue from user fees in 19 African countries average just 
6.9% of the public health service budget (Pearson 2002; Yates 2009).  
 
Not only was revenue lower than predicted but administrative costs are high. For instance 
in Zambia the cost of administering user fees consumed almost all of the user fee revenue 
(Pearson 2004). The impact is greatest among the poor and vulnerable (Mwabu, Mwanzia 
et al. 1995; Blas and Limbambala 2001; McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005). The argument that 
user fees will prevent mainly unnecessary use of health care has been shown not to hold. 
So-called ‘frivolous’ use is already deterred by the other costs involved in seeking health 
care such as transport (Abel-Smith and Rawal 1992; McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005; Yates 
2009). 
 
A number of studies have documented the consequences of user fees on household health 
seeking behaviour and livelihoods (Bitrán and Giedion 2003; McIntyre, Thiede et al. 
2005; Save the Children 2005; Witter and Babiker 2005). The introduction of user fees 
saw substantial declines in health care use, particularly amongst the poorest (Waddington 
and Enyimayew 1990). In addition, many individuals and households have been 
impoverished by the effects of catastrophic health expenditure (Xu, Evans et al. 2003). 
With growing health care costs, there is increasing evidence that such costs can push 
individuals and households, particularly the vulnerable, into poverty or deeper into 
poverty. Such households may then find it difficult to get out of poverty again. According 
to WHO, it is estimated that 100 million people a year in the world become impoverished 
as a result of paying for health care (World Health Organization 2005). 
 
Exemption schemes to protect the poor have tended not to work in practice (Garshong, 
Ansah et al. 2002). (A detailed review of the effects of user fees and out-of-pocket 
payments is provided in Chapter Three).  
 
A consensus is emerging (which includes the former arch protagonists of user fees) that 
user fees, and for that matter out-of-pocket payments in general, are not appropriate  
financing mechanisms for health services in developing countries (McIntyre, Garshong et 
al. 2008). The removal of such fees has been advocated by some as the way forward. 
Even though the removal of user fees in general often results in increased utilization,  the 
examples of user fee removal in Uganda, Burundi, South Africa, Kenya, Sudan, Senegal, 
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Liberia, Niger, Lesotho and Zambia have revealed serious issues related to the quality of 
services and burden of increased utilisation on the few existing health care professionals 
(Yates 2009). To assume that the removal of user fees will solve a country’s health care 
financing problem is naive. Gilson and McIntyre (2005) argue that the removal of such 
fees should not be thought of as a panacea that can be implemented at the stroke of a pen. 
Rather the policy should be thought of as part of a broader package of health system 
reforms to move towards universal coverage.  
 
1.2 Universal coverage 
It is evident that additional financing is needed for countries to achieve universal 
coverage. This has prompted interest in investigating alternative health care financing 
systems such as tax based financing, social health insurance and community based health 
insurance. WHO has recognized this need and in its World Health Assembly resolution 
WHA58.33 called on all member states to “plan the transition to universal coverage of 
their citizens” (World Health Organization 2005). It is also recognized that the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015, particularly the 
health related ones, requires sustainable and equitable long-term health system financing 
strategies to improve access to health care and potentially to reduce morbidity (Carrin and 
James 2004). Universal coverage has been defined by WHO as “access to adequate health 
care for all at an affordable cost”. McIntyre (2007) has also defined universal coverage as 
“a health system that provides all citizens with adequate health care, regardless of their 
employment status or any other factors”.  Yet another definition refers to “necessary 
health care of good quality” (Kutzin 2000).  The definitions (put together) imply two key 
issues, equity in access to quality health care and financial risk protection. Achieving 
universal coverage requires that attention is not only paid to such factors as geographical 
and cultural barriers, quality of care including poor attitude of health staff which 
discourages the use of health care services particularly by the poor (Walker and Gilson 
2004; McIntyre, Goudge et al. 2009) but also to financial arrangements.  
 
The literature points to the fact that no country, and probably only a few people, would 
explicitly argue that universal coverage is not a desirable goal in the health system (Mills 
2007). “The crucial concept in health financing policy towards universal coverage is that 
of society risk pooling” (World Health Organization 2005). However, this aspect appears 
to be ignored in many policy prescriptions for low income countries (McIntyre, Garshong 
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et al. 2008). Another critical issue affecting universal coverage is the insufficiency of 
resources needed to finance health care through the provision of financial protection in 
developing countries, which is often cited as a key reason for promoting user fees and 
out-of-pocket payments. A critical policy question then arises. Is the current mix of 
financing mechanisms (general tax, SHI/NHI, private insurance and OOP payments), 
with a high percentage of OOP payments particularly in developing countries, able to 
help African countries achieve universal coverage and equitable health financing and 
access to health care services?  
 
Health care financing policy in developing countries including Ghana ought to be guided 
by the World Health Assembly resolution (WHA58.33) in 2005, which noted that, given 
the failure of user fees (Arhin-Tenkorang 2000), increased reliance on pre-payment 
mechanisms, i.e. tax and health insurance, are critical in order to achieve universal access 
to health services (WHO/HTM/TDR 2004). Currently, there is growing international 
attention on health insurance in addressing some of the challenges, including that of 
equity, facing the health systems of developing countries (WHO/HTM/TDR 2004). 
Ghana and some other African countries (e.g. Tanzania, Nigeria, Kenya and South 
Africa) are implementing (or are planning to implement) mandatory health insurance 
schemes with the aim of reaching universal coverage in the longer term. 
 
1.3 Ghanaian health care financing context 
Before Ghana’s independence in 1957, user charges were instituted in all public health 
facilities. After independence, health services became free to the public and were 
financed through general tax revenue. However, sustaining the quality and delivery of 
health services became problematic thereafter.   
 
Following the general economic reforms instituted by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1985, the Ghana Ministry of Health (MOH) 
introduced significant user fees in public health facilities. The aim was to recover at least 
15% of recurrent operating costs. Though user fees for clients had existed earlier, the 
amounts paid were minimal and more of a token. The objective of recovering at least 
15% of recurrent costs was strenuously  pursued and met by Ghana (Creese 1991) . 
However, access and utilization studies showed a significant reduction in the use of 
health services especially in rural areas  after the introduction of user fees (Creese 1991; 
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Asenso-Okyere and Dzator 1997). User fees, commonly called the ‘cash and carry’3
 
 
system in Ghana, undoubtedly contributed to inequitable health service access and 
utilization between different socio-economic groups and between poor rural and richer 
urban dwellers (Waddington and Enyimayew 1990; Nyonator and Kutzin 1999).  
In the late 1980s, the Ministry of Health began to consider the feasibility of health 
insurance as an alternative to user fees. A number of pilot schemes were put in place to 
test the viability and feasibility of this alternative financing arrangement. Some of the 
pilot schemes that were set up have led to some increases in utilization and access, 
promoting equity and efficiency in the areas in which these schemes existed (Atim, Grey 
et al. 2001). In addition to these government initiated pilot schemes, a number of 
community-based pre-payment schemes sprang up and by 2002, there were more than 
159 mutual health organizations, although their coverage remained at only about 1% 
(220,000) of the population (Atim, Grey et al. 2001).  
 
These schemes operated on a pre-payment basis and most were initiated and operated by 
NGO health care providers (e.g. Nkoranza Health Insurance scheme-NKHIS) with a few 
having strong community involvement (e.g., Dangwe West Health Insurance Scheme 
(DWHIS) and the Okwahuman Health Insurance scheme (OHIS)). Despite the presence 
of many community-based health insurance schemes, they have low coverage meaning 
that most patients still have to pay user fees. User fees remain an important source of 
funding for health services in Ghana (Nyonator and Kutzin 1999) and elsewhere (Yates 
2009), which has negative implications for health service utilization especially among the 
poor (Arhin-Tenkorang 2001). 
 
Due to these inherent inequities associated with user fees, strong political support came in 
2001 when the government announced the introduction of a national health insurance 
(NHI) scheme to replace ‘cash and carry’ or user fees at the point of service. This policy 
was translated into legislation in 2003. The NHI encompasses multiple schemes, with a 
district health insurance (DHI) scheme in each of the country’s over 140 districts, private 
mutual health insurance schemes and private commercial insurance schemes in order to 
afford all Ghanaians the opportunity to join a health insurance scheme of their choice. 
                                                   
3 The name was coined from the cost recovery aspects of drugs at public health facilities that required that 
people make payments before they get drugs to take away. 
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The NHI is aimed at providing access to health care for members without having to pay at 
the point of use and hence improving the affordability of medical care. Adults (outside 
the formal sector) pay a yearly minimum subscription of 72,000 cedis (US$8).   
 
A National Health Insurance fund (NHIF) has been set up and is financed through a 
payroll tax contribution, whereby 2.5% of the 17.5% of formal sector workers’ Social 
Security Scheme (SSNIT) contributions is directed towards health insurance, a 2.5% 
value added tax on selected goods and services as well as an annual allocation of central 
government funds. The NHIF transfers funds to each District Health Insurance Scheme 
(DHIS) based on the number of SSNIT contributors and indigents in the district 
(Ministerial Task Team 2002). Existing community based mutual health insurance 
schemes continue to exist but also need to be licensed by the National Health Insurance 
Council (NHIC) and do not receive any subsidy from NHIF. However, they can also seek 
to be incorporated into the district schemes created under the law. The law also makes 
provision for the licensing and operation of private commercial schemes, who also don’t 
receive a government subsidy and their activities are regulated by the NHIC. A relatively 
comprehensive benefit package (outpatient and inpatient health services), including 
maternal care services and covering over 90% of the health care burden, was put together 
for the NHI (Ministerial Task Team 2002).  
 
Against a background where OOP payments currently account for over 45% of  health 
care financing in Ghana (McIntyre, Garshong et al. 2008), under the NHI the government 
is seeking to provide quality, accessible, efficient and equitable health services to about 
60% of Ghanaians by 2015 and subsequently to obtain universal coverage throughout the 
country (Ministerial Task Team 2002). Ghana’s ambitious yet innovative initiative has 
elements in common with the health insurance reforms introduced in Thailand 
(Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2005). Many are worried about the 
sustainability of the comprehensive and attractive benefit package covered by the NHI 
and how equity, which is the core of the health system policy, can be enhanced such that 
payments through this health care financing system are progressive. As the international 
community watches with interest Ghana’s giant step with this mandatory health insurance 
aimed at establishing universal coverage, there is a need for substantive research aimed at 
strengthening the design and implementation of the scheme to enhance its progress to 
universal access through equitable health care financing.  
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1.4 Rationale for the study 
Ghana has chosen to pursue universal coverage and financial protection after two decades 
of negative experience of user fees and out-of-pocket payments, which have resulted in 
massive reduction in overall utilisation of health care services, particularly among the 
poor.  However, achieving universal coverage, requires that health care is financed 
according to ability to pay and benefits from using health services are distributed on the 
basis of need for care (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer et al. 1999). The equity implication of a 
given distribution of health care financing depends on the extent to which the financing 
rate and structure ties health care payments to ability to pay or income.  
 
It is fortunately the case that methodological tools have been developed to improve the 
measurement of equity in health care financing (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 1992). 
Unfortunately the application of the relevant tools for measuring the equity of financing 
mechanisms, particularly for assessing the progressivity of financing mechanisms, has 
remained focused primarily on the health care systems of developed countries and, more 
recently, some Asian countries (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 1992; O'Donnell, van 
Doorslaer et al. 2008). There has been only very limited application in developing 
countries and almost none in sub-Saharan Africa (Cissé, Luchinia et al. 2007; Ataguba 
and McIntyre 2009). This is despite the apparent importance of equity as a central policy 
goal in many health systems in developing countries. Most such countries are grappling 
with finding health care financing mechanisms that would balance the need to mobilize 
resources within the context of severely limited ‘fiscal space’ with the need to promote 
equity and attain universal coverage. 
 
Although there is a commitment to pursuing a universal health system in Ghana, no 
assessment of equity in health care financing has been undertaken, nor has the impact of 
the NHI on the financing system been evaluated. To improve equity in health care 
financing and promote the goal of achieving universal coverage, first, there is a need to 
measure the degree of progressivity of existing health care financing mechanisms to be 
able to establish the relative funding burden on the poor compared with the rich. This will 
allow us to identify which health care financing strategies are regressive (i.e. place the 
burden on the poor) and which are progressive (i.e. the rich contribute a higher proportion 
of their income than the poor). It will therefore provide insights into which financing 
mechanisms best provide financial protection and promote universal coverage. Second, 
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the nature and extent of catastrophic payments need to be identified and dealt with. For 
instance, knowing the extent to which direct out-of-pocket payments are catastrophic and 
impoverish households will be important evidence for policy makers and planners for 
assessing the extent of financial protection in the current health system and hence the 
degree of urgency of exploring alternative, particularly pre-payment, financing 
mechanisms. Third, if a mandatory health insurance scheme is adopted as a mechanism 
for promoting equitable financing, as has occurred in Ghana, an assessment is required of 
which factors might influence enrolment in or the successful implementation of such a 
scheme. In Ghana, both formal and informal sector workers are expected to contribute to 
such schemes. While mandatory contributions can be enforced relatively easily for formal 
sector workers, those in the informal sector need to be persuaded to join. It is better to 
identify and deal with factors that may discourage informal sector workers from joining 
(or lead to dissatisfaction and opposition to compulsory payments by formal sector 
workers) at an early stage to ensure effective implementation of SHI/NHI. This research, 
which applies internationally accepted tools for critically analyzing health care financing 
in Ghana, seeks to explore these three issues with the intention of contributing to 
strengthening the implementation of the NHI in pursuit of an equitable and universal 
health system.   
 
1.5 Aim and objectives 
1.5.1 Aim 
The aim of this study is to conduct a health care financing incidence analysis and to 
explore factors influencing health care financing incidence, particularly in relation to the 
NHI in Ghana. 
1.5.2 Objectives 
1. To evaluate the relative progressivity of each health care financing  mechanism in 
Ghana and to compare this with other countries. 
2. To evaluate the overall progressivity of health care financing.  
3. To assess the extent of catastrophic health care payments. 
4. To assess the extent of the impoverishment effect of direct health care payments. 
5. To identify and evaluate the factors influencing enrolment in the NHI. 
6. To provide policy recommendations on how to promote equitable health care 
financing in Ghana. 
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1.6 Research questions 
The research questions are based on the study objectives: 
• What is the progressivity of different health care financing mechanisms in Ghana? 
• What is the overall progressivity of health care financing in Ghana?  
• What is the extent of the catastrophic and impoverishing effects of health care 
payments? 
• What factors influence enrolment in the NHI? 
 
1.7 Summary   
Health care financing strategies have recently been given greater priority in international 
health policy debates and research. A consensus is emerging on the need for developing 
countries to move towards universal coverage through pre-payment financing 
mechanisms, given that user fees and other direct payments have had and continue to 
have negative effects, particularly on poor individuals and households. User fees and 
direct payments disproportionately affect the poor. Unfortunately exemptions that were 
introduced to try to cushion the effects of user fees have failed to protect the poor from 
catastrophic health care costs to the point that 84% of those eligible for exemptions in 
Ghana never got them (Nyonator and Kutzin 1999). Evidence also shows that simply 
removing user fees as some advocate is not a sustainable solution to health care financing 
(US Network for Global Economic Justice 2003; Burnham, Pariyo et al. 2004; Yates 
2004; Burger and Swanepoel 2006; Xu, Evans et al. 2006). It has to be supported by a 
simultaneous increase in funding through pre-payment mechanisms. There is therefore a 
growing need for developing countries, particularly in Africa, to provide fair health 
financing, financial protection and universal coverage to their populations if they are to 
achieve the health-related MDG goals. WHO has recognized this need and in its World 
Health Assembly resolution WHA58.33 called on all member states to “plan the 
transition to universal coverage of their citizens” Identifying a combination of health care 
financing mechanisms that would provide the needed access to health care services for all 
citizens (and protect them from making catastrophic health care payments) is best 
informed by understanding how the burden of health care financing currently falls on 
different segments of the population. Assessing health care financing mechanisms to 
establish their level of progressivity and their catastrophic and impoverishment impacts, 
as well as evaluating the factors that affect the relative progressivity of health care 
financing particularly the NHI are critical for identifying strategies for achieving the 
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health equity goals that are sought. New methodological tools for improved measurement 
of equity in health care financing have remained focused on health care systems of 
developed countries with very limited application in SSA and none in Ghana.  
 
1.8 Organisation of the remaining chapters 
Chapter Two examines the background of the country. It covers briefly the geography, 
history, political system and the economy of the country. These issues directly or 
indirectly affect the equity dimension of health care financing in the country. The chapter 
concludes with an overview of the health sector, particularly the organisation of the 
health system including its financing and service provision. 
 
Chapter Three reviews the relevant literature for the study. The review of literature 
provides a general perspective and context to the study. As this research evaluates equity 
in health care financing, this review focuses on exploring the concept of equity and 
critically reviewing alternative health financing mechanisms.  
 
Chapter Four outlines the detailed methodology including the data sources, measurement 
of households’ ability to pay (socio-economic status) and health care payment variables. 
The chapter also highlights methods of data collection, analysis and how ethical issues 
were considered. 
 
Chapters Five to Seven contain the empirical results. Chapter Five provides critical, in-
depth estimations of the incidence of the various health care financing mechanisms in 
Ghana.  
 
Chapter Six reports on the catastrophic and impoverishment effects of out-of-pocket 
payments for health care in Ghana. The results in this chapter (which to my knowledge 
are the first of their kind in Ghana) can serve as a baseline for tracking the trend of the 
catastrophic and impoverishing effects of OOP payments as the national health insurance 
expands.  
 
Chapter Seven looks at the factors influencing people’s decision to join or not to join the 
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS).  
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Chapter Eight highlights the key issues and challenges in attaining financial protection 
and universal coverage in the Ghanaian health care system. 
 
Chapter Nine summarises the main findings of the study in terms of the objectives set out 
at the beginning of the research. The Chapter brings together the findings of the thesis 
which provide answers to the various research questions posed. In doing so it also serves 
to demonstrate that the research objectives have been met. The Chapter concludes with 
some recommendations for policy and for further research. 
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Chapter Two:  Profile of Ghana 
2.0 Introduction  
Since it is important to understand the country context where the study was carried out, 
this chapter seeks to provide a profile of Ghana. It covers briefly the geography, history, 
political system and the economy of the country. These issues directly or indirectly affect 
the equity dimension of health care financing system in the country. The chapter 
concludes with an overview of the health sector, particularly the organisation of the 
health system including its financing, service provision and the challenges it faces.  
2.1 Geography 
Located on the West Coast of Africa about 750km north of the equator on the Gulf of 
Guinea and with a total land area of 238,305 km², Ghana is bordered on the north by 
Burkina Faso, on the west by Cote d’Ivoire and on the east by Togo (Asante and Aikins 
2008). It has a tropical climate characterized most of the year by moderate temperatures 
(21-32º C) which provide favourable grounds for the breeding of the mosquitoes that 
cause malaria. There are two main wet seasons, from March to July and from September 
to October. Annual rainfall in the south averages 2,030mm but varies greatly throughout 
the country, with the heaviest rainfall in the western region and the lowest in the north 
(Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research 2008). 
 
2.2 History, political and administrative system 
Formerly called Gold Coast, in 1957 Ghana was the first country south of the Sahara to 
gain independence from Britain. It was also the first to suffer from military interventions 
in its governance. The military government reigned until 1992 when the country returned 
to a relatively stable parliamentary democracy. There is an elected government with a 
president, a cabinet, a parliament and an independent judiciary. The country is divided 
into 10 regions (Ghana Health Service 2007) and 138 districts. The districts are 
administered by District Assemblies which are headed by a District Chief Executive 
(DCE), who is nominated by the President and endorsed by the elected district 
representatives. Ghana continues to enjoy a stable political environment [with a recent 
(December 2008) smooth transfer of power from one democratically elected government 
to another] despite increasing instability in the region and sub-region. For example, the 
deteriorating situation in neighbouring Cote d’Ivoire is a cause for serious concern. To 
date, the numbers of both Ghanaians returning home and foreign refugees have been 
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manageable (Ghana Statistical Service 2004)  However, Ghana is not equipped to handle 
large refugee flows and the impact on the nation’s already overstretched resources could 
be overwhelmed if the situation worsens. On the domestic front, there are chieftaincy 
disputes from one end of Ghana to the other (Ramachandra and Hsiao 2007). Although 
basic reforms are in place for the acceleration of decentralisation and the delegation of 
responsibility for provision of many social services to district governments, the 
commitment at the national level to these policies is missing (Ghana Health Service 
2005). Key ministries, such as health and education, have yet to relinquish centralised 
control and function to the districts, and the level of resources needed at a district level to 
provide these services are not yet available to District Assemblies and local authorities 
(Ghana Statistical Service 2006). 
 
2.3 Demography 
Ghana’s population was estimated at 18.4 million4
 
 in the 2000 Population and Housing 
Census (another census is due in 2010). Its population structure is typical of a developing 
country with about half of the total population below 15 years of age. Ghana is no longer 
20% urban and 80% rural as is normally suggested. The results of the 2000 population 
and housing census showed that approximately forty-four per cent (44%) live in urban 
localities. The rural /urban classification of localities in the census is population based, 
with a locality population size of 5,000 or more being classified as urban and less than 
that being rural. Apart from the Accra and the Kumasi Metropolis with populations of 
1,658,937 and 1,170,270 respectively, the population of localities defined as urban in the 
2000 census ranged from small rural towns such as Essam in the Western region with a 
population of 5,019, to Tamale with a population of 202,317 (Ministry of Health 2006).  
2.4 The economy and fiscal issues 
2.4.1 Macroeconomic situation 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate was 6.8 per cent in 2008 which is an 
increase (almost doubling) from 3.7 per cent in 2000. The GDP of Ghana has seen 
positive growth over the years compared to its neighboring countries. Whilst Ghana 
recorded a 1.8 per cent growth in GDP per annum in the period 1990-2003 for instance, 
Cote D’Ivoire and Gambia had negative figures for the same period. Available figures 
                                                   
4 The current (2008) population is estimated at 21million  
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shows GDP per capita (PPP US$) in 2005 was 2,480. Compared to Botswana (12,387), 
South Africa (11,110) and Gabon (6,954), this figure is very low but compared to 
neighbouring Nigeria (1,128), Cote D’Ivoire (1,648), Cameroun (2,299) and Burkina 
Faso (1,213), Ghana’s figure is high (Institute of Statistical Social and Economic 
Research 2008).  
 
The Human Development Index (HDI) for 2005 was 0.553  which is lower than a country 
like Botswana (0.654) but higher than Nigeria (0.470) and Angola (0.446) (UNDP 2005). 
With regards to inflation, Ghana has seen some inconsistent inflation trends over the 
years which are often largely influenced by global markets prices of imported goods and 
services as well as government expenditure. Inflation has recently increased from less 
that 13% in 2007 to about 20% by the close of 2008 (Ministry of Health 2009). The 
recent increase is probably due to the current global financial melt down.  Government 
budget deficit has also seen a jump from 3.2 per cent of GDP in 2004 (when the country 
ceased to be defined as a Heavily Indebted Poor County) to almost 14 per cent of GDP in 
2008. Among several reasons for this astronomical increase is lack of discipline in 
government expenditure in 2008 which was also an election year. 
 
Currently Ghana’s domestic economy continues to revolve around subsistence 
agriculture, which accounts for 35% of GDP and employs 60% of the work force, mainly 
small landholders. Ghana remains heavily dependent on international financial and 
technical assistance. Gold, timber, and cocoa production are major sources of foreign 
exchange. Ghana’s recent discovery of oil in commercial quantities promises to boost the 
economy when production starts in the third quarter of 2010. 
 
Ghana’s Gini index (an indicator of inequality) for 2008 of 40.8 is by no means the best 
in Sub Saharan Africa when compared to Egypt (34.4), Tanzania (34.6) and Guinea 
(36.5) but it was better than countries such as Zambia (50.8), South Africa (57.8) 
Botswana (60.8), Sierra Leone (62.9) and Namibia (70.7) (Ministry of Health 2009). 
However the economic gap between the rich and the poor remains a major challenge. An 
earlier study in 2002 by the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development found a 
frightening picture of mass unemployment and underemployment and a perceived 
widening of the gap between the rich and the poor (the poorest 20% enjoy only 8.4% of 
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the national income whilst the richest 20% enjoy as much as 41.7% (Ghana Statistical 
Service 2004).  
 
From the GLSS surveys, with the exception of the Upper West region, poverty levels in 
all regions have reduced over the period from 1991/92 to 2005/6 (see Figure 2.1). There 
are marked differences in poverty between southern and northern Ghana. Even though the 
northern part (Upper East and Northern) has seen some reduction in poverty incidence, 
their overall standing with regard to poverty incidence leaves them far above the national 
average of 29% (Ghana Statistical Service 2007). This picture reflects the overall 
geographically entrenched inequities that have existed between the south and the north of 
Ghana over many years. Currently the Upper West region is the most deprived region, 
with about 9 in every 10 people falling below the poverty line. The picture in Upper East 
is almost as bad.  
 
Figure 2. 1 Poverty incidence by administrative region, 1991/92 to 2005/06  
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Source: GSS 2007 
Poverty line for 2006=3,708, 800 cedis per annum (about US$365) 
 
2.4.2 Taxation  
Tax is a major component of health care financing and a key tool for income 
redistribution and if a country is to meet the needs of its population, government will 
need to mobilize resources through taxation. Consequently this section looks at taxation 
in Ghana.  
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
 16 
The most radical tax reform in Ghana was the introduction of VAT, first in 1995 but it 
was then resisted so strongly by the people that it had to be withdrawn and was then 
reintroduced in 1998 and has been in operation since. The reasons for introducing VAT 
were two fold: first its efficiency compared with the sales tax that VAT sought to replace. 
VAT unlike the conventional sales tax system efficiently addresses the problems of 
cascading and input tax credit that causes an automatic increase in the consumer price 
level . The problem of cascading is avoided in VAT as the tax is imposed on the value 
addition at every stage of production. The system of taxation under VAT is also 
successful in avoiding tax evasion that is frequent in sales tax. Second VAT was 
introduced to  bring Ghana into line with the protocol of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) that made it mandatory for members to adopt a VAT 
system by the end of 1999 (Addison and Osei 2001). The widespread public resistance to 
VAT was due to poor public education which was reflected in the inadequacy of the 
capacity that was put in place to manage the VAT process as a whole. When it was 
reintroduced a wide range of goods and services which are consumed mainly by the poor 
were made exempt.  
 
Petroleum taxes are very controversial in Ghana and indeed one of the most hotly debated 
taxes. Politicians tend to manipulate this tax in the lead up to elections since Ghanaians 
are concerned about the effects of increases in petroleum tax on their cost of living. 
Recently however, petroleum products have been deregulated. This allows a competitive 
tendering process between the oil marketing companies as well as the Ghana National 
Petroleum Company (GNPC) which was previously the sole importer of the product into 
the country. In 1998 the petroleum tax was restructured so that it consisted of two 
components: an ad valorem component to the ex-refinery price (applicable to all 
products) and a specific rate applicable to road transport fuels (Price WaterHouse 
Coopers 2009).  
 
Direct taxes have also been reformed over several years. Corporate tax rates have not 
only been falling since 1986, from 55 per cent in 1986 to 28 per cent in 2006 (Price 
WaterHouse Coopers 2009)  but have been made the same for all sectors. This was aimed 
at boosting and promoting businesses. To reduce evasion, the basis for assessing 
corporate taxes was changed from profits to income. With respect to personal income tax, 
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the tax free bracket has been persistently increased (see Figure 2.2) whilst marginal tax 
rates have been lowered.  
 
 
Figure 2. 2: Figure Annual tax returns of Ghana (2000-2006) 
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2.4.3 Government spending 
Government budgetary commitments and actual expenditure on health as a proportion of 
total government spending has increased significantly in recent years. For instance 
recurrent spending on health has consistently increased from 10.2% of total government 
resources in 2001 to 14.5% in 2005 and further to 17% in 2006 (see Figure 2.3). The 
actual amount spent by government in the health sector increased from GH¢477.60 
million in 2004 to GH¢617.07 million in 2008. Over 30% of this money is from Donors 
and development partners and the rest from general taxes.  Given that OOP payment 
account for over 40% of total health care expenditure, actual total health care spending is 
estimated at GH¢1billion, The health sector’s share of the national cake as indicated in 
figure 2.3 shows that the share of government spending on health at 17% is third to 
economic affairs and education in 2006. Ghana therefore appeared to have met the Abuja 
target of the 15% allocation of government resources to the health sector but much of the 
increases go to pay wages and salaries.  
2.5 Health status of Ghanaians 
Representatives from 189 countries committed themselves to sustaining development and 
eliminating poverty at an extraordinary meeting in 2000. They set goals and targets called 
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the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and these are now accepted as the 
framework for measuring the progress of development. Out of the 48 indicators, 18 are 
directly related to health, thus emphasising the importance of health in the development 
process. Most health indicators of Ghana show a general improvement over the fifteen 
years from 1988 to 2003. However from 1998 to 2003, maternal, infant, under-five 
mortality and neonatal mortality rates worsened.  This is worrying in the light of the 
Ghana Health Sector’s efforts under the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) to 
achieve the health related Millennium Developments Goals by 2015.  
 
Figure 2. 3: Percentage share of total Government budget for 2006 
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2.5.1 Maternal mortality 
Maternal mortality is quite high in Ghana. A total of 995 institutional maternal deaths 
were recorded in 2007. This represents a 4% increase over the 957 maternal deaths 
reported in 2006.  The institutional maternal mortality ratio has increased from 187 per 
100,000 live births in 2006 to 229.9 live births in 2007(GHS 2007)  During the last 10 
years the maternal mortality ratio has been fluctuating between 186 /100,000 live births 
and 277/100,000 live births. Among the reasons cited for these very high rates - and this 
is not limited to Ghana but is true of other developing countries – are complications 
during pregnancy and childbirth. Figure 2.4 below depicts trends in institutional maternal 
deaths and maternal mortality ratios in Ghana over the past ten years(GHS 2007)  
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Figure 2. 4: Trend in Institutional Maternal Deaths and Mortality Ratio in Ghana, 
1997-2007 
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Wide regional differences are observed, ranging from 141/100,000 live births in the 
Upper West Region to 342/100,000 live births in the Western Region. Three regions, 
Brong-Ahafo, Upper East and Volta showed improvement with decreases in their 
maternal mortality ratios. In the case of Upper East the reduction could be due to 
UNICEF’s intensive child survival intervention under the Accelerated Child Survival and 
Development (ACSD) initiative that was introduced as a pilot project in 2001/2002.  The 
Western Region showed the worst deterioration rising from 266/100,000 live births in 
2006 to 342/100,000 live births in 2007 (Figure 2.5) (GHS 2007). The question that then 
arises is whether Ghana can really meet the fifth Millennium Development Goal (i.e. to 
reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio) given 
these startling figures (see Figure 2.4 and 2.5). In 2008, the Government instituted free 
delivery in both public and private health facilities in response to these revelations. This 
however only takes away a part of the barrier; physical access barriers and perhaps socio-
cultural barriers need to be identified and removed if the country is to make genuine 
headway in reducing maternal mortality.   
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Figure 2. 5: Maternal Mortality Ratio by Region, 2005-2007 
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2.5.2 Infant and child mortality 
The child health component of the MDGs is the reduction of under-five mortality by two 
thirds by 2015, using 1990 as the reference year (World Health Organization 2005). After 
declining from 77/1000 live births in 1988 to 57 in 1998, the trend in the infant mortality 
rate was reversed and rose to 64/1000 in 2003. Similarly the under 5 mortality rate 
declined from 155/1000 live births in 1988 to 108/1000 in 1998, increased to 111/1000 in 
2003 (Ghana Statistical Service 2004; GHS 2007) but recently decreased to 80/1000 in 
2008 (Ghana statistical Service 2009). A Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 
conducted in 2006 showed that while the under 5 mortality rate has remained at the level 
found in 2003, the infant mortality rate (IMR) actually increased further to 71/1000 live 
births (Ghana Statistical Service 2006). Mortality rates of children in rural communities 
have been consistently higher than for urban residents. Regionally infant mortality varies 
quite markedly.  Western region has the lowest IMR with a rate of 45 per 1000 live births 
while the rate for Upper West is 114 (Figure 2.6).  Under five mortality in Upper West 
(191) is three times that of Western Region (66). 
 
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
 21 
 
 
Figure 2. 6: Infant mortality and under five mortality by region 2006 
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Generally poorer people lose more children (infant and under five) than their rich 
counterparts. The difference in Under 5 mortality between the poor and the rich is 
striking (see Figure 2.7) and a source of worry from the perspective of equity and social 
justice.   
 
Figure 2. 7: Infant and under 5 mortality by expenditure quintile  
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The increasing trend in infant mortality is also shown in the routine service delivery 
reports. Institutional infant deaths have increased by almost 10% from 5,291 in 2006 to 
5,811 in 2007 (see Figure 2.8).  Though deaths during the post neonatal period have 
declined, the number of deaths during the neonatal period have increased sharply thus 
off-setting any gains made.  The 2003 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) showed 
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that the increase in infant mortality was due mainly to the increase in neonatal deaths 
(Ghana Statistical Service 2004). Figure 2.8 depicts the trend of institutional infant deaths 
since 2000.  
 
Figure 2. 8: Institutional Infant deaths, 2000-2007 
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
N
um
be
r 
of
 d
ea
th
s
All <1 mth 1-11 mth
 Source: GHS 2008 
 
Comparing Ghana with countries tracked by UNICEF, based on the current level of under 
5 mortality rates, Ghana had the 32nd highest rate out of a total of 194 countries and 
territories according to the 2008 State of the World’s Children Report (UNICEF 2008). 
This was a marked deterioration from its previous rank of 48 in 20055
 
 (UNICEF 2008).  
Even though Ghana has the lowest under 5 mortality in the West African sub-region, 
some of the countries (according to the report) have made better progress in reducing 
their under 5 mortality between 1990 to 2006 than has Ghana (Figure 2.9 ) (UNICEF 
2008). With the target date for attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
now only about 6 years away, urgent actions (including ensuring equitable and universal 
financial protection particularly among the poor) must be taken if Ghana is to be among 
those countries that will achieve MDG4  
                                                   
5 NB: Countries with lower under 5 mortality rates have a higher rank 
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Figure 2. 9: Percentage Reduction in U5MR between 1990 and 2006 in selected West 
African Countries 
43
28
26
22
17
17
13
0
7
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Cape Verde
Togo
Gambia
Senegal
Ivory Coast
Nigeria
Mali
Sierra Leone
Ghana
Co
un
try
% reduction in U5MR 1990-2006
 
Source: UNICEF 2008 
2.5.3 Disease burden 
The pattern of diseases in the population has not shown any significant changes over the 
years. Malaria still tops the list of diseases managed at the outpatient departments of 
clinics and hospitals (44 per cent), followed by upper respiratory tract infections (6.8 per 
cent), diseases of the skin (4.3 per cent) and diarrhoeal diseases (4.2 per cent). 
Hypertension, a disease commonly found in adults falls within the top 10 causes of 
outpatient visits in Ghana (2.8 per cent). The high prevalence of hypertensive diseases 
and other chronic conditions reflects the aging population of the country (GHS 2007). 
Table 2.1 below shows the top ten diseases reported at outpatient departments in Ghana.  
 
 
Table 2. 1: Top ten diseases reported at outpatient departments 2004 
Disease Male Female Total % 
Malaria 1,523,807 1,835,384 3,359,191 43.94 
Acute Respiratory Infection 246,693 272,959 519,652 6.80 
Skin Disease and ulcers 157,754 167,508 325,262 4.25 
Diarrhoeal Diseases 154,473 167,931 322,404 4.22 
Hypertension 78,918 133,436 212,354 2.78 
Home/Occupational accidents 103,491 84,452 187,943 2.46 
Acute Eye Infection 92,357 94,877 187,234 2.45 
Pregnancy & related complications      _ 150,613 150,613 1.97 
Intestinal worm Infestation 70,985 80,345 151,330 1.98 
Rheumatism & Joint pains 66,098 80,454 146,552 1.92 
 Source: GHS 2005 
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Also of concern is pregnancy related complications; this is particularly worrying because 
even though this is clearly restricted to women, it still stands out as one of the top ten 
causes of ill-health in the country.  
 
According to HIV sentinel survey data, the 2007 national median prevalence of HIV 
declined to 2.6% from 3.2% in 2006 while the mean prevalence declined to 3.0% from 
3.2% during the same period (GHS 2007). However available figures show commercial 
sex workers in Accra and Kumasi had respective rates of 76% and 82% in 2001, which 
reduced to 54% in 2002 in Accra (Ghana Statistical Service 2004).  Sentinel Surveillance 
results also showed wide regional variations over the years. The lowest prevalence of 
1.7% was recorded in the Northern region while the highest prevalence of 4.3% was 
reported in the Eastern region in 2007 (see Figure 2.10).  Six regions showed increases in 
prevalence in 2007 compared with 2006 with the Northern region showing the highest 
percentage increase (36%) from 1.3% to 1.7%.  However, since the prevalence in these 
regions was relatively low, the overall national prevalence actually declined.  In spite of 
the decline in prevalence from 4.9% in 2006 to 4.2% in 2007, the Eastern region retains 
the position of the region with the highest prevalence in the country (Ghana Health 
Service 2008). 
 
Figure 2. 10: Mean HIV Prevalence by region, 2004-2007 
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With regards to age group, HIV prevalence is highest among 25-29 age group compared 
to the rest of the age groups. There are 387 sites for counseling and testing in the country 
and the number of people on ARTs has increased over the years but it currently 
represents only 19.5% of those who actually need ARTs (Ghana Health Service 2008). 
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Guinea worm diseases which results from unsafe water and sanitation, particularly affect 
fifteen districts in the Northern, Brong Ahafo and Volta Regions and result in significant 
suffering and reduction in food production in these areas. 
 
Non-communicable diseases are increasing with lifestyle changes. Hypertension, 
diabetes, chronic renal diseases, cancer and mental diseases are increasing and there is a 
rise in alcohol and tobacco use, and substance abuse. Road traffic accidents are now 
responsible for approximately 1,300 deaths and 10,000 injuries per year which is a source 
of concern. 
2.6 Health care system, facilities, human resources and utilisation of health care 
2.6.1 Brief history of health care system in Ghana 
The history of colonial and post colonial health care system in Ghana is inseparable from 
the history of colonial control of power and resources. The colonial period saw the 
development of provision of modern health care that was mainly curative to the neglect of 
preventive care. Another feature of colonial health care system was that health care 
facilities were mostly established in the urban areas to the neglect of the rural areas. Thus 
the health care system was biased towards the provision of health care to the small elite 
group of colonial administrators and their assistants (Arhin-Tenkorang 2000). The health 
system was also developed to provide care to formal sector workers especially the mine 
workers who needed to remain strong to produce the minerals. Access to health care in 
the colonial period was mainly through direct payment at the point of service and this 
limited access to the few who had the means to pay.  
 
After independence the then socialist and Pan-Africanist government led by Dr. Kwame 
Nkrumah tried to eliminate all barriers to access to health care and to ensure that 
everyone had access to health care irrespective of their socio-economic background. User 
fees were abolished and health care was thus free to all and funded through general taxes 
and donor support (Nyonator and Kutzin 1999).  The free health care which was part of 
the socialist policies was also backed by the Arusha declaration of 1967 which intended 
to ensure universal access of social services to the poor and those living in marginalised 
rural areas. These fully tax funded health systems tried to address some of the inequities 
in geographical distribution of health services. Attention was given to developing a wide 
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range of primary health care facilities across the countries, promoting and strengthening 
preventive interventions such as immunisation and antenatal care.  
 
In the 1980s Ghana like many African countries started crumbling under severe 
macroeconomic difficulties which resulted in negative or limited economic growth. As 
mentioned previously, Ghana’s situation was exacerbated by an unstable political 
environment through frequent military interventions in governance.  Ghana did not have 
the resources to maintain the free health services and indeed the socialist ideologies. 
Public health services deteriorated and added to this was the prescription of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAP) by the IMF and World Bank which require government 
to reduce expenditure and to share cost which meant levying significant user fees for 
health care (as previously mentioned in chapter one). These were necessary requirements 
and conditions for loans that the country desperately needed. These developments led 
naturally to the growth of the private sector where previously they were limited or non 
existent. The results of all these developments which can be said to be largely influenced 
by colonial health policies, is a heavily fragmented and inequitable health system.  
2.6.1.1 History of health care financing  
Against the background of a fragmented health care system, the history of health care 
financing in Ghana can best be described as checkered. As mentioned previously user 
charges were instituted in all public health facilities before Ghana’s independence and so 
health care was financed basically through taxation, user fees and donor support. After 
independence in 1957, health services became free to the public and were financed 
through general tax and donor support. Nevertheless, sustaining the quality and delivery 
of health services became problematic thereafter.   
 
As part of the key reforms that Ghana and other developing countries had to carry out as 
part of the IMF and World Bank loan conditions, was to implement user fees in public 
health institutions. Ghana implemented the user fees to the latter achieving the 15% target 
of recurrent operating cost. However, the effects of these fees were devastating 
particularly among the poor who could no longer access health care. The biting effects 
effect of user fees naturally led to evolution and growth of community-based health 
insurance which was led largely by churches. Like in Thailand, strong political will 
(election promise) for the establishment of a NHI to replace user fees came through in 
2001  
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Table 2. 2: Chronological Development of Health Care Financing in Ghana 
Year  Event Rationale  Features Sources of Financing Results 
1957 Introduction 
of a national 
health 
service 
modeled 
after the 
British 
system 
Driven by 
early economic 
performance 
natural 
resources, and 
strong export 
base 
-Everyone entitled 
to free health care 
-Health care 
delivery through a 
network of publicly 
owned facilities 
General Revenue Not sustainable 
with the decline 
in economic 
performance, the 
scheme proved 
to be too 
expensive 
1985 Co-
payments 
introduced 
Co-payments 
for services 
-Co-payments for 
services 
-Health care 
delivery  through a 
network of publicly 
owned facilities 
General revenue and 
user fees 
Out-of-pocket 
user charges 
from partial to 
full recovery 
1992 Cash-and-
carry 
system 
instituted 
-to increase 
funds for 
providers 
-To make fee 
recovery legal 
-To restrict 
unnecessary 
use 
-Full cost recovery 
for drugs 
-Reduced fees for 
children and 
primary care 
facilities 
General revenue and 
user fees 
Outpatient visits 
dropped by 66%  
Early 
1990s 
Voluntary 
mutual 
health 
insurance 
organization 
movement 
-Heavy cash-
and-carry 
burden 
-Lack of social 
protect 
mechanisms 
-Lack of 
government 
oversight of 
the informal 
sector 
-Subsidisation of 
the vulnerable by 
the better off 
-Social protection 
against the 
impoverishing cost 
of illness 
-Donors such as the 
DANIDA and USAID 
-Community  
  
-Reduced gap 
between those 
covered and 
those not 
covered 
-Paved the way 
for spread of 
MHOs 
Early 
2000s 
Profusion of 
MHOs 
-Trend in other 
African nations 
-Success of 
initial MHOs 
in Ghana 
-
Encouragement 
by the Ministry 
of Health 
-Spread across 67 
out of 138 districts 
in 10 regions 
-Diverse in 
management styles 
and benefits 
-Based on district or 
occupation or 
religion or gender 
-Donors such as the 
DANIDA and USAID 
-Community  
  
-Financial 
protection and 
health services 
access for poor 
-Model for 
covering larger 
parts of the 
population 
2003 National 
mandatory 
health 
insurance 
reform 
-Relative 
success of the 
MHOs 
-Agenda of the 
ruling 
government 
(election 
platform) 
-Abolish cash and 
carry 
-introduced 
mandatory health 
insurance 
-Expand coverage 
through MHOs in 
all districts 
-National health 
insurance levy 
(NHIL)-2.5% VAT 
-2.5% of SSNITa
-Returns on 
investment made by 
the National Insurance 
Council 
 state 
budget transfers 
-Voluntary 
contributions 
-National Health 
Insurance 
Council set up 
-Interim 
administration 
arrangements 
introduced 
-Move toward 90 
district mutual 
health schemes 
Source: Ramachandra and Hsiao 2007  
a
 
 SSNIT= Social Security and National Insurance Trust. Formal sector employees contribute 5% of their 
incomes to the SSNIT and their employers pay 12.5%  
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Ghana has thus implemented most of the known health care financing mechanisms: 
general tax, out of pocket (OOP) payments, donor funding and health insurance 
(community based and the national health insurance). Table 2.2 gives a summary of the 
chronological development of health care financing in Ghana. The current concern is how 
to provide equitable health care financing in the country as well as promote universal 
coverage.  
 
The NHI encompasses multiple schemes as shown in the framework (see Figure 2.11), 
with a mandatory health insurance scheme for those working in the formal sector, a 
district mutual health insurance (DHI) scheme in each of the country’s 143 districts, 
private mutual health insurance schemes and private commercial insurance schemes in 
order to afford all Ghanaians the opportunity to join a health insurance scheme of their 
choice (Government of Ghana 2003). It is important to note that unlike the district mutual 
health insurance the private mutual and private commercial health insurance do not 
receive government subsidies. At present, there are not private and private commercial 
health insurance schemes. 
 
Figure 2. 11: Institutional framework of the Ghana’s National health insurance 
scheme 
 
Source: Wahab 2008 
 
The NHI is aimed at affording members access to health care without having to pay at the 
point of access and offer affordable medical care. The funding of the NHIS comes from 
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2.5% VAT levy on selected goods and services, 2.5% of workers Social Security and 
National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) contribution, Parliamentary approval from the 
consolidated fund, donations, grants, gifts and other voluntary contributions, money that 
may accrue from the investment by the National Health Insurance council (NHIC) and 
from graduated premium contributions by those in the informal sector of  ¢72,000 
(GH¢7.2) to ¢480,000 (GH¢48.0)6
 
 The purpose of the graduated premiums is to ensure 
equity through assessing who pays what being based on the criteria outlined in Table 2.3. 
The complexities and lack of clarity in these criteria has resulted in current premiums 
contributions being flat, with people generally paying the lowest premium of ¢72,000 and 
this makes it regressive. It is important to note that the NHIS (especially at the 
implementation stage) received a lot of financial support from international organizations 
particularly from DANIDA and that contributed to the smooth initiation of the scheme. 
 
Table 2. 3: Graduated premium arrangement  
Core 
Poor 
A Adults who are unemployed and do not receive any identifiable 
and constant support from elsewhere for survival. 
Free  
Very 
Poor 
B Adults who are unemployed but Receive identifiable and 
Consistent financial support from sources of low income 
 
¢72,000 Poor C Adults who are  employed but receive low returns for their 
efforts and are unable to meet their basic needs 
Middle 
income 
D Adults who are employed and able to meet their basic needs ¢180,000 
Rich E Adults who are able to meet their basic needs and some of their 
wants. 
 
¢480,000 Very 
Rich 
F Adults who are able to meet their needs and most of their wants. 
Source: Ministerial Task Team 2002 
 
Membership of the NHIS is legally mandatory (unless alternative private health insurance 
can be demonstrated); however, in practice membership is optional for non-formal sector 
workers (the bulk of the population). The growth of membership has nevertheless been 
impressive – with card-holders rising from 6.6% of the population in 2005 to 45% three 
years later in 2008. This compares more than favourably with many other schemes – in 
Tanzania, for example, total enrolment in the new SHI Benefit scheme is reported to be 
covering less than 1% of the population (McIntyre, Garshong et al. 2008).  
 
                                                   
6 Ghana currency was redenominated in July 2007 such that ¢10,000 became GH¢1. The name of the 
currency changed from “cedis (¢)” to “Ghana cedis (GH¢)”. The inter-bank exchange rate to the US$ at the 
time was ¢9400 (¢0.94) to US$1 
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Figure 2. 12: Proportion NHIS card-holders, by region, 2005 & 2008 
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Source: Annual health sector reviews for 2005 and 2008, NHIS 
 
The variation across regions is very high, however, ranging from 13% membership in 
Central Region to 70% in Upper West in 2008. These variations relate in part to previous 
patterns of community-based health insurance membership (Brong Ahafo, for example, 
had many schemes in operation prior to the NHIS being established). However, the rapid 
growth, especially in the northern regions, suggests that high uptake by exempt groups 
and the informal sector is also playing a role (see Figure 2.12). Greater Accra has a 
relatively low membership (32%), in part perhaps because of a greater propensity to use 
private insurance here. 
 
The NHIA does not break down its card-holders by category of member but does provide 
this information for ‘registrants’ (a larger group comprising those who have expressed 
interest in joining as well as those who are actually holding valid cards). The evolution in 
registrants is shown in Table 2.4.  It indicates which groups have fuelled the growth in 
membership: the formal sector, as would be expected, has not increased much over the 
past three years and only comprises 3% of the population in 2008. By contrast, informal 
sector registrants have grown from 3% to 16% of the population. Another category which 
has seen a large increase has been the children of members (this group is exempt), which 
grew from 8% to 27% (Ministry of Health 2009; Witter and Garshong 2009). The 
indigent, however, fell from just under 4% of the population to 1% in 2008 which is a 
source of concern given that over 20% of the population are estimated to below the 
national poverty line (Ministry of Health 2009). 
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Table 2. 4 NHIS registrants, by category, 2006 & 2008 
 2005 2008 
Membership 
categories 
Number of 
registrants 
Proportion of 
population 
Number of 
registrants 
Proportion of 
population 
Formal sector 468,092 2.24% 811,567 3% 
Informal sector 615,450 2.94% 3,727,454 16% 
Paying members 1,083,542 5.18% 4,539,021 19.25% 
Pensioners 43,208 0.21% 71,147 0.30% 
Children 1,751,175 8.37% 6,305,727 27% 
70+ 266,421 1.27% 816,956 4% 
Indigent 790,078 3.77% 302,979 1% 
Pregnant women   432,728 2% 
Overall exempt 2,850,882 13.62% 7,929,537 34% 
Total 3,934,424 18.79% 12,468,558 54% 
% of registrants 
paying 28%   36%   
Source: Annual Health Sector Reviews for 2006 and 2008 
 
2.6.2 Current funding of the health system 
There is a complete lack of data on private for-profit health services in Ghana.  These 
services are quite limited in Ghana (mainly small clinics, maternity homes and drug 
sellers), and the vast majority of services are provided by public sector and faith-based 
(mission) facilities.  The information presented below relates to these services and does 
not include information on the private for-profit sector. 
 
The main sources of funding for the health sector in 2008 includes Government of Ghana 
(GoG), Donor, internally generated funds (IGF) and the National Health Insurance funds. 
It should be noted that over 80% of the NHIS funds collected are outside the control of 
the health sector budget. Only 17.9% in the 2008 health budget was allocated to the NHIS 
by the Ministry of Finance. Payments by DHIS schemes to health facilities on behalf of 
NHI members are captured in the IGF alongside out-of-pocket payment. Donor support 
still remains a significant part of health sector funding (see Figure 2.13). 
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Figure 2. 13: Source of health sector expenditure in 2008 
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Source: Ministry of Health 2009 
 
Funding for service delivery continues to be faced with many challenges. As the wage 
bill within the sector has grown significantly, this has affected the level of funds available 
for service provision and development or investment. This is particularly so with GoG 
subsidy (see Figure 2.14). Basically GoG funds are used almost exclusively to fund 
salaries and wages while Donor funds are paying for drugs, equipment and other supplies.  
 
Figure 2. 14:  Expenditure by source and line item 2008 
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Source: Ministry of Health 2009 
 
A comparison of spending by item shows that in spite of the increasing costs of personnel 
emoluments they are holding steady around 46-47% of total expenditure (see Figure 
2.15). Over the three years item 2 shows no particular trend. Spending on Services is 
gaining rapidly at the expense of investment, which is falling rapidly, even in nominal 
cedi terms. 
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Figure 2. 15: Total expenditure by line items from 2006-2008 
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Source: Ministry of Health 2009 
 
The shift of financial resources to the district level has been maintained.  As shown in 
Table 2.5, about 62% of the approved budget went to the District level (district hospitals, 
district health directorates and sub-districts). On the whole, about 76% of the approved 
budget was disbursed to budget management centres (BMCs) for implementation of their 
2007 Programme of Work (Ministry of Health 2009).  The lowest disbursement rate of 
16% was to the district hospitals followed by the regional hospitals with 21%.  
 
Table 2. 5: Approved Budget Amount Disbursed by Level, 2007 
Level Approved 
Budget (GH¢)7
Share of 
Budget (%)  
Amount 
Disbursed (GH¢) 
Approved Budget 
Disbursed (%) 
GHS HQ 1,081,829.95 22 1,006,470.87 93 
Regional Health Directorates 503,900.98 10 564,205.67 112 
Regional Hospitals 277,564.42 6 57,513.00 21 
District Health Administration 888,394.98 18 1,299,656.00 146 
District Hospital 1,254,502.29 26 194,458.00 16 
Sub-districts 897,918.94 18 611,643.00 68 
Total 4,904,111.56 100 3,733,946.54 76 
Source: Ministry of Health Annual Review report 2008 
 
Health sector financing is changing in two ways: the relative shares of different sources 
are changing, and the method/ease of access to those sources is also changing. In terms of 
sources, financing is characterised by a levelling off of the share of GoG funding even in 
nominal terms, and a significant increase in share of IGF, powered by the growth of the 
                                                   
7 Ghana currency was redenominated in July 2007; the name of the currency changed from cedis (¢) to 
Ghana cedis (GH¢). The equivalent rate is ¢10,000 = GH¢1. The inter-bank exchange rate (September 
2009) is GH¢1.45= US$1.  
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NHIS. From 2006 to 2008, the GoG subsidy has increased by only 11% in nominal terms, 
whereas IGF has increased by 176% (see Figure 2.16). 
 
Figure 2. 16 : Growth of GoG subsidy and total IGF between 2004 and 2008  
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Source: Ministry of Health 2009 
 
The IGF funds comprise two separate income streams: insurance claims paid through 
NHIS and the district scheme concerned, and out-of-pocket payment of user fees known 
as “Cash and Carry”. Within these, the Cash and Carry component is diminishing in 
importance (see Figure 2.17) as the spread of NHIS membership increases. 
 
Figure 2. 17: Internally Generated Funds (IGF) in nominal Ghana cedis (millions) 
44.83
61.5
11.38
37.48
49.75
38.1
98.7
1.85
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
2005 2006 2007 2008
Year
in
 G
ha
na
 ce
di
s
Cash NHIS  
Source: Ministry of Health 2009 
 
The share of NHIS income and ‘cash and carry’ varies widely amongst regions. NHIS 
funding is proportionately most important in the North and least important in Greater 
Accra (see Figure 2.18). 
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Figure 2. 18: Shares of NHIS and ‘cash and carry’, by region, 2008 
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Instead of the NHIS merely covering some of the recurrent non salary costs of services, 
as user fees used to, it is now gradually expanding to fund other functions. For instance in 
the guideline for the 2009 budget, items 3 (services costs) and item 2 (administration) are 
either reduced or cut entirely for facilities which generate income, and hospitals are 
directed to set aside 10% of the IGF revenue for replacement for equipment and minor 
rehabilitation of infrastructure. IGF revenue is also used to pay staff. The overall need to 
reduce growth in item 1 (personal emoluments) may be circumvented by the fact that 
institutions are now able to hire casual staff and pay from their IGF. The trend towards 
funding curative care (e.g. staff costs, drugs, etc) fully from NHIS could pose a risk and 
could affect the sustainability of the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) (Ministry of 
Health 2009). 
 
2.6.3 Organisation of the health care system 
Three key players in the Ghanaian health system include the Ministry of Health (MoH), 
the Ghana Health Services (GHS) and Christian Health Association of Ghana (CHAG).  
The MoH is responsible for policy formulations and all stakeholders in the health sector 
are ultimately responsible to the MoH. The GHS established by the Ghana Health Service 
and Teaching Hospital Act 525, 1996, is responsible for all state health facilities except 
teaching hospitals and those owned by the military (Ministry of Health 2006). CHAG acts 
on behalf of 16 Christian churches who are involved in the provision of health care.  
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2.6.3.1 Policy framework 
The policy framework of the national health care system is focused on the core problems 
of the country. The government is determined to improve access and equity to essential 
health care and ensure that the health 
 
sector plays an essential role in the national Poverty 
Reduction Strategy. The strategic objective is to improve geographic, financial and socio-
cultural access, particularly to vulnerable groups, to quality health care services.  
2.6.3.2 Public 
Functionally, GHS is organized at five Levels (see Figure 2.19). The highest at the apex 
being the tertiary hospitals and the lowest are the community clinics. A relatively unique 
aspect of the public health system in Ghana is the Community- based Health Services and 
Planning (CHPS). Operationally, CHPS is defined as a “strategy for the health care 
delivery system to provide cost-effective and adequate quality basic primary health 
services to individuals and households in the communities where they live through 
engaging the community in the planning and delivery of services” (Nyonator 2004)8
 
. 
CHPS basically entails a nurse living in a defined community and offering limited 
curative and preventive health care services. Even though, CHPS is seen as a well tested 
strategy for reducing inequities and promoting geographical access to basic health care, 
its main challenge is the enormous resources required to roll out the strategy to all parts 
of the country. 
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Figure 2. 19: Organizational structure of Ghana health services delivery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6.3.3 Private 
In addition to the government health care system, churches play a major role in service 
provision. CHAG coordinates its programmes with the MoH and GHS. CHAG 
predominantly focus on the poorest and vulnerable groups who are mostly in the rural 
areas. Though it is an independent health organization, CHAG and GHS institutions are 
closely linked in rural health provision and are de facto fully integrated in the national 
health system with staff of CHAG institutions receiving their salaries from the MoH. 
There is no present competition between CHAG and GHS: A district or sub district has 
either a CHAG or a GHS health facility. CHAG is seen to be playing a complementary 
role to the MOH and the GHS and is the 2nd largest provider of health services in the 
country. It is estimated that approximately 42% of total health services in the country are 
provided by CHAG’s member institutions. 
Source: GHS 2007 
 Community (Health delivered through community health nurse, CHPS, outreach programmes, resident or itinerant herbalists, traditional birth attendants and/or retail drug peddlers) 
 
       Sub-districts (A health centre services a geographical area with 15 000 to 30 000 population. It provides basic curative care, disease prevention services and maternity services (primary health care). 
 
      Districts (A district hospital provides support to sub-districts in various respects including referral and emergencies and training etc) 
       Regional (provides specialized clinical and diagnostic care etc) 
       
  Tertiary 
 (Apex of the referral system) 
National (MoH/Ghana Health 
Service providing policy and 
strategic direction) 
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Other private health care providers include for-profit clinics which provide just 2% of 
health care and a significant number of chemical sellers and traditional healers which are 
mostly patronized by the poor in rural areas.  
2.6.4 Health facilities 
In Ghana, health facilities are public, private not for profit e.g. CHAG, and private self-
financing. Public facilities include the teaching hospitals and all GHS facilities (hospitals, 
polyclinics, health centres, health posts, CHPS compounds, small clinics), including the 
10 regional hospitals. Private facilities include hospitals, maternity homes, clinics and 
chemical sellers. Chemical sellers are more widely spread in rural communities and 
usually the first point of call. In the private sector, Greater Accra region has almost a 
quarter (24.8 per cent) of all private health facilities, with the Ashanti region following 
with 20 per cent. The Upper East region recorded the least (1.6%) private health facilities 
in the country in 2004. There are more health facilities (over 60%) and beds (over 70%) 
in Ashanti, Eastern, Volta, Western and Greater Accra regions than the rest of the regions 
in the country (see Tables 2.6 and 2.7) and this is understandable given the large 
population sizes in these areas (Ghana Health Service 2005).  
 
Table 2. 6: Regional Distribution of Health Facilities-2004 and relation to 
population distribution 
Region Population 
2000 
Teaching 
Hospital 
Regional 
hospitals 
Other 
facilities 
Total  
Western  1,924.577 0 1 310 311 
Central  1,593,823 0 1 263 264 
Greater Accra  2,905,726 1 1 308 310 
Volta  1,635,421 0 1 338 339 
Eastern 2,106,696 0 1 389 390 
Ashanti  3,612,950 1 0 445 446 
Brong Ahafo  1,815,408 0 1 250 251 
Northern  1,820,806 0 1 193 194 
Upper East  920,089 0 1 132 133 
Upper West  576,583 0 1 101 102 
Total 18,912,079 2 9 2,729 2,740 
Source: GHS 2005 
 
In terms of ownership of beds, government has over 50% of the beds capacity in the 
country (see Table 2.7).  
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Table 2. 7:  Distribution of Hospital beds by Region and Ownership - 2004 in 
relation to population distribution  
Region Population 
2000 
Government Mission Private/public Private Total  
Western 1,924.577 1,050 480 308 0 1,838 
Central 1,593,823 1,130 366 54 0 1,550 
G.Accra 2,905,726 2,871 0 759 593 4,223 
Volta 1,635,421 1,260 967 47 0 2,274 
Eastern 2,106,696 1,410 929 174 0 2,513 
Ashanti 3,612,950 1,769 1196 256 594 3,815 
B.Ahafo 1,815,408 384 1011 44 9 1,448 
Northern 1,820,806 722 339 0 0 1,061 
U.East 920,089 469 253 0 0 722 
U.West 576,583 346 336 0 0 682 
Total 18,912,079 11,411 5,877 1,642 1,196 20,126 
       Source: GHS 2005  
 
Available evidence shows that there has been a general increase in the number of health 
facilities in both the public and private sectors. The number of hospitals in the public 
sector increased from 251 in 1991 to 333 in 2001. For Greater Accra region, the number 
of hospitals almost doubled within the period, while the number of hospitals in Ashanti 
Region increased by a third. On the other hand, the number of hospitals in the Northern, 
Central, Volta and Upper East Regions remained almost the same over the period. With 
regard to health centres, significant increases in the numbers occurred in all regions. 
 
2.6.5 Human resources 
The provision of human resources in adequate quantity and with appropriate competence 
to provide health care services is critical in improving equity in access to health care 
services. Ghana is presently severely short of qualified human resources for health (GHS, 
2003). From the Annual Health Sector Review in 2006, the health sector has a workforce 
of about 43,000 people. The public sector employs about 41,000 of which 4.8% are 
medical doctors, 34.7% are nurses (including midwives), 3.3% are pharmacists and 
57.2% are non-clinical staff (Ghana Health Service 2007; GHS 2007). The issue here is 
the large number of non-clinical staff as against clinical staff in the health sector. The low 
numbers can be attributed partly to the low production levels of medical personnel by the 
available training institutions, which always fall short of annual requirements. In 2002, 
for instance, the medical training schools in Ghana produced only 159 physicians as 
against a higher potential demand of over 1,000. This situation is also exacerbated by the 
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high rates of emigration of trained doctors, inequitable distribution of staff and great 
disparities between the urban southern regions and the more rural northern ones. This has 
resulted in a very low level of medical personnel-to-population ratios in Ghana (Table 
2.8)  that can hardly support the optimal running of the present health system, let alone 
any scaled-up health system. For instance, the Ghana Service Provision Assessment 
estimated for the year 2002 a doctor to population of about 1: 8,554.   
  
Table 2. 8: Health Staff Population ratios 
Category of staff 2005 Target for 2010 
Doctors 1: 10,000 1: 5000 
Nurses 1:1,587 1: 1,000 
Pharmacists 1: 14,286 1: 10,000 
 
A review of the health sector in 2006, not only showed high health personnel-population 
ratios but marked and wide geographical disparity across the country. Whilst Greater 
Accra has 3 doctors to 10,000 people, Northern region has 1 doctor to 100,000 people 
(see Table 2.9). Greater Accra has already reached the 2010 target staff: population ratios 
for doctors, nurses and pharmacists (see Table 2.9). However, a visit to any health 
institution including Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital reveals a woefully inadequate number 
of staff on duty taking care of both outpatients and inpatients.  
 
Table 2. 9: Selected Health Staff: Population Ratio (both public and private) 2005 
Regions Doctors/10000 pop Nurse/10000 pop Pharmacists/10000 pop 
Western 0.5 4.4 0.2 
Central  0.4 5.9 0.2 
Greater Accra 3 12 2.6 
Volta 0.4 6.3 0.1 
Eastern 0.5 6.6 0.2 
Ashanti 1 4.1 0.6 
Brong Ahafo 0.4 3.4 0.1 
Northern 0.1 3.4 0.1 
Upper East 0.4 7.1 0.1 
Upper West 0.2 5.6 0.03 
Source: Health Sector Review 2006 
 
A key aspect of the supply of health personnel relates to spatial distribution. While 
doctors are mainly stationed in hospitals, the regional shares of doctors suggest a 
substantial mismatch between the number of hospitals and the number of doctors. For 
instance, Greater Accra region and Ashanti region have a little over half (55 per cent) of 
the hospitals (both public and private) in Ghana but have 69 per cent of doctors. On the 
other hand, Volta region with 8.9 per cent of Ghana’s hospitals has only 4.7 percent of 
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doctors and the three northern regions with 7.6 per cent of hospitals have only a total of 
5.1 per cent of doctors.  
 
Of late, the human resource problems seem to be compounded by a high rate of internal 
and external attrition. The public sector is losing large numbers of its health workers. The 
more serious threat seems to emanate from external attrition. The situation is no different 
with other health workers such as nurses, pharmacists and laboratory technicians. The 
State of the Ghanaian Economy Report notes that 68 per cent of medical officers, trained 
between 1993 and 2000, have left the country (Institute of Statistical Social and 
Economic Research 2008). The major beneficiaries of Ghana’s loss of medical personnel 
include the United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK), Germany and 
Canada. The USA, for instance, is estimated to be employing 1,200 physicians of 
Ghanaian origin; whilst the United Kingdom has about 300 doctors , South Africa 150 
and Canada 50 (Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research 2008). Ironically, 
there seem to be more Ghanaian doctors working outside the country than inside Ghana. 
 
Not only is Ghana losing medical doctors but also nurses. The attrition of nurses reached 
alarming proportions during the past 8 years (see Table 2.10). It is estimated that Ghana 
has lost about 50% of its professional nurses to the UK, USA and Canada in the last 10 
years. The available records show that about 530 nurses left Ghana in 2002 compared to 
328 in 1999.  
 
Table 2. 10: Migration and Destination of Ghanaian Nurses  
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
USA 50 42 44 129 81 80 426 
UK 97 265 646 738 405 317 2468 
Canada  12 13 26 46 33 10 140 
South Africa 9 4 3 2 6 - 24 
Others 4 4 8 8 5 - 29 
Total 172 328 727 923 530 407 3087 
Source: Health Sector Review 2006 
 
The increasing outflow of medical personnel has worsened the already precarious human 
resource situation and created a human resource gap in the health sector, which does not 
auger well for equitable access and sustainability of the health system. 
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2.6.6 Utilisation of health services 
The rate of utilization of health services (from public and CHAG institutions) by the 
population provides some insights in service accessibility. Since 2000, the utilization of 
OPD services has increased as shown by the total OPD attendances as well as the 
attendances per capita (see Figure 2.20).  Total OPD attendances rose from 12,233,527 in 
2006 to 15,712,070 in 2007. This amounts to a 28.4% increase over the 2006 
performance.  During this period the attendance per capita increased from 0.55 to 0.69, 
representing a 25.5% increase (Ghana Health Service 2007).  This represents the highest 
annual increase. Much of this remarkable achievement is attributable to the national 
health insurance scheme. It is believed that the implementation of the NHIS in 2004 has 
removed a significant financial barrier to access to services but it is important to know 
who is bearing the burden of this financing mechanism.  
 
Figure 2. 20: Total OPD Attendance and Attendance per Capita, 2000-2007 
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Analysis of regional performance in terms of service utilisation shows wide variations. 
While the Brong-Ahafo region attained attendance per capita above 1.0, the performance 
in the Northern region is just above 0.3. Indeed the Northern region is the only region that 
has shown very little progress in the utilisation of OPD services during the last 6 years. 
During this period attendance per capita in this region has not risen above 0.3 (see Figure 
2.21).  There are still significant barriers to utilisation of health services in the Northern 
Region. Occupying about 30% of the land area of the country, many of the over 5,000 
settlements in the region are simply too far from health facilities.  This situation is not 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
 43 
helped by the poor road network within the region. CHPS must be vigorously promoted 
to address the issue of inadequate geographical access while the other sectors including 
the District Assemblies address the challenges facing implementation of the Health 
Insurance and improvement in the road network.    
 
Figure 2. 21: Trend in Per Capita OPD Attendance by Region, 2003-2007. 
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Source: GHS 2008 
 
The Bed Occupancy Rate (BOR) in any hospital, within a specified time frame, 
represents the proportion of the beds available in the facility that were occupied by 
patients during that period. It is a measure of efficiency of the hospitals operations. The 
Average Length Of Stay (ALOS) on the other hand is affected by the disease pattern as 
well as the quality of interventions.  A bed occupancy rate of below 80% is an indication 
that the available beds are being under-utilised and implies technical inefficiency (Akazili, 
Adjuik et al. 2008). The Greater Accra region reported 73.4% occupancy while the Brong-
Ahafo Region reported 66.5% in 2007 (see Table 2.11). The other regions all reported 
below 60% occupancy. In Table 2.9 below, the Teaching and Psychiatric Hospitals have 
been excluded.  The Teaching Hospitals tend to handle more complicated cases referred 
from other facilities and this increases the duration of hospitalisation while the 
Psychiatric Hospitals and other specialised hospitals also deal with cases that tend to stay 
for longer periods. For example, in 2007 if data from the Teaching Hospitals and 
Psychiatric Hospitals are included, the ALOS for the Ashanti region increased from 3.7 to 
4.8 days, that of the Greater Accra increased from 4.7 to 11.2 days, while the national 
figure saw an increased from 4.1 to 5.2 days. 
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Table 2. 11: Bed Occupancy Rates (BOR) and Average Length of Stay (ALOS) in 
Public Hospitals (excluding Teaching and Psychiatric Hospitals), 2005-2007 
 
Region 2005 2006 2007 
BOR ALOS BOR ALOS BOR ALOS 
Ashanti 47.6 3.7 44.3 3.4 52.1 3.7 
B/Ahafo 57.5 4.5 55.3 4.0 66.5 3.9 
Central  50.2 4.0 46.2 3.8 50.7 3.9 
Eastern 50.3 4.7 50.7 4.9 54.3 5.0 
GAR 54.7 4.0 57.6 4.2 73.4 4.7 
Northern 60.8 3.1 49.0 3.5 55.1 3.0 
U/ East 45.9 3.0 41.1 3.1 45.9 3.0 
U/West 52.1 3.4 43.2 3.6 53.5 3.7 
Volta 45.3 5.6 46.3 5.6 50.6 5.7 
Western 51.9 4.2 49.4 4.1 48.7 3.9 
Total 50.9 4.1 48.4 4.1 54.4 4.1 
 
 
2.7 Summary 
Located on the west coast of West Africa, with a tropical climate, Ghana has a population 
of about 21 million which is growing at 2.5%. Ghana was the first Sub-Saharan Africa 
country to gain independence in 1957. Compared to other neighbouring countries, 
Ghana’s economy has seen some impressive growth, with GDP increasing from 3.7% in 
2000 to 6.8% in 2008; but the results of the growth is not fairly distributed as geographic 
and socio-economic equalities are wide with the Gini coefficient estimated at 40.9% in 
2008. Wide regional variations in poverty are also observed with the north having higher 
poverty than the south.  
 
The main source of health sector financing is taxation, but OOP payments are very 
significant. The National health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), launched in 2004 to replace 
user fees or “cash and carry”, is mainly funded through tax and is increasingly becoming 
a significant financing mechanism. Government expenditure on health has seen some 
increases over the years and the country seems to have reached the Abuja target of 
allocating 15% of government revenue to health; however over 80% of the increase has 
gone to wages and salaries leaving a small share for service delivery. 
 
Health status in Ghana is generally poor. Life expectancy is less than 60 years and a high 
and increasing maternal mortality is a source of concern as the MDGs target date draws 
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closer. Infant and under 5 mortality is also high and particularly so among the poor. 
Malaria and upper respiratory tract infections are the top reasons for OPD services.  
 
The key players in the health sector are the Ministry of Health which formulates policy, 
the Ghana Health Service which provides over 50% of services and the Christian Health 
Association of Ghana that provides about 42% of health care. For-profit clinics and a 
significant number of chemical sellers are also in operation in the country, as well as 
traditional healers.  
 
The location of health facilities in Ghana is a reflection of colonial health care policy 
where most of the health facilities were located in the urban areas. Despite efforts to 
provide more health facilities in rural areas after independence in line with Primary 
Health Care policy, over 60% of formal health care facilities are  currently based in the 
urban areas and so naturally most of the health professionals are also based there resulting 
in wide geographical disparity in health profession-population ratio. The staffing problem 
in the country is further compounded by high attrition of key health staff (doctors and 
nurses) particularly through emigration. The burden of health care provision is thus left 
on the few staff remaining who are over-burdened by recent increases in health service 
utilization.  
 
The Ghanaian health system faces major challenges, not least of all constrained resources 
(financial and human) to meet a substantial burden of ill-health.  
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Chapter Three: Literature Review 
 
“The mistakes of others are the lessons for only the wise”  
A Ghanaian proverb 
 
3.0 Introduction 
This section reviews the relevant literature for the study.  Although I did not undertake a 
formal systematic review, I comprehensively searched the literature on health care 
financing with respect to low- and middle-income countries through key electronic search 
engines (including PubMed, CINAHL and Medline) and a search of relevant websites 
(including World Bank, WHO, ID21). The review of literature is to give a general 
perspective and context to the study. As this research evaluates equity in health care 
financing, this review focuses on explaining the concept of equity and critically 
reviewing alternative health financing mechanisms.  
 
3.1 Equity9
According to Mooney, the notion of equity is not straightforward and often is complex to 
define (Mooney 1994) and may even mean different things to different people in different 
societies at different times. This may be the reason why McLachlan and Maynard (1982), 
suggested that “… equity like beauty, is in the mind of the beholder..” (Wagstaff and van 
Doorslaer 2000). Given the different perspectives on the concept of equity, it is 
sometimes erroneously confused with equality. Equality is a condition of being equal. 
The distinction is important because being unequal may be judged to be fair or equitable 
(McIntyre 1997). Thus, equity can be viewed as a moral or ethical principle, which refers 
to fairness and justice in the distribution of resources, welfare and opportunities among 
different sub-groups of a population. Hence inequity implies that there are unfair 
disparities in the resource and welfare distribution. 
 
 
Since the interpretation of fairness and justice in any given society is influenced to a large 
extent by the ideology of that society, it would be useful to consider briefly some theories 
of justice and fairness which often shape a society’s ideological perspectives. Gillon 
(1986) provides a helpful summary of the various theories of justice and fairness. 
 
                                                   
9 Robert McNamara (when he was head of the World Bank) stated that “the pursuit of growth and financial 
adjustment without a reasonable concern for equity is ultimately socially destabilizing’’(WHO, 2000) 
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Rawls’ (1971 pp 23) theory of justice provides one perspective for assessing what is fair 
and/or just. According to Rawls (1971): 
  “in order to achieve impartiality, individuals should be placed behind a ‘veil of 
ignorance’ such that they did not know what their own position in society would be. They 
were then asked which sort of society they will choose to live in. The society that emerges 
is one which gives the greatest advantage to the least well off in society”  
Thus the impartiality here has led to ‘maximising’ of the ‘minimum’ position and it is 
arrived at through the impartiality created by the ‘veil of ignorance’, the so-called ‘maxi-
min’ solution (Mooney 1994). This theory was criticised by later writers. Taylor (1989), 
quoted in Mooney (1994, p.68) notes that even though Rawls’ theory of the ‘veil of 
ignorance’ represented a breakthrough in thinking about a just society which particularly 
suggests giving priority to the less fortunate in society, the theory is silent on the other 
groups in society. In the context of health, the theory might suggest that the most severely 
ill should be given priority but it does not say to what extent they should be given priority 
and at what cost to the general society. Despite the criticism, the fact remains that in 
societies where there are daunting inequalities like in the USA and most parts of Africa 
(Martinez-Vazquez 2004; Odaga 2004; Cissé, Luchinia et al. 2007), there is need to 
discriminate unequally (but equitably) in favour of the needy in the allocation of health 
care services.  
 
Libertarians on the other hand emphasize a respect for natural laws based on two of 
Lockes’ natural rights10
 
 in their theory of justice and fairness (Mooney 1994). To them, 
everyone is entitled to what they have provided that they acquired it justly (Mooney 
1994). This theory epitomizes a capitalist system and may mean that those who have are 
under no obligation to give to the less fortunate in society. In terms of health, the 
Libertarians advocate the distribution of health care based on ability to pay with state 
involvement limited to a minimum package for the vulnerable. The classical market 
mechanism according to the Libertarians is the just and fair means of distributing 
resources and opportunities to all. To the libertarians (e.g. Nozick, 1974) taxation is 
warranted only to maintain minimal state activities.  
The Egalitarian perspective emphasizes equal net welfare for all individuals. Indeed, this 
is the strictest definition of equality and would imply an equal share of opportunities and 
                                                   
10 The rights to life (i.e. not to be unjustly killed) and possessions 
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resources to all in a society (McIntyre 1997). Marx added a new angle to this by 
highlighting the importance of needs in the distribution of resources and opportunities. To 
him, the need level of the individuals or groups in society should be the yardstick for the 
distributions of resources and opportunities. In terms of health too, Marxian ideology 
favours health systems which distribute health care services according to need and are 
financed according to ability to pay within the common principle of ‘from each according 
to his/her ability and to each according to his/her need’. It should however be noted that 
this theory of distribution according to need is not exclusive to Marx but is a key 
component of the twentieth-century Egalitarian ideology  
 
Different people will subscribe to different theories of justice (Rawls, Libertarian, 
Egalitarian, Marxist, etc.) and this will influence how they define equity and equity in 
health.  
 
3.2. Equity in health  
Equity in health has been conceptualized and defined in many ways. For instance, the 
International Society for Equity in Health (ISEqH), defines equity in health as “the 
absence of systematic and potentially remediable differences in one or more aspect of 
health across population subgroups defined socially, economically, demographically or 
geographically” (Starfield 2001; Macinko and Starfield 2002). According to Whitehead 
(1992) equity in health implies that ideally everyone should have a fair opportunity to 
attain their full health potential and more pragmatically, that none should be 
disadvantaged from achieving this potential if it can be avoided. Common to these 
definitions of equity in health is the idea that certain health differences are unjust and 
unfair. Thus policy for equity in health is not to eliminate all health differences so that 
everyone has the same level and quality of health but rather to reduce or eliminate those 
differences that result from factors that are considered not only unjust and unfair but 
unnecessary and avoidable (Whitehead 1992).  
 
The fundamental concern about justice and fairness raises the issue of how justice and 
fairness is to be determined. Whitehead (1992) proposes criteria to assess which health 
inequalities or differences are unjust and unfair and are deemed inequitable (Whitehead 
1992). According to her, health inequalities due to inherent biological variations and 
freely chosen health damaging behaviour may not be considered inequitable because, 
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they are either unavoidable or “fair” However, health differences such as those arising 
from inadequate access to health and social services, exposure to damaging health 
behaviours not based on informed choices as well as exposure to unhealthy living and 
working conditions, that are potentially remediable are seen as  unfair and thus constitute 
health inequities (Whitehead 1992; Whitehead, Dahlgren et al. 2001). Clearly, inequities 
are generally seen as differences in health which are not only unnecessary and avoidable, 
but are considered unfair and unjust (Whitehead 1992; Liu, Hsiao et al. 1999; Whitehead, 
Dahlgren et al. 2001; McIntyre and Gilson 2002). The concern of equity of health is thus, 
the creation of equal opportunities for health and bringing health differentials down to the 
lowest level possible (Whitehead 1992).  
 
Among the various theories, and definitions of distributive justice and fairness that might 
be brought to bear on equity in health, it is generally agreed that some have a greater 
applicability and acceptability than others. Many writers have argued for instance, that 
among the various distributive principles proposed by philosophers in the context of 
equity, the egalitarian (as opposed to the libertarian) notion that health care ought to be 
distributed according to need commands the greatest support among policy makers, 
health professionals and the public at large (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer et al. 1999; Van 
Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al. 2000; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003). Recent debates on 
equity of health have also pointed to the fact that, in addition to distributional justice of 
health care resources, fair procedures in deciding on the distribution is also critical to the 
success of equity in health outcomes. This is what is commonly known as procedural 
justice.  
 
From the above discussion, two distinct approaches to equity in health can be identified, 
horizontal and vertical equity. Horizontal equity requires the like treatment of like 
individuals and vertical equity requires the unlike treatment of unlike individuals in 
relation to the differences between them (Whitehead 1992; Culyer 2001). Put differently, 
those in greater need for instance should receive greater attention and resources. In many 
health systems including Ghana, equity strategies often focus on achieving horizontal 
equity in health care delivery (e.g. “equal access to all” proposed in the National health 
Insurance design). Even though there is some logic in pursuing horizontal equity, recent 
debates highlight the fact that most developing countries with histories of daunting 
inequalities could not achieve significant equity in outcome through horizontal equity. In 
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this respect vertical equity goals in both health delivery and financing are proposed as the 
way forward for accelerated achievement of equity for countries plagued with wide 
inequalities like Brazil, South Africa, the USA and to a lesser extent Ghana. 
Undoubtedly, there are challenges in pursuing this noble goal (vertical equity) and these 
relate to how to identify the poor or the needy for positive discrimination and also the 
political will to pursue vertical equity goals. 
 
Mooney (1994) has emphasised the fact that vertical equity should receive more attention 
as a health policy goal. According to him "if, as is normally the case, ill health is not 
randomly distributed across different groups in society, might that society not want to 
give preference, on vertical equity grounds, for health gains to those groups in that 
societies which are on average in poor health” (Mooney 1994). This conforms to what 
Rawls (1971) pointed out in his ‘behind the veil’ theory and it implies that it is not 
enough to treat those groups with the poorest status in the same way as others within the 
population even though this may be fairer than the status quo (McIntyre and Gilson 
2002). In this vein, the very disadvantaged ought to be specifically catered for in health 
policy formulation so as to even out the historical disadvantage faced by the group 
through the promotion of equity in access, utilisation and more importantly the financing 
of health care. 
 
The fundamental question resulting from the discussion of equity and equity in health is 
“why is equity and equity in health so important?” In other words, why is there the need 
to pursue equity goals? From a pragmatic point of view equity goals are not only ethical 
but morally right. A fair and just distribution of resources and opportunities to all could 
promote political and socio-economic stability in a country. For instance, soaring crime 
rates in Latin America and Africa in recent years have been attributed to failure to 
consider the effects of uncontrolled free-market reforms on vulnerable social groups, 
along with the associated dismantling and privatization of many state institutions 
(Braveman and Tarimo 2002). According to the WHO (2005), inequities in health negate 
economic growth and productivity and further worsen poverty (WHO/HTM/TDR 2004). 
For example, malnutrition and poor health decrease worker productivity (ibid). Another 
pragmatic argument for equity in health that may only appeal to the self-interest of the 
privileged groups is to avoid spillover effects of poor health among the disadvantaged. 
Given contemporary population density and mobility, neglect of infectious disease 
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control, jeopardizes the health of the more affluent as well as that of the poor who 
provide services for them in their homes, shops and restaurants (Braveman and Tarimo 
2002). Thus, equity in health care requires a humane and equitable health care financing 
mechanism that will provide adequate access to quality health care for all the population 
especially the poor.  
 
3.3 Equity in health care financing 
Policy statements on equity in health care financing generally agree on the fact that health 
care payment should be related to the ability to pay rather than the need for care or use of 
medical facilities (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer et al. 1999; Rannan-Eliya, Pande et al. 2001; 
Abu-Zaineh, Matari et al. 2008). This can be interpreted in terms of vertical equity such 
that individuals or households of unequal ability to pay make appropriately dissimilar 
payments for health care, and in terms of horizontal equity that individuals or families 
with the same ability to pay should make the same payment. 
 
In examining the problem of vertical equity (which is the main focus of the current 
study), consideration has to be given to the precise form that the differential treatment of 
unequals should take. Should those with the greater ability to pay be paying more as a 
proportion of their income? In other words, should the relationship between ability to 
pay11
                                                   
11 Traditionally, income and/or consumption expenditure estimates, sometimes adjusted for size and age 
structure using an appropriate equivalence scale is often used to measure ATP but in data poor economies 
like Ghana, these methods would be supplemented by measures of socio-economic status (SES) using 
composite asset indices (McIntyre et al. 2002). A detailed discussion of the ability to pay measurement is 
presented in the methodology section.  
 and payments for health care be progressive? Or should they merely be paying 
more in absolute terms? In other words, can the relationship between ability to pay and 
payments be proportional or even regressive (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003; 
O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008)? If the relationship is to be regressive, how 
regressive should it be? What are the factors influencing the incidence of health care 
financing? Answers to these questions, are relevant for improving equity goals in health 
care financing. The study attempts to evaluate the degree of progressivity as well as 
factors influencing the progressivity of existing health care financing mechanisms and to 
consider future policy for these options. As mentioned in chapter one this study takes the 
position of vertical equity (i.e. advocating for a progressive financing regime) in health 
care financing and this is from the background of the fact that there is already existing 
entrenched inequity in health care financing and service access in the country and so this 
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is the most appropriate means of effectively and speedily achieving equity gains as it 
recognizes that different people have different starting points and so must be treated 
differently (Mooney 1996; McIntyre, Muirhead et al. 2002; Mills 2007). 
 
One generally accepted way of examining equity in health care financing is to look at the 
relative progressivity of the health care financing mechanisms (general tax, social health 
insurance, private insurance, out-of-pocket and community based health insurance) 
individually and collectively. Most studies on equity in health care financing or 
progressivity of health care financing to date have focused on the first four health care 
financing strategies (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008; Yu, Whynes et al. 2008; Yates 
2009)  and this is so because most studies on equity in health care financing have been 
carried out in the high and middle income countries whose health systems are financed by 
a mixture of two or more of the four methods (general tax, social health insurance, private 
health insurance and out-of-pocket payment).  
 
The current study is unique in three ways. First, it will be the first time a comprehensive 
study on equity in health care financing is being undertaken in Anglophone SSA and 
particularly in Ghana12
 
. Secondly, the study will critically and comprehensively evaluate 
the factors influencing the relative progressivity of health care financing which is not 
often investigated in equity in health care financing studies but which is fundamental to 
tackling the problems of inequities in health care financing. Finally, the study would 
examine in addition to the first four financing methods, community-based health 
insurance which is a growing health care financing strategy in SSA.  
 3.3.1 Measurement of equity of health care financing  
There are a number of ways of measuring the incidence of health care financing. One 
method is based on the tabulations of total contributions to health care financing relative 
to income across socio-economic groups (Hurst 1992). The method produces useful static 
data that can indicate whether a financing strategy is progressive, regressive or 
proportional. This method could be complemented by the progressivity index method.  
 
                                                   
12 Similar comprehensive analysis is also being undertaken in South Africa and Tanzania 
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The most widely tested progressivity indices that was employed in this study include the 
concentration and Kakwani indices. The concentration index (C) is an index of 
distribution of payments (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer et al. 1999). It is restricted to a range 
of (-1 to 1). A negative value indicates that the poor contribute a larger proportional share 
than the rich (i.e. regressive) and positive value indicates the rich contribute a larger 
proportional share than the poor (i.e. progressive). A value of zero indicates the same 
proportional payment for both the rich and the poor (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 
2008). The Kakwani index (see details in the methodology section) of progressivity is 
based on the extent to which a tax system or any of the financing mechanism departs 
from proportionality. It is defined as twice the area between a payment concentration 
curve and a Lorenz curve. A negative number implies regressivity, i.e. the poor make 
higher health care payment as a proportion of their income than the rich and a positive 
number indicate progressivity, i.e. the vice versa (Kakwani 1977). A zero Kakwani index 
implies proportionality, i.e. equal health care payments as a proportion of incomes 
between the rich and poor (Kakwani 1977).  
 
The two methods were employed to draw inference on the burden or incidence of health 
care financing in Ghana. An advantage of using the Kakwani index is that it controls for 
the distribution of income or consumption expenditure, which is a key variable when it 
comes to defining how regressive or progressive a financing mechanism is. 
 
 Ability to pay or socio-economic status (see details in the methodology section) will be 
measured using consumption, expenditure or income and this will be complemented by 
asset index measurement. This is so because direct incomes are difficult to collect in data 
poor and largely informal labour economies like Ghana. Also the consumption or 
expenditure methods have been widely used in similar studies (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer 
et al. 1999; Younger, Sahn et al. 1999; Cissé, Luchinia et al. 2007; O'Donnell, van 
Doorslaer et al. 2008; Yu, Whynes et al. 2008). 
 
3.4 Health care financing mechanisms 
Before attempting to measure the health care financing burden, it is important to briefly 
evaluate each of the health care financing strategies from an equity perspective, drawing 
on international experience and related literature. 
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3.4.1 General tax revenue and equity 
Paying for services through government revenue is made possible through general tax. It 
is the oldest and most popular method of mobilising revenue for financing various sectors 
of a country including the health sector. It is particularly important in the funding of 
preventive, environmental and other health services which have public good 
characteristics (McIntyre 1997). General tax is broadly made up of direct and indirect tax. 
 
Direct taxes are taxes levied on income earnings (personal income tax-PIT and company 
income tax -CIT) and wealth (property tax-PT). Direct tax such as PIT tends to be 
progressive. However, the degree of progressivity can vary significantly between 
countries depending on the nature of the structure and rates of the tax. Direct tax 
progressivity also depends on the proportion of the population falling within each taxable 
income stratum (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer et al. 1999). For instance in low income 
countries such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka the poorest13
 
 20% of households make 
virtually no contribution to direct taxes but the richest fifth contribute more than 90% of 
the direct tax revenue (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). This makes the direct tax of 
these countries more progressive than China where direct tax paid by the poorest fifth of 
households is significant due to an agricultural tax which is concentrated on the poor that 
outweighs the effect of PIT paid mainly by the rich (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 
2008). It has been revealed that poor countries (Nepal, Bangladesh and Kyrgyz), with a 
narrow tax base make less use of direct tax compared to richer countries such as Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and South Korea (EQUITAP 2005). 
Indirect taxes14 on the other hand are taxes levied on consumption goods. Indirect taxes15 
tend to be regressive particularly taxes such as sales, value added taxes (VAT), excise16
                                                   
13 Probably due to the fact that they do not earn income and have no property 
, 
and import taxes. For example, the study by Wagstaff and others (1999) of certain high-
income countries finds that indirect taxes are regressive (the burden of the taxes is 
14 Some of these taxes include general sales tax (GST), value added tax (VAT), custom and excise, import 
duty, etc. 
15 They could also have mixed redistributional impact depending on the tax base, rates, exemptions, and 
exclusions 
16 The distributional impact of excise taxes depends strongly on the consumption patterns by income group. 
For example, one study in Madagascar found that car and petrol taxes were strongly progressive, alcohol 
taxes appear quite progressive in most cases, and even tobacco taxes were reasonably progressive due the 
price elasticity facing these goods (Gottret and Schieber 2006). However, tobacco taxes in other country 
settings have been found to be regressive, because the poor spend larger shares of their more limited 
household incomes on tobacco than the rich (ibid) 
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concentrated on low-income groups) in all countries in the sample. This is consistent with 
the notion that indirect taxes are mostly taxes on consumption, and because low-income 
groups spend more of their income on consumption than high-income groups, their tax 
payments are also proportionally higher (Gottret and Scheiber 2006). In an earlier 
comparative study of European countries, only Portugal and Spain were found to have a 
progressive indirect tax. The main reason is that these two countries have relatively high 
tax rates on luxury goods, which are mostly consumed by the privileged.  However, in a 
recent comparative study of Asian countries, all the countries except Japan have 
progressive indirect taxes reflected by positive Kakwani indices (EQUITAP 2005). In 
eight of the countries however, the Kakwani indices are very close to zero indicating 
proportionality. The reason for the significant progressivity of indirect taxes in some of 
these countries is due to exemption of food from tax and the propensity of poor 
households to consume products sold in small local markets that are not subject to 
indirect tax. 
  
Putting the direct and indirect taxes together, general tax tends to be a progressive 
financing source (McIntyre 1997). However, the degree of progressivity of general tax 
depends to a large extent on the progressivity of its component parts (direct and indirect 
taxes) and their relative share of total tax revenue. If direct tax, which is often typically 
progressive, forms a large component of overall tax, then general tax can be progressive. 
On the other hand if indirect tax, which tends to be regressive, is given stronger emphasis 
in the overall tax system then the tax burden can be regressive (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer 
et al. 1999; Cissé, Luchinia et al. 2007; O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008) 
 
Given the fact that general tax usually tends to be a progressive source of health care 
financing, especially in high income economies, many believe that general tax as a health 
care financing mechanism, could be a source through which universal access to health 
care could be achieved. The poor could be protected from financial shocks associated 
with large health care costs through general tax financing. Since health services fully 
funded from tax do not involve payment at the point of access, financial accessibility of 
health care services could be high (Bennett and Gilson 2000). If general tax financing is 
to improve equity in access, there would be a need for commitment to channeling more 
resources from general tax to the areas that are in high need. However in middle and low 
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income countries with a limited tax base, it is difficult to increase resources from this 
source (Hay 2003). 
 
In many of these countries, a high percentage of the population is in the informal sector 
(e.g., more than 60% of Ghanaians are in the informal labour market) and so direct 
taxation through payroll deduction is quite limited. It is also not advisable to increase 
direct taxes as this would overburden workers who already have many deductions on 
their pay cheques and could even create a disincentive to work. Neither is it appropriate 
to increase indirect taxes, especially on goods consumed by the poor as this would 
worsen their plight and may even push them into severe poverty with long term effects on 
growth and productivity (Normand 1999; McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005; Obermann, Jowett 
et al. 2006) 
 
One way of increasing tax revenue is to improve tax compliance. It is well known that 
many people in Africa evade tax and even tax officials connive with people to evade 
taxes and so there is a lot of leakage in revenue mobilisation through tax (Younger 1996). 
Strengthening the tax system would result in increased revenue which if channeled to the 
health sector could greatly improve access in health care. There is a recognition that 
improvement in the ‘fiscal space’ by expanding or increasing government revenue could 
result in more resources also coming to the health sector (Younger 1996; Hay 2003). This 
is a challenge to many developing countries including Ghana. 
 
Another problem in relying on tax revenue as a health care financing strategy is the large 
debt burden on developing countries particularly in Africa. African countries received 
some $540 billion in loans between 1970 to 2002 and despite paying back close to $550 
billion in principal and interest, the continent stills owes over $200 billion and this is the 
biggest obstacle to its development. Most of this debt is illegimate, having been incurred 
by despotic and unrepresentative regimes. What is disturbing is that African governments 
spend almost $14 billion annually on debt services. Other words, many African countries 
use up to 20% or more of annual government budget to service debt instead of channeling 
this to important areas like the health sector. For instance Ethiopia’s total debt is slightly 
more than 100% of its GDP and the recent Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
initiative provided Ethiopia with only $50million which is less than 1% of her GDP 
(McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005). The debt burden means that many African countries in a 
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similar debt situation to Ethiopia may not be able to even maintain current funding to the 
health sector. Perhaps the recent debt relief initiative by the G8 to cancel 100% of debts 
to the IMF, World Bank (IDA) and African Development Bank, may be promising but 
this has not been far reaching enough and even the condition of spreading the debt to 40 
years does not bring the needed relief to poor countries (McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005; 
Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research 2008).  
 
Yet again the problem of wars and conflict especially in African countries such as Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Eritrea and Côte D’Ivoire diverts huge amounts of government resources to the 
acquisition of ammunitions and thereby denying the health sector needed resources from 
general tax revenue (Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 2002). Some 
developing countries that are not even in conflict situations (that is not to say those in 
conflict situations should spend more on defence than on health) devote more than twice 
the amount of tax revenue to defence as they do to the health sector (McIntyre, Gilson et 
al. 2005)  
 
Given these pressures on general tax revenue especially in Africa and given the fact that 
many African countries are yet to even obtain the Abuja target17
 
 of allocating 15% of 
government revenue to the health sector, the prospects of increasing health sector funding 
from general tax revenue is limited. It is in this vein that alternative health care financing 
mechanisms such as mandatory health insurance and other pre-payment schemes are 
being considered in many parts of Africa. 
3.4.2 Social health Insurance and equity 
As stated earlier, the term Social Health Insurance (SHI) is often used interchangeably 
with National Health Insurance (NHI). Indeed, both terms refer to health insurance that 
has a legal requirement for people to become members and benefit from a package of 
health services. Some distinguish between the terms SHI as being legally compulsory for 
a particular group of people (e.g., formal sector workers), while NHI is legally universal 
                                                   
17 A meeting of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Abuja, 
Nigeria from 26-27 April 2001, at a Special Summit devoted specifically to address the exceptional 
challenges of HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Other Related Infectious Diseases at the invitation of H.E. 
President Olusegun Obasanjo of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In this extraordinary meeting, the Heads 
of State and Government pledged among other things to allocate at least 15% of annual government budget 
to the improvement of the health sector. 
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and covers all the people (e.g., formal and informal sectors) and government subsidizes 
contributions especially for the indigent (McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005). The common 
characteristic of SHI and NHI is that they are mandatory health insurance schemes and 
are based on risk-sharing and a spirit of solidarity. A key principle of SHI and NHI is that 
there should be separation and definition of the roles or functions of the purchaser, 
provider and regulator. Clear separations and definitions the roles are key for an effective 
and efficient SHI and NHI that could progress towards universal coverage. Ghana seeks 
to combine SHI and CBHI to form the NHI. In this section, I will mainly use the term 
SHI, irrespective of population coverage by the scheme. 
 
The history of SHI dates back to the medieval period (1300s) where small groups of 
workers created mutual assistance associations under the auspices of their craft guild 
(Carrin and James 2004). However, modern SHI is generally believed to have started in 
1883 in Germany (Van Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al. 2000; Bärnighausen and Sauerborn 
2002; McIntyre, Doherty et al. 2003; World Health Organization 2005). It was in 1883 
that Bismarck (the then Chancellor of Germany) legislated and made SHI compulsory for 
workers earning less than specified amounts (Bärnighausen and Sauerborn 2002). Other 
European countries (e.g., the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, Italy, Portugal, etc) 
took Germany’s lead. Latin American countries (Columbia, Argentina, Chile etc) also 
have extensive experience in SHI. SHI has long been in place in many Asian countries 
too (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, Japan etc). 
The Middle East as well as North Africa also has some level of SHI. In North America, 
Canada has experience in SHI. Australia is also a country with a wealth of experience in 
SHI.  
 
It is evident from the literature that SHI has been in the world for well over a century but 
it is quite a new phenomenon in SSA. Even though there are a number of social security 
schemes in Africa particularly West Africa, SHI is quite limited in SSA (McIntyre, 
Doherty et al. 2003). South Africa has been ‘struggling’ for the past two decades to 
introduce SHI but not much has been achieved to date (ibid). Zimbabwe has also 
considered introducing SHI in its health care system. Indeed, Kenya was the first country 
in SSA to introduce some compulsory health insurance in the form of SHI and this was 
followed by Tanzania. Ghana is the latest African country to introduce a compulsory 
health insurance to the formal sector and is extending this to the informal sector 
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(McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005). Nigeria, Togo and Côte D’Ivoire are also at various 
planning stages of introducing SHI. Even though SHI is quite new in SSA, it is spreading 
fast and with the support of the WHO, World Bank and other international organisations, 
SHI and other forms of health insurance could be replacing user fees in many countries. 
 
There are varied reasons for the interest in SHI as an alternative health care financing 
strategy. The major motivation for the introduction of SHI in many developed and 
developing countries is to generate additional revenue to augment the shortfall in tax 
based funding in health care (Ensor 1995; Bennett, Creese et al. 1998; Kutzin 1998; 
Normand 1999; Bärnighausen and Sauerborn 2002; McIntyre, Doherty et al. 2003; 
Schneider 2005; World Health Organization 2005). In Germany for instance, generation 
of “new money” was a major reason for SHI as well as in Latin American countries.  
 
Another motivation for SHI is the fact that the flow of funds to the health sector is visible. 
In this way, people are more willing to contribute because they see a clear link between 
contribution and the benefits they receive. This is different from general tax revenue 
where the health sector’s share of resources is subject to political decisions. For instance 
in Germany, the SHI contributions are clearly linked to the benefit package 
(Bärnighausen and Sauerborn 2002). There is visibility of the funds.  
 
Patients’ rights as consumers of health services are also greatly enhanced under SHI 
compared with tax financing. This is because, with tax financing, health care is often 
viewed as being offered free to the point that providers sometimes feel they are doing 
patients a favour (Obermann, Jowett et al. 2006). With SHI, especially if there is active 
purchasing of health care services, providers tend to respect patients as customers.  
 
Other objectives of introducing SHI in both developed and developing countries could be 
to promote equity and sustain the financing of health services. SHI can promote equity if 
contributions are progressive or even proportional such that people pay contributions 
according to their levels of income. Sliding scale payment instead of a flat rate would 
ensure that the rich and healthy contribute to the health care of the poor and sick. Another 
way of promoting equity under SHI is the subsidization of the contributions of the poor. 
This would also ensure that the vulnerable who cannot afford health care are covered. 
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The use of risk-equalization18
 
 in the case of multiple schemes would also enhance equity 
under SHI. The promotion of equity is particularly important in developing countries and 
countries with vast income inequalities and this often shapes the framework of SHI. 
Equity in SHI is critical if SHI is to result in universal coverage as in Germany, Japan, 
Israel, Denmark, Costa Rica and many other countries (Carrin and James 2004).  
SHI can be a progressive19
 
 and equitable health care financing mechanism, at least in the 
countries that rely heavily on this funding mechanism (Atim 1998; Bennett, Creese et al. 
1998; Bärnighausen and Sauerborn 2002). Under SHI, health care services are paid for 
through contributions to a health fund. The most common basis of contributions is the 
payroll with contributions from the employer and the employee (Bärnighausen and 
Sauerborn 2002). However, the absence or presence of a cap on maximum contributions 
and structure of contributions (i.e., flat or proportional rate) influence to some extent the 
degree of progressivity of SHI in a country  (McIntyre 1997; Gottret and Scheiber 2006).  
Usually and in most countries, the contribution is based on ability to pay and access to 
services is based on need which makes it a more progressive health care financing 
mechanism than out-of pocket and private health insurance. For instance, Italy and 
Portugal have progressive SHIs and this is because SHI contributions are proportional to 
incomes, besides, pensioners are also exempted from SHI contributions (Wagstaff, van 
Doorslaer et al. 1999). However, SHI is regressive in France, the Netherlands and Spain 
because contributions did not relate to earnings and their pensioners are not exempted. In 
Asia, SHI is progressive in the countries because contributions do not relate to earnings 
and more importantly the State subsidizes contributions for the poor. SHI is regressive in 
Japan because of lack of subsidy for the poor (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). The 
presence or lack of subsidy is therefore an important factor influencing the incidence of 
SHI, particularly in low and middle income countries. 
SHI in many developing countries is yet to achieve universal coverage in the sense of 
covering the whole population by the insurance. Many developed countries have taken 
                                                   
18 In Ghana where there are multiple schemes, it is expected that risk-equalisation will result from poor 
schemes receiving higher financial support than the rich schemes. 
19 The relative progressivity or equity dimension depends to some extent on the key design elements or 
features and these include, sources of funding, pooling of funds (coverage, contribution and allocation 
mechanisms), type of organisation responsible for fund pooling, and the type of benefit package and level 
of OOP (see conceptual framework). It is important to recognise that, other factors such as powerful actors 
or stakeholders, extent of government subsidy, adverse selection and cream skimming influences the equity 
dimension of SHI. 
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many years to achieve universal coverage. Germany is reported to have taken over a 
century to reach universal coverage (Bärnighausen and Sauerborn 2002). Austria took 77 
years to cover 96% of the population under the SHI. It took Belgium 118 years to obtain 
universal coverage (Carrin and James 2004). Israel and Luxemburg took 84 and 72 years 
respectively to reach universal coverage and even though Costa Rica and Japan took a 
relatively shorter time (20 and 36 years respectively), they were induced and powered by 
special efforts (enhanced economic growth and regulations) (ibid). Universal coverage in 
Russai will require new and targeted policies (Balabanova, Falkingham et al. 2003). The 
few SSA countries trying out SHI are yet to cover 30% to 40% of the total population. 
Undoubtedly extending coverage of SHI is a gradual process and it is taking certain 
countries some time to move from the planning to implementation stage (Hajizadeh and 
Connelly 2009). As said earlier, countries like South Africa, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Togo, 
and Côte D’Ivoire are still grappling with moving to implementation; even those who 
have implemented SHI for sometime now (e.g., Kenya, Tanzania and Ghana) are 
grappling with the issue of extending coverage to the informal sector. Ghana is currently 
extending SHI to the informal sector through a network of district mutual health 
insurance schemes throughout the country.  
 
The length of time it takes for a country to reach universal coverage could be shortened 
by improving on the benefit package, enacting legislation and getting the opposition 
onboard. The benefit package must be comprehensive, affordable and attractive. This is a 
critical factor to attract people from the informal sector to join SHI. There must also be 
the political will and this must be done through enacting the appropriate laws through 
parliament as done in Germany, the Philippines, Denmark, Costa Rica, Sweden, Thailand 
and many other countries (Carrin and James 2004). Ghana’s NHI has been legislated 
through parliament. Equally important is the presence of societal and political values in 
the country (Balabanova and McKee 2004). The values of self help and mutual support 
already existing in a country are good grounds for the success of SHI and should be 
tapped to ensure the success of SHI growing to universal coverage. A study on reforming 
health care financing in Bulgaria revealed that values such as equity and transparency are 
important for a successful implementation of SHI (Balabanova and McKee 2004). All 
stakeholders and particularly in the African setting, the opposition political parties, must 
be brought onboard if SHI is to succeed in reaching universal coverage. 
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There are many other conditions for a successful SHI. Drawing on Normand and Weber 
(1994) and Grottret and Schieber (2006), Box 3.1 provides a summary of the pre-
conditions for the successful development of SHI into a universal coverage   
 
Box 3. 1: Pre-conditions for successful development of SHI 
♦ Level of income and economic growth (Hay 2003) is key to the success of SHI as happened in some high 
income countries like Japan and Taiwan 
♦ Dominance of the formal sector verses informal sector because SHI operates easily with formal sector 
since it is easier to collect payment from this sector than the informal sector 
♦ Population distribution in favour of urban areas (or densely populated areas) is key to a successful SHI 
than scattered rural population 
♦ Countries that can tolerate increased payroll deductions without negative effects on employment and 
growth are well placed to succeed in SHI 
♦ Strong administrative capacity to implement SHI without excess administrative cost in a transparent and 
well govern fashion is critical for the population support 
♦ Quality health care infrastructure to support SHI will prevent opting out by the wealthy and healthy and 
thus eroding cross-subsidization  
♦ Stakeholder consensus in favour of SHI is vital for high level support 
♦ Political stability is critical in all areas of development including SHI 
♦ A system where there already exists the spirit of solidarity is important to a successful SHI  
♦ Ability to extend the system to the informal sector and fully subsidizing the contribution of the poor is 
critical if SHI is to provide universal cover 
Source: Carrin and James 2004; Hay 2003 
 
3.4.3 Donor funding  
Donor funds as a health care financing mechanism is unique to developing countries and 
more so in SSA. It contributes significantly to national and health budgets in many 
African countries.  
 
A potential problem of donor funding is that if the funds are provided in the form of 
general budget support (GBS) and not directly to the health care budget as in the sector 
wide approach (SWAp), it is possible that the health sector may not get a fair share of the 
funds. Though it is generally recognised that donor funds are important to improving or 
providing services to the poor and thereby promoting equity, the question that comes to 
mind is the reliability and sustainability of this financing mechanism (McIntyre, Gilson et 
al. 2005). Some donors do not fulfill their pledges and when this happens, national health 
plans could be destabilised if this is a major component of the budget. Most African 
countries are vulnerable to this. Even though donor funding could be an equitable 
financing strategy, there is a call for countries that rely so much on donor funding to 
rethink and find more sustainable domestic health care financing mechanisms, at least in 
the longer term (DFID Health Systems Resource Centre 2002; McIntyre, Gilson et al. 
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2005). Nonetheless, donor funding will remain a significant source of health care 
financing especially in Africa.  
3.4.4 Private Health Insurance and equity 
This is a voluntary pre-payment system where people pay an individual premium, usually 
risk-related and which is also related to the cost of providing the services (McIntyre, 
Gilson et al. 2005; Obermann, Jowett et al. 2006; Pauly, Zweifel et al. 2006). This means 
people in high risk groups (who are most often in the low income bracket) pay more than 
those in low risk groups. This makes PHI20
 
 one of most regressive health care financing 
mechanisms (DFID Health Systems Resource Centre 2002; Carrin and James 2004). For 
instance in USA and Switzerland where the majority of people rely on it for cover, PHI is 
regressive because contributions are based on a flat rate or are risk rated and lower 
income groups tend to have a greater risk of ill-health (Wagstaff 2008). However, PHI 
can be progressive if it is taken up as a supplementary cover to that provided on a 
universal basis by the State (e.g., Italy, Portugal and the UK) and in which case, only 
those in higher income buy the cover (DFID Health Systems Resource Centre 2002; 
Carrin and James 2004). PHI, just like OOP is progressive in many Asia countries 
because it is the preserve of the rich; the poor cannot buy the cover (EQUITAP 2005).  
It is argued that private health insurance (PHI) can protect individuals from catastrophic 
health expenditure and that it should be encouraged. Also, proponents of PHI believe that 
this financing mechanism could help free up government resources that hitherto would 
have been consumed by those in the PHI (DFID Health Systems Resource Centre 2002; 
World Bank 2004). The “freed resources” could then be directed to providing primary 
health care (PHC) or improving on the services used by the majority poor and in this way 
equity could be enhanced.  
 
The argument in favour of PHI not withstanding, PHI is generally confined to a relatively 
elite group. There is insufficient ability to pay for PHI in most low and middle income 
countries. Except in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, PHI is quite limited in SSA. 
A few PHI schemes exist in Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya and other African countries, but 
generally cover less than 1% of the population. In South Africa, with gross disparities 
between income groups, higher income groups have long depended upon PHI (McIntyre 
                                                   
20 Funds are often controlled and managed by for-profit companies  
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and Gilson 2002). In all these places and beyond, the experience of PHI is that, their 
coverage, access, risk pooling, cross subsidisation and financial risk protection are often 
very limited. Typically, PHI is a good available only to the rich in poor countries, the 
healthy and those that live in urban areas and so its expansion could be difficult in SSA. 
 
Tax exemption of PHI to encourage more people to join, often advocated by the 
proponents of PHI, could lead to a kind of government subsidy to the better off people in 
PHI. It is evident that PHI covering groups which are more affluent usually captures 
significant government subsidies even if government does not explicitly subsidise PHI 
(DFID Health Systems Resource Centre 2002).  
 
The argument of freeing more resources for the poor through PHI depends critically on 
whether any freed resources are actually used to support the health care of the poor as 
well as regulation governing PHI and how it interacts with the rest of the health care 
system, particularly if PHI exists in parallel to SHI. It is also important to consider 
whether or not those purchasing PHI are allowed to opt-out of the primary financing 
mechanism or whether they must continue to contribute to the SHI where this exists 
(Ensor 2001; Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 2002; Carrin and James 2004). 
If they are allowed to opt-out, then there would be the tendency to cream skim as usually 
those who join the PHI are the healthy and wealthy people leaving only the less healthy 
and poor people to the SHI, which would worsen the existing equity problems.  
 
3.4.5 Community based health insurance (CBHI) and equity 
According to Dror and Preker (2002), Community Based Financing (CBF) evolved as a 
generic expression used to cover a large variety of health care financing arrangements21
                                                   
21Different authors use the term in different ways: community based health insurance, micro financing 
arrangement, community health fund, mutual health insurance, mutual health organization, rural health 
insurance, revolving drug funds and community involvement in user fee arrangements. 
. 
CBHI (which is a form of CBF) is a scheme formed usually by a community, mission 
facility, or a donor with the aim of providing risk pooling to cover part or all of the cost 
of health services of its members (Bennett 2004; McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005). Many of 
these are usually based in the rural areas, where there is limited financial risk protection 
(Baltussen and Bruce 2006). A unique feature of CBHI is the substantial element of 
community participation in the overall management of these schemes even if a scheme is 
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established by a mission or a donor (e.g. the Nkoranza scheme in Ghana was 
establishment by the mission hospital in the area but there is a high level of community 
participation in decision making) (Baltussen and Bruce 2006; Witter, Arhinful et al. 
2007). Unlike PHI, the premiums of CBHI are usually based on community rating (Criel, 
Atim et al. 2004). This means, community risk sharing, such that community members 
pay premiums according to the average risk of the community. Premium contributions are 
also often made on an annual basis and usually coincide with the time of harvest of crops 
when community members would have a better ability to pay. Unlike SHI, CBHI 
provides cover for the informal sector of the population and so they provide a mechanism 
for insured members to access services without having to pay at the point of access, 
which means CBHI emerges as an alternative to user fees (Bennett, Creese et al. 1998; 
Musau 1999; Criel, Atim et al. 2004; Ekman 2004). Another feature of CBHI is the 
voluntary nature of the schemes and the spirit of self-help and social mobilization 
embraced by the poor in many developing countries where these schemes exist. 
 
CBHI are unique financial arrangements in developing countries particularly in SSA. 
There are a number of CBHIs in Asia and Latin America22
 
. In SSA, the old CBHIs are 
mostly found in West and Central Africa. Some of the oldest schemes include 
Babouantou of Cameroon, CAM of Burundi, Bwamanda of the DR Congo, Nkoranza of 
Ghana and Boboye of Niger among several others. The growth of these schemes in East 
and Southern Africa is a relatively new phenomenon. Probably due to the negative impact 
of user fees (mentioned in chapter one), there seems to be international support (e.g. by 
the World Bank, WHO, the Commission for Macroeconomics and Health and USAID) 
for the establishment of CBHIs as a panacea to rural health care financing problems 
(Odaga 2004; WHO/HTM/TDR 2004; World Bank 2004). For instance, the World Bank 
provided financial and technical support for the establishment of the Tanzania community 
health fund which is aimed, among other things, at providing financial protection to the 
poor. USAID also supported the establishment of the Nkoranza scheme in Ghana (Atim 
1998; Atim, Grey et al. 2001). 
The literature cites various advantages of CBHI and that may explain the recent interest 
in CBHIs by community members, missionaries, donor and even international 
organizations like the World Bank. CBHI often evolves in a context where there is high 
                                                   
22 For example RAHA of India, BAO of Vietnam  and SWHI of Thailand etc 
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user fee financing of health care. By spreading contributions between the healthy and the 
sick, the wealthy and less wealthy, the young and the old and allowing people to spread 
their contributions over time in a more predictable way rather than pay at the point of 
access, CBHI is able to mitigate the worst equity effects of user fees (Atim 1998; Atim 
1999; Bennett and Gilson 2000; Arhin-Tenkorang 2001; Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health 2002; Dong, Kouyate et al. 2003; Bennett 2004; Criel, Atim 
et al. 2004). Thus CBHI provides some level of financial protection to insured members 
and so improves on the accessibility of health services to those who need it (Arhin-
Tenkorang 2001; Preker, Carrin et al. 2001; Dong, Kouyate et al. 2003; Balabanova and 
McKee 2004; Poletti, Balabanova et al. 2007). If schemes (e.g. Nkoranza in Ghana and 
UMASIDA in Tanzania) cover inpatient services in the benefit package, they would 
protect the poor against catastrophic health care costs that could push them into 
impoverishment and so CBHI could contribute  a great deal to poverty reduction (Preker 
and Carrin 2004; WHO/HTM/TDR 2004). According to Jakab and Krishnan (2004), the 
poor ought to join a CBHI so as to take advantage of the financial risk protection and 
cross-subsidization that CBHI offers. If CBHI has a sliding scale of premiums, 
contributions will reflect ability to pay.  
 
Another significant motivation for CBHI cited in the literature is that a significant 
reduction in the burden of public health resources could be realized through CBHIs as 
those covered by CBHIs will not rely solely on public health resources (Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health 2002). These resources could then be directed to the very 
vulnerable and indigent in society (WHO/HTM/TDR 2004). Given these potential 
advantages, it is not surprising that the World Bank, the WHO and others are vehemently 
pushing for the establishment of CBHIs.   
 
The advantages of CBHIs notwithstanding, there is evidence that they generate very 
limited resources as premium payments are usually small and so without donor or 
international support, many CBHIs cannot survive on their own contributions (Atim 
1998; Atim, Grey et al. 2001; Bennett 2004; Criel, Atim et al. 2004). There is also 
evidence that geographical inequities exist in CBHIs where members who are near to the 
health facilities utilise more services than those living in remote areas. The flat rate as 
opposed to sliding scale premiums often associated with CBHIs does not position them to 
target the poor well enough. Another related concern is the fragmentation and low 
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population coverage of CBHI, such that risk pooling, financial risk protection and cross 
subsidisation is limited (Arhin-Tenkorang 2001; Atim, Grey et al. 2001; Aikins 2003; 
Ekman 2004). Ghana for instance, is known to have up to 159 CBHIs in 2002 but with a 
total membership of only a little over 220,000 (Atim, Grey et al. 2001; Ministerial Task 
Team 2002). In such a situation, government may need to provide a regulatory 
framework and to play a redistributive role between the different schemes. This is critical 
in ensuring that the schemes are able to serve the poorer households.  
 
Another concern about CBHI is also the fact that the very poor are usually not covered 
(Arhin-Tenkorang 2000; Arhin-Tenkorang 2001; Ekman 2004; Preker and Carrin 2004). 
The very poor who cannot afford to pay the premiums are not covered by CBHI and this 
is a source of concern, and even though some schemes try to provide exemptions to the 
very poor and indigent, these exemptions are often not only difficult to implement but 
constrained by limited resources available to the schemes themselves. 
 
To date there is no evidence as to how CBHI is linked to the other components of the 
health system (McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005). In other words, how does CBHI fit in the 
overall health care financing mechanism? Ghana is currently and uniquely trying to 
integrate CBHI into its national health insurance.  
 
So far studies on CBHI have mainly centered on factors affecting enrolments and how 
best to address these factors (affordability, timing, quality, active purchasing, adverse 
selection, government support and social factors among others) (Ensor 2001; Ekman 
2004). The equity aspects of CBHI23
 
 as a financing mechanism have not been explored in 
depth. Information on the overall progressivity of CBHI is important for policy direction 
on its expansion and how best it can achieve equity goals.  
Despite the concerns of CBHI and the need for more equity work on CBHI before 
considering its expansion, there is no doubt that CBHI remains a significant financing 
mechanism in SSA and in Ghana. In addition, CBHI can play a role in reaching universal 
coverage within the context of mandatory health insurance.  
 
                                                   
23 Including factors (contribution rates and structure, pooling, subsidisation, exemptions and benefit 
package, etc.) influencing its incidence  
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3.4.6 Out-of-pocket (user fees) payments and equity 
In an OOP payment system of health care financing, patients pay directly at the point of 
accessing health care either to a public or private health provider. The experience of out-
of-pocket (OOP) payment in Europe (e.g., Germany, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, 
etc) includes deductibles, residual payments and co-payments by those covered by health 
insurance (WHO/HTM/TDR 2004). OOP is also quite a significant health care financing 
mechanism in the USA and parts of Latin America and Asia (WHO/HTM/TDR 2004).  
 
In Africa, a common form of OOP payment is user fees which are payments at public 
sector facilities. Other OOP payments are those made to private providers such as the 
occasional purchase of medicine from informal drug sellers and traditional healers 
(McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005). SSA experience of user fees began in the early 1980s, 
when due to severe macroeconomic difficulties (high indebtedness, negative growth, lack 
of resources, and financial burden on service use), international organizations (especially 
the World Bank and IMF) prescribed through conditions of their loans, various economic 
and health reforms (Structural Adjustment Programme-SAP) including user fees to most 
countries as a way forward (Akin, Birdsall et al. 1987; Jimenez 1987; Creese 1991; 
Adams, Darko et al. 2002). Ghana was the first country in SSA to implement in totality 
the Breton Woods structural reforms (Creese 1991). Ghana introduced comprehensive 
user fees in all sectors including public health facilities. Other countries (e.g., Kenya, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria, etc) also introduced user fees in public health facilities 
(Creese 1991).  
 
The major motivation or objective of introducing user fees was to generate revenue for 
the health sector. Another objective was to improve the quality of care in the health care 
system through improving drug availability and facility improvement from the revenue 
generated through the fees (Creese 1991). It was also thought that through user fees, 
community involvement in the running of health facilities could be enhanced. 
  
Proponents of user fees argue that introducing user fees in a tax financed system can 
promote equity. Tax financing, it is argued is skewed towards subsidising hospital 
services and so introducing user fees in selected hospitals or urban areas could redirect 
the public subsidy to the rural poor (de Ferranti 1985; DFID Health Systems Resource 
Centre 2002).  It has been further argued that user fees would prevent ‘frivolous’ health 
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services utilization (Akin, Birdsall et al. 1987; Stanton and Clemens 1989). In other 
words, health care resources would be appropriately used. Also, providers would be more 
responsive to patients under a user fees regime and will tend to provide quality health 
care to them. These arguments appearing sound on paper, have failed to materialize in 
almost all countries in which user fees were implemented.  
 
It is not easy to design and implement discriminated user fees that can protect the poor. 
Household incomes are generally low especially in SSA and this does not make it 
possible to generate the needed resources to improve on the quality of primary health care 
services. Households are already making substantial contributions through transport costs 
etc and so user fees place an additional burden especially on the poor. The issue of 
‘frivolous’ use is unlikely to apply in most SSA countries because utilization of health 
services is already extremely low (Russell 2004; Gilson and McIntyre 2005; Chuma, 
Musimbi et al. 2009). It is argued overwhelmingly that user fees undermine obtaining 
universal coverage of basic health services (Arhin-Tenkorang 2000; Gilson and McIntyre 
2005; Yates 2009). 
 
Evidence shows that, there has been a decrease in utilisation of health care services 
wherever user fees were implemented (Arhin-Tenkorang 2000). For instance, the 
reduction in utilization was a third in Zambia, 50% percent in Kenya and as much as two 
thirds in Ghana. The much talked about revenue generation was not realized as most 
countries could not generate more than 5% of the total health care cost. Gilson et al. 
(1995) also reported lack of direct targeting of fee revenue to the poor. The effect of user 
fees on households has also been extensively investigated and the overwhelming findings 
indicate negative impact of user fees on households (Stanton and Clemens 1989; McPake 
1993; Mwabu, Mwanzia et al. 1995; Gilson 1997; Bennett and Gilson 2000; Russell and 
Abdella 2002; WHO/HTM/TDR 2004; Xu, Evans et al. 2006; Cissé, Luchinia et al. 
2007). Increases in user fees have rarely been accompanied by improvements in the 
quality of services (WHO/HTM/TDR 2004). It has been reported in Ghana, South Africa, 
Burundi, Tanzania and Zambia that poor households were either unable or had difficulty 
seeking treatment due to user fees (Nyonator and Kutzin 1999). Due to user fees, poor 
households either have to delay health seeking until the condition of illness becomes 
serious and this further aggravates their conditions (Nyonator and Kutzin 1999). User 
fees have made the direct cost of health care unbearable to poor households. The cost of 
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health care has sent some poor households to near permanent impoverishment. The effect 
of user fees has been universally and overwhelmingly negative and this has been blamed 
on poor design, planning and implementation. The planners also failed to recognize the 
very low incomes levels in SSA (McPake, Hanson et al. 1993; McIntyre, Thiede et al. 
2005).    
 
Exemptions which were supposed to take care of the poor and vulnerable were also 
poorly implemented (Gilson and Mills 1995; Adams, Darko et al. 2002; Gilson and 
McIntyre 2005). Health providers for instance lack clarity on exemptions’ criteria 
coupled with a lack of awareness of eligibility among the intended beneficiaries. It is also 
reported that even those who were aware did not want to be labled with the title of an 
indigent and so would not access the services altogether (Adams, Darko et al. 2002). 
Identifying those eligible for exemptions is also difficult. In Ghana, for instance, the aged 
(over 70 years), children under five and paupers are exempted from user fees but 
determining someone’s age without a birth certificate is difficult for providers and this 
sometimes results in confrontations and subsequent embarrassment to beneficiaries 
(Waddington and Enyimayew 1989). Even if people are willing to access the exemptions, 
there is a problem of insufficient funds to take care of the beneficiaries (McIntyre, Gilson 
et al. 2005; Xu, Evans et al. 2006; Yates 2009).  
 
Most of the equity studies in health care financing have revealed that out-of-pocket 
payment is the most regressive of all the health care financing mechanisms due to its link 
with utilisation of health care services (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer et al. 1999; Wagstaff and 
van Doorslaer 2001; Cissé, Luchinia et al. 2007; Leive and Xu 2008; O'Donnell, van 
Doorslaer et al. 2008; Yu, Whynes et al. 2008; Ataguba and McIntyre 2009; Chuma, 
Musimbi et al. 2009; Hajizadeh and Connelly 2009). Because OOP require payment at 
the time of health service use, the poor, who often shoulder the greatest disease burden, 
pay substantially for health care services (Penchansky 1977; Cissé, Luchinia et al. 2007). 
Unlike health insurance, OOP payments lack a risk pooling mechanism24
                                                   
24 Concern over heavy reliance on OOP financing motivated the current international consensus that 
identifies prepayment and better risk-pooling as key mechanisms for ensuring fair financing for health care 
(WHO 2005) 
 and other 
essential elements that could make a health care financing mechanism equitable as 
suggested by Kutzin (2001). A comparative study of health care financing in nine 
European countries and the USA revealed that OOP payments were regressive in all 
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countries except Spain. The USA and Switzerland had the most regressive OOP 
payments and this was because co-payments were paid by all irrespective of one’s 
income levels.  
 
However, a recent comparative study of health care financing in Asian countries showed 
that OOP payments were concentrated among the higher income groups. The richest 
quintile contributed more than half of OOP payments in Bangladesh, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand (EQUITAP 2005). In these countries, the poor did 
not only pay less in absolute terms but less as a proportion of household resources 
(O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). It was only in Japan, Kyrgyz and Taiwan that the 
share of OOP paid by the poorest quintile exceeded its share of ability to pay, thus 
making OOP payments mildly progressive or proportional in most of these Asian 
countries and so contradicting the common assertion that OOP payments are regressive 
(O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). The reason for this phenomenon is that OOP 
payments in these countries are for private health care, which is mainly consumed by the 
rich and even though there are charges at the public health facilities, these are very 
modest and the poor are exempted. Also in some of the countries where SHI is operating, 
most of OOP payments are associated with co-payments which are evenly spread across 
the populations (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). However, although the rich pay 
more in these countries, they also benefit more than the poor from health services. 
Sometimes, OOP payments are progressive simply because the poor are unable to use 
health services. 
 
Due to user fees’ negative equity implications, there is a general call for their removal 
and to be replaced by a more humane health care financing mechanism as a matter of 
urgency if universal health care, which is a goal of many SSA countries, is to be achieved 
(WHO/HTM/TDR 2004; Gilson and McIntyre 2005; World Health Organisation 2008). 
The WHO and World Bank are currently supporting alternative health care financing in 
the form of pre-payment schemes (health insurance) in favour of user fees which was 
seen as the ‘panacea’ to the problem of health care financing in the 1980s. In fact, 
countries especially those in SSA are being asked to work towards removing user fees 
which serve as a barrier to health service access, but this cannot be done overnight 
(Gilson and McIntyre 2005). Even though some countries (e.g., Uganda and South 
Africa) have taken steps to remove user fees fully or partially (McIntyre, Gilson et al. 
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2005), user fees will continue to be a significant health care financing mechanism due to 
the substantial resources required to meet the cost of increased utitlisation. Ghana is 
currently implementing SHI which is aimed at replacing user fees but the government 
needs over US$13 million per annum to replace user fees (Ministerial Task Team 2002).  
 
3.5 Health care financing mix 
The mix of health care financing varies from one country to the other. The health care 
financing triangle (Figure 3.1) referred to in the EQUITAP25
  
 comparative study of 13 
Asian countries (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008), illustrates the mix of health care 
financing arrangement applicable to both high and low income countries. Countries that 
fall close to the 45º line (point C) indicate that their health care is financed almost 
exclusively from OOP and government tax revenue. Countries that are located at point D 
for instance, depict that their health care is financed substantially (over 70%) from OOP. 
At point B, countries’ health care is financed almost exclusively from government tax 
revenue. However, countries that fall at point A indicate that such countries have a 
substantial element of health insurance in their health care financing arrangement.  
Figure 3. 1: Health care financing triangle 
 
 
Adapted from EQUITAP 2005 
 
                                                   
25 EQUITAP (“Equity in Asia-Pacific Health Systems”) is a collaborative effort of more than fifteen 
research teams in Asia and Europe engaged in examining equity in national health systems in the Asia-
Pacific region. The work of the collaboration involves both development of methodological tools, and 
actual assessment of the performance of national health systems in Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong SAR, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand 
and Viet Nam. The project is an initiative of the Asia-Pacific National Health Accounts Network 
(APNHAN) in collaboration with Erasmus University (The Netherlands) and London School of Economics 
(United Kingdom). 
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In a recent comparative study of 13 Asian countries, it was revealed that countries/states 
such as Sri Lanka, Punjab (in India), Nepal, Bangladesh and Kyrgyz financed their health 
care virtually from equal shares of government revenue and OOP payments (point C on 
the triangle). The study and earlier studies (EQUITAP 2005), have shown that except for 
USA, Switzerland and China, high income countries rely on public health care financing-
general tax and SHI-and low income countries generally rely more on OOP payments.  
For instance, the OOP percentage share of the total expenditure on health care was about 
50% in Nepal, whilst it was only 12% in Japan.  
 
The situation is not different in Africa, where countries such as Côte D’Ivoire, Cameroon, 
Burundi, Sudan, Nigeria and Uganda have more than 70% of their health care financing 
coming from private sources which is virtually all from OOP payments as private health 
insurance is very limited in these countries (McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005). Many other 
African countries including Ghana have over 45% share of private financing which is 
mostly OOP payments. The high percentage of private health care financing associated 
with low income countries is a source of worry and has tremendous equity implications in 
relation to the ability to pay for poor households.  
 
The incidence of all financing mechanisms combined is dependent on the percentage 
share of each health care financing mechanism to total health care financing and the 
extent to which each health care financing strategy is itself progressive, proportional or 
regressive (McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005; Yates 2009). For instance, the overall financing 
of Germany and the UK are more progressive than the USA because SHI and general tax 
are the predominant health care financing mechanisms in Germany and the UK which are 
progressive while in the USA, health care financing is mainly private insurance and OOP 
payments which are regressive (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer et al. 1999). Many low income 
countries, including Ghana, which have significant OOP payments in their health care 
financing systems, could have an overall inequitable or regressive health care financing 
system. Empirical data is thus needed to understand the equity dynamics of health care 
financing in low income countries especially in Africa.   
3.6 Summary of the literature review  
The purpose of this Chapter was to review relevant literature on equity, equity in health 
and equity in health care financing and examine the various health care financing 
mechanisms and their mix. Equity is a difficult concept to define but remains a very 
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important policy goal (Whitehead 1992). Some writers even suggest that equity should be 
given more priority than efficiency (Mooney 1996). Equity in health care financing 
requires that health care be financed according to be ability to pay rather than the use of 
health services. This can be interpreted in terms of vertical equity or horizontal equity, 
with the later requiring that individuals with the same ability to pay make the same 
contribution. Vertical equity, which requires that individuals of unequal ability to pay 
make appropriately dissimilar payments for health care, is preferred in this study. 
However the question remains how dissimilar these payments should be. Should 
individuals make proportional or progressive payments? This study advocates not only 
for  vertical equity but a very progressive financing system such that the disadvantaged or 
poorer pay a lower percentage of their income than the rich. This is the most appropriate 
means of effectively and speedily achieving equity gains as it recognizes that different 
people have different starting points and so must be treated differently (McIntyre, 
Muirhead et al. 2002). The precise form that the differential treatment might take requires 
that the poor and the disadvantaged are comprehensively protected from the burden of 
health care payments. It is important to note that there are operational difficulties in 
measuring vertical or even horizontal equity as there needs to be a judgement on both  the 
relevant dimensions for measuring differences (i.e. difference in need) and how 
differently those groups should be treated.    
 
In sum, empirical evidence on alternative financial contribution mechanisms reveals that 
OOP payments are generally regressive or as minimum, least progressive. OOP payments 
are supposedly progressive simply for the fact that the poorest do not use health services 
if they are required to pay. PHI is often regressive particularly in countries (e.g. USA and 
Switzerland) where PHI contributions account for a large share of total health care 
financing. In the few occasions where PHI is progressive (e.g. South Africa), the poor are 
simply not part of this system and only those who contribute benefit. SHI on the other 
hand is generally progressive since it is normally based on payroll deductions. However, 
it is often less progressive compare to general tax. General tax is usually the most 
progressive financing mechanism. There is a general consensus internationally that OOP 
payments be reduced or removed altogether and efforts made to promote pre-payment. 
However, given the fiscal constraints, there is tremendous interest in supplementing tax 
funding with SHI contributions to achieve universal coverage. 
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3.7 Coceptual framework  
It is generally accepted that health care should be financed according to ability to pay but 
this requirement can be interpreted in terms of both vertical equity and horizontal equity 
(Wagstaff 2000; O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). As mentioned earlier, this study 
focuses on vertical equity in health care financing, which requires that persons or 
households of unequal ability-to-pay make appropriately dissimilar payments for health 
care. However the question remains what should be the extent of differences in the 
burden of health care payments relative to income? Should the burden of health care 
payment be proportional, progressive or even regressive? If progressive as this study 
advocates, how progressive should health care payments be? Therefore, the study defines 
equity in health care financing by going beyond the conventional definition of vertical 
equity in health care financing in recognizing that persons or households have very 
different starting points in life and so must be treated unequally but equitably with regard 
to health care financing. This requires that the poor and vulnerable who cannot make 
financial contributions are recognized in the formulation of health care financing policies. 
The poor and vulnerable will need to be identified and adequately exempted from health 
care payments. It also recognizes that health care payments should not compel individuals 
and households to sell valuable household assets or borrow and should not impoverish 
households (Russell and Abdella 2002; McIntyre, Thiede et al. 2005; Chuma, Musimbi et 
al. 2009; Kruk, Goldmann et al. 2009).  
 
Equity in health care financing rests on the relationship between Financing mechanisms 
and socio-economic status or ability to pay (see A and B in Figure 3.2). Most countries 
including Ghana finances their health care from a mix of two main categories of 
financing mechanisms-voluntary and mandatory. Voluntary health financing includes 
OOP payments, private health insurance (in Ghana this financing mechanism covers less 
that 1% of the population) and to some extent NHI/SHI. Mandatory health financing 
includes direct tax (i.e. personal income tax, company tax) and indirect taxes (fuel levy, 
VAT and import duty) and to some extent NHI/SHI. SHI is often mandatory when it is 
limited to the formal sector and funded through compulsory payroll deductions. However, 
NHI/SHI is voluntary if it is extended to cover the informal sector through premium 
payments. One unique feature of the Ghana’s NHI/SHI is that the SHI/NHI is by law 
mandatory for both formal and informal sectors but in practice it is voluntary for the 
informal sector since they are required to pay a premium to join. The other key element 
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influencing the equity of health care payments is that of the socio-economic status or 
ability-to-pay of the population. Although there are a number of alternative measures of 
socio-economic status that can be used to measure equity in health care financing, the 
appropriate measure that has been selected in this study is the household consumption 
expenditure using both the per capita and adult equivalent (see details in methods 
chapter). 
 
The burden of each payment mechanism can be classified as progressive, proportional or 
regressive (see Figure 3.2). Some payment mechanisms (e.g OOP) could also be 
catastrophic in that households can be exposed to large unexpected expenses when they 
have to use health services which can be very high relative to their ability to pay. Some 
financing mechanisms, particularly OOP payments, could also force households or 
individuals into poverty through the purchase of health services. The health system needs, 
therefore, to seek financing mechanisms which will allow for pooling of resources in a 
common pool. This is critical because health care costs are unpredictable as it is difficult 
for individuals and households to know when illness will strike or the intensity of the 
illness and what the needed health services will cost. It is easier to predict the health care 
needs and health care costs for a group of people based on epidemiological and other 
related data than for an individual and that is why there is a need for risk-pooling such 
that the healthy cross-subsidise the ill. With pooling, the risk of falling ill and incurring 
unexpected and high health care costs is shared between those in the pool. In Figure 3.2, 
it can be seen that, according to the literature, those financing mechanisms that allow for 
the widest pooling include the NHI/SHI, and direct and indirect taxes. OOP payments 
lack pooling characteristics. Private health insurance (PHI) has limited pooling since it 
mostly the better-off who belong to these schemes. One unique feature of this study is 
that it does not just stop at assessing the distribution of the burden of health care 
financing but goes beyond this to explore the factors or drivers (C in Figure 3.2)) that 
influence the financing incidence, particularly for the financing mechanism (NHI/SHI) 
that the health sector has some level of control over and which Government intends to 
build on in order to extend financial protection to the population. In contrast, the health 
sector has limited ability to influence taxation policies. The factors that may influence the 
the enrolemt in the NHI in Ghana are listed on the right hand side of Figure 3.2 (C in 
Figure 3.2).  
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Universal coverage is a policy objective of most health systems and as Mills (2007) 
highlighted, no country objects to universal coverage but the question is how to achieve 
that. Universal coverage is commonly defined as all citizens (breath of coverage) having 
access to adequate health care (depth of coverage) at an affordable cost. This means that 
universal coverage can be achieved through a combination of different financing 
mechanisms, particularly SHI/NHI and taxes (particularly the progressive ones). 
Achieving universal coverage requires that individual and structural factors (D in Figure) 
are identified and resolved.  
 
This conceptual framework reflects the key elements of the analysis (emerging from the 
literature review) that is undertaken in this study. It serves as a reference point for 
reviewing how the different elements of the analysis relate to each other. 
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Figure 3. 2: Conceptual framework: Equity in health care financing  
 
A  
Health care 
financing 
mechanism 
 
 
OOP 
B 
Socio-economic 
measure or 
ability-to-pay 
                           Burden of health care financing  
              (Progressivity, Catastrophic and Impoverishment effect) 
     Universal coverage (often a 
key goal of health systems) 
 
NHI/SHI 
Voluntary Mandatory 
 
Direct tax 
Level of 
Pooling 
and 
cross-
Subsidisa
tion 
Household 
consumption 
expenditure (per 
capita and per 
adult equivalent) 
 
PHI 
 
Indirect 
tax 
Informal 
worker 
Formal 
worker 
 
C: Factors influencing enrolment in 
the NHI/SHI 
-Premium levels 
-Frequency of premium increases 
-Socio-economic status 
-Benefit package 
-Perceived quality of care 
-waiting period before benefiting 
-exclusion of some health condition 
 
 
 
D: Achieving universal coverage 
-Relative share of different financing 
sources 
-Rate and structure of contributions 
-Who is covered (poor or rich?) 
-Possibility of opting out 
-Legal requirement  
-Economic growth 
-Nature of pooling (single or 
multiple) 
-Risk equalisation or not 
-Reinsurance mechanism 
-Effective exemption mechanisms  
-Quality of care  
-Administrative cost 
No pooling 
(OOP) 
Pooling 
(Taxes & NHI/SHI) 
Financing mechanisms that allow 
for financial protection 
Limited pooling 
(PHI) 
 
Policy 
objective 
Particularly 
those taxes 
that are 
progressive 
& NHI/SHI 
Breath of coverage 
(Population) 
Depth of coverage 
(Services) 
D 
C 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
 79 
Chapter Four: Methods 
4.0 Introduction 
The chapter outlines the detailed methodology including the data sources, measurement 
of households’ ability to pay (socio-economic status) and health care payment variables. 
The chapter also highlights methods of data collection, analysis and how ethical issues 
were considered. 
 
The study attempted to measure the relative progressivity of health care financing 
mechanisms and the catastrophic and impoverishment effect of health care payment 
drawing on secondary data in the form of the 2005/2006 national household survey (the 
Ghana Living Standard Survey). This was complemented by my own primary data 
collection (a household survey called the SHIELD survey, focus group discussions and 
indepth interviews) in six districts. The SHIELD survey data largely involved data 
collection on the NHI including factors influencing the incidence of this financing 
mechanism.  
 
4.1: Data sources 
4.1.1 The Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS) 
The main data source for determining who bears what health care financing burden was 
the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS).  
 
The history of the Living Standard Survey (LSS)26
                                                   
26 Also known in the literature as Living Standard and Measurement Survey (LSMS) 
 can be traced back to family budget 
surveys. The first of these surveys were undertaken by Reverend David Davies in 1795 
and Sir Frederick Morton Eden in 1797 in England (Deaton 1997). Davies and Morton 
were moved by the distress of the working classes at the time. Davies used his results to 
draw attention to the living conditions of the poor, and to argue in favour of a minimum 
wage. The spread of working class-socialism in Europe also led to the compilation of 
household budgets in the late 1940s in Europe (Deaton 1997). According to Deaton 
(1997), information on Belgian household budgets was used by Ernest Engel not only as 
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basis for his observation that the fraction of the budget devoted to food is larger for 
poorer families, but to estimate aggregate consumption (Deaton 1997).  
 
The current system of LSS was initiated by the World Bank in 1980 based on the need to 
improve data collection efforts in developing countries in order to understand better the 
extent of poverty and the determinants of living standards. The survey is designed to 
provide household level data for the evaluation of the effects of various government 
policies on the living conditions of the population. The main advantage of the LSS is that 
it is a multi-topic survey designed to allow for various kinds of analysis, including equity 
and financing incidence analyses. The Ghana LSS was first conducted in 1987/88 with 
follow-ups in 1991/92, 1998/99, 2000/2001 with the latest being in 2005/2006.  
 
The secondary data used for the financing incidence calculations were the latest Ghana 
Living Standard Survey (GLSS) of 2005/2006 collected by the Ghana Statistical Service, 
a national body responsible for conducting all demographic, health and living standard 
surveys. This is the fifth time this survey has been conducted, hence its name of GLSS 5. 
The sample size for GLSS 5 was 8687 households, covering a total of 36, 488 
individuals. The individuals represent 0.17% of the total population of Ghana. Data 
collected by a LSS relates to all aspects of household decision-making and well-being. 
The data contain information on household consumption of both durable and non-durable 
items. Data on the consumption of durable items were collected for the previous 12 
months whilst those for non-durable or frequently purchased items were collected weekly 
for ten weeks using a weekly diary. 
4.1.2 The SHIELD household survey 
To complement the GLSS data, a primary household survey was conducted in a sample 
of six districts (see section 4.2.1) focusing on the NHI and other direct health care 
payments. The SHIELD survey collected data on household expenditure on health care, 
household SES, factors affecting health care payments and the impact of out-of-pocket 
payments on the ability of lower income subgroups to access prompt and equitable care 
for major health problems in the country. The SHIELD data was collected within four 
months (July to October) in 2008, with a total population of 14050. 
 
The Ghana NHI is a recent phenomenon and NHI contributions were not fully captured in 
the 2005/2006 GLSS, which was used to analyze the incidence of the other health care 
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financing mechanism. Thus, information on NHI was gathered through the SHIELD 
survey and from the offices of SSNIT and the NHIS, which allows for a more accurate 
incidence analysis of health insurance contributions. The SHIELD survey also 
supplemented the incidence analyses of direct payments (OOP) for health care at the 
household level.  
 
The key policy focus of the Ghana NHI implementation is the expansion of district health 
insurance (DHI). The challenge is its rapid expansion to cover those in the informal 
sector. So a key aspect of the SHIELD survey was to investigate in detail who contributes 
to these schemes, and to identify the obstacles to further expansion of the DHI scheme 
coverage. The instrument was developed based on the objectives of the study. 
 
Household survey questionnaire interviews were conducted with heads of households 
(see Appendix A for questionnaire). Here, a wide range of data was collected including:  
 SES indicators 
 MHI scheme membership status, and if they are members, when they joined 
 The contribution rate and frequency of payment by members  
 Whether or not they were exempted from contributions (if eligible for exemption, 
whether they received the exemptions or not) 
 Perceptions of how the HI has changed access to and quality of health services 
 Satisfaction with DHI  
 Health service use in a specified recall period. 
  
Information on SES enables the analysis of the equity in health insurance contributions 
and other direct health care payments. Information was also collected on non-members of 
the scheme, and the reasons why they are not members. 
 
4.1.3 Qualitative components 
Qualitative data collection methods (focus group discussions27
 
, in-depth interviews) were 
undertaken in the survey study sites (sampled districts) as well as with key National 
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) staff.  
The qualitative research explores issues affecting health care payment and the impact of 
this NHI on the ability of lower income subgroups to access prompt and equitable care 
                                                   
27 A focus group discussion is usually made up of between eight to twelve participants. The main purpose of this 
interviewing technique is to solicit generalized information that provides the normative patterns of the beliefs and 
perceptions of the communities under study. Although guides are drawn up to cover the broad themes of the research, 
discussions do not necessarily have to follow the order of the guide; however, the most important issue to remember is 
to make sure that all themes are covered by the end of a session 
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for major health problems in the country. Generally, information gathered from the FGDs 
and IDIs included:  
 Current premium level   
 Whether different people pay different premiums and the basis 
 Whether the scheme is pro-poor 
 Criterion for granting exemptions in the districts  
 How premiums are collected (installment, in-kind)  
 Whether exempt groups (identification of the poor) are issued with the same type 
of insurance cards 
 Challenges with regards to the issuance of cards  
 Waiting period between registration and issuance of insurance card 
 Issues (length of time, processes) of reimbursement of providers’ claims  
 Funding of the DHI 
 Benefit package and quality of services (issues of purchasing) to client 
 Issues of sustainability of the scheme 
 Community participation and support of the scheme 
 General challenges of the of the scheme 
 
4.1.3.1 Focus Group Discussion (FGD) 
The qualitative studies involved interaction with community members through FGDs in 
the six sampled districts (see Appendix B for FGD guide). The FGDs concentrated on the 
ways in which people perceive the scheme and how it impacts on their health care 
seeking. Discussions also explored community views on strategies for the expansion of 
the national health insurance scheme. Specific issues that were explored included 
contribution rates and frequency of payment, benefit package, exemption criteria and 
mechanisms, quality of care and general satisfaction with the scheme. On the training of 
staff for the data collection, six teams (made up of two experienced people per team and 
who understood the local language) were recruited and trained for a week. The FGD 
guide was piloted in areas outside the six study districts. 
 
4.1.3.1 Indepth Interviews 
At the DHIS offices, information was collected through indepth interviews from scheme 
managers on the benefit package and purchasing (type of services and providers covered, 
whether there is active service purchasing, and provider payment mechanisms), and the 
nature of the DHI (extent of community participation and accountability mechanisms). 
Information was also collected on the coverage (number of members disaggregated by 
contributors and those exempted) and general implementation challenges of the scheme 
(see Appendix C for data collection sheet). I (researcher) personally conducted the 
interviews with the district scheme managers. The eligibility for inclusion was based on 
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one’s district being part of the overall SHIELD study. I interviewed the scheme managers 
in their offices and permission was sought to tape record these interviews.  
 
In addition to interviewing the six district scheme managers, a key NHIS headquarter’s - 
operation manager who represented the executive secretary of the NHIS (see Appendix D 
for indepth interview guide) was also interviewed by the PI.. The operation manager is 
the link person between the district schemes and the NHIS headquarters and so it was 
important that he was selected for the interview.  
 
4.1.4   Training of field assistants  
Thirty-five field assistants with tertiary education background were recruited and trained 
on the background, aims and objectives of the study, the role of the interviewer, 
community entry strategies and the household survey instrument for a period of three 
weeks. They were also trained on the administration of the various study instruments. 
Mock interviews were also conducted as part of the training. This was followed by 
supervised pretests in the field to assess the competences of the field assistants. Actual 
data collection commenced on the 11th July 2008 and ended on 30th October 2008 with 
periodic meetings of the field assistants to address issues from the field. 
 
With the FGDs, six teams of two people each with relevant experience, were recruited 
and trained for two weeks on the objectives of the study, how to conduct qualitative 
research and all other techniques for carrying out FGDs. After the training, a supervised 
pilot test was undertaken. The FGDs were also undertaken within the same period as the 
household survey  
 
4.2 Sampling 
4.2.1 The six study districts for the SHIELD study 
Since the country is distinctly and broadly zoned into three belts (southern, middle and 
northern sectors) the study has strategically undertaken a multi stage random sampling in 
each of the belts for the SHIELD survey (household survey, FGDs and IDIs) (see Figure 
4.1). The key criterion was that a district had to have DHI scheme28
                                                   
28 There were a total of 145 district health insurance schemes in 2008 
 operating at the time 
of initiating this study. Two districts and their schemes from the southern belt were 
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selected and these are Kpeshie Sub-Metro scheme (a new urban scheme which is 
operational and working in line with the NHIS) and the Dangwe West scheme (which is 
operational and has been working for over five years covering both out and inpatient care 
in line with NHIS). Two districts and their schemes from the middle belt have been 
selected, the AtwimaNwabiagya and Berekum schemes in Ashanti and Brong Ahafo 
regions respectively (functioning schemes, operating in line with the NHIS). Two 
schemes were also randomly selected from the relatively poor northern belt and these are 
the Lawra and West Gonga schemes which were also operating in line with the NHIS and 
have so far registered more indigents (who cannot pay their premiums and have to be 
fully subsidized by government) than the southern and middle belts of Ghana. A brief 
description of each district is provided below  
 
Figure 4. 1: Map of Ghana showing the location of selected districts 
 
 
4.2.1.1  Lawra 
The Lawra district has an estimated population of 96,841. The population density is about 
89 per square kilometre. About 83% of the population is engaged in subsistence 
agriculture (both crop and animal production). The soil here is poor and the weather 
conditions are unfavourable for good crop production. Food shortages are experienced 
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which lead most of the youth migrating to the southern part of the country in search of 
jobs. The district has two district hospitals and eight sub-district public health centres and 
two Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) centres. It has three functioning CHPS 
compounds.  The district has one private maternity home and one private clinic. It has 
213 trained Traditional Birth Attendants (TBA) and 13 chemical sellers, but most of these 
are located in the district capital. 
4.2.1.2 West Gonja 
The West Gonja district lies in the savannah zone of Ghana. The district is divided into 
six sub-districts. These are Damongo, Mole, Busunu, Daboya, Mankarigu.and Bawena. 
Just like the Lawra district, rainfall in the district is erratic and this irregular distribution 
of rainfall hinders agricultural activities and this leads to food shortages and hunger 
around the months of May/June. The district also experiences soil erosion and floods.  
About 60% of the population is engaged in agriculture, livestock farming and fishing. 
Quite a number of the inhabitants, mostly the youth, migrate to the southern part of the 
country in search of economic activities.  With regard to health services, the only district 
hospital is located in Damongo (the district capital) and is owned and operated by the 
Catholic church. It serves as a referral centre for the health centres. At the sub-district 
level, there are four health centres, three (3) clinics and one CHPS compound.  
4.2.1.3 Berekum  
Berekum is one of the 19 districts in the Brong Ahafo Region (see Figure 4.1).  The 
Berekum scheme has the highest number of NHI registered members in Ghana currently. 
More than half of the population is insured. With a population growth rate of 2.5%, the 
population is about 110,827 based on the 2000 population and housing census. The main 
economic activity in the region is farming and more than 70% of the population is 
engaged in farming. Unlike the northern districts, there is food sufficiency in this district. 
It is a major cocoa and timber producing area. It has three sub-districts. The Holy Family 
hospital is a mission health care facility that had served the district for over 50 years. It is 
the only referral point for 21 other facilities. The district has 11 public health facilities of 
which three are functional CHPS compounds. It has 10 privately owned health care 
facilities. 
4.2.1.4 Atwima Nwabiagya  
The district has two rainfall seasons each year and food is abundant. The district capital is 
Nkawie and has four sub districts: Abuakwa, Akropong, Barekese and Asuofua. The 
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district has a population of 185,074. With regards to health care, the district has one 
public district hospital and four health centres. It has also four private clinics and seven 
private maternity homes. The doctor-patient ratio is as high as 1:92,537 (GHS 2007). 
4.2.1.5 Kpeshie  
The Kpeshie district has one of the most vibrant urban health insurance schemes and was 
the first to be established in the Greater Accra Region in 2004 after the introduction of the 
NHIS. The  Kpeshie district has a population of 387,013. The major economic activities 
in the district are fishing, carpentry and commercial transportation.  There is a large group 
of formal and informal workers in the district. There are about 36 health facilities in the 
district and most of them are privately owned including ten private midwifery centres.  
The only hospital operating under the Ghana Health Service in the District is the La 
General Hospital. The doctor-patient ratio is 1:52,315 while the nurse-patient ratio is 
1:1,982. 
4.2.1.6 Dangme West  
Dangme West district is one of the five administrative and political districts in the Greater 
Accra Region. It covers about 45% of the land surface of the Greater Accra Region. It has 
a completely rural setting.  The population is estimated at nearly 100,000. Communities 
with the largest populations are Prampram, Dodowa and Old Ningo with slightly over 
56,000 people. Most of the communities are small and widely scattered with less than 
2,000 people. There is wide spread poverty among the people who are mostly subsistence 
farmers, fishermen and petty traders. A handful of artisans and civil servants are also 
found in Dodowa, Prampram and Asutsuare. The district has one of the oldest district 
health insurance schemes in the country. There are four health centres, three community 
clinics and three CHPS Zones for the public sector. These inadequate facilities are 
complemented by one mission facility, three private clinics and two maternity homes. 
There are three diagnostic laboratories, one each in the three largest communities. There 
is no hospital and referral cases are handled by neighbouring districts.   
4.2.2 Sample size determination for the SHIELD household survey 
According to the National Health Insurance (NHIC) 21% of the 21 million people of 
Ghana were insured with the NHIS in 2007 and are effectively protected from out-of-
pocket fees (Agyepong and Adjei 2008). At the time of going to field for the survey in 
August 2008, the NHI coverage was expected to increase from the 21% in 2007 to 
approximately 38% and so assuming an absolute precision of + 2.25% at the 95% 
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confidence level with an expected proportion of 38% NHIS coverage in 2008, we 
calculated a sample size based on the number of households in each of the six districts 
below. I further stratified the respondents according to the proportion of insured and 
uninsured population in 2007 (NHIC 2007). The proportion of rural/urban29 and regional 
household sizes30
 
 as captured in the 2000 population and housing census report (GSS 
2002) were also used to estimate the final sample population for the various districts. 
According to Wayne W.D. (1987), sample size can be calculated through the following 
formula:                                                             
                N z² p (1-p)                                                   
      n =  ──────────                                            
           d² (N-1) + z² p (1-p)                                               
                                                                               
       N: total population                                                    
       Z: value (corresponding to the confidence level)                     
       d: absolute precision                                                  
       p: expected proportion in the population      
      n: number of households 
 
This gives a sample size of 2980 households. 
 
4.2.2.1 Sampling frame and units 
The sampling frame was drawn from Enumeration Areas (E.A’s) of the six districts 
according to the 2000 population and housing census frame of the Ghana Statistical 
Service (GSS). The Enumeration Areas (EAs) are small area units of a population size of 
about 750 and between 150-200 households on average. EAs have important properties 
such as well defined boundaries that are represented on maps and relatively small sizes of 
clusters. Specifically, the EAs constitute the primary sampling units (PSU), while 
households within EAs constitute secondary sampling units (SSU). The samplying 
method for the SHIELD survey reflected the way the GLSS sample was done.   
 
                                                   
29 Urban proportion of district population (Atwima Nwabiagya 20.7%; Berekum- 54.7%; Dangme west 
23.6% and Kpeshie 100% ; Lawra 13.8%; West Gonja 13.7%) 
30 Regional household sizes (Ashanti Region –Atwima Nwabiagya 5.3; Brong Ahafo-Berekum-5.3; Greater 
Accra-Dangme west and Kpeshie 4.6; Upper West-Lawra 6.4; Northern Region-West Gonja 7.4) 
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A two staged stratified random sampling design was adopted31
                                                                           
. Initially a fixed number 
of 20 households per EA was considered and given our sample size of 2960 households, 
this yielded 148 EAs (i.e. =2980/20) in the first stage of sampling. The 148 EAs were 
then apportioned to each district based on the proportion of the population in that district. 
For instance Atwima Nwabiagya has a population of 158,989, which is 13.86% of the 
total population of the six districts and so the number of EAs that was sampled in the 
district was 21 (i.e. 13.85% of 149 EAs). Given that the urban population constituted 
20.7% of the population in Atwima Nwabiagya, the distribution of EAs between rural and 
urban in that district was 17 and 4 respectively. To obtain the number of households that 
was surveyed in rural and urban areas, I multiplied the number of EAs in each location by 
the 20 households that was initially considered (Table 4.1). 
Table 4. 1: Sample allocation and number of EAs 
      Number of EA's selected No. of HHs selected 
Districts Population* 
Proportion 
urban** Urban Rural 
 
Total*** Urban Rural Total 
Atwima Nwabiagya 158,989 20.7 4 17 21 80 340 420 
Berekum 108,078 54.7 8 6 14 160 120 280 
Dangme West 111,935 23.6 4 11 15 80 220 300 
Lawra 101,119 13.8 2 11 13 40 220 260 
Kpeshie 466613 100 60 0 60 1200 0 1200 
West Gonja 200,374 13.7 4 22 26 80 440 520 
TOTAL 1,147,108  82 67 149 1640 1340 2980 
*2007 population from population projection estimates, Ghana Statistical Service  
** Proportion urban population 
*** assuming a fixed take of 20 HHs per EA 
 
The EAs for each category (rural and urban) were selected using systematic sampling. 
For example, choosing four urban EAs from a total of 28 urban EAs in Atwima 
Nwabiagya was done by first randomly selecting an EA as a starting point; I divided the 
28 EAs by the 4 EAs to obtain a required systematic pattern of selection (i.e. 7). All the 
EAs were numbered serially and in the case of Atwima Nwabiagya the third EA was 
initially randomly selected and so the next EA that I selected systematically was 10th, 17th 
and 24th. Maps for the selected EAs were then prepared by the Cartography division of 
the Ghana Statistical Service. Map description forms were prepared and attached to each 
map for easy interpretation of the maps. In the second stage, the 20 households were 
selected systematically (the same way as was carried out with the EAs) for each EA to 
produce a total of 2980 households, stratified into insured and uninsured by the 
                                                   
31 The same method used in the GLSS 2005/2006 
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proportion insured and uninsured (Table 4.2). The target was then to interview a round 
figure of 3000 households but at the end of data processing, 2986 households were 
successfully interviewed and captured in the data base. The 14 remaining households had 
incomplete information that could not be captured in the data base  To identify an insured 
or uninsured household for interview, data collectors initially went round all households 
in the sampled EAs and screened the households. Households in each domain (insured 
and uninsured) were selected systematically. Head of households or adult respondents 
were asked a screening question about whether the head of the household or the spouse or 
both were currently insured with the DHI and had a valid Identification card (ID). The 
Data collectors went further to inspect the ID. A household where the head or the spouse 
or both had a valid ID, that household was considered an insured household. On the other 
hand where neither the head nor the spouse is insured, that household is considered an 
uninsured household. This criterion was adopted because in the NHI, children under 18 
are only covered if both parents (or one parent as the case may be) are insured.  
 
Table 4. 2: Distribution of the population and households into insured and 
uninsured 
*Urban district 
4.2.2.2 Sample size for the FGDs and IDIs 
Eight FGDs were conducted in each district except Kpeshie, stratified into adult (over 18 
years old) male and female, urban and rural and insured and uninsured  Since Kpeshi is 
mainly an urban area, four stratifications were used (i.e. adult male and female, insured 
and uninsured). Each FGD was made up of 8 to 12 members. These were randomly 
selected or sampled from the communities. In all, 44 FGDs were successfully carried out 
and transcribed in the six districts of the study. Seven in-depth interviews involving the 
six district health insurance scheme managers and the operation manager at the NHIS 
headquarters were successfully conducted and transcribed. All instruments that were 
Districts Population 
Insured 
pop 
Uninsure
d pop 
Number 
of HHs 
Household Sample Size interviewed 
Total 
Insured Uninsured 
Rural urban Rural urban 
Atwima Nwabiagya 158,989 88,313 70,676 29,998 420 186 46 154 34 
Berekum 108,078 65,413 42,665 20,392 280 75 94 45 66 
Dangme West 111,935 51,257 60,678 24,334 300 98 39 122 41 
Lawra 101,119 49,222 51,897 16,887 260 105 20 115 20 
Kpeshie* 466613 137,363 329,250 101,438 1200 - 354 - 846 
West Gonja 200,374 45,173 155,201 27,078 520 96 21 344 59 
 1,147,108 436,741 710,367 220,126 2,980 560 574 780 1066 Un
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administered at the community level were translated into the various local languages by 
experienced translators and back translated into English to ensure accuracy. 
4.3 Data collection methods 
Given the high illiteracy rates in the study areas, the study involved face-to-face 
interviews in the sampled areas. All interviews (except for the officials of the NHIS and 
the district scheme managers) were conducted in the respective local languages of the 
respondents. Fieldworkers were recruited and trained for approximately four weeks for 
the household survey and two weeks for the qualitative arm of the study. The training 
enabled the fieldworkers to understand and appreciate the concept of the study, how to 
‘enter’ the community and how to ask questions appropriately and in a culturally 
acceptable manner.  
 
A pilot test for the quantitative and qualitative studies was conducted before starting data 
collection. The pilot test was essential to identify various issues such as, the acceptability 
and reactions of the respondents to questions, length of time for interviews, logical 
sequence of questions, clarity of questions and need for more instructions on the 
questions. Pilot testing of both the quantitative and qualitative questions was carried out 
in areas and to people who were not part of the actual sample population. 
 
Permission was sought to tape record all the qualitative interviews. Detailed notes of the 
discussions were taken. Interviews were then transcribed verbatim and translated into 
English for analysis and report writing.    
 
4.3.1 Quality control 
To ensure the quality of work in the quantitative (household survey) arm of the study, 
completed questionnaires were checked by the researcher for errors and inconsistencies to 
ensure that questionnaires were corrected before data entry. Data entry screens were 
designed with all the necessary checks in place. The piloted questionnaires were used to 
test the screens before actual data entry. Any query or inconsistencies in the 
questionnaires were returned to the fieldworker(s) for a re-interview with the respondent. 
The researcher conducted further checks by randomly selecting questionnaires that were 
completed by fieldworkers and the respondents revisited and interviewed to make sure 
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that fieldworkers actually conducted interviews in the study areas. In all about 3% of 
households were revisited and interviewed. 
 
With the qualitative arm, the researcher ensured that information recorded was translated 
into English and transcribed verbatim (in the respondent’s own words) to guarantee one 
does not lose the original meaning of the expressions. The tapes were labeled and 
securely kept for future reference. The importance of ensuring quality work was stressed 
in the training and during the pre-testing of the study instruments.  
 
All the household survey questions were pre-coded and a database was constructed using 
the FoxPro (version 2.6) database management program by data managers. The 
questionnaires were put into batches and given form numbers to avoid any losses. The 
data was entered twice by trained data entry clerks. This was followed by a verification 
check by a data manager to ensure that the data were correctly entered.  
 
4.4 Introduction to Data analysis 
Analysis of financing incidence require two key variables, the ability to pay or socio-
economic status and the amount paid towards health care health care payment 
mechanism. Each of them is examined in relation to how they were analyzed in this 
study. The two main data sets used for the analysis was the GLSS and SHIELD 
household survey. To ensure that the SHIELD household survey was also nationally 
representative as that of GLSS, the survey was weighted. 
4.4.1 Weighting the SHIELD household survey 
To generate the weights, I assume that for each of k  individuals in the SHIELD sample 
survey, I have information on a set of J  relevant variables of interest denoted as: 
 
 ,1 ,[ , , ]k k k Jx x x ¢= K  ………………………………………………….. (4.1) 
 
These set of J  variables I used to ensure that the generated weights replicate the 
population of those with the same variable.  Basically, each of these variables is a 
dichotomous variable.  I used the following variables: sex, insurance status, location 
(urban/rural). 
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Therefore, ,1
K
k malek
x
=å  is the total number of males in the SHIELD sample.  The same can 
be obtained for the total number of females, insured individuals, those that live in urban 
areas and those that live in rural areas.  Generally, ,1
K
k Jk
x
=å  is the total number of 
individuals in the sample with a characteristic in the Jth variable.  Because there was no 
initial sample weights provided, all individuals were assumed to be self-weighted.  The 
re-weighting exercise here takes into account the variables that were used in the sampling 
process. The SHIELD sample was selected by taking into account insurance membership, 
region and location.  The sex variable was included to ensure demographic balance in the 
weights. 
 
My intention therefore is to generate the weight kw¢ for each individual such that: 
 
 
1
K
x k kk
T xw
=
¢= å ………………………………………… (4.2) 
 
is the total number of individuals with the specified characteristic of the variable x .  For 
example, maleT  will be the total number of males.  The estimated sample equivalent is ˆxT . 
 
Because this will require series of permutations, one simple way to go about Equation 
4.2, which I adopted here is to generate a dummy that encompasses the three relevant 
variables.  This gives me eight (8) permutations.  Therefore, Equation 4.2 simplifies to: 
 
 
, ,1M
K
Z k k mk
T w Z
=
= å
g
 for each m …………………………………. (4.3) 
 
Where ,k mZ  is the combination of the three dummy variables.  Note that ,1 ,[ , , ]k k k MZ Z Z= K  
where 8M = . The equivalent sample representation is 
,
ˆ
MZ
T
g
 where 1kw =  for all k . 
 
Basically, the weight variable of interest kw  appropriate in Equation 4.3 to generate the 
population totals is given as: 
 
 ( ), ,1 ˆ/
M
k z m z mm
w T T
=
= å ……………………………………………….. (4.4) 
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Where ,z mT  in this case, is the total number of people in the population of Ghana with the 
specified combination of characteristics m .  For example ,1zT  may be the total number of 
Ghanaians who are females, insured and reside in the urban areas.  This was obtained 
from the National Health Insurance Authority.    
 
Specifically, the weighting scheme in Equation 4.4 was done across the three Ghanaian 
zones (coastal, northern, and middle zone).  This was also possible as I obtained the 
population distribution of the variables under consideration across the zones. 
 
4.5 Measurement of ability to pay or socio-economic status (SES) variable 
The study related health care payments to SES within households to determine the 
incidence of health care payments. However, the problem arises as to how best to 
measure SES or living standards. The approaches available for measuring SES that are 
applicable to the evaluation of the incidence of health care payments are household 
income, household expenditure and household consumption. Sen (1999) has also 
proposed measuring individual welfare in terms of individual “capabilities”. He argues 
that wellbeing should be assessed by the attainment of some basic capabilities such as 
avoiding hunger and illiteracy (Martinez-Vazquez 2004). According to Sen, while income 
and individual preferences matter, they should be seen to be influencing capabilities only 
along with other factors. Sen’s argument simply adds to the uncertainty about how “best” 
to measure welfare or SES.  
 
All the arguments in the literature notwithstanding, the most ‘relevant’ measure of SES 
must depend largely on the availability of the required data. As Filmer and Pritchett 
(1998) noted in their study in Nepal, there is no perfect measure of SES. Income, and 
consumption expenditure measures have been used in different studies (O'Donnell, van 
Doorslaer et al. 2008) . In the comparative study of 13 Asian countries, income was used 
as a measure of SES in Japan. Consumption expenditure was used in the case of less 
developed countries like Nepal (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). Household assets 
are increasingly used as a practical approach in classifying SES in low-income country 
HH surveys. While asset-based wealth indexes are less likely to suffer from problems of 
recall bias and mis-measurement (of ownership of assets) by comparison with other 
measures in developing countries, they are not without their limitations such as focusing 
on ownership at the household level and thereby overlooking the fact that ‘poor’ 
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individuals may live in relatively wealthy households. Also, it is not always easy for 
households to convert assets into cash for the purposes of health care treatment. Reported 
income is often seen as a good measure of SES. The use of income as a measure of socio-
economic status for example, allows one to examine income elasticity in health care 
payments.  Income also measures the degree of household “command” over resources 
(which they could use if they so wish). Another advantage of income is that it generally 
costs only a fifth as much to collect income data compared to consumption expenditure 
data, so a larger sample for collecting of income data can be collected (World Bank 
2005).  
 
However, data on income have their drawbacks. First, the lack of an organized labour 
market particularly in SSA and income variability over time does not allow it to be a 
good estimate of SES especially in developing countries including Ghana. It is not clear 
what time period is appropriate for the measurement of income; should someone’s 
income be looked at for a year? Five years? Or a lifetime? Many students for instance are 
poor now but have good lifetime prospects. Secondly, income could be underestimated in 
developing countries with a large informal sector population and subsistence agriculture 
activities. People forget, particularly when asked in a single interview about items they 
may have sold or money they have received up to a year before. People may even be 
reluctant to disclose the full extent of their income for fear of taxation. Others may be 
reluctant to report income earned illegally (e.g. smuggling, stealing, and prostitution). 
Income could therefore be underestimated. For instance in 1969/70 socio-economic 
survey in Sri-Lanka, wages were found to have been underestimated by 30% whilst rent, 
interest and dividends were underestimated by as much as 78% (World Bank 2005).  
 
Due to the drawbacks with income measurement, household consumption expenditure is 
often preferred in this kind of analysis. It is important to note that consumption 
expenditure also has its drawbacks. For instance households tend to under-declare what 
they spend on luxuries (e.g. alcohol, cigarettes) or illicit items (e.g. drugs, prostitution). 
The amount that a household said they spent on alcohol according to the 1972/73 
household budget survey in the US was just half of the amount that companies said they 
sold (World Bank 2005). Another drawback is that, consumption choices made by 
households may be misleading (e.g. for instance if a rich household chooses to live 
simply, that does not mean that household is poor). It is also difficult to measure some 
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components of consumption including durables goods and it is very time consuming to 
record consumption in HH surveys. Despite these drawbacks, consumption expenditure is 
a better measure than income particularly in developing countries with a large informal 
sector. In the first place consumption expenditure smoothes out irregularities and so 
reflects long term average well-being. Secondly, consumption expenditure is obviously 
less understated than income because expenditure is easier to recall. Thirdly households, 
from empirical evidence are more able and willing to recall and report what they spent 
rather than what they earned. Finally consumption expenditure is also more closely 
related to a household’s wealth (or “permanent income”) under standard economic theory 
(Younger 1996). A detailed explanation of how this measure was obtained from the 
GLSS is provided below.  
4.5.1 Consumption expenditure  
The construction of the socio-economic measure in this study is based on household’s32
 
 
reported expenditure and consumption of food, housing and other non-food items. The 
measure also takes into consideration consumption from sources other than purchases 
from the market. This implies that consumption of own production (normally 
agricultural), imputed rents from owner-occupied housing units, transfers received in kind 
from any source and wage payments, are all considered in measuring the household 
consumption expenditure.  
In estimating the total consumption expenditure of households, information relating to 
household expenditure for a period of twelve months was collected using a GLSS 
questionnaire. Responses that related to frequent purchases were collected using shorter 
recall periods. Food purchases from the market, consumption of food items produced by 
the households themselves and non-food items that are frequently purchased such as 
soap, beverages and tobacco are those normally collected for shorter recall periods. The 
GLSS survey had recall periods of 1 day, two weeks, one month and one year, depending 
on the expenditure item being recorded. It is important to note that recall bias can arise if 
people can not easily recall certain events being interrogated. Recall of information 
depends entirely on memory which can often be unreliable. The literature notes that 20% 
of critical details of a recognized event are irretrievable after one year from the 
                                                   
32 A household is generally defined as a group of persons who eat together or share the same budget for 
household consumption and expenditure. The household was chosen as the unit of analysis because the 
household rather than the individual generally operates as an economic unit 
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occurrence and 50% are irretrievable after five years. Given the complex non-dependable 
process of storing incidents, it has been concluded that the accuracy of recall in humans 
significantly depends on the time interval between the event and the time of its 
assessment (Bradburn, Rips et al. 1987; Grosh and Glewwe 2000). Sections in the GLSS 
that capture information (frequently purchased and less frequently purchased, food and 
non-food items) used for the computation of consumption expenditure (SES) include 
section 2, 4, 7A, 7B, 7C, 7D, 8H, 9A, 9B, 10D and 12B. 
4.5.2 Unit of analysis for consumption expenditure 
The unit of analysis in the comprehensive health care financing incidence analysis and 
cross sectional case studies is the individual. However the data was collected at the 
household and the individual levels. A household is generally defined as a group of 
persons who eat together or share the same budget for household consumption and 
expenditure (Leibrandt and Woolard 1999). Given that individuals are not the same in 
terms of age and sex, an adjustment to the household was made for size and age structure 
through the application of an equivalence scale to SES in order to get per adult equivalent 
estimates (EQUITAP 2005). 
 
In the simplest case of obtaining per capita or individual level estimates, we can simply 
use the number of household members to convert household consumption or expenditure 
into individual consumption or expenditure. However, while per capita household 
consumption or expenditure is a convenient measure of living standards, it ignores 
household economies of scale which arise because some goods and services that are 
consumed by the household have public good characteristics as they generate benefits for 
other household members beside the primary consumer. There may even be age or gender 
specific differences in consumption and expenditure needs. In particular, it is necessary to 
reflect the consumption needs of children relative to adults. 
 
Due to these concerns, equivalence scales can be constructed as a function of the 
household size and demographic composition. There have been some attempts to come 
up with empirically based estimates of equivalence scales based either on a behavioral or 
subjective approach, but the more common approach is to simply define the number of 
adult equivalents (AE) in the household as: 
                                 ( )θαKAAE ii += , 
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  where A is the number of adults in the household, K is the number of children (0-14) α 
is the “cost of children”, and θ determines the degree of economies of scale. The 
challenge is determining the appropriate values for α and θ. This depends to some extent 
on where (e.g. developed or developing countries) the study is being undertaken. Deaton 
and Zaidi (2002) have proposed values of 0.3 -0.5 for α in developing countries (higher 
values in developed countries) and near unity for θ given the large proportion of 
subsistence food consumption in developing countries. Thus, the equivalent calculation 
applied in this study is given as: 
 
                                        ( ) 75.05.0 KAAE +=  
Both the per capita and per adult equivalent estimates are applied in this study to see if 
there are differences in the results. 
4.6 Financing mechanisms-calculations 
4.6.1 Taxes (direct and indirect) incidence 
An analysis of tax incidence is required in this study and this is so because the Ghanaian 
health care system like many other developing countries is significantly financed by 
direct and indirect tax revenue. The estimation of tax incidence33
 
 involves an analysis of 
the transmission of each separate tax from the place of statutory incidence to the place of 
economic incidence (burden) (Younger 1996; Martinez-Vazquez 2004). Economic 
incidence of a tax refers to where the reduction in real purchasing power falls, while the 
statutory incidence refers to who is legally required to pay the tax. It is the economic 
incidence that is of interest in any analysis of how taxes affect poverty and inequality. 
The question of who bears or is affected by what health care payment is critical because 
those whom the law requires to pay a tax are not necessarily those who suffer the decline 
in purchasing power associated with the transfer of resources to the government. Rather, 
households whose demand and supply for products and factors of production are 
relatively elastic will generally shift the burden of the tax onto those whose demand and 
supply are inelastic (Martinez-Vazquez 2004) 
 
                                                   
33 The basic methodology behind conventional models of tax incidence is to allocate tax burdens to 
different income groups, ordered from the rich to poor by deciles or quintiles of the population on the basis 
of a series of assumptions about who bears the final burden of taxes (Martinez-Vasquez 2004). 
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Consequently certain assumptions34
4.6.1.1 Direct tax 
 have to be made about the tax-shifting element. 
These shifting assumptions facilitate the allocation of the burden of each health care 
payment to different income groups (Martinez-Vazquez 2004). In this study, we assume 
that the incidence of direct tax (mainly personal income tax in Ghana) falls on the legal 
tax payer and indirect taxes (import, fuel levy, VAT) fall on the consumer. The only tax 
that has less agreement in the literature about its incidence assumption is corporate tax 
(CT). The taxes identified and measured in this study included direct taxes (income tax 
and corporate tax), indirect taxes (VAT, National health insurance levy-NHIL, Fuel levy, 
import duty). These taxes make up over 94% of the total taxes revenue collected in 
Ghana. In calculating the incidence of tax payments, each tax payment per household was 
estimated from relevant sections of the GLSS and triangulated with actual revenue of this 
tax from the tax collector or Ministry of Finance. This file was then combined with 
consumption expenditure to work out the percentage of expenditure contribution to that 
tax. A detailed description of how each tax was measured or calculated is presented 
below.   
Personal Income Tax:  
Due to the unreliability of reported income tax incidence analysts often use data obtained 
from tax authorities to estimate income tax incidence (Younger 1996; Younger, Sahn et 
al. 1999; Borghi, Ataguba et al. 2009). In this analysis however we used GLSS data 
(secondary data) to extract and estimate the incidence of Personal Income Tax (PIT). 
Questions relevant for the calculation of the incidence of personal income tax were found 
in section 4, part A (employment and time use). The specific questions of relevance 
included question 9 “what is the amount (including any bonuses, commissions, 
allowances or tips) received?” The answer to this question was to specify the amount and 
time35
                                                   
34 Conventional tax incidence studies compute tax incidence on the basis of annual data for income sources 
and expenditure patterns and also on the basis of several assumptions concerning how the different taxes 
are shifted to households either because they are consumers, producers or owners of factors of production 
(land, labour, and capital). These assumptions are known in the literature under different interchangeable 
names: “shifting assumptions” or “incidence assumptions,” or “sources and uses side effects”.   
 unit. Another question of relevance was question 12 “what was the status of 
[NAME] in this job?” and the third question was question 13 “For whom did [NAME] 
work for?” These questions were used to identify households who were earners of income 
in the formal sector and by law eligible for pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) or income tax 
payers. Their gross incomes were calculated taking into consideration the time (daily, 
35 Either income was daily, weekly, fortnightly, monthly quarterly or yearly.  
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weekly, fortnightly, monthly or annually) element or frequency of the income received as 
reported in question 9. The number of individuals falling into this category was 1415 and 
this represented about 15% of the individuals who were eligible to work (age 18 to 60). It 
is important to note that the reported income was after income tax since personal income 
taxes are normally deducted at source. Therefore it was necessary to work backwards to 
factor in the tax that had already been deducted to obtain the income before tax. This was 
done by applying the appropriate tax rates depending on the reported income of the 
individual. It is important to note that workers contribute 5% of their income for 
retirement (Price WaterHouse Coopers 2009) and this amount is collected by a social 
security organisation called SSNIT. This was therefore factored into the calculation. It is 
also important to note that dividends received and accrued on deposits and earnings in 
kind were excluded in the calculation. The tax rates were then applied to extract the 
personal income tax.   
 
As in many countries, income tax rates are progressive in Ghana. In 2005 (the year of 
interest because we are using the GLSS of 2005), the rates ranged from 0% for income 
less than ¢1.8million36
 
, to 28% for income exceeding ¢72 million. The income tax rate 
was applied to calculate estimated gross taxable income. It is important to note that 
though tax rebates exist, people have little knowledge about them and the very few who 
qualify for rebates often do not have the patience to go through the arduous process 
associated with securing them. Even tax officials have difficulty making accurate 
calculations of the rebates. Consequently, rebates were not considered in the calculations. 
The weights in the GLSS were applied to the estimated PIT to extrapolate to the 
population as a whole.  
The total income tax revenue (¢2,285.89 billion) for 2005 was obtained from the Ministry 
of Finance and the difference between the estimated PIT from the GLSS and that 
obtained from the Ministry of Finance was about 25% and this was allocated according to 
each household’s share of estimated PIT.  
 
 
 
                                                   
36Inter-bank exchange rate = ¢9,072.12 to US$1.00 in 2005:   ¢= the local currency of Ghana called cedis. 
In July 2007, there was redenomination of the currency and ¢10,000 became equivalent to GH¢1 (i.e. 
10,000 cedis (¢) became 1Ghana cedis (GH¢). 
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Corporate tax:  
There is a lack of consensus as to how corporate tax should be calculated. Different 
authors have assumed the burden or incidence of corporate tax differently (Younger 
1996; Martinez-Vazquez 2004). The key elements of the debate regarding this tax have 
been whether increases will result in lower wages, lower retail earnings or higher prices? 
Some writers assume an equal share (50%) of burden for consumers and shareholders 
(mainly foreign owned in Ghana) and others assume a 10% burden on consumers and 
90% burden on shareholders of the companies (Younger 1996; Martinez-Vazquez 2004).  
 
In this analysis, those households who reported dividends were identified in section 11 of 
the Ghana Living Standard Survey on “Income and Miscellaneous income and 
expenditures”. The question on the receipt of dividends was however lumped in with 
donations from churches and Institutions. It then became important to try to isolate the 
dividends and interest payments by matching the dividend question with shares 
ownership in section 12 part B “Assets and durable consumer goods”. Based on this 
information, about 1% of households in the sample owned shares. However, only 0.4% of 
the total households in the sample reported dividends (¢0 to ¢5,000,000). The file was 
then merged with the consumption expenditure file to measure the distribution of 
dividends received across SES groups. We would expect shareholders to lie in the highest 
wealth groups. In Ghana, 84% of dividends received were amongst those in the top 
quintile. The distribution of dividend receipts by SES groups was captured through the 
following STATA command “tabstat dividentpay [aweight=weights], statistics (sum) by 
(qunintile_r) columns (variables)”. 
 
The next stage of this calculation was to identify all goods manufactured by the 
companies responsible for over 70% of overall corporate tax payments as a basis for the 
allocation of tax where the burden is shifted to consumers. These are categorised first into 
food and non food and then into frequently purchased and less frequently purchased items 
and captured in section 9 of GLSS. The frequently purchased items were annualised by 
multiplying the expenditure by the number of weeks in a year (52) and dividing by the 10 
weeks of records (gen expfreqpuritem_corp=  s9bq1+s9bq2+ s9bq3+ s9bq4+ s9bq5 
+s9bq6 +s9bq7+ s9bq8+ s9bq9 + s9bq10) obtained in the GLSS survey (gen 
annlxpefreqitem_corp = expfreqpuritem_corp*52/10). The less frequently purchased 
items (which is in annual form) were obtained for the previous 12 months. The 
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expenditure on the annualised frequently purchased items was then added (gen 
ExpHHitems_corp=s9aq2+ annlxpefreqitem_corp) to the less frequently purchased items 
to give total expenditure on the goods of those producers which were subject to corporate 
tax. The total company tax revenue was obtained from the Ghana Ministry of Finance for 
2006 and then allocated to households based on their relative share of dividends received 
as well as their relative share of consumption of items whose producers were subject to 
corporate tax, taking into consideration the population weights.  
 
As indicated in the literature review, the balance of the burden of corporate tax on 
consumers and producers can be pictured in so many ways depending on inter alia the 
elasticity of the good in question. This study considered just two scenarios. The first is 
when corporate tax is shared equally (50/50) between consumers and shareholders and 
the other where corporate tax is totally (0/100) shifted to consumers, given assumptions 
about the elasticity of items manufactured locally and the lack of substitutes for them. 
Another scenario is when corporate tax is totally shifted to shareholders but in the 
Ghanaian situation where shareholders are very few (about 0.4% of households), that 
scenario is not realistic. Therefore I considered only the first two scenarios. Corporate tax 
as a percentage of household consumption expenditure by quintile was calculated. 
4.6.1.2 Indirect taxes 
VAT and NHIL: 
Value Added Tax (VAT) is a tax applied on the value that is added to commodities at 
each stage of the production and distribution chain. It thus forms part of the price the 
consumer pays for goods and services. In Ghana, VAT was introduced to replace the 
sales and service taxes then administered by Custom, Excise and Preventive Service 
(CEPS) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). VAT was introduced in the late 1990s 
and brought the sales and service taxes under one umbrella with a single positive rate to 
replace the multiple indirect tax regime. The current total rate of VAT collected is 15%. 
This includes a main VAT component of 10% with two additional sector specific 
components of 2.5% each. The first 2.5% is directly earmarked and allocated to the 
Ghana Education Trust Fund (GETFund). The other 2.5%, which was introduced in 2004 
by act of parliament and called the National Health Insurance Levy (NHIL), is collected 
separately but on the same goods and services that VAT is covering (Price Water House 
Coopers 2008). This means that two separate incidence calculations must be undertaken: 
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Firstly the 10% VAT that is placed in the general tax revenue pool and the second the 
NHIL which is directly and fully allocated to funding health care.  
 
The key issue to note in the VAT calculation is that VAT is assumed to be shifted to 
consumers.  Further and something not unique in Ghana was the fact that strong 
opposition greeted the introduction of VAT which led to its withdrawal and subsequent 
reintroduction. Because of this, a wide range of essential goods and services, mostly 
consumed or patronised by low income earners, are VAT exempt.  
 
To measure the incidence of VAT, household expenditure on goods and services that are 
not VAT exempt was extracted from section 9 part A and B of the Ghana Living Standard 
Survey (GLSS) data.  This section contains all the data on consumption expenditure on 
food and non-food (frequently purchased and less frequently purchased items). To obtain 
the actual VAT payment for each household, the VAT rate was applied to the sum of 
expenditures on goods and services where VAT is applicable (note that 162 out of 260 
frequently purchased and 96 out of 243 less frequently purchased goods and services 
were dropped because they are VAT exempt). The frequently purchased items identified 
as VATABLE were annualised and added to the consumption expenditure of less 
frequently purchased items. The standard VAT rate of 10% was applied to extract VAT 
payments such that the sum of the expenditure on VAT applicable goods was multiplied 
by 0.0909 (=10/110). Since NHIL is collected on the same goods and services as that of 
VAT, the same calculation was applied, but at a rate of 2.5%. The difference between 
VAT and NHIL is clearly that the entire NHIL goes to health.  
 
Information on the actual VAT (¢5,238.60 billion) and NHIL revenue amounts (¢352.43 
billion) was obtained from the tax collector. These were both higher than those estimated 
from the GLSS.  While this was to be expected due to some level of under-reporting in 
the GLSS data, the shortfall might also be attributed to the VAT and NHIL levied on 
intermediate goods and services that are not consumed directly by households and for that 
matter not reported by households. Therefore, the difference was allocated pro rata with 
each household’s share of estimated VAT and NHIL.   
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Fuel levy 
In 2005 the fuel levy was second only to VAT in its contribution to total tax revenue, 
contributing 17%. In computing the incidence of taxes and other health care financing 
mechanisms, the fuel levy is important and critical because fuel affects all sectors of the 
economy and an increase or decrease in the levy often has multiplier effects on many 
sectors of the economy.  The incidence of the tax on fuel was calculated by first 
identifying the users of the various types of fuel, both for public and private purposes 
(e.g. private vehicles versus public transport), in the GLSS. The key fuel types in Ghana 
are petrol, diesel and kerosene.   
 
The GLSS has questions on direct expenditure on the various types of fuels. Engine oil 
and lubricants are coded 145 and 146 respectively and are captured in section 9, part A 
(less frequently purchased items). Kerosene is coded 188 and is one of the frequently 
purchased items. Other frequently purchased items include petrol (coded 202) and diesel 
(coded 203) which are also contained in section 9, part B.  
 
In calculating expenditure on private transport and on fuel for other household uses, 
expenditure was extracted on engine oils and lubricants. We also extracted expenditure 
on kerosene, petrol and diesel. Given the fact that these are frequently purchased, they 
were annualised and added to the expenditure on engine oils and lubricants to obtain the 
annual household private expenditure on fuel.  
 
In terms of expenditure on public transport, four questions were identified in section 9, 
part B (frequently purchased items) that were relevant to the calculation and these 
include: passenger transport by railway (coded 211), passenger transport by road (coded 
215 and 216), passenger transport by sea and inland waterway (coded 220) and other 
purchased transport services (coded 224 and 225).  These were extracted and annualised 
by multiplying the ten weekly records by 52/10.  
 
The two data files (private expenditure on fuel and expenditure on public transport) were 
merged with the consumption expenditure files to get a single file. Important elements in 
these calculations are the prices of the various fuel types which we obtained from the 
Customs and Preventive services of Ghana. We also obtained the tax components of the 
various fuels. In generating total fuel levy for private use, we summed the household 
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private expenditure on the various fuel types (kerosene, petrol and diesel) divided these 
by the price per litre for each fuel type and then multiplied these by the tax rate for each 
fuel type. With public transport, we obtained the average cost of public transport per 
kilometre in 2005 which was about ¢500. We also know that an average of 4 litres of fuel 
lasts for about 25 kilometres, so the rate of fuel use per kilometre is 0.16. In generating 
the total fuel levy paid by public users, we obtained the sum total of household 
expenditure on public transport divided by public transport costs per kilometre, multiplied 
by the rate of fuel use per kilometre and by the average tax rate of fuel.  To get the total 
fuel levy paid, we added the total tax component on public expenditure and that of the 
private expenditure taking the weights into consideration and then calculated the 
household fuel levy as a percentage of household consumption expenditure per quintile. 
Further, the total fuel levy contribution as provided by the Ministry of Finance was 
¢3,762.95 billion. The difference between that and the estimated fuel levy from the GLSS 
was allocated pro rata to each household with their share of estimated fuel levy.  
 
Kerosene levy 
The incidence of fuel levy is calculated alongside kerosene, but since kerosene is 
generally consumed by the poor, it is important to examine its burden or incidence 
separately. Kerosene is often consumed more by those who do not have access to 
electricity. In remote areas, the high cost of kerosene can consume much of a family’s 
income. The question on kerosene in the GLSS was extracted. As stated above under fuel 
levy, kerosene (coded 188) is one of the frequently purchased items and is captured in 
section 9, part A of the GLSS. Given the fact that kerosene is a frequently purchased 
item, it was annualised. Key elements required for the calculation included the prices of 
kerosene per litre and the tax component of kerosene and these pieces of information 
were obtained from the Customs and Preventive services of Ghana. The estimated 
kerosene levy was triangulated as was done in the other taxes. 
 
Import duty 
It is often assumed that import duties passed on to consumers have the same incidence as 
VAT (Martinez-Vazquez 2004). Import is the third largest contributor of taxes after VAT 
and income tax in Ghana. To calculate the burden of import duty, a number of steps were 
taken. First, the expenditure on imported commodities by households were identified and 
extracted from section 9 part A and B of GLSS. Secondly we obtained the 2005 import 
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duty (itemised) from the Custom, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS). CEPS is the 
government organisation responsible for collecting import duty. The itemised import duty 
was allocated to households according to their consumption of the identified import 
commodities.  
4.6.2 Non–tax health care financing incidence analysis 
Apart from tax, health care in Ghana is also financed by Health insurance contributions 
made up of premiums (through DHIS) from the informal sector and pay roll deductions37
4.6.2.1 OOP payments 
 
(by SSNIT) to the National health insurance scheme as well as OOP payments. Before 
allocating the above health care payments to income groups by quintiles of households, it 
will also be important to provide the incidence assumption as to who bears the burden of 
each of them since the allocation of these health care payments will depend on these 
assumptions. The incidence of SSNIT contributions falls on formal sector workers and 
that of the DHIS contributions fall on those who are in the informal sector who are 
insured. OOP payments are also assumed to directly affect the consumer of the service. 
Below is a detailed explanation of how OOP payments and health insurance contributions 
were measured and calculated.  
Most previous estimates of the incidence of OOP payments in developing countries have 
relied on data from small-scale health surveys that are not nationally representative and 
often restricted to rural areas (Sauerborn, Adams et al. 1996; Ranson 2002). We analysed 
data from the GLSS which has comprehensive information on health care and household 
consumption expenditure and which allow us to estimate the magnitude of the incidence 
of OOP payments in Ghana. 
 
The variables of interest for the estimation of OOP payments incidence are captured in 
section 9 part A and B of the GLSS survey data. In section 9 part A (less frequently 
purchased items), we identified expenditure on health care such as all kinds of medical 
products, medical services including traditional healers, dental services, paramedical 
services and hospital services (ranging from code 116 to 132 in the GLSS 5 
questionnaire). These were captured annually so there may be a problem of recall bias. 
However, part B of section 9 (frequently purchased items) captures comprehensive eekly 
expenditures, using a weekly diary, continually for 10 weeks. In this section, information 
                                                   
37 2.5% of formal workers’ salaries go to the NHIF as their premium contributions to the NHIS  
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was captured that is relevant to the estimation of OOP payments including expenditures 
on health products such as pain killers, antibiotics, anti-malaria medicines, traditional 
Ghanaian drugs and other medical and pharmaceutical products excluding condoms. 
These range from code 193 to code 198 in the GLSS 5 questionnaire.   
 
Expenditure on the frequently purchased health items were annualised by multiplying by 
the number of weeks in a year (52) and dividing by the 10 weeks of records obtained in 
the GLSS survey. The less frequently purchased health items (section A in section 9) 
were obtained for the past 12 months (which is collected annually as stated earlier). The 
expenditure on the annualised frequently purchased health items was then added to the 
less frequently purchased items to give total OOP health expenditure. It should be noted 
that as in many countries, OOP spending is a significant proportion of health care 
financing in Ghana. The National Health Accounts (NHA) estimates in Ghana for 2006, 
using 2002 figures, revealed that Ghana’s OOP spending was 24% of total health 
spending (GHS 2006), although other literature (Leive and Xu 2008) suggests an even 
higher rate (about 48%) for  the same period. The key thing to note however is that OOP 
payments are generally a significant part of health care spending in Africa with Burkina 
Faso, Ethiopia and Zambia having OOP spending of 54%, 35% and 29% respectively 
(Leive and Xu 2008).   
 
For triangulation, we obtained OOP estimates from the NHA (¢570,059,068,095) and 
compared these with the GLSS survey weighted estimates (¢1,556,220,276,450.20). The 
latter was 2.7 times the former. One explanation for the difference could be the fact that 
NHA figures were for 2002 and the GLSS figures for 2005. Another reason could be that 
the NHA underestimated the true value of OOP expenditure on health care. However, 
when we inflated the NHA figure using an average inflation rate of 15% over the four 
years, the two sets of estimates almost coincide. Using the GLSS estimate we obtained 
the share of each household’s consumption expenditure per quintile. 
4.6.2.2 Health insurance contribution 
Comprehensive data on health insurance contributions including premium and 
registration payments largely by the informal sector, was collected through the SHIELD 
household survey. Information on issues such as amount of premium and registration fees 
paid, population covered by health insurance, reasons for not registering, types of health 
schemes, expected benefits from the scheme and the proportion of the population that 
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benefited from the scheme among others, were also collected through this survey from 
the six districts in 2008.  
 
The premium component of the health insurance contributions paid by the informal sector 
directly to the District health insurance schemes is by law (Act 650) graduated. It ranges 
from ¢72,000 to ¢480,000 (US$8.00 to US$53.00) (MOH 2004; Ministry of Health 
2006). The graduation was designed in such a way that the poor should pay the lowest 
rate and the higher rates should be paid by the rich. However, in reality it appears that the 
premium payment generally is flat which makes it all the more important to document the 
distribution of the burden of this payment mechanism across the population as a whole.  
 
The health insurance contributions (premium and registration fees) were summed, 
weighted and saved as a file called “insurance_informal”. To get the total national health 
insurance contributions, I needed to add the contribution from the formal sector. As 
mentioned earlier, 2.5% of the formal sector contribution to SSNIT is deducted for the 
national health insurance. The Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) is 
the organization managing pensions in the country and so they have information on the 
value of formal workers deductions paid to the national insurance scheme per year. 
Therefore, I obtained the total amount that SSNIT paid to the NHIS on behalf of formal 
workers in 2008 and allocated this to individuals with formal sector workers within 
households based on their reported income. This was also saved as a file called 
“insurance_formal”. The GLSS was used to predict the consumption expenditure variable 
(see Box 4.1) in the SHIELD household survey and saved as a file called “con_exp” 
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Box 4. 1: Predicting consumption expenditure variable in the SHIELD survey 
 
Given that the GLSS was conducted about a year after the launch of the National Health Insurance scheme, 
the information collected on the status of the NHIS will have changed since that time. There is also the 
need to collect information on factors affecting enrolment in the NHIS. For these reasons there was a need 
to conduct the SHIELD survey. Since that survey did not capture very comprehensive consumption 
expenditure (certainly not as comprehensive as in the GLSS), this variable (which is a proxy measure of 
socio-economic status or ability to pay as required for the computation of financing incidence) must be 
linked from the GLSS to the SHIELD survey. In the SHIELD survey there were variables that sought 
information on frequent spending per month. These included expenditure on health care, clothing, utilities, 
transportation, fuel for cooking and household use, household utensils and other frequently purchased 
items.  The assumption was made that these variables are analogous to the frequent spending variables in 
the GLSS data. The expenditures on frequently purchased items, age of the head of the household and 
location (rural/urban and region) of the household were identified and used to predict the total consumption 
expenditure through a log regression model [(reg link lfreqexp age1 age2 age3 reg1-reg3 urban 
[pw=weight]]. The correlation of the prediction was about 80%. The prediction [predict consexp1, xb] was 
based on the GLSS and coefficients obtained from this regression were used to predict the consumption 
expenditure in the SHIELD survey.  The total household consumption expenditure variable was then 
generated by taking the exponential of the linear prediction plus the Duan Smear correction factor [gen 
consexpend= exp (consexp1+duan_smear)]. (The Duan Smear correction factor (Duan N 1983)  is the 
exponential of the root mean square [sca duan_smear= (((`e(rmse)')^2)/2)].) The consumption expenditure 
so predicted in the SHIELD survey is what is used to calculate the incidence of health insurance 
contributions. These are then compared with the values from the GLSS 
 
The two files (insurance_informal and insurance_formal) were merged with the 
household consumption expenditure file to obtain a single file which enabled the 
calculation of the incidence for health insurance contribution.  
 
For all the financing mechanisms, Table 4.3 provides a summary of each type of 
financing mechanism and the quantification technique.  
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Table 4. 3: Financing incidence analysis estimation techniques 
 
Component  Share in Total Health 
care financing 
Incidence 
assumption 
Source of 
Data 
Ratesa Computation technique 
Taxes 47%     
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
5.2% Legal tax 
payer 
GLSS, 
2005/2006 
5%-20% depending 
on income level. 0% 
¢1,800,000. Rebates 
is not a common 
practice in Ghana 
Apply the appropriate tax rate and tax thresholds on the gross 
taxable income (salaries and wages received, income from 
business or professional practice/activities, part of dividends and 
interest received and/or accrued on deposits) of working age 
individuals within each household within the taxable range  
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
7.1% Shareholde
rs and 
consumer 
GLSS, 
2005/2006 
Rate is 28% and this 
is paid quarterly in 
the case of large 
companies. 
Apportioning the total corporate tax receipts based on the 
Ministry of Finance data to households based on the tax shifting 
assumptions. Assumption of tax shifting includes certain 
percentage borne by shareholders (the GLSS collected 
information on those who receive dividends) and the rest by 
households through consumption. Two tax shifting scenarios 
range was assumed in this study. The first was equal (50:50) tax 
burden shared between consumers and shareholders/capital 
owners and the second was the assumption that the full (100%/ 
burden of falls on consumers.  
Value 
Added Tax 
(VAT) 
11.3% consumer GLSS, 
2005/2006 
15% on standard rate 
goods and services  
The VAT rate is applied to expenditure of goods and services 
that are standard rated excluding the zero-rated and exempted 
goods (since 2.5% is specifically earmarked fund for education 
and 2.5% for health services, 10% was considered in the 
calculations) 
National 
Health 
Insurance 
Levy 
2.4% consumer GLSS, 
2005/2006 
2.5% on standard 
rated goods and 
services  
The same distribution across households as VAT but at 2.5%. 
NHIL rate is applied to expenditure of goods and services that 
are standard rated excluding the zero-rated and exempted goods 
(the same goods and services as VAT).  
      
Import 
Duty 
8.0% consumer GLSS, 
2005/2006 
Varied depending on 
item 
Comprehensive list of import duty and amount received on duty 
for each item was obtained from CEPS and these amounts were 
allocated to households based on reported consumption of these 
imported items from GLSS 
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Component  Share in Total Health 
care financing 
Incidence 
assumption 
Source of 
Data 
Ratesa Computation technique 
Fuel Levy 8.5% consumer GLSS, 
2005/2006 
¢716.72/litre for 
petrol 
¢429.96/litre for 
Diesel 
¢353.88/litre for 
kerosene 
Since fuel is consumed by households (for both personal and 
public transport) as well as corporate users, estimation involved 
a process of generating the component attributable to public 
transport users, users of private transport and those attributable 
to users in businesses 
Other 4.3%  GLSS, 
2005/2006 
Includes taxes on 
cigarette, drinks, 
stamps, airport 
departures, and 
unidentified levies.  
Not calculated (small share of total revenue) 
Insurance  5%     
National 
Health 
Insurance 
Scheme 
5% payer SHIELD 
household 
survey 
2008b  
 Total national health insurance contributions is made of 
premiums contributions of the informal sector and pay roll 
deduction of formal sector workers  
Out-of-
pocket 
payment 
48% payer    
OOP 
payments 
48%  GLSS, 
2005/2006 
 Comprehensive household expenditure on medicines, 
consultations,  preventive and curative treatments,  procedures  
excluding transportation were summed up 
a This  applies to the taxes and are based on the 2005/2006 assessment year 
b  This was my own survey that was collected to complement the GLSS data and to answer key questions on the NHIS 
NB: GLSS-Ghana Living Standard Survey 
*Inter-bank exchange rate = ¢9,072.12 to US$1.00 in 2005 
 Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
 111 
4.7 The Kakwani index for measuring progressivity of health care financing 
In addition to estimating contributions to each financing mechanism as a percentage of 
consumption expenditure in each quintile, it was necessary to calculate the incidence of 
financing using the concentration index and the Kakwani index to establish whether a 
health care financing mechanism is progressive, regressive or proportional relative to 
ability to pay (ATP) or SES. The Kakwani index used in this study enables an illustration 
of the degree of relative progressivity of each health care financing mechanism and the 
overall health care financing incidence (Kakwani 1977). The Kakwani index is defined as 
twice the area between the Lorenz curve38
 
 for gross income LX(p) (Figure 4.2), 
Figure 4. 2: Lorenz curve 
 
 
 
and the concentration curve for health care payments, LT(p) (the p in parentheses here 
indicates the person’s or household’s rank in the gross income distribution) (Kakwani 
1977; Cissé et al. 2006). LX(p) shows the relationship between the cumulative  percentage 
of income and the cumulative population, where the individuals (or households) are 
ranked according to their income or consumption (expenditure), whilst LT(p) is formed by 
plotting the cumulative proportion of the population (ranked by income or consumption) 
against the cumulative share of health care payments (Kakwani 1977). Thus, we have:  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
38 The Lorenz curve is a graphical device used to demonstrate the equity of distribution of a given variable 
such as income, asset ownership or wealth. 
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The degree of progressivity of the health care financing system can be assessed by 
calculating the difference between the concentration coefficient of health care payments, 
CT and the Gini39
 
 coefficient of gross income, GT. The value of πk  ranges from -2 to 1 
(Kakwani 1977). A positive Kakwani index (πk > 0) indicates the health care financing 
system is progressive, so that the Lorenz curve of income lies above the concentration 
curve of payments, and vice versa if it is regressive (πk < 0). A Kakwani index  of zero (πk 
= 0) indicates proportionality of health care payments and thus the Lorenz and 
concentration payments curves would coincide (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 1993; Cissé 
et al. 2006). The statistical significance of the Kakwani index was also calculated. In 
other words the significance of the difference between the concentration index and the 
Gini coefficient was calculated and presented in a summary table (Table 5.15).  
In addition, the Kakwani index for total health care payments was calculated as the 
weighted average of the indices for the individual components of finance. That is, 
 
 
Where πk is the Kakwani index for finance source k and the weight wK is the proportion of 
total expenditure on health care accounted for by that source (EQUITAP 2005). 
 
4.8 Estimating catastrophic health care payments 
According to the World Health Organisation, one conception of fairness in health care 
financing is whether or not households and individuals are protected from catastrophic 
health care expenditure (World Health Organization 2005). Indeed there is considerable 
worldwide interest in fairness in health care financing (World Health Organization 2000; 
                                                   
39 The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households 
deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of zero measures perfect equality while an index 
of 100 implies perfect inequality 
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Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2005; McIntyre, Garshong et al. 2008; 
O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008; Yip and Hsiao 2008; Mooney 2009; Yates 2009). 
Households without comprehensive health insurance or tax financing cover such in China 
and the USA face the risk of incurring large expenditure when a household member falls 
ill and that is catastrophic if health care expenditure is too large relative to the available 
resources to the household (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008; Yip and Hsiao 2008). It 
should be noted however that large health expenditure to a household does not actually 
mean that the household is making catastrophic health care payment. It is only 
catastrophic when the health care expenses disrupt the household living standards with 
regards to the purchase of other essential non-medical goods and services (Xu, Evans et 
al. 2003; O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). According to O’Donnell and others the  
best way to measure catastrophic health expenditure is by the use of longitudinal data 
which will allow for observation over time and how living standards of households have 
been disrupted through health shocks (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). However, in 
the absence of such longitudinal data, cross sectional data (usually for a year) is used in 
which case some approximation of the disruptive effect of health care expenditure on 
material living standards must then be made (Xu, Evans et al. 2003; Wagstaff 2006; 
O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008).  
 
A more popular approach, which is applied in this study, is to define medical spending as 
catastrophic if it exceeds some fraction or threshold of household income or total 
expenditure in a given period of time (which is usually one year). This can be assessed 
using cross sectional data. However, there is no consensus in the literature on the 
threshold proportion of household expenditure (Xu, Evans et al. 2003). However, 
thresholds of 10% and 40% (for total expenditure and non-food expenditure respectively) 
are most often cited as representing the points at which the absorption of household 
resources by spending on health care is considered to impose a severe disruption to living 
standards (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). A major limitation of these thresholds is 
that they are arbitrary and is obviously a matter of judgement. It is therefore best to 
present results for a range of values for the thresholds (e.g. 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 
30% 35%, 40%) and readers can choose where they prefer to give more weight.  
 
The assumption in this study (and which is supported by the literature) is that households 
have total gross expenditure of x and expenditure on food as f(x). Catastrophic threshold 
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is defined to be zcat where zcat is y% of x. Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2003) have 
proposed the following indices in their studies. These indices are used in this study to 
measure and explain both catastrophic health care payment and the impoverishment 
effect of health care payment (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer E et al. 2008).  
4.8.1 Catastrophic Payment Headcount Index: Hcat .  
This is defined as the percentage of individuals in the sample population whose 
healthcare expenditures as a proportion of their income exceed the threshold zcat. Let Ti be 
the healthcare payment of the ith household, x the total household expenditure and x-f(x) is 
household non-food expenditure(O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). Catastrophic 
payment is incurred if  




 >= zcatx
TE 1  or 





>
−
= zcatxfx
TE
)(
1  where T is the OOP 
payments, x total household expenditure; f(x) is household food expenditure and zcat is 
some threshold. The value of zcat is subjective and it should vary depending on if x or x-
f(x) is the denominator. 
 
Then the incidence of catastrophic or catastrophic payment headcount index is defined as:  
uEH E
N
i icat N
== ∑ =1
1 -------------------------------------------------------------- (4.5) 
Where: N = sample size 
 
The difficulty with this measure is that it fails to capture the height above which 
individuals exceeding the threshold actually exceed it.  
 
4.8.2 Catastrophic payment gap index, Gcat:  
This measure captures the average degree by which health care payments (as a proportion 
of income) exceed the threshold zcat. In other words it is defined as the amount of 
expenditure by which (given  0>Ei ) Ei  actually exceeds the threshold divided by 
the sample size. Formally then, the catastrophic payment gap may be specified as:  
uOG O
N
i icat N
== ∑ =1
1    (For 0>Oi )----------------------------------------------- (4.6) 
/i i i catO T x z= -  
Where uO  = the mean ofOi . The mean positive gap ( catMPG ) is given as  
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uuEOMPG EO
N
i i
N
i icat
//
11
== ∑∑ == ----------------------------------------------- (4.7) 
   
Equation 4.7 can be expressed as 
 
*O E catu u MPG=  
 
Thus, the overall mean catastrophic ‘gap’ equals the fraction with a positive gap times the 
mean positive gap. 
 
According to Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2003) the difficulty with the approaches 
outlined above is that they are blind as to whether it is the poor or the better-off 
individuals who exceed the threshold (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003; O'Donnell, van 
Doorslaer et al. 2008). Most societies in the world including Ghana will care more if it is 
an individual in the lowest quintile whose health care spending (as a share of income) 
exceeds the threshold than if it is a rich individual. One way of getting around this issue is 
to see how the proportions of those exceeding the threshold vary across the income 
distribution. This can be done formally using the concentration index for Ei, which can be 
defined as CE (see earlier discussion on the calculation of concentration indices). A 
negative value of this indicates a greater tendency for the poor to exceed the payment 
threshold, whilst a positive value indicates a tendency for the better-of to exceed the 
threshold (Xu, Evans et al. 2003). 
 
Again a difficult arises. As Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2003) noted, the headcount (uE) 
and the concentration index (CE) could move in different direction over time (Wagstaff 
and van Doorslaer 2003). The uE may be higher among the poor than in among the rich in 
one region of country but the CE could be lower among the poor than the rich in another 
region. In such circumstances, it will be useful to have an index trading off the two 
dimensions (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003; Xu, Evans et al. 2003; Ekman 2007; 
Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2007; van Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 2007; 
O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). This can be done by constructing a weighted 
version of the headcount that takes into consideration whether it is the better-off or 
mostly the poor people who exceed the threshold.  
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4.8.3 Weighted Catastrophic Payment Head Count Index, WEcat. 
WEcat weights the variable indicating whether a person has exceeded the threshold, Ei by 
the individual’s rank in the income distribution. If WEcat > Hcat,, then it is the poor who 
mostly exceed the threshold but if WEcat < Hcat, then the incidence of catastrophic 
spending is concentrated on the rich (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2001; Xu, Evans et al. 
2003). To obtain an index for weighted catastrophic payment head count, define: 
12 ii
N rw
N
+ − =   
   
 
Where wi (weight) is equal to 2 for the most disadvantaged person and this declines to 
2/N for each person step up through the income distribution, and reaches 2/N for the least 
disadvantaged person. ir = i
th household’s absolute rank in the income distribution for 
1 ir N≤ ≤ . Where 1 2 3 ... Nr r r r< < < <  reflects the fact that households are ranked in 
ascending order of income. Weighting the Ei by wi, , I obtain  
 
  1Ecat i iW w EN
= ∑ -------------------------------------------------------------------- (4.8)  
        
 
Given the weighting used in (4), the index  WEcat can be written as 
*(1 )Ecat E EW u C= − --------------------------------------------------------------- (4.9) 
 
Equation 4.9 is simply the catastrophic payment headcount multiplied by the 
concentration index. If those who exceed the threshold tend to be poor, the concentration 
index CE will be negative and this will raise WEcat above uE. Thus, the catastrophic 
payment problem is more complex than simply looking at the fraction of the population 
exceeding the threshold, since it overlooks the fact that it tends to be the poor who exceed 
the threshold and visa versa when CE is positive (Xu, Evans et al. 2003; Limwattananon, 
Tangcharoensathien et al. 2007). 
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4.8.4 Weighted Catastrophic Payment Gap Index, WGcat. 
This measures the tendency of large excesses (overshoot) of catastrophic payments to be 
concentrated among the worst-off. If WGcat > Gcat, then large excesses tend to be 
concentrated among the poor. If WGcat < Gcat, large excesses tend to be concentrated 
among the well-off. The index for measuring the extent of large excesses that are 
concentrated among the poor is the weighted gap index (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer E et al. 
2008). It is defined as: 
G
cat i i
IW w O
N
= ∑  ------------------------------------------------------------------ (4.10) 
Given the weighting used in (6), the index  WGcat can be written as 
 
*(1 )Gcat O OW u C= − ------------------------------------------------------------- (4.11) 
Where the CO is the concentration index of the overshoot or excesses in catastrophic 
payment gap. A negative CO means a tendency for large excesses to be concentrated 
among poorer individuals. Equation 4.11 has the same logic as Equation 4.9. Below is a 
summary of the different techniques of catastrophic payments. 
Table 4. 4: Summary of different techniques of catastrophic payments 
 
 Types of measures Techniques of measurements Limitation  
1 Catastrophic Payment 
Headcount Index: 
Hcat 
-Healthcare expenditures as a 
proportion of their income exceed 
the threshold zcat 
it fails to capture the height above 
which individuals exceeding the 
threshold actually exceed it 
2 Catastrophic payment 
gap index, Gcat: 
-Measure captures the average 
degree by which health care 
payments (as a proportion of 
income) exceed the threshold zcat 
. 
-Blind to  whether it is the poor or 
the better-off individuals who 
exceed the threshold 
3 Weighted 
Catastrophic Payment 
Head Count Index, 
WEcat. 
-Weighted version of the 
headcount that takes into 
consideration whether it is the 
better-off or mostly the poor 
people who exceed the threshold.  
 
-Catastrophic payment problem is 
more complex than simply looking 
at the fraction of the population 
exceeding the threshold, 
4 Weighted 
Catastrophic Payment 
Gap Index, WGcat. 
-Measures the tendency of large 
excesses (overshoot) of 
catastrophic payments to be 
concentrated among the worst-off 
-Blind as to how far catastrophic 
payment causes hardship to 
individuals or households 
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4.9 Estimating the Poverty Impact of Healthcare payments 
The difficulty that still remains with catastrophic payment is that the approach is blind as 
to how far catastrophic payment causes hardship to individuals or households. An 
alternative perspective is that of the impoverishment effect measure (O'Donnell, van 
Doorslaer et al. 2008). The main focus of this approach is that no one ought to be pushed 
into poverty or deeper into poverty because of health care expenses. Impoverishment can 
result from incurring medical expenditure as this can be at the expense of meeting basic 
needs such as food, clothing and shelter. However these forms of impoverishment are not 
normally captured by the standard approach to the measurement of poverty, which 
compares total household expenditure with a poverty line that is not sensitive to highly 
variable health care need. 
 
 4.9.1 Poverty line 
Measuring the impoverishing effects of health care costs requires the establishment of a 
poverty line. Two absolute poverty lines developed and used by the World Bank-
(international) $456.25 (¢1,697,519.19) and $912.50 (¢3,395,038.38) per capita per year 
at 2005 purchasing power parities (PPP) or $1.25 and $2.50 per capita per day were 
applied. These are a revised version of the 1993 purchasing power parities of $1.08 and 
$2.15. The $1.25 (lower poverty line) is the median of the ten lowest poverty lines 
operational in a sample of low-income countries. This represents a very low living 
standard that is often referred to as extreme poverty. Individuals whose total expenditure 
falls below this line are considered to be in extreme poverty, since even if they allocated 
their entire budgets to food, they would not be able to meet their basic food requirements. 
The implication is that, a Ghanaian is considered extremely poor if he/she spent less than 
¢4,650.74 a day. This does not make explicit allowance for health care needs. The higher 
or upper poverty line is simply twice the lower one and is intended to roughly correspond 
to the threshold at which someone would be considered poor in middle–income countries. 
However it is still used for low-income countries since it still represents a very low living 
standard that is unlikely to be sufficient to cover health care needs. Since health care 
needs are not explicitly reflected in these low absolute poverty thresholds, it is consistent 
to compare them with household resources net of out-of-pocket payments. 
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4.9.2 Poverty headcount index 
This measures the proportion of population that is poor. For the purpose of this study it is 
divided into two: the pre-payment and post-payment poverty indices. Let xi be individual 
i’s pre-payment income. Then define 1preiP =  if prepovix z<  (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 
2003; Xu, Evans et al. 2003). The pre-payment poverty headcount is equal to  
 
1
1
pre
Npre pre
pov ii pN uH P== =∑ ----------------------------------------------------- (4.12) 
 
Where N is the sample size 
 
4.9.3 Poverty gap index 
This index indicates the percentage of the poverty line necessary to raise an individual 
who is below the poverty line up to that line. It gives the depth to which individuals who 
fall below the poverty line are actually below it. Denote 
pre
ig the pre-payment poverty 
gap. This is equal to prepovix z− if prepovix z< , and zero otherwise (Xu, Evans et al. 2003; 
O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). The average pre-payment poverty gap is defined as 
1
1
pre
preNpre
pov i i gN gG u== =∑ -------------------------------------------------------- (4.13) 
 
4.9.4 Normalized poverty gap index  
This index measures the severity of poverty among the extremely poor. It is the weighted 
sum of the poverty gaps (as a proportion of the poverty line), where the weights are the 
proportionate poverty gaps themselves. This index gives more weight to observations that 
fall well below the poverty line. The normalized pre-payment poverty gap is defined as  
pre
pre pov
prepov
pov
GNG z
= ---------------------------------------------------------------------- (4.14) 
 
4.9.5 Normalized mean positive gap  
1 1
/ /pre pre
preN Npre pre
ipov i ii g pgMPG u uP= == =∑ ∑ -------------------------------- (4.15) 
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From Equation 4.15 we have  
 
*pre pre prepovg pu u MPG=  
This means the average (pre-payment) poverty gap equals the fraction with a positive gap 
multiplied by the mean positive gap (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008).  
 
Note that to get the indices for post-payment which is analogous to the pre-payment 
indices, we replace the pre-payment poverty line prepovz , by post-payment poverty line 
post
povz  and all other superscripts ‘pre’ by the superscript ‘post’  
 
The difference between the relevant prepayment and post-payment indices are taken as 
the measures of poverty impact of out-of-pocket payments and these are: 
 
 
1. Headcount:    H Post prepov povPI H H= −  
2. Poverty gap:    G Post prepov povPI G G= −  
3. Normalize poverty gap: NG Post prepov povPI NG NG= −  
4.10 Analysis of Factors affecting FIA (insurance) 
Analysis of the qualitative data, focused on emerging themes such as strategies for the 
expansion of the NHI scheme. This was done after all the transcribed interviews were 
reviewed. Analysis was done manually using appropriate codes and also on sub-themes 
such as  
 Contribution rates and frequency of payment 
 Perception of the benefit package 
 Exemption criteria and mechanisms, 
 Perception of quality of care, 
 The general satisfaction with the NHI  
 Challenges of the NHI.  
 
These were the key issues that emerged as factors affecting the people’s willingness to 
enroll or renew their membership with the NHIS (see conceptual framework). The unit of 
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analysis for the qualitative arm of the study was the individual or group’s view based on 
these emerging themes and sub-themes.  
4.11 Ethical considerations  
The study adhered to the Helsinki Declaration and so the protocol of the study was 
reviewed and approved by the Ethics committees of the Faculty of Health Science of the 
University of Cape Town and the Ghana Health Service before commencement of the 
study.  
 
4.11.1 Human use 
The main human involvement stems from the household survey and qualitative studies 
which involved interviews of household heads, community members and officials of the 
NHI at the district and at the headquarters.  
 
4.11.2 Consent procedures  
Permission (through community entry) was sought from the chiefs and elders of the study 
areas for the household surveys.  Individual written consent (see Appendix E) was sought 
in the case of the household level interviews (household heads), FGDs (community 
members) and in-depth interviews (district and headquarters officials of NHI). 
Interviewees were informed of the purpose of the study, and that they were free to 
participate or not to participate in the study. They were also informed that they were free 
to withdraw from the study at any stage. The consent forms were available in the 
language of the interviewee.  
 
4.11.3 Risks and benefits to the participants 
No physical or mental risks were posed in the course of conducting the study except for 
the ‘invasion’ of privacy as a result of disclosure of information such as consumption 
expenditure, household asset ownership and other socio-economic and demographic 
variables. Participants were reminded that the data was going to be aggregated in the 
analysis and there was not going to be disclosure of an individual’s identity in the data to 
a third party.  
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The benefits of being part of the study were that information gathered through this study 
will contribute to an appropriate and equitable universal health care financing system for 
the people of Ghana. 
 
4.11.4 Confidentiality 
Data collected from each study participant was kept in a binder and data forms containing 
personal identifiers were kept in locked cabinets and accessible only to the researcher. 
With the secondary or electronic data, apart from signing an agreement with the Ghana 
Statistical Service to use the data only for the purpose for which it was obtained, names 
and other identifiers of individuals or households were removed from the data before 
analysis. 
 
4.11.5 Plan for utilization of results 
Apart from submitting the thesis to the University of Cape Town, brief copies of the 
report will be made available to the other stakeholders (e.g. Ghana Health Service and 
WHO) involved in the study and the results will be published in peer reviewed journals. 
The results of the study will also be disseminated at the community, district, and the 
national levels.  
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Chapter Five: Progressivity of health care financing 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides critical, in-depth estimations of the incidence of the various health 
care financing mechanisms in Ghana. These are based on living standard measures of per 
capita and adult equivalent household consumption expenditure. Detailed calculation of 
all direct taxes (personal income tax and corporate tax), indirect taxes (VAT, fuel levy 
and import duty) and out-of-pocket payments using the GLSS survey data (conducted in 
2005/2006 with a sample of 8687 households) are presented. With respect to National 
Health Insurance (NHI) however, the SHIELD40
 
 household survey conducted in 2008 is 
used because, at the time the GLSS was conducted, the level of NHI coverage was low 
(less than 9%).  
5.1 Taxes (direct and indirect) 
The primary aim of taxation is to raise revenue for the government to meet its spending 
requirements on, for example, health and education. This is the case in both economically 
advanced economies like the USA and Japan and developing countries such as Ghana. In 
addition to generating revenue, taxation provides a means for promoting economic and 
social policies. The government uses taxation to exercise control over the economy as a 
whole. By adjusting taxes and tax rates, the government is able to influence consumption, 
savings and investment in the economy. 
 
According to Adam Smith41
                                                   
40 SHIELD: Strategies for health insurance for equity in less developed countries. 
, an excellent system of government can be created based on 
certain principles that are not only established in the country but adhered to. To him, such 
principles should be used as a guideline for creating systems of taxation as well. He 
identified four principles of taxation and these are what is popularly known as the 
“canons of taxation”. These include equity, certainty, economy and convenience. Equity 
in taxation warrants that people’s taxes should reflect their ability to pay and hence that 
the amount of tax paid should be higher the higher the income. With regard to certainty, 
the tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain and not arbitrary. 
According to Adam Smith, the time and manner of payment as well as the quantity to be 
http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/heu/SHIELD/about/about.htm 
 
41 http://www.bized.co.uk/virtual/economy/policy/tools/income/inctaxth1.htm, accessed on 17/11/2009 
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paid ought to be clear to the contributor and to every other person. The economics of  
taxation also requires that every tax ought to be designed so as both to take out and to 
keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible relative to what it brings into the 
public treasury. In other words, the collection of tax should involve as little expense as 
possible. Finally, a tax needs to be convenient. This principle denotes that every tax, 
whether a direct or indirect tax, ought to be levied at the time or in a manner, in which it 
is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay. In Ghana, as in other countries, 
taxes are classified into two main types, direct and indirect.  
5.1.1 Direct taxes 
Direct taxes are those paid directly to the revenue authorities. The main direct taxes in 
Ghana are Personal Income Tax (PIT) and Corporate Tax (CT). In Ghana, as is the case 
in many other developing countries, direct taxes represent between 28% and 32% of total 
tax revenue. However, in most developed countries (e.g. the United Kingdom, United 
States of America, Japan and Germany), direct taxes contribute over 70% of the total tax 
revenue (Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research 2008; O'Donnell, van 
Doorslaer et al. 2008). The reasons for this difference between developing and developed 
countries are not hard to find. Ghana generally has low formal employment level and as a 
result a narrow tax base. There is a lack of large scale private companies and also a large 
informal sector, including subsistence agriculture and petty traders with no proper record 
keeping on incomes. Also important is the widespread tax evasion in Ghana and other 
developing countries. A key question that this chapter addresses is “what is the burden of 
these taxes on individuals and households and especially on the poor?” The results of the 
estimates of the burden or incidence of these two direct taxes are outlined below. CT, as 
indicated, is a direct tax on companies and corporations. However, several assumptions 
about tax shifting (see methods chapter) have been adopted which then mean that it 
appears as a form of indirect tax on the economic agents who in the final analysis bear the 
burden of that tax.  
 
5.1.1.1 Personal income tax (PIT) 
Figure 5.1 shows the percentage share of PIT payments across the different SES groups. 
As expected, personal income tax payments are concerntrated among the rich (i.e. in 
quintiles 4 and 5) who  contribute over 80% of total personal income tax. This is  due to 
the tax schedule. Tax rates for the 2005/2006 year are graduated such that the higher the 
income the higher the personal income tax rate. People with an annual income of less 
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than ¢1.842
 
 million were exempted from paying income tax. With an income of between 
¢1.8 million and ¢4.8 million cedis, the tax rate was 5%; between ¢4.8million and ¢27.6 
million 10%; ¢27.6 million and ¢36 million cedis it was 15%; between ¢36 million cedis 
and ¢72 million cedis, 20%; and above ¢72 million cedis 28%.   
Figure 5. 1: Percentage share of PIT by consumption expenditure quintile 
Quintile 4
22%Quintile 5(richest)
63%
Quintile 1(poorest)
1%
Quintile 2
3% Quintile 3
11%
 
 
 
Personal income tax as a proportion of household consumption expenditure was 
calculated using both per capita and per adult equivalent measures of household 
consumption expenditure. Both these measures are extensively used in the literature 
(Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1992; Van Doorslaer and Wagstaff 1993; Wagstaff and van 
Doorslaer 2000; EQUITAP 2005; Ping, Whynes et al. 2008). Here I have used both 
measures to enable a comparison of whether relative progressivity differs between the 
two measures. Figure 5.2 depicts the payment of PIT as a proportion of household 
consumption expenditure. The results show that PIT is clearly progressive for household 
consumption expenditure on both a per capita and per adult equivalent basis. The main 
reason for the strong progressivity of personal income tax is the highly skewed tax rates 
in favour of  low income earners in the formal sector. This is justified under the principle 
of equity in health care financing such that those who have more should pay more. 
Adjusting for adult equivalence in household consumption expenditure makes a 
negligible difference to the relative progressivity of PIT.  
 
                                                   
42 The inter-bank exchange rate =¢9,072.1 to US$1.00 in 2005 
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Figure 5. 2: PIT as a proportion of household consumption expenditure 
 
 
The concentration curve for personal income tax payments was constructed as well as the 
Lorenz curve (as shown in Figure 5.3). According to Wagstaff and others, when the 
concentration curve for health care payments lies completely outside the Lorenz curve of 
ability to pay (which in this case is based on household consumption expenditure), the 
health payment is progressive (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 1992). Proportionality (as 
explained in chapter four) is attained when the two curves conincide. In this case, the 
concentration curve of personal income payments lies outside the Lorenz curve of 
consumption expenditure (or ability to pay). Thus as Figure 5.3 shows, the Lorenz curve 
dominates the concentration curve of personal income tax payments at all points further 
confirming the progressivity of personal income tax in Ghana.  
 
Figure 5. 3: Concentration curve of PIT payments and Lorenz curve of household 
expenditure, Ghana: 2005/2006 
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To determine the extent of progressivity and confirm the dominance of the Lorenz curve 
over the concentration curve of personal income tax payments, the Gini coefficient of 
consumption expenditure was calculated and subtracted from the concentration index of 
the personal income tax to obtain the Kakwani index. This index, as explained in the 
previous chapter, measures the extent to which a tax system departs from proportionality. 
To do this it measures the size of the area between the Lorenz curve of consumption 
expenditure and the concentration curve of personal income tax payments (see Table 5.1). 
Here the Kakwani index shows that personal income tax payments are very progressive 
and thus the burden of this payment is heavily borne by the rich in Ghana. 
 
Table 5. 1: Kakwani index of Personal income tax (PIT) 
 Index 
Concentration Index 0.680 
Gini coefficient 0.424 
Kakwani index 0.256 
 
 
These results are not only consistent with findings of an earlier tax incidence study in 
Ghana, but with similar studies in other countries. In a study in the late 1980s, Younger 
(1996) used the income tax information from the first Ghana living standard survey 
(1988) and the 1988 income tax schedule to measure the progressivity of income tax. He 
ordered households by per capita expenditures and then plotted their cumulative 
expenditures and cumulative tax payments against the cumulative proportion of 
households-so called Lorenz curves. Although he did not explicitly calculate a Kakwani 
index for PIT, the concentration curve for income tax payments lay everywhere below the 
Lorenz curve of  household expenditure, thereby indicating that income tax was 
progressive (Younger 1996).  
 
Many countries have progressive PIT for instance Tanzania and South Africa (the two 
other countries in the larger SHIELD project). Using the income and expenditure survey 
data of 2005/2006, South Africa obtained a Kakwani index for personal income tax of 
0.2194, which is very progressive (Ataguba and McIntyre 2009). The finding for 
Tanzania (using the household budget survey) was similar being again over 0.20 (Akazili, 
Ataguba et al. 2009). These countries also have similar tax rate structures to that of 
Ghana. Indeed, personal income tax and direct taxes in general tend to be progressive 
everywhere. Earlier studies by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1999) in a range of OECD 
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countries and recent studies by the EQUITAP team in Asia found direct taxes to be 
generally progressive (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer et al. 1999; O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et 
al. 2008). Younger and others (1999) in a study in Madagascar on tax incidence, using the 
Madagascan household income and expenditure survey data from 1999, found that 
personal income tax was very progressive. This was illustrated graphically using the 
concentration and Lorenz curves. The concentration curve of personal income tax lay 
entirely outside the Lorenz curve of household expenditure, thus confirming the 
progressivity of personal income tax in Madagascar. Figure 5.4 depicts the Kakwani 
indices of personal income tax or direct tax from some selected countries and where 
Ghana stands in relation to the other countries. It is clear from the figure that there is a 
consistent pattern with personal income taxes being generally progressive.   
 
Figure 5. 4: Kakwani indices of personal income tax/direct tax of some selected of 
countries and Ghana 
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Source: Wagstaff, van Doorslaer et al. 1999; O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008): Authors own 
calculation 
 
 
The question that then arises is what is the implication of such progressivity for health 
care funding in Ghana? Personal income tax in Ghana accounted for about 11% of the 
total tax revenue in 2005 and, since unsurprisingly this tax was found to be progressive, it 
could continue to be an important contributor to providing financial protection for the 
poor and vulnerable. Using personal income tax as a source could be a way of ensuring 
equity in health care financing in the country since those who have a higher ability to pay 
will be contributing to funding the health needs of those less well placed. However, any 
increase in personal income tax without some compensating increase in wages and 
salaries could have negative consequences for labour productivity and weaken incentives 
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to work. Sustained growth of the GDP of the country and a resultant increase in its ‘fiscal 
space’ is ideally what is required to allow personal income tax revenue to be increased. 
With the current GDP growth rate of about 6% in Ghana (Institute of Statistical Social 
and Economic Research 2008), there are then limits on what can be achieved through 
income tax. As a result there is a need to look at other financing mechanisms in terms of 
their incidence or burden. The other direct tax is corporate tax.  
 
5.1.1.2 Corporate tax  
Corporate tax refers to a direct tax levied by various jurisdictions on the profits made by 
companies or associations and often includes a tax on the capital gains of a company. 
Earnings are generally considered to be gross revenue minus expenses. In 2005 in Ghana, 
corporate tax was 15% of total tax revenue. The rate of corporate tax has seen substantial 
reductions over the years, from 36% in 1996 to 28% in 2005 and to 25% in 2006. These 
reductions in the corporate tax rate are meant to promote the growth of companies in 
Ghana. Most of the large companies in Ghana self assess their tax liabilities and submit 
financial statements to the internal revenue services.  
 
 A key question to consider in the incidence analysis of corporate tax is “who bears the 
burden of the corporate tax?” This is a difficult question over which economists disagree, 
but one thing is certain: it is people who pay all taxes. When the government levies a tax 
on a corporation, the corporation is more like a tax collector than a taxpayer. The burden 
of the tax ultimately falls on people (the owners, customers, or workers of the 
corporation). However corporate income tax is sometimes popular, in part because it 
appears to be paid by rich corporations. Yet those who bear the ultimate burden of the tax 
are often mere households and consumers and employees of corporations. Because of the 
lack of agreement as to who exactly pays corporate income tax, a number of scenarios 
need to be assumed in calculating the incidence of corporate tax. The assumptions based 
on the various scenarios are important because these will enable us to see the different 
incidences of corporate tax depending on which assumption is used.  
 
Unlike personal income tax which is clearly known to be paid by formal sector workers, 
there is less clarity regarding who pays corporate tax. In this study the incidence of 
corporate tax is calculated based on two assumptions the first, as mentioned in the 
methods chapter, is that there is an equal share of corporate tax payments between 
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shareholders and consumers, and the second is what the nature of corporate tax incidence 
is if we assume that consumers bear 100% (shifted completely) of corporate tax. 
 
I begin with the assumption that corporate tax is shared equally (50/50) between 
shareholders or capital owners and consumers of corporate goods and services. Figure 5.5 
illustrates the percentage share of  corporate tax across consumption expenditure 
quintiles. Close to 80% of corporate tax is contributed by those in quintiles 4 and 5 so that 
the burden of corporate tax appears to be on the rich, based on this assumption of equal 
shares of corporate tax payments between consumers and shareholders. In a similar study 
in South Africa, the richest quintile share of corporate tax (with an assumption of equal 
shares of corporate tax) was found to be over 80% (Ataguba and McIntyre 2009). 
 
Figure 5. 5: Percentage share of  CT by consumption expenditure quintile (when CT 
is assumed to be shared equally-50/50 between shareholders and consumers)  
Quintile 2
8% Quintile 3
12%
Quintile 4
28%
Quintile 
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49%
Quintile 
1(poorest)
3%
 
 
The results in Figure 5.6 again show that the burden of corporate tax (assuming that the 
tax is shared equally between consumers and shareholders) falls on the rich. It can be 
observed that corporate tax appears progressive whether the per capita or adult equivalent 
household consumption expenditure measure is used. Whilst the poorest group (indicated 
by quintile 1) pays 0.68% in corporate tax as a proportion of their consumption 
expenditure (based on per capita expenditure measure), the richest group (quintile 5) 
contributes almost 2% as a proportion of their consumption expenditure. The situation is 
replicated when we use the per adult household consumption expenditure measure. The 
payment of corporate tax as a proportion of household consumption expenditure using a 
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per adult equivalent measure is slightly higher for quintiles 1, 3 and 4. In South Africa, 
the trend is similar and again corporate tax was found to be progressive. 
 
Figure 5. 6: CT as a proportion of household consumption expenditure by quintile 
(when CT is assumed to be shared equally 50/50 among shareholders and consumers)  
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To test the progressivity of the corporate tax payments based on the assumption that 
corporate tax income is distributed equally across households and shareholders, the 
Lorenz curve of household consumption expenditure and the concentration curve of 
corporate tax payments were constructed (Figure 5.7). Here it can be observed that the 
Lorenz curve dominates the concentration curve of corporate tax payments up to the last 
decile of the consumption expenditure distribution, but thereafter the concentration curve 
crosses the Lorenz curve.  This is because shareholders are heavily concentrated in the 
top decile of the population. In this case there is thus no overall dominance of the Lorenz 
curve over the concentration curve (Figure 5.7).  
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Figure 5. 7: Concentration curve of corporate tax payment and Lorenz curve of 
household expenditure, Ghana: 2005/2006 
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NB: Here it is assumed that corporate income tax is distributed equally across households (based on their 
reported consumption expenditure on manufactured goods) and shareholders (based on receipts of 
dividends) 
 
Further confirmation of the progressivity of corporate tax emerges when the Kakwani 
index is calculated as presented in Table 5.2. The positive concentration index shows that 
those who are better off bear the greatest burden of corporate tax, again confirmed by the 
positive Kakwani index of 0.099. The results also suggest that the poor consume fewer 
manufactured goods than the rich. Indeed many of these goods may be out of reach of the 
poor and so it is not surprising that corporate tax (with the equal share assumption) is 
progressive.  
 
Table 5. 2: Kakwani index of corporate tax (assumption of equal share) 
 Assumption that corporate income tax is distributed equally 
between consumers and shareholders 
Concentration Index 0.522 
Gini coefficient 0.424 
Kakwani index 0.099 
 
 
Moving to the assumption that corporate tax is completely shifted to the consumers of 
corporate goods and services, the results show that higher income groups (quintile 4 and 
5) bear a higher proportion of corporate tax, rather similar in fact to what was found for  
the previous distribution of corporate tax assumption. There is however a small 
difference. Whilst the proportion of corporate tax share for quintile 4 and 5 combined is 
76% (under the assumption of an equal share of corporate tax for consumers and 
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shareholders), the proportional share under the assumption of total burden on consumers 
was 72% (Figure 5.8). The generally higher proportional share of corporate tax shows 
that again in Ghana the rich bear a higher burden of this tax.   
 
Figure 5. 8: Percentage share of  CT by consumption expenditure quintile (when CT 
is assumed to be wholly shifted to consumers) 
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Figure 5.9 depicts the corporate tax payments as a proportion of consumption expenditure 
using the assumption that corporate tax is completely shifted to consumers of corporate 
goods and services. Corporate tax under this assumption is still progressive. In South 
Africa, corporate tax became regressive under the assumption of a complete shift of 
corporate tax to consumers (Ataguba and McIntyre 2009). The results are again presented 
using both the per capita and per adult equivalent household consumption expenditure 
measures and these reveal that corporate tax is progressive under both assumptions. As 
indicated earlier, the reason for the corporate tax remaining progressive is that Ghana has 
a large subsistence, rural sector and many lower income people simply do not consume 
many manufactured goods and services. 
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Figure 5. 9: CT as a proportion of household consumption expenditure by quintile 
(when CT is assumed to be completely shifted to consumers) 
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To provide further evidence of progressivity, the Lorenz and concentration curves were 
constructed. As can be seen the concentration curve is outside the Lorenz curve of 
consumption expenditure for the major part of the curve, thus again confirming the 
progressivity of corporate tax (Figure 5.10).  
 
Figure 5. 10: Concentration curve of corporate tax payment and Lorenz curve of 
household expenditure, Ghana: 2005/2006 
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NB: Here it is assumed that corporate income tax is completely shifted onto consumers or distribution 
across households based on reported consumption expenditure of manufactured goods 
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When the Lorenz and concentrations curves cross, and depending on how they cross, it is 
difficult to judge whether a payment mechanism is progressive or not. In this particular 
care and judging from the  shape of the curve in Figure 5.10 the Kakwani index is going 
to be positive. But verifying this further, I calculated the Kakwani index, the 
concentration index and the Gini coefficient as illustrated in Table 5.3. Just like the 
incidence of corporate tax under the earlier assumption, the concentration index is 
positive meaning that the better-off bear the largest burden of corporate tax. The positive 
Kakwani index confirms the progressivity of this tax, due to the rich consuming more 
manufactured goods and services than the poor. 
 
Table 5. 3:  Kakwani indices of corporate tax (assumption of complete shift to 
consumers) 
 Assumption that corporate income tax is shifted 
completely to consumers 
Concentration Index 0.564 
Gini coefficient 0.424 
Kakwani index 0.121 
 
5.1.2 Indirect taxes 
Indirect taxes are taxes on goods and services collected from importers, manufacturers 
and other intermediaries, who as far as possible pass the burden on to the final consumer 
by including the tax in the selling price of the commodity. In Ghana, indirect taxes 
contribute over 70% of the total tax revenue every year (Institute of Statistical Social and 
Economic Research 2008). In advanced countries, however, they contribute less than 
30%. The reasons for indirect tax contributing a higher percentage of total tax revenue in 
developing countries like Ghana is the ease and convenience involved in collection as 
well as the difficulty in evading this type of tax. Its cost of collection is also relatively 
low. The main indirect taxes (that make up over 95%) in Ghana are Value added tax 
(VAT), the National Health Insurance Levy (NHIL), the fuel levy and the import duty. 
These are the indirect taxes considered in this study. The percentage contribution of each 
of these to the total tax revenue in 2005 was quite significant43
 
. The results of these, 
beginning with VAT, in terms of their incidence are presented below. 
                                                   
43 VAT- 25.5%, NHIL -5%, Fuel levy-18%, Import duty-16.5% 
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5.1.2.1 Value added tax (VAT) 
It is important to emphasise that VAT is a tax on the expenses incurred by consumers 
when they pay for goods or services. In Ghana VAT was reintroduced in 1998 after initial 
resistance to it and its subsequent withdrawal in 1995 to replace other taxes on 
expenditure including a sales and services taxes. Thus VAT is a general consumption tax. 
With a percentage share of total tax revenue of 25.5%, VAT was (and still remains) the 
single largest contributor to total tax revenue. As stated in chapter four, the rate of VAT is 
15% which consists of 10% plus 2.5% for a specific educational fund and 2.5% NHIL. 
This analysis uses only the 10% that goes to the government consolidated fund for 
disbursement. Given that VAT is the single largest tax component in Ghana, it is an 
important source of funding for health care in the country. It is thus important to know 
and document the incidence of this tax on the general population. Policy makers who 
have the welfare of the people at heart will however generally frown on relying on a tax 
that is regressive. 
 
This analysis of the incidence of VAT starts with the calculation of the percentage share 
of VAT by consumption expenditure quintile. As can be seen in Figure 5.11, the greatest 
share of the burden of VAT is in the higher quintiles i.e. the rich are bearing a more than 
proportionate share of the burden of VAT. Whilst quintiles 1 and 2 combined account for 
15% of VAT, quintiles 4 and 5 combined account for 70% (Figure 5.11). This reflects the 
large exemptions that characterised the implementation of VAT in Ghana. As mentioned 
previously, the initial introduction of VAT in 1995 was met with massive resistance in 
the form of strikes and demonstrations by the general public. The subsequent withdrawal 
of the tax and further consultations resulted in a wide range of exemptions of goods 
largely consumed by the poor. Another reason for this VAT distribution pattern is the fact 
that the Ghanaian economy is not ‘formalised’ like middle-income and developed 
countries where groceries and other goods and services consumed by lower socio-
economic groups are sold in the shops and supermarkets that can easily attract VAT. The 
percentage share of VAT in the higher quintiles is similar to that in South Africa 
(Ataguba and McIntyre 2009). 
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 Figure 5. 11: Percentage share of  VAT by consumption expenditure quintile 
Quintile 2
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15%
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23%
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47%
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1(poorest)
5%
  
 
VAT payments as a percentage of household consumption expenditure applying both the 
per capita and per adult equivalent measures were estimated. As can be observed in 
Figure 5.12, the rich pay a higher proportion of their consumption expenditure on VAT as 
compared to the poor. Using per capita consumption expenditure, one can observe that 
whilst VAT payment is 2.09% of the poorest quintile consumption expenditure, it is 
3.63% for the richest. The result is little different when we use the per adult equivalent 
measure, with VAT being 2.14% of the consumption expenditure of the poorest 20% of 
households and 3.58% for the richest quintile (Figure 5.12). The results thus show that 
VAT is a progressive financing mechanism in Ghana.  
 
The results also are consistent with findings in other lower income countries. For instance 
in Tanzania (which also has a large informal sector) the richest quintile pays a higher 
proportion of their consumption expenditure as VAT. Whilst the poorest 20% contributed 
4.1% of their consumption expenditure as VAT, the richest 20% contributed 8.4% 
(double) of their consumption expenditure (Akazili, Ataguba et al. 2009). Tanzania, just 
like Ghana, has exempted from VAT a wide range of goods that are consumed mostly by 
the poor. Goods such as agricultural products (crops, livestock and fish) are VAT exempt.  
The South African economy, which is more formalised than Ghana and Tanzania, has a 
different story to tell. There the poorest quintile pay more (10.4%) as a proportion of their 
consumption expenditure than the richest quintile (8.8%) (Ataguba and McIntyre 2009). 
Though some goods and services are exempted in South Africa, the extent of exemption 
is not as great as in Ghana and Tanzania. South Africa is also more formalised which 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
 138 
means that many of the goods and services that do not get taxed in say Ghana and 
Tanzania are easily taxed in South Africa where they are found in the shops and 
supermarkets. A tax incidence study in Malaysia and Madagascar found VAT to be 
progressive (Younger, Sahn et al. 1999; Yu, Whynes et al. 2008). In these countries, 
goods and services mostly consumed by the poor were exempted from VAT as in Ghana 
and Tanzania and that at least in part explains the progressivity of VAT in these 
countries.      
 
Figure 5. 12: VAT as a proportion of household consumption expenditure by 
quintile 
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The Lorenz and concentration curve for VAT are illustrated in Figure 5.13. As in the case 
of personal income tax and corporate tax, the concentration curve of VAT lies outside of 
the Lorenz curve of consumption expenditure. However the gap between the 
concentration curve and the Lorenz curve is smaller compared to the direct taxes. The 
closeness of the two curves suggests that VAT is verging on being proportional, 
proportionality, occurs when the two curves (the Lorenz and concentration curves) 
coincide.  
 
In passing, it is important to note that Younger’s study on tax incidence in Ghana using 
the 1988 GLSS did not capture VAT as it had not at that time been introduced but it did 
cover the sales tax that was in existence at the time. This sales tax was found to be 
proportional. This was surprising to Younger in a country like Ghana where agriculture, 
which was not affected by the sales tax, accounted for nearly half of GDP (Younger 
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1996). Younger’s study recommended that “…the government’s project to establish a 
value added tax (VAT) is welcome; a VAT’s incidence should be similar to the sale 
tax…..” (Younger 1996). 
 
Figure 5. 13: Concentration curve of VAT payment and Lorenz curve of household 
expenditure, Ghana: 2005/2006 
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  Table 5.4 provides the results of the concentration index of VAT, the Gini coefficient of 
consumption expenditure and the Kakwani index. The Kwakwani index is positive 
confirming progressivity but this is less than for personal income tax and corporate tax. 
The findings are different from those in South Africa.  The Kakwani index for VAT in 
South Africa is negative and hence the payment mechanism is regressive. Tanzania 
registered a much higher Kwakwani index than Ghana, which probably means Tanzania 
exempted a wider range of goods and services used predominantly by the poor.  
 
Policy makers might then be quick to jump at the idea of advocating for increasing health 
sector resources through VAT. However care must be taken as VAT could easily move to 
be regressive if the economy were to become more formalised as has happened in South 
Africa and other developed countries.  
 
Table 5. 4: Kakwani index of VAT 
 VAT 
Concentration Index 0.473 
Gini coefficient 0.424 
Kakwani index 0.049 
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5.1.2.2 National Health Insurance Levy (NHIL) 
Following the implementation of the national health insurance scheme in Ghana in 
2003/2004, there was a need to provide funding to support its operation and so a 
‘National Health Insurance Levy’ was introduced to be a key source of funding for the 
NHI and it now covers about 60% of the funds for the NHIS. The levy is supposed to be 
used to subsidize the health care needs of subscribers to the NHIS, especially those in the 
informal sector who generally pay a flat annual premium of ¢72,000 (US$8) and to fully 
cover the premiums of the poor. Formally the NHIL is a levy imposed by section 86 (1) 
of the National Health Insurance Act 2003 (Act 650) on goods and services supplied in or 
imported into Ghana.  
 
It is important to note that this NHIL is levied on the same goods and services as VAT. 
The levy is collected by the VAT secretariat and the proceeds from it are paid into a fund 
which is administered by the National Health Insurance Council. NHIL is the only 
earmarked tax for health care in Ghana. In 2005, NHIL contributed about 5% to the total 
tax revenue in the country. It is therefore important and policy relevant to determine the 
burden of this levy on the Ghanaian population. Since NHIL is imposed on the same 
goods and services as VAT, its progressivity follows the same pattern as that of VAT. As 
with the 10% general VAT component, the NHIL is progressive, with a concentration 
index of 0.473 and a Kakwani index of 0.049. However, given that the NHIL has a rate of 
2.5% compared to the general VAT rate of 10%, NHIL payments as a proportion of 
household consumption expenditure (by per capita and per adult equivalent measures) is 
lower than for general VAT (see Figure 5.14).  
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Figure 5. 14: NHIL as a proportion of household consumption expenditure by 
quintile 
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5.1.2.3 Fuel levy 
Fuel levies are perhaps the most controversial tax in Ghana, as politicians often use it as a 
campaign tool or strategy to garner votes. They promise to reduce the price of fuel by 
reducing the levies on fuel when they get into power. Then when they do gain power, 
they are faced with the realities of rising international fuel prices and cannot fulfill the 
promises. This is then capitalized on by the opposition in the next election and a circular 
process ensues.  As mentioned in Chapter 4, fuel prices and levies affect every part of the 
economy and fuel levies contributed about 17% to the total tax revenue in 2005. As the 
fuel levy will continue to be an important tax in Ghana, it is important to know and 
document the incidence of these taxes. Fuels in Ghana consist of petrol, diesel, kerosene, 
engine oil and other lubricants. I began by examining the incidence of all fuel combined. 
thereafter, I examine the incidence of all fuel levies excluding kerosene and finally I 
examine the incidence of the levy on kerosene.  
 
Why these separations? While one needs to assess the incidence of the total fuel levy in 
the country, the poor are known to use kerosene extensively and it is important to assess 
the burden of this tax on different income groups. The kerosene levy is estimated to be 
16.5% of the total fuel levy, which is quite substantial. Knowing these burdens separately 
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allows the information to be more policy relevant than having a single estimate for all 
fuels combined as has been the case in other studies (Younger, Sahn et al. 1999).  
 
Figure 5.15 depicts the percentage share of the general fuel levy by quintile. This includes 
taxes on all known fuels including engine oil, diesel, petrol, kerosene and others. It can be 
observed from Figure 5.15 that the share of this levy paid by the top income quintile is 
over 40%, while that of the bottom quintile is less than 10%.  The share of quintiles 1 and 
2 combined account for almost 20% of the percentage share of fuel levy which is quite 
substantial. The figures make intuitive sense as higher income households are likely to 
consume more fuel particularly through the use of private cars. The low but substantial 
share of fuel levy for lower income households is a reflection of their use of public 
transport and kerosene.   
 
Figure 5. 15: Percentage share of  fuel levy by consumption expenditure quintile 
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The incidence of the fuel levy was then calculated as a proportion of consumption 
expenditure, using both the per capita and per adult equivalent consumption measures. At 
a first glance at Figure 5.16, one may be tempted to say that the fuel levy is progressive 
given that the richest quintile is contributing more as a proportion of consumption 
expenditure than other quintiles. However, when the incidence of the fuel levy is 
examined further, beginning with the per capita consumption expenditure measure, one 
can see that, whilst quintile 1 is contributing 1.52% as a proportion of consumption 
expenditure to fuel levy, quintile 4 is contributing 1.44%. The contribution to fuel levies 
relative to consumption expenditure of the second quintile is higher than quintile 3 or 4. 
Turning to the per adult equivalent measure, there is an equal contribution between 
quintiles 1 and 4. Quintile 1’s contribution is even higher than quintile 3, and quintile 2’s 
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fuel levy contributions as a proportion of consumption expenditure is higher than quintile 
3 or 4.  It is important to stress that the rather higher than proportional contribution of fuel 
levy among the poorest 20% of the population could be attributed to their use of public 
transport which is factored into this analysis, but which is often not considered in other 
studies (Younger 1996). Also the poor are more likely to consume more kerosene than 
the rich. The higher contribution among the richest quintile (quintile 5) could be 
attributable to a higher rate of private car use among this group of the population.  
 
 
Figure 5. 16: Fuel levy as a proportion of household consumption expenditure by 
quintile 
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Given the unclear pattern in Figure 5.16, I proceeded to construct the Lorenz curve of 
consumption expenditure and the concentration curve of fuel levy payments. Figure 5.17 
depicts the results and this clearly shows that fuel tax is regressive. This finding is 
contrary to the progressive result that Younger found in his tax incidence study in Ghana 
using the 1988 GLSS data. The reasons for this probably lie partly in the fact that the 
1988 GLSS survey data used by Younger lack detailed questions to capture household 
expenditure on fuel such as kerosene. Additionally, he captured the impact of petroleum 
tax on the public transit sector by assuming that 20% of the cost of transport was for fuel. 
This 20% came from some input-output tables in Niger, Cameroon and Madagascar. The 
2005/2006 GLSS survey (which this study used) had a diary system that provides detailed 
information on frequently purchased items, such as kerosene and other fuels. A study in 
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Madagascar in the late 1990s also by Younger (Younger, Sahn et al. 1999)  found the fuel 
levy to be progressive. My results are however consistent with those of a study in South 
Africa (Ataguba and McIntyre 2009) where the fuel levy was found to be regressive. In 
the South Africa study (as with this study), detailed information on the fuel levy 
component of public transport was derived from calculating the fuel consumption rates by 
taxis and other methods of public transport, the cost of fuel per kilometre and transport 
fares by type of transport (as explained in Chapter four). These were all factored into the 
calculation to obtain the incidence of fuel levy payments. As is shown in Figure 5.17, the 
concentration curve of fuel levy payments dominates the Lorenz curve of the 
consumption expenditure variable, suggesting that the fuel levy is regressive. 
 
Figure 5. 17 : Concentration curve of fuel levy payment and Lorenz curve of 
household expenditure, Ghana: 2005/2006 
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The Kakwani index for the fuel levy was -0.041 (see Table 5.5) and the negative value 
confirms that indeed the fuel levy in Ghana is regressive. This is consistent with findings 
elsewhere. In South Africa, the Kakwani index for the fuel levy using the 2005/2006 
income and expenditure survey was -0.0294. As mentioned earlier, my finding suggests 
that while poor households do not own private cars and so do not spend directly on fuel, 
poor households in fact bear a heavy burden of the fuel levy because of their use of public 
transport (which is not usually factored into many tax incidence studies) and also 
consume more kerosene than the rich.  
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Table 5. 5: Kakwani index for fuel levy 
  fuel 
Concentration Index 0.383 
Gini coefficient 0.424 
Kakwani index -0.041 
 
5.1.2.4 Fuel (excluding Kerosene) levy 
Since kerosene is used largely by the poor, it was important to isolate it from the 
calculation of the general incidence of fuel tax payments. Figure 5.18 shows that, the 
richest quintile accounts for more than 48% of the total use of non-kerosene fuel. This is 
higher than that found in Figure 5.15, which means that excluding kerosene means that 
the richest quintile have a yet higher percentage share of the rest of the fuel levy. This 
makes intuitive sense as the rich tend to use more of other fuels than the poor.  
 
Figure 5. 18: Percentage share of  fuel(excluding kerosene) payment by consumption 
expenditure quintile 
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When the kerosene levy is excluded and we calculate the rest of the fuel tax payments as 
a proportion of consumption expenditure, the results (Figure 5.19) are quite different 
from Figure 5.16. The patterns (whether the per capita or per adult equivalent 
consumption expenditure measure is used) clearly show that the incidence of the fuel 
(excluding kerosene) levy payments is progressive. Whilst the poorest quintile 
contributes 0.68% and 0.66% respectively as a proportion of consumption expenditure, 
the richest quintile contributes 1.75% and 1.68% respectively as a proportion of their 
consumption expenditure. In other words the rich bear the burden of the fuel levy 
(excluding kerosene). These results are consistent with Younger’s tax incidence studies in 
Madagascar (Younger, Sahn et al. 1999).  
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Figure 5. 19: Fuel (without kerosene) payment as a proportion of household 
consumption expenditure by quintile 
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The concentration curve confirms the progressivity of the fuel levy (excluding kerosene) 
(Figure 5.20) as it lies outside the Lorenz curve everywhere. This dominance of the 
Lorenz curve over the concentration curve shows clearly that the burden of the fuel levy 
other than kerosene in Ghana is on the rich. If the Government or policy makers are 
considering raising more tax funds (including for health care), the good news from an 
equity perspective is that the levies on fuels other than kerosene represent an attractive 
option.  
 
Figure 5. 20: Concentration curve of fuel (excluding kerosene) levy payment and 
Lorenz curve of household expenditure, Ghana: 2005/2006 
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The Kakwani index is positive (Table 5.6), which confirms the progressivity of the fuel 
levy excluding kerosene. It can thus be argued that the major cause of the regressivity of 
the total fuel levy is the levy on kerosene.  
 
Table 5. 6: Kakwani index of fuel (excluding kerosene) levy 
 Fuel (excluding kerosene) 
Concentration Index 0.481 
Gini coefficient 0.424 
Kakwani index 0.061 
 
5.1.2.5 Kerosene levy 
Given that kerosene is largely used by the poor and that the kerosene levy makes up about 
17% of the total levy on fuel, it is important to know the burden of this tax. Figure 5.21 
shows the percentage share of the kerosene levy by consumption expenditure quintile. It 
can be seen that the poorest 20% of the population pay 18% of the total kerosene levy; 
the second poorest pay 26%; and the richest 20% pay less than 15% of the share of total 
kerosene levy.    
 
Figure 5. 21: Percentage share of  kerosene levy payment by consumption 
expenditure quintile 
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Kerosene levy payments as a proportion of household consumption expenditure, applying 
both the per capita and adult equivalent measures (Figure 5.22) show that the poor are 
bearing the brunt of the kerosene levy. Thus, for example, whilst the poorest 20% of 
households are paying 0.70% or 0.69% (per capita or adult equivalent measure 
respectively) as a proportion of their consumption expenditure, the richest quintile is 
contributing only 0.09%.  
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Figure 5. 22: Kerosene levy payment as a proportion of household consumption 
expenditure by quintile  
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The Lorenz curve for consumption expenditure and the concentration curve for kerosene 
levy payments are presented in Figure 5.23. The concentration curve completely 
dominates the Lorenz curve. The concentration curve even crosses the 45 degree line 
which show that the kerosene levy is indeed very regressive. The results are consistent 
with earlier findings by Younger (Younger 1996). Although, as indicated above, the 1988 
GLSS data used in Younger’s analysis did not give detailed information on kerosene 
purchases, his results still show that kerosene levy was very regressive (Younger 1996). 
A tax incidence study of kerosene in Madagascar also found the levy there to be very 
regressive (Younger, Sahn et al. 1999).  
 
One of the problems of some studies in the field is that they may fail to calculate the 
incidence of various levies separately (Yu, Whynes et al. 2008). This can mean that their 
results are rather broadly based such as claiming that indirect tax is regressive, 
proportional or progressive without revealing which elements are responsible for making 
the tax in question regressive, proportional or progressive (Yu, Whynes et al. 2008). For 
example, a study in Malaysia concluded that indirect tax was the most regressive tax (Yu, 
Whynes et al. 2008) but did not drill down to analyse which components were 
responsible for this finding.  
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Figure 5. 23: Concentration curve of kerosene levy payment and Lorenz curve of 
household expenditure, Ghana: 2005/2006 
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If policy makers seek to alleviate the burden of tax on the poor, they will need to consider 
either reviewing the levies on kerosene or removing them altogether. Certainly such 
actions on their own will reduce Government revenues but this could be compensated for 
by increasing the levies on other fuels like petrol and diesel which are progressive. The 
nature of the concentration curve as captured in Figure 5.23 shows that in Ghana at least, 
the kerosene levy is perhaps the most regressive tax of all.  
 
Looking further at the regressivity of the kerosene levy, the Kakwani index was 
calculated. As can be seen in Table 5.7, the Gini coefficient far exceeds the concentration 
index and the Kakwani index is very negative at -0.407, thus confirming the regressivity 
of the kerosene tax in Ghana.   
 
Table 5. 7: Kakwani index of kerosene levy 
 Kerosene 
Concentration Index 0.016 
Gini coefficient 0.424 
Kakwani index -0.407 
 
5.1.2.6 Import duty 
Apart from a few items which are exempted from the payment of customs duties, all 
imports attract import duties into Ghana. This duty was the third biggest contributor to 
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total tax revenue after VAT and the fuel levy in 2005, being 16.5% of total tax revenue. 
The key question here is who is paying this import duty? The immediate answer is those 
who import goods and services but a more reflective answer would seek to understand the 
burden or incidence of import duty on different segments of the population. One possible 
answer to this is provided by Martinez-Vazquez (2004) who argues that import duties 
passed on to consumers have the same incidence as VAT (Martinez-Vazquez 2004).  
 
One of the difficulties usually associated with measuring the progressivity of import duty 
is differentiating the consumption across households of locally produced goods and 
imported goods. Ghana however has very few manufacturing companies and most of the 
manufactured goods consumed are imported. The incidence was therefore calculated as 
stated in chapter four by identifying the expenditure by households on imported 
commodities. Based on the list of imported items and their import duty for 2005 from the 
Custom, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), allocation was then made to households 
according to their consumption of the identified imported goods. 
  
Figure 5.24 depicts the percentage share of import duty by consumption expenditure 
quintile. The richest quintiles (quintile 4 and 5) combined have a percentage share of over 
70% of import duty compared to less than 14% for the poorer quintiles (quintile 1 and 2). 
This shows that the rich, by virtue of their higher consumption of imported goods, have a 
higher share of the import duty. 
 
Figure 5. 24: Percentage share of  import duty payment by consumption 
expenditure quintile 
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The incidence analysis of import duty shows that the payment mechanism is progressive 
just like VAT. As can be seen in Figure 5.25, there is little difference in the results 
between the per capita and per adult equivalent measures. The results show that whilst the 
poorest quintile is paying 1.55% or 1.61% respectively of their consumption expenditure 
in import duty through the consumption of imported goods and services, the richest 
quintile is paying more than double - 3.71% or 3.68% respectively (Figure 5.25).  For 
policy makers concerned with equity, this is good news as the import levy could be a 
source of increased funding without burdening the poor provided consideration is given 
to identifying and exempting imported goods and services consumed by the poor. 
  
Figure 5. 25: Import duty payment as a proportion of household consumption 
expenditure by quintile 
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The Lorenz curve of consumption expenditure and the concentration curve of import duty 
are displayed in Figure 5.26. The concentration curve is completely dominated by the 
Lorenz curve, further confirming the progressivity of the import duty in Ghana and that 
the rich are bearing more of the burden of import duty.  
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Figure 5. 26: Concentration curve of import duty payment and Lorenz curve of 
household expenditure, Ghana: 2005/2006 
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To obtain the magnitude of the progressivity of import duty, the Kakwani index was 
calculated and with a value of 0.129, shows that import duty is progressive (Table 5.8), in 
fact its progressivity is second only to personal income tax. This suggests that the poor 
are either consuming imported goods that are import duty exempt or they are consuming 
just a small amount of imported goods compared to the rich.  
 
Table 5. 8: Kakwani index of import duty 
 Kerosene 
Concentration Index 0.552 
Gini coefficient 0.424 
Kakwani index 0.129 
 
The results are consistent with findings from Tanzania. Using the household budget 
survey data of 2000/2001 (and inflating this to 2005 prices) the incidence of import duty 
was calculated in a similar way to this study. The results revealed that import duty in 
Tanzania was progressive (Akazili, Ataguba et al. 2009). A study in Madagascar however 
found the opposite (Younger, Sahn et al. 1999) with import duty being regressive. There 
were problems with that study however because it proved difficult to identify which 
households consumed imported goods. That study then assumed that import duties 
increased the price of all goods, whether imported or not, so that buyers of those goods 
bear the import duty incidence (Younger, Sahn et al. 1999).  
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5.1.3 Total tax  
Pooling all the components of general tax together (direct and indirect) excluding the 
NHIL and education earmarked tax, the incidence of tax overall was calculated. Direct 
taxes included personal income tax and corporate tax (with the assumption of an equal 
share of corporate tax between consumers and shareholders) and indirect taxes included 
VAT, the fuel levy and import duty.   Figure 5.27 shows that taxation overall is 
progressive. Given that tax revenues are very crucial funding sources not only for the 
health sector but other sectors as well, the finding that taxation overall is progressive is 
welcome news for policy makers interested in equity.  
 
The results are consistent with findings from Asia (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008), 
South Africa (Ataguba and McIntyre 2009) and Tanzania (Akazili, Ataguba et al. 2009). 
They are also in line with findings from Malaysia where, even though indirect taxes were 
regressive, overall tax was progressive (Yu, Whynes et al. 2008). Results from 
Madagascar are also similar to the findings from Ghana (Younger, Sahn et al. 1999). 
Wagstaff and others also found tax funding in Europe and the USA to either be 
proportional or mildly progressive (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer et al. 1999).   
 
Figure 5. 27: General tax payment as a proportion of household consumption 
expenditure by quintile 
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
Pa
ym
en
t a
s 
%
 o
f H
H
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
ex
pe
nd
Quintile
1(poorest)
Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile
5(richest)
Socio-economic status
Per capita CE Per adult equiv CE
 
 
Figure 5.28 and Table 5.9 show the incidence of that portion of general taxes that goes to 
health as well as the National Health Insurance Levy (NHIL). As stated in Chapter Two, 
government allocated 15% of tax revenue to the health sector in 2005/2006. The only tax 
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to which the 15% figure was not applied was the NHIL as this is an earmarked tax that 
goes in total to the health sector. Table 5.9 and Figure 5.28 show that everybody (whether 
poor or rich) pays health tax44
 
 either directly and/or indirectly by virtue of their 
consumption of goods and services. Even though tax overall is progressive, one needs to 
recognize that the poorest 20% are still paying 1.5% of their meager consumption 
expenditure towards health through tax. This could have implications for their ability to 
consume other important health related goods and services. 
Table 5. 9: General tax (i.e. 15% of tax that goes to health) and NHIL payments as a 
proportion of consumption expenditure quintile (per capita and adult equivalent) 
 
Socio-economic 
status 
Per capita consumption exp. Per adult equiv. consumption exp. 
General tax NHIL Total General tax NHIL Total 
Quintile 1(poorest) 0.95% 0.55% 1.50% 0.97% 0.57% 1.54% 
Quintile 2 1.03% 0.59% 1.62% 1.01% 0.57% 1.58% 
Quintile 3 1.20% 0.64% 1.84% 1.22% 0.68% 1.90% 
Quintile 4 1.57% 0.73% 2.30% 1.60% 0.71% 2.31% 
Quintile 5(richest) 2.20% 0.98% 3.18% 2.15% 0.96% 3.11% 
 
 
Figure 5. 28: Pictorial depiction of general tax (i.e. the 15% that goes to health)  and 
NHIL payment as a proportion of household consumption expenditure by quintile 
(based on per capita) 
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The concentration curves for direct, indirect (excluding NHIL and dedicated education 
tax) and overall taxes are compared with the Lorenz curve of consumption expenditure. 
Direct tax is the most progressive as is revealed by the magnitude of the dominance of the 
                                                   
44 The component of tax that goes to the sector health 
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Lorenz curve over the concentration curve. The concentration curve for direct tax lies 
well outside the Lorenz curve (Figure 5.29). The cause of the high progressivity of direct 
tax lies in the extent of the progressivity of personal income tax. Indeed most studies on 
equity in health care financing have consistently found direct tax to be progressive 
(Wagstaff, van Doorslaer et al. 1999; Younger, Sahn et al. 1999; Wagstaff and van 
Doorslaer 2000; Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2005; Cissé, Luchinia et al. 
2007; O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008; Yu, Whynes et al. 2008; Leung, Tin et al. 
2009).   
 
Figure 5. 29: Concentration curves of Total tax payments and Lorenz curve of 
household expenditure, Ghana: 2005/2006  
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According to Leung and others in their recent study of Hong Kong , the main driver of 
overall progressivity of health care financing there is direct tax (Leung, Tin et al. 2009). 
They also found the burden of direct tax to be heavily concentrated on the better-off both 
in absolute terms and relative to ability to pay. In Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Thailand, 
the poorest 20% of households make virtually no contribution to direct taxes while the 
richest fifth contribute more than 90% of tax revenues (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 
2008). In general in most studies the progressivity of direct tax is largely influenced by 
personal income tax. 
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Indirect taxes on the other hand, although found to be progressive in Ghana, are only 
mildly progressive compared to the direct tax. In a study by Wagtsaff and others on 
equity in health care financing in Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands. 
Portugal, Sapin, Switzerland, UK and the USA, they found that indirect taxes were 
regressive in most of the countries, particularly so in Ireland and the US (Wagstaff, van 
Doorslaer et al. 1999). The finding in Ghana was consistent with their results from Italy, 
Portugal and Spain. The progressivity of indirect taxes in these countries was due to 
higher VAT rates being levied on luxury goods. In Ghana the progressivity of indirect 
taxes is also influenced by the wide range of VAT exemptions on goods (especially 
agricultural goods) largely consumed by the poor and the progressivity of import duties.  
 
The results on the progressivity of indirect tax in Ghana are also consistent with findings 
from Asia where O’Donnell and others (2008) also found the burden of indirect taxes to 
be concentrated on the better off but to a much lesser extent than direct taxes in all 
countries except in Japan. Japan was the only country in the Asian study in which the 
share of indirect taxes contributed by the least well off is greater than their respective 
share of total ability to pay (ATP) (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). The 
progressivity of indirect taxes in Thailand, Hong Kong, Nepal and Bangladesh is 
explained by the exemption of food from taxation in Thailand and Bangladesh and the 
propensity of poor rural households in Bangladesh and Nepal to consume local products 
that are not subject to taxation (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008) just as is the case in 
Ghana. In Sri Lanka, by contrast, only some food items are tax-exempt and so indirect tax 
is only mildly progressive and verging towards proportionality (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer 
et al. 2008).  
 
In the EQUITAP study in Asia, only the incidence of broad categories of financing 
mechanisms (direct tax, indirect tax, insurance and OOP) are revealed. Indirect tax in 
which import duty is a part was found to be progressive in most of the countries including 
Bangaldesh, Nepal, Thailand, South Korea, Sri-Lanka Taiwan and China (O'Donnell, van 
Doorslaer et al. 2008). 
 
Pooling the direct and indirect taxes together, the results for total tax are also progressive. 
The progressivity of overall tax in Ghana is driven largely by the progressivity of direct 
taxes as is the case in Hong Kong and many Asia countries in the EQUITAP study 
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(O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). The progressivity of the total tax payment in 
Malaysia and Madagascar was also driven largely by the strong progressivity of direct tax 
(Younger, Sahn et al. 1999; Yu, Whynes et al. 2008). Given a Kakwani index of 0.098 
this confirms that Ghana’s tax system is indeed progressive.  
5.2 Non-tax 
Apart from tax revenue and donor support, health care in Ghana is also significantly 
financed by non-tax financing mechanisms. These include out-of-pocket payments and 
national health insurance (NHI) contributions. This section provides the results of the 
financing incidence of OOP payments and NHI contributions. 
5.2.1 Out-of-pocket (OOP)  payments  
Direct payment is quite significant in Ghana and accounts for over 40% of health care 
expenditure (Ramachandra and Hsiao 2007). This figure may well reduce as the NHI 
introduced in 2004 expands to provide financial protection to more people. It is important 
to note that OOP payments include payments for private care (including traditional or 
herbal) and medicines, co-payments for those privately insured (which are not common in 
Ghana) and user charges for public health care. Given the significance of OOP payments, 
it is important to know the distribution of its burden on the population.  
 
Figure 5.30 depicts the percentage share of OOP payments across socio-economic 
groups. Although the rich (i.e. quintile five) pay a higher percentage share of OOP 
payments, the poorest 40% of households also pay a substantial share (over 20%) of 
these.  
 
Figure 5. 30: Percentage share of  OOP payment by consumption expenditure 
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Quintile 2
14%
Quintile 3
20%
Quintile 4
19%
Quintile 5(richest)
40%
Quintile 
1(poorest)
7%
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
o
n 
 158 
 
To obtain the burden of OOP payments across socio-economic groups, we calculated 
OOP payments as a proportion of household consumption expenditure using both the per 
capita and per adult equivalent measures. As Table 5.10 depicts, there is not much 
difference in the results across the two measures. The findings also show that poorer 
households are bearing more of the burden of OOP payments than richer households. 
Whilst the poorest 20% of households are contributing about 3% as a proportion of their 
consumption expenditure, the richest 20% are paying 2.7%. This is not surprising as the 
poor are more likely to get ill and will need to spend more of their meagre resources to 
seek health care as most OOP payments are flat amounts that are not differentiated 
according to income. The results are again consistent with findings elsewhere. In South 
Africa for instance, whilst 20% of poorer households paid almost 1.8% as a proportion of 
their consumption expenditure as OOP, the richest 20% contributed 1.6% (Ataguba and 
McIntyre 2009).  
 
Table 5. 10: Out-of-pocket payment as percentage of consumption expenditure 
quintile by per capita and per adult equivalent measure  rounded to nearest 1000 or 
even million  
 SES measure Consumption expenditure (CE)  OOP payment OOP 
payment as 
% of CE 
Per capita consumption expenditure measure 
Quintile 1          8,105,764,266,916  242,368,093,685  2.99% 
Quintile 2        16,583,595,884,539  479,040,682,954  2.89% 
Quintile 3        23,400,461,937,488  670,560,105,672  2.87% 
Quintile 4        29,874,259,995,433  641,800,915,552  2.15% 
Quintile 5        47,035,271,455,110  1,296,229,009,815  2.76% 
Total      124,999,353,539,490  3,329,998,807,678  2.66% 
Per adult equivalent consumption expenditure measure 
Quintile 1          8,028,723,732,010         232,949,993,774  2.90% 
Quintile 2        16,592,305,217,657         458,721,074,868  2.76% 
Quintile 3        23,176,209,034,541         690,131,969,081  2.98% 
Quintile 4        28,719,103,171,063         626,298,576,337  2.18% 
Quintile 5        48,483,012,384,215      1,321,897,193,618  2.73% 
Total      124,999,353,539,490      3,329,998,807,678  2.66% 
 
 
Exploring the regressivity of OOP further, the concentration curve for OOP payments and 
the Lorenz curve for consumption expenditure are constructed (see Figure 5.31). This 
shows that OOP payments are regressive. This is because the concentration curve of OOP 
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payments dominates the Lorenz curve throughout the distribution except for the last 
section (top right corner) where the two curves (Lorenz and concentration) appear to 
coincide. The regressivity of OOP payments shows that the poor in Ghana are bearing the 
largest burden of OOP payments.  
 
Figure 5. 31: Concentration curves of OOP payments and Lorenz curve of 
household expenditure, Ghana: 2005/2006  
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OOP payments [though not statistically significant (P-value =0.463)] are regressive as 
indicated by the negative value for the Kakwani index (-0.070) in Table 5.11. User fees, 
which are a major component of OOP payments, play a significant role in the regressivity 
of OOP payments in Ghana. Ghana has been noted for fully complying with and 
implementing the World Bank and IMF policies of cost-sharing in health care financing 
to the point that the country at one stage managed to achieve a 15% cost recovery level at 
public health facilities (Garshong, Ansah et al. 2002). The exemptions or waiver policy 
for the poor, which were brought in alongside the introduction of user charges and which 
aimed to relieve the burden on the poor were poorly implemented. This weakened the 
intended cushioning effect on the poor of high user fees (Arhin-Tenkorang 2001; 
Garshong, Ansah et al. 2002; Arhin-Tenkorang 2004).  In addition to user fees, people, 
especially the poor, also make substantial direct payments at private health institutions 
including traditional and spiritual healers. These payments are often not captured in 
formal health expenditure data but were collected in the 2005/2006 GLSS survey which 
enabled a comprehensive and accurate analysis of the incidence of OOP.  
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Table 5. 11: OOP Payment indices 
 index 
Concentration index 0.354 
Gini coefficient 0.424 
Kakwani index -0.070 
 
The regressivity of OOP payments in Ghana is consistent with findings from South 
Africa, Tanzania and elsewhere. OOP payments are regressive in South Africa because 
the exemptions or waivers in place may not be far reaching enough to provide financial 
protection for the poor and vulnerable. Similar reasons as in Ghana account for the 
regressivity of OOP payments in Tanzania. A study in Bangladesh revealed that OOP 
payments were regressive with a Kakwani index of -0.10 and this was due to lack of a 
socio-economic gradient in the choice of providers as poor people were as likely to use 
private providers as rich people (Rannan-Eliya, Pande et al. 2001).   
 
OOP payments also emerged as being regressive in earlier studies by Wagstaff and others 
in Europe and the US. OOP payments were regressive in all the countries that were 
studied except Spain but the extent of regressivity of OOP payments varied across the 
countries. The Netherlands (-0.059) and Italy (-0.004) had mild regressivity whilst 
Switzerland (-0.263) and the USA (-0.296) were very regressive. That OOP payments 
were only mildly regressive in Italy and the Netherlands, stems from the fact that private 
insurance cover taken up by people in the higher income groups was not comprehensive 
enough and included co-payments (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer et al. 1999). In the 
Netherlands for instance, many of the expenditures associated with OOP payments were 
incurred by the privately insured in the upper half of the income distribution who had 
insurance policies with substantial deductibles or which excluded primary care.  That 
OOP payments were found to be regressive in Switzerland and the USA was due to the 
fact that - with the exception of Medicaid members and some privately insured in the US 
for instance - all are making co-payments irrespective of income. The two countries also 
have predominantly private financing systems (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 1992).  
 
However, similar studies elsewhere have found OOP payments to be progressive. For 
instance, in Sri- Lanka, OOP payments were judged to be very progressive, in fact more 
progressive (Kakwani index of 0.548) than tax payments. The reason for this is a general 
reliance by the poor on subsidised and mostly free care provision by the government and 
the switch to unsubsidised use of private providers by those with higher incomes. OOP 
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payments were also progressive (Kakwani index = 0.3952) in Malaysia. In that country it 
was the third most progressive health care payment mechanism after direct tax and 
private health insurance. The reasons for this progressivity were similar to what pertained 
in Sri Lanka, the main one being that there was a switch to the use of private health 
services by the rich but the poor predominantly relied on subsidised public health 
services.  
 
The EQUITAP study in Asia also found OOP payments to be progressive or mildly 
progressive in all the countries in the study except for the most developed country, 
namely Japan. The argument put forward in the study to explain the progressivity of OOP 
payments is that the lack of insurance cover in developing countries means that the better-
off must pay OOP to secure quality health care, typically from the private sector. Also 
there is a constraint on the ability of poor households to pay for health care to such an 
extent that the poorest of the poor simply cannot afford health care. The study further 
argued that studies that come out with a regressive OOP payments for developing 
countries probably did not use nationally representative expenditure surveys but relied on 
data restricted to small rural areas (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). Though this 
argument may have an element of truth to it, it fails to recognise that poor households 
seek health care at many different places including traditional and spiritual healers and 
often have to make substantial and catastrophic payments because they go only when 
their illness is severe. Further, payment in kind can be substantial. In addition, high user 
fees could be less prevalent in some Asian countries than in African countries, including 
Ghana.  
 
5.2.2 Health insurance contributions 
Unlike the incidence calculations for tax and OOP payments, both the data sets of the 
GLSS survey and the SHIELD survey were used to examine National Health Insurance 
contributions45
                                                   
45 SHIELD survey data was used to calculate informal NHI contributions and GLSS survey in addition to 
SSNIT data were used to calculate the formal NHI contributions. 
. As stated in chapter four, the SHIELD survey was conducted primarily to 
unearth factors affecting the uptake of health insurance by households. Even though 
information on the NHI was captured in the GLSS study, this survey was conducted just a 
year into the implementation of the NHI and at the time (2005) the total coverage was just 
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about 8%. It is important to state that formal sector workers46
 
 were included immediately 
after the implementation of the NHIS; thereafter there was a gradual extension to the 
informal sector. The SHIELD survey of 2008 offers the opportunity to obtain information 
on a later situation (in which the NHI now covers above 40% of the population) with 
regard to its incidence. The results for the incidence of formal sector contributions, the 
informal sector premium contributions and the combined incidence of the national health 
insurance are presented below (Table 5.12). Box 4.1 (see methods chapter) outlines how 
the consumption expenditure variable was predicted in the SHIELD survey to ensure 
comparability between the two surveys. 
Table 5.12 depicts the distribution of consumption expenditure and contributions to the 
NHI across per capita household consumption expenditure quintiles. The incidence of 
NHI contributions is in two forms, the formal sector workers’ contributions for 2008 and 
the informal sector premium contributions also in 2008. The third column in the table 
shows the incidence of the combined formal and informal sector premium contributions 
i.e total NHI contributions. It can be observed from Table 5.13 that the formal sector 
contribution is progressive. This is not surprising as the formal sector workers 
contributions are based on 2.5% salary deductions and the denominator used in this 
analysis is household consumption expenditure.  
 
Four years into the roll-out of the NHI, and with coverage now above 40% (see Chapter 
Two) largely because of a higher coverage of the informal sector, the SHIELD survey 
offered the opportunity to calculate the incidence of the premiums paid by the informal 
sector. This holds the key to equitable health care financing and the expansion of 
coverage to move towards universal cover. The results in Table 5.12 show that informal 
sector NHI contributions are regressive. The reason is that everybody from the informal 
sector pays a flat premium. Though the NHI act stipulates a graduated premium payment 
based on the income of individuals, the difficulty of establishing who is in which income 
group, makes its implementation impossible.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
46 Though formal sector workers were immediately included, individuals had to register and get a card to 
qualify as a cardholding member. 
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Table 5. 12: NHI contribution across consumption expenditure quintile  
SES 
Formal sector NHI 
contribution as proportion 
of consumption expend*  
Informal sector NHI 
contribution as a proportion 
of consumption expend** 
Total NHI contribution 
as a proportion of 
consumption expend 
Quintile 1 1.10 3.85 1.58 
Quintile 2 1.32 2.54 1.61 
Quintile 3 2.26 1.88 2.13 
Quintile 4 3.44 0.96 2.95 
Quintile 5 4.49 0.27 3.82 
*Using GLSS and SSNIT data, **Using SHIELD survey data 
 
The incidence of the total NHI contributions is progressive as can be seen in Table 5.12. 
This is because the formal sector workers’ contributions are more than five times those of 
the informal sector with the result that the incidence of the total NHI contribution is 
progressive (Figure 5.32). Whilst the poorest 20% of households are paying 1.58% of 
consumption expenditure, the richest 20% contributes 3.82%. This suggests that the NHI 
is progressive and its progressivity is strongly influenced by the progressivity of the 
formal sector contributions. It is important to note that the informal sector premium 
contribution is just 5% of the total national health insurance fund. 
 
Figure 5. 32: Health insurance contribution as a proportion of household 
consumption expenditure by quintile 
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The concentration curve of total NHI contributions confirms again the progressivity of 
the total NHI contributions (Figure 5.33). The concentration curve lies completely outside 
the Lorenz curve.   
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Figure 5. 33: Concentration curves of NHI payments and Lorenz curve of household 
expenditure, Ghana: 2005/2006   
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Further confirmation of the progressivity of the total NHI contribution is shown in Table 
5.13. That the Kakwani index is positive (0.144) confirms that the NHI contribution is 
progressive. Again this revelation is good news for policy makers and government to 
further strengthen the NHIS in the country.  The NHIS is a fast growing financing scheme 
and its contribution to the health sector funding has risen from 5% in 2005 to over 20% in 
2008. The coverage also rose from around 8% in 2005 to over 40% in 2008. This fast 
growth is unprecedented in the history of social health insurance. It needs to be sustained 
to provide effective financial protection and universal coverage to all people in Ghana. 
Given that the NHI has been found to be progressive, it places a responsibility on policy 
makers, stakeholders and government to ensure that the scheme is sustained. However, 
NHI contributions could be regressive if the informal sector contributions begin to 
account for a significant proportion of the total NHI contribution. This could happen if 
more people in the informal sector enrol and/or there are increases in premium payments.  
 
Table 5. 13: NHI Payment indices 
 NHI contribution 
Concentration index 0.567 
Gini coefficient 0.424 
Kakwani index 0.144 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
 165 
The finding of the progressivity of NHI payments in Ghana is consistent with results 
elsewhere. Social health insurance was found to be progressive in Malaysia (Yu, Whynes 
et al. 2008). The Malaysian social health insurance is an amalgamation of contributions to 
EPF (employment provident fund) and SOSCO (social security organization). The EFP 
was progressive but conversely the imposition of an upper earning limit for SOSCO 
contributions and the ineligibility of the affluent as members made SOSCO contributions 
regressive. However the combined effect makes the social health insurance contribution 
progressive in Malaysia (Yu, Whynes et al. 2008).  
 
In most developing countries, where typically only formal sector workers are covered 
(China, Indonesia, the Philippines), the poor make little contribution to social insurance 
revenues simply because they do not belong to the system. However, in such partial 
health insurance systems, the better-off do not only pay more, they get more (O'Donnell, 
van Doorslaer et al. 2008). The poor do not contribute but they are also denied the 
benefits of coverage. In South Africa for instance the private health insurance 
contributions were found to be very progressive suggesting the burden is on the better-
off, but the poor do not belong to the schemes and so are not benefiting (Ataguba and 
McIntyre 2009). In Tanzania, the social health insurance is progressive because 
contributions are made largely by formal sector employees (who mostly belong to the 
better-off group) and they are the ones who benefit. The progressivity of the Portuguese 
social health insurance scheme also stems from the fact that although contributions to the 
scheme are compulsory and earnings related, the scheme is not universal, covering and 
requiring contributions from only certain employees (the majority of these working in the 
public sector) (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 1992). The progressivity is due to the fact that 
these workers tend to be in the higher income groups. 
 
Contrary to the finding in Ghana, earlier studies in France, the Netherlands and Spain 
found social health insurance contributions to be regressive (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer et 
al. 1999). This stems from the fact that contributions tended to be proportional to earnings 
only up to a ceiling. The regressivity would be even higher if certain groups such as 
pensioners were not exempt from contributions (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer et al. 1999).  
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5.3 Dominance testing 
Dominance testing (using a do-file prepared for assessing the dominance of financing 
mechanisms47
 
) was also undertaken (see Table 5.14). This is another method of testing 
for the relative progressivity of the different sources of financing. In Table 5.14, D 
indicates that the concentration curve of the row source dominates (is more progressive 
than) that of the column source (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). Dominance is 
rejected if there is at least one significant difference in one direction and no significant 
difference in the other, with comparisons at a 5% level of significance; non-D indicates 
that there is non-dominance between the concentration curves (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer 
et al. 2008). It is clear that the concentration curve for the fuel levy dominates the rest of 
the health care financing mechanisms. On the other hand, the concentration curve for 
personal income tax is clearly dominated by all the other financing mechanisms. This 
further confirms that personal income tax is the most progressive of all the financing 
mechanisms. The regressivity of the fuel levy is a worrying phenomenon. Apart from 
personal income tax and the fuel levy, the other financing mechanisms do not dominate 
completely or are not entirely dominated. For instance, the concentration curve for 
National Health Insurance contributions is dominated by all others except corporate tax 
and import duty. 
Table 5. 14: Dominance testing 
 Health care payments 
Fuel 
levy 
OOP 
payments 
Corporate 
income tax VAT 
Import 
duty 
National  
health  
insurance 
Personal 
income tax 
Kerosene levy D D D D D D D 
Fuel levy  non-D D D D D D 
OOP payments   non-D non-D non-D D D 
Corporate income tax    non-D non-D Non-D D 
VAT     non-D D D 
Import duty      Non-D D 
National health insurance       D 
 
5.4 Total health care financing incidence 
Figure 5.34 combines all sources of health care payment in Ghana (general tax, NHIL, 
NHI contributions and out-of-pocket payments) and measures total payments as a 
                                                   
47 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAH/Resources/Publications/459843-
1195594469249/dominance.ado  ( version 1.0 Owen O'Donnell- 9 June 2006) 
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proportion of consumption expenditure. The results in Figure 5.34 thus provide the 
answer to the key question “who pays for health care in Ghana?” The brief answer is 
largely the better-off but the poor are making a significant contribution as well.  
 
Figure 5.34 shows that health care financing is generally progressive. It should be noted 
again that only a portion of total government tax resources (i.e. 15% in 2005/2006) was 
allocated to the health sector and this is factored into the calculation of the general tax. 
Whilst the poorest 20% of households are contributing 6% as a proportion of their 
consumption expenditure, the richest quintile is contributing about 10% so that the main 
burden of overall health care financing is on the rich. Nevertheless, the poor are also 
making a substantial contribution of their meagre income to health care, particularly 
through OOP payments.  
 
Figure 5. 34: Distribution of total health financing incidence in Ghana  
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The concentration curve of total health care payments in Figure 5.35 is dominated by the 
Lorenz curve which also indicates progressivity. Further confirmation of progressivity is 
illustrated in Table 5.15. The Kakwani index of 0.071 (robust standard error of 0.067) 
confirms that Ghana’s health care financing is progressive. The reasons for this stem from 
the high progressivity of personal income tax, the progressivity of VAT, the import duty 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
 168 
and the national health insurance contributions. However the fact that out-of-pocket and 
fuel levy payments are regressive diminishes the level of overall progressivity.  
 
Figure 5. 35: Concentration curve of total health financing and Lorenz curve of 
household expenditure, Ghana: 2005/2006 
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The findings from Ghana are again consistent with findings in other countries. For 
instance overall health care financing in South Africa was found to be progressive but this 
progressivity was largely influenced by the private health insurance contributions which 
is benefiting only the few who belong to these schemes (Ataguba and McIntyre 2009). 
The Kakwani index for total financing was 0.065. Health care financing in Asia is also 
generally progressive except for Japan, Korea and Taiwan (the more advanced 
economies) (Table 5.16). Higher income households contribute more as a proportion of 
ability to pay in most of the low and middle countries in Asia (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer 
et al. 2008). In Malaysia, households contribute progressively towards direct taxes, social 
health insurance, private health insurance and out-of-pocket payments. Indirect tax was 
the only regressive financing mechanism in Malaysia (see Table 5.16), the reason being 
that the way in which sales taxes (which represented indirect taxes) are levied depends on 
the type of goods, irrespective of the household’s ability to pay. The poor naturally have a 
lower ability to pay and end up spending a higher proportion of their incomes on 
purchasing goods. However, the combined effect of the progressivity of the other 
financing mechanisms in Malaysia results in overall progressive financing (Yu, Whynes 
et al. 2008).  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
 169 
Table 5. 15: Cumulative shares of health payments by consumption expenditure quintile, Ghana 2005/2006 
Per capita 
Household (HH) 
Expenditure 
Quintile 
Per 
capita 
HH 
Expend 
Direct taxes  Indirect taxes Non-tax HCF 
incidence 
(total) Personal 
Inc tax 
Corp 
Inc 
tax∞ 
Direct 
tax 
Value-
added 
tax± 
Import 
duty 
Fuel 
levy 
Kerosene 
levy 
Indirect 
tax 
NHI Out-
of-
pocket 
Poorest 20% 
(Standard error) 
5.53% 
(0.096) 
1.25%* 
(0.208) 
3.38%* 
(0.807) 
1.99%* 
(0.271) 
3.26%* 
(0.931) 
4.02%* 
(0.496) 
6.43%* 
(0.197) 
16.76%* 
(0.376) 
4.07%* 
(0.570) 
2.91%* 
(0.371) 
6.92% 
(1.810) 
4.07% * 
(0.471) 
Poorest 40% 
(Standard error) 
15.64% 
(0.2371) 
6.36%* 
(1.616) 
10.70%* 
(2.469) 
7.85%* 
(1.294) 
8.91%* 
(1.930) 
11.48%* 
(1.411) 
17.97%* 
(0.425) 
37.82%* 
(0.594) 
11.34%* 
(1.330) 
10.06%* 
(0.994) 
19.36% 
(2.758) 
11.99%* 
(1.004) 
Poorest 60% 
(Standard error) 
30.38% 
(0.4288) 
13.01%* 
(1.865) 
23.58% 
(4.962) 
16.66%* 
(1.910) 
19.42%* 
(4.399) 
22.04%* 
(2.691) 
33.88%* 
(0.676) 
60.49%* 
(0.685) 
22.85%* 
(2.758) 
19.31%* 
(1.344) 
37.72% 
(4.647) 
24.02%* 
(1.914) 
Poorest 80% 
(Standard error) 
51.64% 
(0.6813) 
27.84%* 
(2.651) 
44.05% 
(8.462) 
33.43%* 
(3.131) 
53.54% 
(9.624) 
39.78%* 
(4.851) 
54.60%* 
(0.960) 
81.80%* 
(0.630) 
49.47% 
(5.574) 
38.42%* 
(2.134) 
57.98% 
(6.395) 
46.81% 
(3.556) 
Test of Dominance 
-Against 45% line  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-Against Lorenz C  -  - -  + + - -  - 
Concentration 
index/Gini coeff 0.424 0.680 0.522 0.625 0.473 0.552 0.383 0.016 0.481 0.567 0.354 0.495 
(Robust SE) (0.019) (0.040) (0.087) (0.037) (0.074) (0.038) (0.014) (0.013) (0.041) (0.031) (0.059) (0.033) 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Kakwani index  0.256 0.099 0.202 0.049 0.129 -0.041 -0.407 0.057 0.144 -0.068 0.071 
(Robust SE)  (0.112) (0.207) (0.101) (0.144) (0.082) (0.036) (0.034) (0.081) (0.074) (0.093) (0.067) 
(P-value)  (0.022) (0.632) (0.046) (0.733) (0.115) (0.261) (0.000) (0.477) (0.051) (0.463) (0.291) 
Source: Author;  
Note: For shares: Bold indicates significant difference from population share (5%)  
                              * indicates significant difference from expenditure share (5%) 
(Standard errors for concentration and Kakwani indexes are robust to heteroskedasticity and within cluster correlation) 
∞ Assumption is that corporate tax is distributed equally (50/50) across households (based on reported consumption of manufactured goods) and 
shareholders (based on receipt of dividends) ** NHIL: National Health insurance levy (2.5% of social security of formal workers) 
# Dominance test (- indicates the 45% degree line/Lorenz curve dominates the concentration curve: + indicates concentration curve dominates 45%-
degreeline/Lorenz curve. Blank indicates non dominance. ± NHIL has same results as that of VAT  
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Table 5. 16: Cross-country comparison of progressivity indices (distributional 
incidence of health care financing)  
 
Country Year Financing mechanisms Total 
financing Direct 
tax 
Indirect 
tax 
NHI/SHI 
contributions 
OOP  or 
direct 
payments 
Africa       
Ghana 2005/2006 0.202 0.057 0.144 -0.068 0.071 
South Africa 2005/2006 - - - -0.0259 0.065 
Asian countries 
Bangladesh 1999/2000 0.552 0.111 - 0.219 0.214 
Thailand 2002 0.510 0.182 0.180 0.091 0.197 
Phillippines  1999 0.381 0.002 0.205 0.139 0.163 
Malaysia 1998/1999 0.395 -0.078 0.081 0.104 0.186 
Taiwan 2000 0.244 0.040 -0.075 -0.079 -0.029 
Sri-Lanka 1996/1997 0.569 -0.010 - 0.069 0.085 
Indonesia 2001 0.196 0.074 0.306 0.176 0.173 
China 2000 0.152 0.040 0.235 -0.017 0.040 
Nepal  1995/1996 0.144 0.114 - 0.053 0.063 
Japan 1998 0.100 -0.223 -0.042 -0.269 -0.069 
OECD countries 
Portugal 1980 0.279 0.079 0.277 -0.158 0.063 
The 
Netherlands 
1987 0.185 -0.009 -0.002 -0.059 -0.034 
Spain 1980 0.170 0.023 -0.063 0.016 -0.023 
Italy 1987 0.054 0.001 0.028 -0.004 0.022 
USA 1981 0.162 -0.174 -0.035 -0.387 -0.145 
UK 1985 0.131 -0.059 0.043 -0.190 0.032 
Ireland  1987 0.250 -0.120 0.110 -0.070 0.034 
Source: Wagstaff, van Doorslaer et al. 1999; O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008): Authors own 
calculation 
 
5. 5 Summary 
The chapter assessed the incidence of health care financing in Ghana employing the 
Kakwani’s progressivity index. This analysis represents the first study to measure 
progressivity of each of the financing sources and the whole health care financing system 
in Ghana in a comprehensive manner (Table 5.15).  
 
 As mentioned earlier, the Kakwani index of 0.071 demonstrates equitable financing in 
the Ghanaian health care financing system. As can be seen in Table 5.16, the results of 
the incidence in health care financing in Ghana are consistent with findings in some 
selected OECD and Asian countries. One consistent result from all countries is that, 
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direct taxes everywhere are progressive as shown by the positive Kakwani indices. OOP 
or direct payments are regressive in most of the countries including Ghana. The findings 
from Ghana which are specifically summarized in Table 5.15 and 5.16 suggest that the 
direct and indirect (except for fuel tax which was regressive) taxes and the National 
health insurance contributions are all progressive and OOP payments are the only 
regressive financing mechanism. Despite the growing NHIS, OOP could in future still 
remain a significant financing mechanism. The fact that households have to pay for drugs 
that are not covered by the NHI drug list and that traditional healers are not covered by 
the NHI means households will continue to encounter OOP payment problems. Out-of-
pocket payments represent the greatest burden on households (especially the poorer ones) 
as far as health care financing is concerned and so the next chapter will examine the 
catastrophic and impoverishment effect of OOP payments. 
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 Chapter Six: Catastrophic and poverty impact of health care payment 
6.0 Introduction 
From the previous chapter, out-of-pocket payments emerged as the only regressive form 
of health care payment in Ghana. The chapter also revealed that OOP payments, 
excluding transport costs, are about 3% of total household consumption expenditure. The 
share of OOP payments of total health care expenditure in Ghana is estimated at 48% 
(Leive and Xu 2008). This is significant and has implications for health care access and 
poverty. Although this is expected to decrease as the National Health Insurance currently 
in place expands in coverage, OOP payments will remain a significant source of health 
care finance in the country. The substantial share of OOP payments is consistent with 
other studies, for example direct payment for health care was 2.5% and 3.4% of total 
household expenditure in Paraguay and Thailand respectively (McIntyre, Thiede et al. 
2005). In Burkina Faso and Sri-Lanka, OOP payments for health care were 4.4% and 
6.5% of total household consumption expenditure respectively (McIntyre, Thiede et al. 
2005). Direct health care expenditure is also 5% of total household expenditure in India 
(Garg and Karan 2009).   
 
As stated in Chapter Three, out-of-pocket payments take two major forms, namely user 
fees for public sector health services and direct payments to private sector providers. User 
fees usually dominate, even though direct payments to the private sector are substantial. 
In the 1980s, when Ghana and many other Africa countries were suffering from 
macroeconomic stagnation as a result of negative growth and increasing indebtedness, the 
World Bank and IMF supported the introduction of user fees through loan conditionalities 
and the associated Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). As mentioned in Chapter 
One, the Ghanaian government also thought at the time that introducing user fees would 
help to generate revenue to improve the quality of the health services, particularly by 
making  drugs available at facilities which were then seriously under-funded (Nolan and 
Turbat 1995). The government also thought that by introducing user fees, communities 
would feel more involved and take ownership of local facilities. The World Bank, the 
IMF and other international organisations that favoured the introduction of user fees also 
argued such fees would prevent the frivolous use of health care service and would 
encourage people to comply with the referral system (de Ferranti 1985; Akin, Birdsall et 
al. 1987). It was further argued that user fees would promote equity since those who 
could afford to pay would ease the burden on government who could then concentrate its 
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resources on the poor (McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005). Ghana adhered strictly to the 
introduction of user fees and thereby managed almost 100% recovery of drug costs. 
 
However, the impact of user fees in Ghana has been disastrous. Revenue generation was 
relatively insignificant in terms of total health care costs and there was a more than two-
thirds drop in utilisation of public health services, the fall being mainly among low-
income and vulnerable groups (Arhin-Tenkorang 2000; Chuma, Musimbi et al. 2009). 
The exemption programme that was in place to cushion the effects of user fees was 
poorly implemented due to a lack of clarity and understanding of its operation. This 
resulted in many who were eligible for exemption not being exempt.  One study in the 
Volta region of Ghana found that 84% of patients who were eligible for exemptions did 
not receive them (Nyonator and Kutzin 1999). A national study found that almost half of 
the clients interviewed who were eligible for exemptions had in fact paid for services 
(Garshong, Ansah et al. 2002). Research has also highlighted that the poor very seldom 
receive exemptions (Adams, Darko et al. 2002).  
 
The result of introducing user fees was that people, and particularly the poor, were dying 
needlessly because they did not seek health care. Where households have to incur health 
care costs, they use coping strategies such as reducing consumption (often on very basic 
necessities of life), borrowing or selling vital household assets. Households sometimes 
have to divert resources that would have been used for food and other basic consumption 
to pay for health care. Indeed people (again especially the poor) were detained at public 
health facilities in Ghana to work in order to pay for the cost of their treatment 
(Garshong, Ansah et al. 2002). Evidence clearly shows that the most vulnerable 
households face enormous constraints in accessing care when they are required to pay 
user fees, particularly where geographic access is poor and other costs (e.g. for transport) 
of treatment seeking are high (Russell 2001; Russell and Abdella 2002; Russell 2004; 
McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005; Akazili, Aikins et al. 2007; Chuma, Musimbi et al. 2009). 
With the significant levels of poverty in Ghana, household livelihoods are so fragile that 
if a member has to use health services and pay fees, the household may have to take 
actions to access cash that could lead to further impoverishment. Generally the 
implementation of user fees has had tremendous negative effects, not only in Ghana but 
in other African countries, to the point where those who vociferously supported its 
introduction have done an about-turn and are now arguing that low- and middle-income 
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countries should rather adopt some form of pre-payment for health care. The World Bank 
has acknowledged that “Out-of-pocket payments for health services – especially hospital 
care – can make the difference between a household being poor or not” (Claeson, Griffin 
et al. 2001; McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005; Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien et al. 
2007) and are now indicating that alternative financing mechanisms such as insurance 
may be preferable. 
 
This chapter reports on the catastrophic and impoverishment effects of out-of-pocket 
payments for health care in Ghana. The results in this chapter (which to my knowledge 
are the first of their kind in Ghana) can serve as a baseline for tracking the trend of 
catastrophic and impoverishing effects of OOP payments as the NHI expands. Though 
Ghana has implemented national health insurance, more than 40% of the population is not 
covered and not all diseases are covered. It therefore remains important to examine the 
catastrophic nature of this payment mechanism. I begin with catastrophic health care 
payments (a bit of literature or background is provided on current debates on catastrophic 
health care payment before the actual results). 
 
6.1 Catastrophic health payments 
There is considerable worldwide interest in fairness in health care financing (World 
Health Organization 2005). One conception of such fairness relates to whether 
households and individuals are protected from catastrophic health care expenditure 
(Ekman 2007; O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). Households without comprehensive 
health insurance or tax financing cover are exposed to the risk of incurring large 
expenditures when a household member falls ill. This can be catastrophic if that 
expenditure is too large relative to the resources available to the household (Xu, Evans et 
al. 2003; O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). It should be noted however that large 
health expenditure for a household does not necessarily mean that the household is faced 
with catastrophic health care payments. Rather payments are deemed catastrophic when 
the health care expenses in effect disrupts the household’s living standards with regard to 
the purchase of other essential non-medical goods and services (Deaton 1997). According 
to O’Donnell and others (2008), the  ideal way to measure catastrophic health expenditure 
is by using longitudinal data (Xu, Evans et al. 2003; Wagstaff 2006; O'Donnell, van 
Doorslaer et al. 2008) which will allow observations over time on how living standards of 
households have been disrupted through such health shocks. However, in the absence of 
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such longitudinal data, cross sectional data (like the Ghana Living Standard Survey) can 
be used in which case some approximation of the disruptive effect of health care 
expenditure on material living standards must be made (Xu, Evans et al. 2003).  
 
A common approach, which is initially applied in this study, is to define medical 
spending as catastrophic if it exceeds some fraction or threshold of household income or 
total expenditure in a given period of time (usually one year). It can be seen very readily 
that such a measure is limited in its ability to capture all that we want to capture. It is 
however a useful starting point.  However, there is no consensus in the literature on the 
threshold proportion of household expenditure to define as catastrophic (O'Donnell, van 
Doorslaer et al. 2008). However, thresholds of 10% and 40% for total expenditure and 
non-food expenditure respectively are often cited as representing the points at which the 
absorption of household resources by spending on health care is considered to create 
severe disruption to living standards (Ranson 2002; Xu, Evans et al. 2003; Wagstaff 
2006). A major limitation of these threshhold levels is that they are arbitrary and a matter 
of subjective judgment.  
 
Two points on the measurement of catastrophic spending can be identified in the 
literature. The first is that this approach to identifying catastrophic payments only 
identifies those who actually incurred catastrophic health expenditures and ignores those 
who could not meet the expenditure and therefore were not able to seek treatment 
(Ranson 2002). Recognising this, Pradhan and Prescott (2002) in their analysis of 
Indonesia health care utilization and expenditure data estimate what they term “exposure 
to” rather than incurring of catastrophic payments. They recognized that the conventional 
survey-based measures of exposure to catastrophic financial risk understate the actual risk 
faced by poorer households that do not see care because of its cost (and thus reported zero 
health expenditures). Another limitation is the fact that illness shocks have catastrophic 
economic consequences not only through medical expenses but also as a result of lost 
earnings. In Indonesia for example Gertler and Gruber (2002) found that loss of earnings 
is more important than medical expenditure. In Ghana, Akazili et al (2007) observed that 
the indirect cost of an episode of malaria was over 70% of the total economic burden of 
malaria. 
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These limitations not withstanding, health care spending in excess of a substantial 
fraction of household resources is informative, if at least with respect to a part of the 
catastrophic economic consequences of illness even if it does not fully identify the 
welfare losses from a lack of financial protection against health shocks (van Doorslaer, 
O'Donnell et al. 2007).  
 
Given the arbitrariness of the threshold budget share, the prevalence and intensity of 
catastrophic payments at a number of thresholds (5% through to 40%) are presented. 
Since in developing countries like Ghana, payment for health care can crowd-out food 
expenditure relative to total expenditure, results for both total expenditure as well as non-
food expenditure are presented. The percentage of households incurring catastrophic 
payment necessarily falls as the threshold is raised, irrespective of the index used to 
estimate it. This shows, as is inevitable, that the incidence and intensity of catastrophic 
health care payments are a function of the threshold adopted. 
 
 Now the results: in Table 6.1, 11% of Ghanaian households spent in excess of 5% of 
total household resources on health care in 2005/2006. At a threshold of 10%, the number 
of households reduces by half.  About 3% of households are observed to have spent in 
excess of 20% of the total household resources. The figure of 11% of households 
spending in excess of 5% of total household resources in 2005/2006 appears higher when 
compared with other developing countries (Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) whose 
findings are even a couple of years back. In 1998/99 for instance, only 7% of Malaysia 
households spend in excess of 5% of the total household resources on health care (van 
Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 2007). In the same year and using the poverty indicator 
survey, it was revealed that less than 10% of Philippines households spend in excess of 
5% of their total household resources on health care (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003). 
From a 2002 socio-economic survey, Thailand had less than 9% of their households 
spending in excess of 5% of their total household resources on health care. Higher figures 
were observed in China and Vietnam. For instance, 28% Chinese households recorded 
out-of-pocket payments in excess of 5% of their total pre-payment income. Vietnam 
recorded 38% of household in 1993 who had incurred catastrophic payment at the 5% 
threshold level (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003) . A recent study in Nigeria, revealed 
that as many as 39% of households recorded out-of-pocket payment in excess of 5% of 
their total household resources on health care (Ichoku and Fonta 2008).  
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A high or low percentage of households in the country spending in excess of 5% of total 
household expenditure on health care is indirectly influenced by general economic 
development. Ghana’s figure of 11% households incurring out-of-pocket payments in 
excess of 5% reflects the modest economic growth resulting in overall poverty reduction 
in the country (see Chapter Two) over the past decade. The economy recovered from 
negative GDP growth in the early 1980s to over 6% GDP growth in 2007/2008 (Ghana 
Statistical Service 2007; Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research 2008).  
 
Table 6. 1: Catastrophic health care payment in Ghana using the GLSS, 2005/2006 
 Catastrophic health care payment 
using total household expenditure 
Catastrophic health payment using 
household non-food expenditure 
              
Thresholds 
5% 10% 15% 20% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
Headcount  
Hcat 11.00% 5.16% 3.39% 2.56% 10.70% 4.91% 3.17% 2.43% 
Con. Index 0.012 -0.016 -0.050 -0.065 -0.019 -0.045 -0.080 -0.087 
Weighted 
headcount 10.87% 5.24% 3.56% 2.72% 10.90% 5.13% 3.42% 2.64% 
         
Gap Measures  
Gcat* 1.83% 1..47% 1.26% 1.11% 3.39% 2.68% 2.29% 2.01% 
PGcat* 16.66% 28.47% 37.22% 43.66% 31.72% 54.57% 72.26% 82.62% 
Con. index 
-0.048 -0.061 
-
0.0656 
-
0.0678 -0.104 
-
0.1223 -0.132 -0.139 
Weighted 
gap (wGcat) 1.92% 1.56% 1.34% 1.19% 3.75% 3.01% 2.59% 2.29% 
*Gcat=catastrophic payment gap; PGat=mean positive gap 
 
Table 6.1 also provides the catastrophic headcount using non-food expenditure as the 
measure of ability to pay. It is evident from the table that non-food needs absorb a 
considerable share of household resources. For instance 11% of households spent more 
than 10% of their non-food consumption expenditure on out-of-pocket expenditures. In 
Malaysia only 1% of households spent in excess of 10% of their non-food consumption 
on health care. Once basic food needs have been met, health care costs can account for a 
large portion of resources for a substantial fraction of the population. In similar studies in 
Asia, between 8% to 16% of households in countries like Nepal, Vietnam, Kyrgyzstan 
and Bangladesh spend in excess of 25% of non-food expenditure on out-of-pocket 
payments (van Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 2007; O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). 
The degree of poverty in Nepal and Kyrgyzstan implies that food absorbs a very large 
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share of household resources and reduces the share of total resources than can be devoted 
to health care.  
 
 However while the catastrophic headcount is informative, it takes no account of which 
category of income earner spends more catastrophically than others. This information is 
important and of concern not only to society but to policy-makers. Is it the poor or the 
rich who spend a greater proportion of their income on heath care? For instance if the 
poor were to be more prone to spending a greater proportion of their meagre income on 
health, this would be of greater concern to policy makers and the larger society, than if it 
were the better-off groups. The index that will enable us to get this information is the 
weighted catastrophic headcount index. This index is derived by multiplying the 
catastrophic payment headcount by the complement of the concentration index as 
indicated in Equation 4.9 in Chapter Four. If those who exceed the threshold tend to be 
poor, the concentration index will be negative; and visa versa. It can be observed from 
Table 6.1 that at a 5% proportion of total income threshold, 10.87% of the 
populationincur catastrophic total health care expenditure. The values decline to 2.72% at 
a 20% threshold. It is important to note that, at a 5% threshold, the weighted headcount 
value (10.87%) is slightly lower than the headcount (11.0%) at the same threshold. This 
means richer households are making slightly more catastrophic payments at this threshold 
(which is confirmed by the positive concentration index). However at higher thresholds 
of 10%, 15% and 20% of total household expenditure, the poor are more often faced with 
catastrophic health expenditure, as reflected by the negative concentration indices.  
 
Switching to catastrophic health care payments using household non-food expenditure, 
the poor are burdened more with catastrophic expenditure. This is confirmed by the 
negative concentration indices (-0.065, -0.0454, -0.0803 and -0.0872), which make the 
values of the weighted headcount higher than the headcount. These results are to be 
expected given that food expenditures are a larger share of the resources of poorer 
households. Similar results are reported in China, South Korea, Nepal, Sri Lanka, 
Vietnam and Taiwan, all in Asia, where poorer households were more likely to incur 
more catastrophic expenditure than richer households (van Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 
2007). 
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 The findings in Ghana, where poorer households are more likely than higher income 
groups to make catastrophic health care payments at higher thresholds, reflect the weak 
implementation of the poverty reduction strategies and more importantly the user fee 
exemption package. The exemption policy in the health sector was introduced to cushion 
the effects of user fees in the 1980s. This exempts the poor, the aged (70+), children 
under five and antenatal care services. But over the years, inefficiency and lack of ability 
to identify the poor and the aged, etc. have hindered effective exemption implementation 
(McIntyre 2003). Where exemptions were more effectively implemented in countries like 
Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, catastrophic payments are made 
disproportionately by the better-off groups.  
 
Headcounts give the prevalence and not the intensity of catastrophic payments. As noted 
in Equation 4.7 (Chapter Four), the intensity is simply the mean payment in excess of the 
threshold (this is the mean positive gap or overshoot). It is important to note that both the 
prevalence and the intensity are reflected in the catastrophic payment gap. Table 6.1 
illustrates the results of the gap, the mean positive gap, the concentration indices and the 
weighted gap. It can be observed that the indices of the gap and the weighted gap decline 
in both the total household expenditure and non-food expenditure measures as we move 
from a lower to a higher threshold. The negative values of the concentration index show 
that it is the poor who are more likely to incur health payments exceeding the thresholds. 
The intensity of catastrophic payments thus affects the poor more than the rich for both 
the total household expenditure and non-food expenditure measures. The results of the 
mean overshoot are staggering, suggesting that there is a high intensity of catastrophic 
health expenditure in the population, especially among the poor, and it is more 
pronounced with non-food expenditure. For instance among those devoting more than 
20% of total expenditure to out-of-pocket payments on health care, the  average OOP 
payment share exceeds this threshold by almost 44 percentage points (see Table 6.1), 
giving a significant OOP budget share of 64%48
                                                   
48 The figure 64 is obtained from the percentage points almost 44% + the threshold level 20% 
. The average budget share for those 
exceeding the 20% of non-food expenditure threshold is much higher; it is 75% OOP 
budget share. This reflects a higher percentage of food shares of total household 
expenditure especially among the poor. From Nepal’s 1999/2000 household expenditure 
survey, among those spending more than 25% of their non-food expenditure on OOP 
payment, the average OOP budget share exceeded this by 34 percentage points, giving a 
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59% OOP budget share. It was 44% OOP budget share in Bangladesh (van Doorslaer, 
O'Donnell et al. 2007). The findings point to a high intensity of catastrophic payment in 
Ghana, exceeding that observed in countries like Nepal and Bangladesh (van Doorslaer, 
O'Donnell et al. 2007)  
 
It is pertinent for policy makers to know whether it is the rich or the poor that are more 
likely to overshoot these thresholds. The catastrophic gap (Gcat) explained in the 
previous paragraph does not point this out. Rather this is highlighted by the concentration 
index of the catastrophic gap and the weighted catastrophic payment gap (wGcat). This 
gives more weight to the poor than to the rich. If the concentration index is positive 
implying Gcat>wGcat, then it is the rich who more likely to overshoot than the poor. 
Table 6.1 shows that, it is the poor households in Ghana who are more likely to overshoot 
with respect to both total household expenditure and non-food expenditure on all the 
thresholds. In contrast to these findings, the rich or better-off are more likely to  
overshoot than the poor households in many of the Asian countries (van Doorslaer, 
O'Donnell et al. 2007). A recent study in Nigeria also revealed a tendency for 
catastrophic health care expenditure to be more prevalent among the richer households 
(Ichoku and Fonta 2008).  The findings of the intensity of catastrophic payments confirm 
the regressive nature of OOP payments identified in Chapter Five. 
6.2 Impoverishment effect of health care payments 
In this analysis the difficulty that remains with the way that the literature deals with 
catastrophic payments, which is what the above findings reflect, is that the approach is 
blind as to the extent to which catastrophic payments cause hardship to individuals or 
households. An alternative perspective is to devise an impoverishment effect measure.  
 
Let us step back for a moment. The main concern here is the idea that ideally no one 
ought to be pushed into poverty (or deeper into poverty) because of health care expenses. 
Such impoverishment obviously can result from medical expenditure displacing monies 
that would otherwise be used to meet basic needs such as food, clothing and shelter 
(Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2007). However this form of  
impoverishment is not normally captured by the standard approaches to the measurement 
of poverty since these only compare total household expenditure with a poverty line that 
is not sensitive to major variations in health care needs. For instance a household that is 
below the threshold but borrows extensively to cover health care expenses would be 
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raised above the threshold and thus not counted as poor. Also the standard approaches to 
measuring poverty do not identify a household that lives below the poverty line but 
borrows to cover health care expenses thereby pushing it yet deeper into poverty. These 
factors lead to an underestimation of the extent of poverty.  
However a method that adjusts for health spending or OOP payments would enable one 
to include households which fall below the poverty threshold and therefore are counted as 
poor. The measure is justified by the fact that spending on health care is a response to a 
basic need that is often not adequately included in the measurement of  some poverty 
lines.  
 
According to Grossman (1972), the impoverishing effect of the cost of health care is the 
amount of other household basic consumption that must be forgone to purchase health 
care. Stated differently, the shadow price of making health care payments (where 
households are assumed to bear the cost of treatment) is other basic needs of the 
household. Thus, health care financing could push households that are just above the 
poverty line into poverty and those already poor deeper into poverty.  
 
In Ghana, poverty and impoverishment due to health care payments could be different 
depending on the geographical location of the household. In this analysis, therefore, I 
examined the poverty effects of health care payments first at a national level, then by 
rural/urban differences and finally across the three geographical zones. There are ten 
regions in Ghana (see Chapter Two) and these can broadly be categorized into three 
geographical belts or zones. The northern zone or belt comprises the Upper East, Upper 
West and Northern regions, the middle zone the Brong Ahafo, Asante, Eastern and Volta 
regions and the coastal zone comprises of the three regions of the Greater Accra, Western 
and Central regions.  
 
Beginning with the national level, Table 6.2 presents the poverty headcount, poverty gap, 
normalised poverty gap and normalised mean poverty gap based on household 
consumption expenditure at pre-payment and post-payment levels and at the two poverty 
lines [the lower ($1.25) and higher ($2.50)].  Obviously we would expect the poverty 
levels post-payment (i.e. after making out-of-pocket health care payments) to be higher 
than pre-payment particularly since out-of-pocket payments can eat deep into the 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
 182 
household purse, thereby leaving fewer resources available for the household to survive 
on. The ‘absolute’ in Table 6.2 is simply the post-payment poverty level less the pre-
payment poverty level. The ‘relative’ measures the relative change in poverty after 
making health care payments. In other words, it is the ‘absolute’ divided by the pre-
payment level, multiplied by 100%. 
Table 6. 2: Impoverishment impact of OOP payment using the GLSS, 2005/2006  
 Poverty line - $1.25/day  Poverty line - $2.50/day 
National Gross of 
health 
payment 
Net of 
health 
payment 
Absolute Relative 
 Gross of 
health 
payment 
Net of 
health 
payment 
Absolute Relative 
    
Poverty 
headcount 17.04% 18.64% 1.59% 9.35% 
 
48.02% 49.85% 1.83% 3.82% 
Standard error 0.00944 0.00998 0.00194    0.01324 0.01323 0.00182  
Poverty gap 90925.73 129776.3 38850.56 42.73%  651869.7 720124.1 68254.3 10.47% 
Standard error 6223.579 13588.53 11871.4    24709.07 28546.66 12477.93  
Normalized 
poverty gap 5.36% 7.65% 2.29% 42.73% 
 
19.20% 21.21% 2.01% 10.47% 
Standard error 0.00367 0.00800 0.00699    0.00728 0.00841 0.00368  
Normalised 
mean poverty 
gap 31.43% 41.02% 9.59% 30.52% 
 
39.99% 42.55% 2.56% 6.41% 
Standard error 0.01169 0.03840 -    0.00757 0.01031 -  
 
A widely used measure of poverty is the poverty headcount index. This simply measures 
the proportion of the population who are deemed to be poor and in this particular case 
those who are poor before making health care payments (pre-payment) and after making 
health care payment (post-payment).  Comparing the poverty headcount in both periods 
(pre-payment and post-payment) at $1.25 or lower poverty line, it is found that health 
care payments increase poverty in Ghana from 17% to 18.6%. This suggests that health 
care spending increases poverty by 1.6 percentage points and, given an estimated 
population in Ghana of 22 million people, translates into about 352,000 more people 
being impoverished as a result of spending on health care. This also represents a relative 
rise of about 9% in the estimate of extreme poverty. Similar results using the lower 
poverty line were found elsewhere. In China, the 2000 urban/rural household survey with 
a sample of 9700 households was used to measure the poverty headcount. The results 
revealed that poverty headcount increased from 13.7% to 16.2%, a difference of 2.6 
percentage points and this translated into over 32 million more people that were pushed 
into poverty by making health care payments (van Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 2006; van 
Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 2007). The relative change in poverty was higher in China 
(18.8%) compared to Ghana (9%).  Bangladesh had an even higher percentage point 
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increase in the poverty headcount due to health care payments. Using the 1999/2000 
household income expenditure survey of a sample of 7,440 households, the poverty 
headcount was found to increase from 22.5% to 26.3%, a difference of 3.8 percentage 
points (equivalent to almost 5 million people). In India, subtracting out-of-pocket health 
care payments from total household resources also increased the poverty headcount by a 
similar margin and this was equivalent to almost 37 million people (van Doorslaer, 
O'Donnell et al. 2006; van Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 2007). Poverty increased by 2.6% 
in Nigeria through health care payments (Ichoku and Fonta 2008). 
 
At the higher poverty line of $2.50 per day, we obviously observed an increase in the 
number of households who are drawn into poverty. Close to half of Ghanaians are 
categorised as poor at this poverty line. When health care payments are taken into 
account, poverty increases from 48% to 49.8%, translating into about 396,000 more 
people being pushed into poverty. The 1.8 percentage points absolute increase represents 
a 3.8% relative rise in poverty. Similarly in China the percentage of households classified 
as poor before making health care payments increased from 13.7% at the lower poverty 
line to 44.6% when the higher poverty line is used. At the higher poverty line, the poverty 
headcount increased by 1.8% which represents a 4.1% relative increase in poverty 
headcount (van Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 2007). In the Philippines, the poverty 
headcount at the higher poverty line increased from 50.2% pre-payment to 51.2% post-
payment, a difference of 1.1% (equivalent to almost 800,000 people pushed into poverty 
through health care payments).  
 
It is generally found in the studies from Asia that countries that had higher mean out-of-
pocket payments as a percentage of their consumption expenditure or income also had 
higher percentage point increases in their poverty headcount. In others words, countries 
with higher shares of out-of-pocket payments suffer a higher burden of impoverishment 
effect from out-of-pocket payments. For instance Bangladesh had a mean OOP payment 
of 5.10% of total expenditure and also recorded a 3.8% increase in poverty. Malaysia had 
1.37% as a mean OOP payments and the increase in poverty was only 0.1% (van 
Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 2007).  
 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, the greatest virtue of the headcount index is that it is not 
only simple to construct but easy to understand. That is why it is widely used. However, 
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the headcount index does not take the intensity of poverty into account. Given this 
drawback, another moderately common measure of poverty is the poverty gap index. This 
simply calculates the extent to which individuals on average fall below the poverty line. 
Table 6.2 thus also provides figures for the poverty gap and the normalised poverty gaps. 
The poverty gap at the pre-payment or gross health payment level is given as ¢90,925. 
This increased by 43% to a post-payment level of ¢129,776. The monetary difference is 
estimated to be on average ¢38,850. This is the mean poverty gap created as a result of 
OOP health care expenditure in Ghana. Expressing this as a percentage of the poverty 
line or normalising this by the poverty line, the poverty gap or severity of poverty 
increases from 5.36% with the $1.25 poverty line to 7.65% when health care payments 
are netted out of total household consumption.  
 
In Nepal the deficit of total consumption (the poverty gap) was more than 10% below the 
$1.25 threshold and this rose by almost a percentage point when out-of-pocket for health 
care were subtracted from total resources (van Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 2007). The 
normalised poverty gap also rose from 6.7% to 7.7% in India, and rose by 0.9% in 
Bangladesh. The deduction of out-of-pocket payments resulted in a small increase (0.2%) 
in the severity of poverty in the Philippines (van Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 2007). This 
suggests that the poor in these countries were better protected from health care costs than 
Ghana which had a increase of over 2%.  
 
Turning to the higher poverty line of $2.50, a similar pattern is observed. The poverty gap 
increased from the pre-payment level of ¢651,869 to a post-payment level ¢720,124, 
giving a difference of an average of ¢68, 254. Normalising this by the poverty line, the 
poverty gap increases from 19.2% to 21.2%, a difference of 2% points which is not 
different from the results at the lower poverty line ($1.25). 
 
 It can be helpful to think of the poverty gap as the cost of eliminating poverty (relative to 
the poverty line), since the quantification of this gap shows how much would need to be 
transferred to the poor to bring their income or expenditure up to the poverty line. This 
would require a lot of information on how to target such assistance to the poor and that is 
often normally lacking in developing countries like Ghana. 
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A measure that takes into account inequality within those who are poor is the normalised 
mean poverty gap. This measure (as explained in Chapter Four) is simply a weighted sum 
of poverty gaps (each as a percentage below the poverty line) and where the weights are 
the percentages below the poverty line. Thus a poverty gap of say 5% below the poverty 
line is given a weight of 5%. This is in contrast to the poverty gap index where in essence 
all points below the poverty line are weighted equally. The measure thus puts more 
weight on observations that fall well below the poverty line. In Table 6.2, the normalised 
mean poverty gap increases with health care payments from about 31% to 41% giving a 
difference of 10% at the lower poverty line. Thus poverty is deepened by 10% as a result 
of OOP payments (see Table 6.2). This 10% represents a rise of about 31% in the 
deepening of poverty in Ghana. At a $2.50 poverty line, poverty deepens by only 3%, 
which represents a rise of 6% in increased poverty in the country. 
 
The results indicate that expenditures associated with health care use in Ghana increase 
impoverishment in the country, as is also shown by Pen’s parade in the next section 
below. 
 
6.2.1: Effects of health care payments on Pen’s Parade  
Figure 6.1 presents the effect of health care payments using Pen’s parade of household 
consumption expenditure distribution, gross and net of health care payments.  
 
Box 6. 1: Pen’s Parade of Dwarfs and few Giants (How did it come about?) 
In his 1980 book, Wealth, Income and Equality, Dutch economist Jan Pen develops a graphic 
metaphor to convey the extent of wealth disparity in Western democracies. He asks the reader to 
imagine a parade of people where everyone's height is proportional to his or her individual 
wealth. A person of average wealth is represented by a person of average height. The parade 
begins with the smallest (the poorest) at the front with the rich bringing up the rear in a one-hour 
parade. The first marchers are actually buried several feet beneath the ground since they have 
negative net worth - they owe more wealth than they own. For approximately 20 minutes there 
are invisible marchers, for they own no wealth. After half an hour, there are dwarfs - people 
about six inches tall, whose wealth is household furniture, a car and perhaps a small savings 
account. "But a surprise awaits us," writes Pen. "We keep on seeing dwarfs. Of course they 
gradually become a little taller, but it's a slow process." Only at about twelve minutes before the 
hour do we begin seeing people of average height, for more than three quarters of the world's 
population have fewer assets than average. In the last few minutes "giants loom up . . . a lawyer, 
not exceptionally successful, eighteen feet tall." In the last few seconds, there are people so tall 
we cannot even see their heads, the corporate managing directors a hundred yards tall. "The rear 
of the parade is brought up by a few participants who are measured in miles . . . their heads 
disappear into the clouds. . . . The last man, whose back we can see long after the parade has 
passed by, is John Paul Getty (this was before Bill Gates) . . . . His height is inconceivable: at 
least ten miles; perhaps twice as much." (Cowell 2006)  
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For each household, a vertical bar or “paint drip” shows the extent to which the 
subtraction of health care payments reduces consumption (World Bank 2005). If a “drip” 
crosses the poverty line, then the household is not counted as poor on the basis of gross 
consumption expenditure but is poor on the basis of net consumption. Comparing this 
graph to that of Bangladesh and Nepal (van Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 2007), Ghana has 
far more households being drawn into extreme poverty through health care payments. It 
can be observed from the graph that there is very little OOP payments for those below 
poverty line of $1.25. This is often so because this group is simply too poor to even think 
about using health care when sick. In other words they are so poor that they use very few 
health care services, which can have grave consequences. It can also be noted on the 
graph that even the relatively well-off (i.e. those with household expenditure levels of 
more than 8 times the poverty line) can be impoverished by OOP payments.  
 
Figure 6. 1: Effect of Health Payments on Pen’s Parade of the Household Consumption 
Distribution, Ghana, 2005/2006 
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6.2.2 Rural-Urban differences in the impoverishment effect of OOP health care 
payments in Ghana, 2005/2006 
 
Urban and rural areas are inextricably linked in the process of development. Although 
poverty in urban areas is substantial and increasing, global poverty is still predominantly 
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a rural phenomenon. Most rural dwellers lack access to the basic necessities of life 
including water, sanitation, good housing and health care and if they have to access 
services such as health care they often do so at a very high opportunity cost, sacrificing 
other basic necessities of life. Table 6.3 provides the results of the impoverishment effect 
of health care payments for both rural and urban areas of the country using the lower 
poverty line ($1.25 per head per day).  
 
Table 6. 3: Impoverishment impact of OOP payments (Rural/Urban) using the lower 
poverty line of $1.25/day 
 Rural  Urban 
National Gross of 
health 
payment 
(1) 
Net of 
health 
payment 
(2) 
Absolute 
3= (2)-(1) 
Relative 
[(3)/(1)]*100 
Gross of 
health 
payment 
(1) 
Net of 
health 
payment 
(2) 
Absolute 
3= (2)-(1) 
Relative 
[(3)/(1)]*100 
Poverty 
headcount 24.60% 26.55% 1.95% 7.92% 4.60% 5.61% 1.01% 21.92% 
Standard 
error 0.24603 0.26552 0.01949   0.00878 0.00959 0.00209   
Poverty 
gap 132947.4 168074.5 35127.13 26.42% 21749.56 66729.64 44980.07 206.81% 
Standard 
error 9021.38 12135 7717.53   5603.97 29485.95 28742.86   
Normalized 
poverty 
gap 7.83% 9.90% 2.07% 26.42% 1.28% 3.93% 2.65% 206.81% 
Standard 
error 0.00531 0.00715 0.00455   0.00330 0.01737 0.01693   
Normalized 
mean 
poverty 
gap 31.83% 37.29% 5.46% 17.14% 27.84% 70.05% 42.21% 151.65% 
Standard 
error 0.0123 0.01924 -   0.03170 0.30448 -   
 
As mentioned earlier, the poverty headcount denotes simply the proportion of individuals 
who fall below the poverty line, gross and net of health care payments. It can be observed 
that whilst the poverty headcount in rural areas is 24.6%, it is only 4.6% in urban areas 
(Table 6.3 and Figure 6.2). After health care payments, the percentage of people who 
become poor and/or drop deeper into poverty increased by 2 percentage points to 26.6% 
in rural areas and this increase represents about an 8% increase in relative terms. On the 
other hand the poverty headcount index in urban areas increased by only 1% percentage 
point from 4.6% pre-payment to 5.6%. However, this increase represents close to a 22% 
relative increase in poverty. This means that the poverty headcount increases by a higher 
percentage in urban than in rural areas. 
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Figure 6. 2: Poverty headcount index  by rural/urban location using the poverty line 
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In rural areas, the poverty gap pre-payment is given as ¢132,947 but was only ¢ 21,749 
among urban dwellers. Whilst the poverty gap among rural households increased from 
¢132,947 to ¢168,074, the urban increase was more than three fold giving a difference of 
¢44,980. We observe that the normalised poverty gap increased by 2 percentage points in 
rural areas but increased by 2.7% among urban dwellers. This 2.7% represents an over 
200% increase in the normalised poverty gap among urban households. This means that 
health care payments have a dramatic impact on poverty levels in urban areas.  
 
The results of the normalised mean poverty gap are also shown (see Table 6.3). It can be 
observed that before making health care payments, the normalised mean poverty gap is 
higher in rural areas than in urban areas; after these payments, the normalised mean 
poverty gap among urban households increases more than three fold and is then greater 
than in rural areas, suggesting that urban dwellers may be making very large catastrophic 
payments compared to their rural counterparts. This has worrying implications for the 
consumption of other basic necessities. Whilst poverty is deepened by about 5.5% in rural 
areas, it is increasing by 42.2% in urban areas a greater than 150% increase in poverty 
due to health care payments. These results make intuitive sense. Urban dwellers are likely 
to consume more western medicine, attend private hospitals, tertiary health care facilities 
and use high cost medical diagnostics and treatment. On the other hand rural dwellers are 
likely to consume health services at the local clinics, local chemical drug sellers and other 
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lower cost health care providers. Further the rural poor sometimes do not access health 
services, not because they do not need them but because they simply cannot afford the 
high cost involved.  
 
6.2.3 Broad geographical zones (northern, middle and coastal) difference in 
impoverishment effect of OOP health care payment using the lower poverty line of 
$1.25 
 
As mentioned earlier, the ten regions of Ghana can be divided into three broad 
geographical zones or belts - the northern, middle and coastal. Before I examine the 
impoverishment effect of health care payments across these zones, it is important to have 
a sense of the regional variations in the poverty headcount index (see Figure 6.3)  
 
Figure 6. 3: Regional distribution of poverty headcount index 
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Results for the poverty headcount presented in Figure 6.3 point to very wide inequalities 
in Ghana. Whilst in Greater Accra, the poverty headcount pre-payment is about 2.6%, it 
is as high as 79.5% in the Upper West region. The differences between the regions of the 
north and the rest are also very striking. Whilst the poverty headcount was 58.8% in the 
Upper East, it is 5.4% in the Eastern region. The Northern region also has a high poverty 
headcount of about 40%. A recent statement by the Vice President (see Box 6.2), captures 
the issue of inequality that has become deeply entrenched in the country over the years. 
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Box 6. 2: Government concern about geographical health inequality 
 
 
Vice President of Ghana, His Excellency John Mahama on Wednesday (05/08/2009) decried 
the lack of social justice and equity in Ghana's healthcare system, describing the situation as 
unacceptable. He said lack of social justice and equity in the health sector remained a major 
development drawback, pointing to the concentration of health professionals in few urban 
centres to the neglect of a number of communities. "This situation lacks equity and is 
unacceptable. Depending on what geographical part of the country you are, access and quality 
can vary dramatically". The Vice President was addressing a joint meeting of the 
Commonwealth Pharmacists Association (CPA) and the Pharmaceutical Society of Ghana 
(PSGH) in Accra on Wednesday. It was on the theme: "Managing Threats and Crises: The Vital 
Role of Pharmacy in An Unstable World." Vice President Mahama said there was huge 
disparity in the distribution of health professionals explaining that 80 per cent of 1, 400 
pharmacists in the country were located in Accra or Kumasi, while the three northern regions 
have less than five per cent of pharmacists and pharmacies. He said while in the Greater Accra 
Region, an estimated health professional ratio was one to 8,000 patients; the figure was 
dramatic in the North where one health professional accounted for 96,000 patients49. 
 
With a pre-payment national poverty headcount of 17%, the three northern regions are the 
only ones that are far above this national average. After health care payments, the poverty 
headcount increased from 79.5% to 80.7% in the Upper West region whilst in Greater 
Accra (the Capital city) it went up by 0.7%. In the Upper West region, over 7 in every 10 
people fall below the poverty line of the $1.25 per day. After health care payments, 
another 1% were pushed into poverty.  
 
However, the Ashanti region is the most affected by health care payments. The 
percentage point increases in poverty after making health care payments are highest in the 
Ashanti region compared to the other regions and this is followed closely by Brong 
Ahafo. Whilst the poverty headcount index in the Central region increased by 0.4% from 
8.16% from pre- to post-payment, the poverty headcount index in Ashanti region 
increased by 2.73% (i.e. from 9.86% pre-payment to 12.59% post-payment). Five regions 
(Upper East, Eastern, Ashanti, Volta and Brong Ahafo) recorded absolute increases above 
the national average of 1.60%. 
 
 
Turning to the broad geographic zones, a similar pattern is observed. The northern zone, 
comprising Upper East, Upper West and Northern regions, has a remarkably higher 
poverty headcount, both pre-payment and post-payment, compared to the other two 
zones. Whilst the poverty headcount was 51.37% pre-payment in the northern zone, it 
was 10.27% for the middle and 5.41% for the coastal zones. However the percentage 
                                                   
49 Source: http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=166469 
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increase in poverty after health care payments is highest among households in the middle 
zone. Whilst the percentage or absolute increase in poverty as a result of health care 
payments was 2.29% percentage points in the middle zone, the northern zone registered 
an increase of 1.5% percentage points and the coastal belt less than 1% percentage point 
(see Figure 6.4). 
 
Figure 6. 4: Poverty headcount of broad geographical zones in Ghana 
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The normalised mean poverty gap is also calculated and presented in Figure 6.5. Here one 
can observe that despite the generally high poverty level or impoverishment among 
households in the northern zone, the middle and particularly the coastal zones are affected 
more by health care payments. In other words, a higher percentage of households in the 
coastal and middle zones are pushed below the poverty line or made poorer through 
health care payments compare to the northern zone (Figure 6.5). In summary, the burden 
of out-of-pocket payments is highest among urban dwellers who are mostly in the coastal 
and middle zones. The fact that the impoverishment burden of health care payments is 
lower in the northern zone implies that they are using no or very few health services.  
 
Figure 6. 5: Broad geographical zones of normalised mean poverty gap (NMPGap) 
of poverty in Ghana 
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6.3 Summary  
Overall, it is to be noted that OOP payment is not only regressive (as was revealed in 
Chapter Five) and catastrophic (Figure 6.6) but has a tremendously impoverishing effect 
(Figure 6.7) on Ghanaians and people of other nations. Comparing Ghana with selected 
African and Asia countries, Ghana is worst off in terms of having a higher catastrophic 
effect of OOP payments (using both 10% of total expenditure and 40% of non-food 
expenditure) compared to countries like Tanzania, South Africa, Malaysia, Sri-Lanka, 
Thailand and Indonesia. However Ghana is better off than Nepal, China, and Bangladesh. 
Countries that have higher catastrophic health care payments are countries which are also 
associated with significant OOP payments.  
 
Figure 6. 6: Incidence of catastrophic payments defined relative to total and to non-
food expenditure 
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Source: Ataguba, Akazili et al. 2009 : van Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 2007 : Own calculations 
 
Figure 6.7 also compares Ghana with some selected countries in terms of the absolute 
change in poverty headcounts as a result of OOP payments. In other words, the figure 
compares Ghana with other countries in terms of poverty impact of OOP payments (i.e. 
the difference between pre-payment headcount and the post-payment headcount).  The 
least change in poverty as a result of OOP payments is observed in Malaysia where OOP 
payments are found to be progressive and this was due to the use of subsidised public 
health services by the poor and a large patronage of private sector services by the well-
off. Bangledesh has the highest impact of poverty as result of OOP payments and this is 
due to poor implementation of exemptions as well as poor quality services just like in 
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Ghana where the poor end up patronising private health services which are often more 
expensive.  
 
Figure 6. 7: Poverty impact of OOP payments-Poverty headcounts (absolute 
change)* 
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Source: Ataguba, Akazili et al. 2009 : van Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 2007 : Own calculations 
*Using the poverty line of $1.08/1.25 per day 
 
These findings lend support to qualitative studies (Dong, Kouyate et al. 2003; Chuma, 
Musimbi et al. 2009) suggesting that health care payments cause impoverishment. The 
World Bank “Voice of the Poor Study” (Naraya 2000) showed that, after illiteracy and 
unemployment, health care costs were the most important precursor to poverty (Naraya 
2000). Further, a retrospective study in India identified the cost of ill health and health 
expenses as one of three main factors responsible for 85% of all cases of impoverishment. 
The apparently low percentage of people pushed below the poverty line by health care 
payments among rural dwellers and the northern belt of the country is simply explained 
by the fact that those threatened by poverty merely forgo health care because of 
unaffordable charges. The results of the significant impoverishment from health care 
payments in Ghana are consistent with results elsewhere. Impoverishment through health 
care payments seems to be greater in Ghana than in many other countries.    
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Chapter Seven: Factors influencing membership of the NHIS 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter looks at the factors influencing people’s decisions to join or not to join the 
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). In Chapter Five, it was found that tax funding 
and the NHIS are progressive whilst out-of-pocket payments are very regressive. Chapter 
Six confirmed that indeed out-of-pocket payments are not only regressive but can be 
catastrophic and impoverish households. Thus, Ghana can only rely on tax funding and 
the NHIS to provide equitable financing and universal health care coverage. The factors 
influencing the incidence of taxes are all outside the control of the health sector. Tax rates 
and general tax policies are determined by the Ministry of Finance (MoF). The health 
sector can only argue for a greater share of tax funds. However, it does have some control 
over certain factors (see conceptual framework in Chapter Three) that may hinder the 
expansion of the NHIS and thereby reduce out-of-pocket payments. As indicated in 
Chapter Three, though it is mandatory by law for all people in Ghana to belong to the 
NHI, in reality it is only the formal sector workers that the mandatory requirement is 
applied to as a proportion of their pension contributions are compulsorily deducted and 
paid to the NHI. NHI is thus voluntary for those in the informal sector.  
 
The chapter draws on the SHIELD household survey and the qualitative data (described 
in Chapter Four) to explore the factors that help to explain the enrolment status of 
individual members of households. As mentioned in chapter four, the SHIELD household 
survey sought household and individual information from six districts which represented 
the three broad geographical zones (the northern, middle and coastal) of the country. A 
questionnaire was used to collect information from households that were currently 
enrolled into the NHIS, those who had not renewed their membership with the NHIS 
(former members of the scheme) and those who had never enrolled in the NHIS. The 
information was weighted to allow a national picture to emerge. I also conducted 44 
focus group discussions (FGDs) with individuals who were either insured or uninsured. 
In-depth interviews were also carried out with the six district scheme managers on issues 
pertaining to the operation and management of the District Health Insurance Schemes. 
Finally a representative of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the National Health 
Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was interviewed to solicit his views on a wide range of issues 
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pertaining to the management, expansion, equitable coverage and sustainability of the 
NHIS.  
 
Knowledge of these factors is critical to expanding coverage of the NHIS. Below, I 
present the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the insured versus 
uninsured. This is followed by a Logit regression analysis to identify the key factors 
predicting enrollment. Finally key views from the focus group discussions and the in-
depth interviews are analyzed to further explore the factors influencing NHIS enrolment 
in support of the discussion of the factors. 
7.1 Socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the insured versus uninsured  
7.1.1 Individual level characteristics 
The results from the survey revealed that 37% of the population were insured. This figure 
is lower than the 45% reported by the NHIS secretariat for 2008 (Ministry of Health 
2009). The reason for the lower figure is that the survey was conducted in 
August/September 2008 and so the time frames are different. Another reason worth 
mentioning is perhaps the strict scrutiny used in the survey to establish an insured 
individual. The criteria used in the survey included the production of a valid card to be 
considered as an insured member 
 
Over 31% of Ghanaians have no formal education. A higher percentage of people with no 
formal education are uninsured compared to the insured group. This is to be expected 
given the design of the insurance scheme, where formal sector workers are automatic 
members through the compulsory deduction of their SSNIT contributions to the NHIS. 
Table 7.1 shows that 51.5% of the population are female while the 2000 population and 
housing census puts the figure at 50.5% (Ghana Statistical Service 2007). The high 
fertility has contributed to the young age structure of the Ghanaian population with over 
40% under 15 years of age (see Table 7.1). With the global trend of decreasing fertility, 
this is a reduction from the 2000 national estimate of 43% of the population below 15 
years of age (Ghana Statistical Service 2007). The fact that more under 15 years of age 
and the over 60 years of age are reported among the insured is a product of the exemption 
package under the NHIS in which those under 18 years (if parents are enrolled) and the 
aged are exempted from contributions (i.e. can register with the NHIS without making a 
contribution).  
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Information on the health seeking behaviour of each member of the household was also 
sought (see Table 7.1). About a third of the population reported having used any health 
services within the previous month, with a higher percentage usage by insured members. 
On hospitalisation within the past year 1.5% of the uninsured were hospitalised compared 
with nearly 4% of the insured. On average 2.4% reported hospitalisations within the past 
year, which is equivalent to a total of 552,000 people. Reported illness or injury within 
the previous month and chronic illness was higher among the insured than uninsured. 
This may mean that there is some element of adverse selection such that those who have 
health problems are more likely to join the NHIS than the healthy. It may also be the case 
that those who are uninsured could have health problems but they are too poor to seek 
health care, which may influence their reporting of illness.  
  
Table 7. 1: Socio-economic and health characteristics of individual household 
members 
Variables Response 
options 
Insured Uninsured P-Value Total 
% Number*       % Number*       % 
Education  None 
Primary 
Secondary  
Tertiary 
1174 
  496 
2047 
4668 
28.4 
12.0 
49.6 
49.0 
2643 
  971 
3286 
  227 
37.1 
13.6 
46.1 
  3.2 
 
0.000 
 
 
31.8 
13.0 
50.1 
  5.1 
Sex Male 
Female 
2523 
2675 
48.5 
51.5 
4555 
4296 
48.5 
51.5 
 
0.002 
48.5 
51.5         
Age 0-5 
6-14 
15-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60+ 
  913 
1400 
1136 
  656 
  433 
  283 
  374 
17.6 
26.9 
21.9 
12.6  
  8.3 
  5.5 
  7.2 
1498 
2148 
2489 
1098 
  725 
  464 
  427 
16.9 
24.3 
28.1 
12.4 
  8.2 
  5.3 
  4.8 
 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
 
17.2 
25.3 
25.8   
12.5 
  8.3  
  5.3   
  5.7              
Use any health service in 
the past month? 
Yes 
No 
2008 
3189 
38.6 
61.4 
2841 
6010 
32.1    
67.9    
 
0.954 
34.5 
65.5 
Any hospitalization in 
the past 12 months? 
Yes 
No 
204 
4993 
  3.9 
96.1     
137 
8714 
  1.5 
98.5 
0.000 
 
  2.4 
97.6      
Any member been ill or 
injured in the past month 
 Yes 
 No 
1705 
3493 
32.8 
67.2 
2352 
6477 
26.6 
73.4 
0.220 
 
28.9 
71.1 
Any Chronic illness 
 
Yes  
No 
300 
4897 
  5.8 
94.2 
294 
8534 
  3.8 
96.2 
0.045 
 
 4.4 
95.6 
*Figures in 1000s (theses have been weighted to national levels) 
7.1.2 Household level characteristics 
Information was also sought on the characteristics of the households in the survey. An 
insured household was defined as either the head of the household or his/her spouse 
having a valid health insurance card. The average household size was 4.9 with a slightly 
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larger household size (5.0) among the uninsured households (see Table 7.2). About 55% 
of the population live in rural areas. It is projected that by 2020, Ghana’s rural population 
will have shrunk to about 46%. Increasing urbanisation brings pressures on already 
inadequate amenities in urban areas including health care. However, according to Carrin 
and James (2004), population distribution in favour of urban areas (or densely populated 
areas) rather than scattered rural populations is key to a successful SHI (see Box 3.1 in 
Chapter Three) 
The results from Table 7.2 show that whilst 63% of insured households have access to 
electricity, 50% of the uninsured have access to electricity. Access to electricity is often 
used as an indicator of a household’s socio-economic status. It is also often a key variable 
in the computation of an asset index of a household or an individual. The results thus 
indicated that the insured are better off economically than the uninsured. Over 90% of 
households used either wood or charcoal as their main cooking fuel and this has direct 
implications for the environment. A higher percentage of the population depends on 
wood for cooking fuel among the uninsured compared to the insured.  
 
Information was also sought from households on the type of toilet used by the household. 
Free range is defined as defecating in the open at any place and often is the only option 
available to the poor. This practice, as can be observed in Table 7.2, is more pronounced 
among the uninsured compared to the insured.  
 
On access to water, even though more insured households have access to pipe-borne 
water than uninsured households, on the whole over 78% of households in Ghana have 
access to improve or safe drinking water (pipe-borne and borehole). According to the 
Water and Sanitation Sector Monitoring Platform (WSMP) the proportion of the 
population that used improved drinking water sources increased significantly from 56% 
in 1990 to 74% in 2006 (Ghana Statistical Service 2006) and with this current figure 
(78.8%), Ghana has already hit the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target of 
ensuring that 78% of a country’s population have safe drinking water by 2015.  
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Table 7. 2: Household level characteristics 
Variables Response options Percentage (%) 
Insured Uninsured P-
value 
Total/ 
average Number  % Number % 
Household size  1960  4.8 2893 5.0 0.012 4.9 
Modern design of house 
 
Yes  
No 
1672 
  287 
85.3        
14.7            
607 
2285 
79.0 
21.0 
0.001 
 
81.6 
18.4     
Location 
 
Rural 
Urban 
1059 
901 
54.0 
46.0          
1591 
1391 
55.0 
45.0 
 
0.000 
54.6 
45.4 
Geographical zone 
  
Northern 
Middle 
Coastal 
285 
935 
739 
14.6   
47.7       
37.7           
466 
1310 
1116 
16.1 
45.3 
38.6 
 
0.000 
 
15.5 
46.3   
38.2     
Status of house for the 
household 
Own 
Family house 
Rented 
Other  
819 
654 
427 
58 
41.8      
33.4   
21.8 
  3.0            
980 
1156 
687 
69
33.8 
40.0 
23.8 
  2.4 
 
 
0.000 
 
37.1 
37.3 
23.0 
  2.6 
Use of electricity in 
household 
Yes  
No 
733 
1227 
62.6   
37.4     
1449 
1443 
49.9  
50.1 
 
0.155 
55.0 
45.0 
Main cooking fuel for 
household 
 
Gas 
Electricity 
Wood 
Charcoal 
Stalks 
Other  
229 
4 
907 
803 
6 
8 
11.7  
  0.2   
46.3       
41.0       
  0.3  
  0.5                
185 
8 
1559 
1109 
3 
25
  6.4  
  0.3  
53.9 
38.4  
  0.1 
  0.9 
 
0.000 
 
 
 
 
  8.6 
  0.3 
50.8  
39.4 
  0.2  
  0.7              
Common toilet facility used 
by this household 
 
 
 
Free range 
Shared Pit latrine 
Own Pit latrine 
Shared KVIP 
Own KVIP 
Own flush toilet 
Shared flush toilet 
Other  
500 
441 
159 
577 
128 
94 
42 
14 
25.5       
22.5 
8.2  
29.5   
6.6  
4.8      
2.2     
0.7       
895 
723 
143 
883 
89 
63 
68 
24 
31.0 
25.0 
 5.0 
30.5 
 3.1 
 2.2 
 2.4     
 0.9  
 
 
0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
28.8 
24.0 
  6.3 
30.1 
  4.5  
  3.3                        
  2.3  
  0.8        
Main source of drinking 
water for this household 
Pipe borne water  
Bore-hole 
Well water 
Dam/dugout 
Stream 
Sachet water 
Other  
1019 
507 
108 
109 
127 
70 
11 
52.0  
25.9 
  5.5  
  5.6     
  6.5  
  3.6 
  0.9                         
1378 
916 
172 
152 
186 
80 
5
47.7 
31.7 
  6.0 
  5.3 
  6.4 
  2.8 
  0.1 
 
0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
49.4 
29.4  
  5.8 
  5.4  
  6.5  
  3.1  
  0.4   
Household face food shortage Yes 
No 
1476 
484 
75.3       
24.7            
2379 
513 
82.2  
17.8 
 
0.000 
79.4 
20.6 
Main source of income for 
household 
Salaries /wages 
Remittances 
Pensions and grants 
Sales of farm prod 
Other non-farm Inc 
No income 
Other  
596 
226 
59 
735 
322 
16 
2  
30.5       
11.6      
  3.1 
37.5   
16.4      
  0.8   
  0.1                        
720 
311 
14 
1222 
593 
14 
13
24.9 
10.8  
  0.5 
42.3 
20.5 
  0.5 
  0.5 
 
 
0.000 
27.2 
11.1  
  1.5    
40.3  
18.9 
  0.6 
  0.3 
Incurred health care expend. 
within the past one month? 
Yes 
No 
1325 
634 
67.6      
32.4       
2181 
710 
75.4  
24.6 
 
0.000 
72.3 
27.7     
Socio-economic status of 
household 
Quintile 1(poorest) 
Quintile 2 
Quintile 3 
Quintile 4 
Quintile 5(richest) 
313 
540 
620 
252 
233 
16.0    
27.5   
31.7    
12.9  
11.9            
577 
786 
793 
387 
347 
20.0 
27.2 
27.5 
13.3 
12.0 
 
0.000 
 
 
 
18.3 
27.3 
29.2 
13.2 
12.0 
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Households were also asked about food shortages, main source of income and whether 
health care expenditure was made within the past month. The results show that close to 
80% of the households experience food shortages and it is more prevalent among the 
uninsured, who are probably those with lower income compared to the insured 
households. It is also shown in Table 7.2 that over 70% of households incurred health 
care expenditure within the past month and this is more so among the uninsured 
households compared to the insured households. This is not surprising as insured 
households will not often pay at the point of access if they use accredited providers. It can 
also be observed that a higher percentage (20%) of uninsured households is in the poorest 
quintile compared to insured households (16%). This means insured households are 
socio-economically better off than insured households and this can be explained in terms 
of the design of the insurance scheme where formal sector workers who are relatively 
better off are all members through the compulsory deduction of their SSNIT contributions 
to the NHI.  
 
7.2 .1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable captures whether an individual within the household was insured 
or not. This dependent variable comes primarily from the question about health insurance 
membership. Another relevant question was whether the registered member has a valid 
health insurance card that will allow him/her to access health services (this is important 
because not all who have registered have their cards yet and so cannot access health care). 
A list of the possible responses on health insurance status was provided: “registered with 
the District health insurance scheme”, “registered with other health insurance scheme”, 
“registered with both the district health insurance and other health insurance scheme”, 
“former members of the district health insurance scheme”, and “never registered with any 
health insurance scheme”. For the regression analysis our dependent variable takes on the 
value “1” for the first three categories i.e. those that have duly registered with a health 
insurance scheme be they the district health insurance scheme or other health insurance 
scheme. 
 
7.2 .2 Explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables can be categorised into the individual level, the head of the 
household and household level variables. The key variables considered are summarised in 
Table 7.3. Why were these variables chosen? The head of the household often takes 
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major decisions including health care on behalf of his or her household members. His or 
her decisions directly and indirectly affect the household members and so an individual 
decision to insure could be directly or indirectly influenced by the head of the 
households. The decision making of the household head is also directly and indirectly 
influenced by key variables such as his or her age, sex, education, religion, marital status 
and occupation. I expect that age would have a direct relation with insurance uptake. In 
other words the older the household head, the more likely a household member is insured. 
I also expect a difference in the insurance status of household members depending on 
whether the head of household is a male or female. The chosen variables seek to explore 
questions such as: Is a household member more likely to be insured if the household head 
is female than male? Is a household member also more likely to be insured if the 
household head is educated than if he or she is not? Could the level of education of the 
household head make a difference in the insurance status of household members? With 
regard to religion of the household head, given that Traditional religion is more 
conservative, household members are more likely to be insured if the household head is a 
Christian or a Muslim. A household member whose household head is married may be 
more likely to be insured as married household heads are generally older. Occupation of 
the household head is also chosen because it could affect enrolment of household 
members into the NHI. For instance household members (especially those under 18 
years) whose household heads are employed are more likely to be insured. 
 
With regard to household level variables, variables such as household size, location, 
whether the household faced food shortages and the socio-economic status of the 
household could affect the decision to join the NHIS. Larger household size is often 
associated with poorer households and so individuals from such households are unlikely 
to be insured compare to smaller households. Insurance status may also be associated 
with the location of the household (i.e. rural/urban and geographical zones). Another key 
variable linked to the socio-economic status of the household is whether the household 
faces food shortages or not. This variable is key to identifying how the really poor 
households are faring as far as NHIS enrolment is concerned.  
 
Two individual variables were identified, the sex of the individual and the whether the 
individual has a chronic illness of not. With regard to the sex of the individual, it will be 
essential to know if there are gender differences in terms of enrolment in the NHIS. In 
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other words, are more males enrolled in the NHIS than females? The issue of whether the 
individual has chronic illness is also key to establishing whether there is some indication 
of adverse selection in the NHIS.  
 
Table 7. 3: Explanatory variables for regression analysis 
 Head of household 
level variables 
Household level variables Individual level 
variables 
1 Age  Household size Sex 
2 Sex Location of household (rural/urban) Has chronic illness 
3 Education Location (geographic zones-north, middle and coastal)  
4 Religion  Whether household face food shortages or not   
5 Marital status Socio-economic status*  
6 Occupation   
* measured by consumption expenditure 
 
The dependent variable, logit ( ip ) was regressed against possible explanatory variables 
where ip  is the success probability corresponding to the i th insured individual.  For the 
observations on all n  individuals in the sample, the random variable iY  (insured 
individual) is from a binomial ( n , ip ) distribution where iY are independent: Log odds 
( iY =1) can be expressed as: 
Log odds ( iY =1) = logit ( ip ) = 0log 1,..., 1,...,1
i
j ij
i
p X i n j k
p
β β
 
= + = = − 
   
 
Where the ijX  represents the j th independent variable at individual i , and the jβ  are the 
parameter estimates of the model. The interpretation of the jβ  parameter estimates is as 
the additive effect on the log odds ratio for a unit change in the j th explanatory variable.  
 
In the case of a dichotomous explanatory variable, for instance gender, eβ
The model has an equivalent formulation 
 is the estimate 
of the odds ratio of being insured with the NHIS for, say, males compared with females. 
0 1 1, ,( )
1 .
1 i k k ii x x
p
e β β β− + + +
=
+   
Key variables (see Table 7.4) were identified and used to regress the health insurance 
status of individuals members of the household where 1=insured individual and 
0=uninsured member. Adjustment was made for the “clustering” at the household level. 
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7.2 .3 Findings from the regression analysis  
To understand the relative contributions of the socio-economic and health factors on 
health insurance membership, we obtain the logistic regression results (see Table 7.4) 
which could be presented either as coefficients or odds ratios. The latter are a unique 
feature of the logit model and more commonly used since they provide a more direct 
measure of the magnitude of the effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable. 
 
Table 7.4 presents the results of the logistic regression estimation of the effect of various 
socio-economic, demographic and health factors on the likelihood of an individual being 
insured with the NHIS. Individuals from larger households are significantly less likely to 
be members. Indeed, for every additional household member, there is a 5% lower chance 
that an individual from that household is insured which is consistent with results in South 
Africa where smaller households were more likely to be insured than larger households 
(Kirigia, Sambo et al. 2005). There are also some significant effects of location. 
Compared to those in rural areas, urban dwellers are 0. 23 times less likely to be insured 
(odd Ratio [OR] =0.768, P<0.01) (see Table 7.4). The main reason has to do with the 
design of the health insurance scheme in Ghana where district insurance schemes (which 
are semi-autonomous) were encouraged to pro-actively promote membership and in 
Ghana and other developing countries, it is easier to identify and locate people in rural 
areas than urban areas. The widespread migration from rural to urban areas is resulting in 
the growth of informal settlements and slums, making tracing people in an urban setting 
even harder. The finding also confirms the findings of an earlier study that was conducted 
in the Kassena-Nankana district of northern Ghana prior to the implementation of the 
NHIS on the willingness to join the scheme which was then about to start. In that study, 
rural residents were 3.7 times more likely to join the NHIS than their urban counterparts 
(Akazili, Anto et al. 2005).  
 
Turning to the socio-economic status of households, though individuals from richer 
households are more likely to be insured, the differences are not significant; quintile 1 
(poorest) for example is not significantly different from the others in terms of the uptake 
of the NHIS. Four factors could explain this phenomenon. The first is the problem 
associated with the use of consumption expenditure to measure socio-economic status. 
Where a poor household borrows extensively to cater for a health or other urgent need, 
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that household by virtue of high consumption expenditure could be classified as rich.  
Secondly the level of premium, which is ‘only’ US$8 per adult per year, may well be 
affordable to many. Thirdly the combined effects of the variables in the model such as 
education of household head, occupation of household and location could be influencing 
the lack of correlation between SES and NHI membership, Finally the policy of 
exempting the poor means potentially better financial access to NHIS for them. These 
reasons not withstanding, what is striking is that individuals whose households 
experienced food shortages within the year were significantly less likely to be insured. An 
individual is about 0.35 (Odd ratio [OR] =0.653, P<0.001) times less likely to be insured 
if his/her household experienced food shortages within the year. Food shortages that 
measure real deprivation (to a basic necessity such as food) has revealed that the poor 
(who often experience food shortages) have less access to the NHIS compared to the rich.  
 
The level of education of the household head also emerged as a determinant of an 
individual’s NHIS membership status with an individual being almost 1.5 times as likely 
to be insured if the household head has secondary education compared to somebody 
whose household head has no formal education. The odds are even higher (3.3) when the 
household head has some tertiary education. This is to be expected given that formal 
sector workers are by law members of the NHIS and their premiums for the NHIS are 
compulsorily deducted and this group is most likely to have secondary and tertiary 
education. The finding is also consistent with findings among South African women, 
where respondents who had at least matriculation (secondary) level of education were 2 
times more likely to be members of a health insurance scheme than those with lower level 
of education (Kirigia, Sambo et al. 2005). This can be attributed to a positive relationship 
between a person’s education and the potential of the individual to acquire skills, a stock 
of knowledge, productivity and awareness of the need to avoid risk of catastrophic health 
expenditure (Grossman 1972). The results on education are closely linked with 
occupation, where individuals whose household heads are government workers are 2.6 
times as likely to be NHIS members compared to those whose household heads are 
farmers. This again reflects the compulsory nature of membership for all formal sector 
workers. If membership were not compulsory for this group, the story could have been 
different. The study on willingness to join the NHIS conducted in the Kassena-Nankana 
district prior to the start of the NHIS indicated that those with tertiary education and 
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formal sectors workers were consistently less likely to join the NHIS than those with no 
education and farmers(Akazili, Anto et al. 2005).  
 
Table 7. 4:  Odd ratios effect of determinants of NHIS membership, SHIELD survey 
2008 
Variables Odd ratios  Robust S E 95% confidence interval 
Household level characteristics    
Household size 0.95606**  0.02183 0.91423 -0.99982 
Rurala 
Urban 
1.00000 
0.76817* 
 
0.105001 
 
0.58763 - 1.00419 
Northerna  
Middle zone 
Coastal zone 
1.00000 
0.75508 
0.66360* 
 
0.119834 
0.190405 
 
0.55323 - 1.03058 
0.37816 - 1.16450 
Food shortages  0.65268*** 0.075447 0.52032 - 0.81870 
Quintile(poorest) a 
Quintile2  
Quintile3 
Quintile4 
Quintile5 (Richest) 
1.00000 
0.95987   
1.42131   
1.23455   
1.32267    
  
0.16249 
0.36896     
0.46052     
0.54532      
 
0.68883  - 1.33754 
0.85452  - 2.36403 
0.59428  - 2.56466 
0.58954 -   2.96751 
Characteristics of household head    
Gender 0.89934 0.094836 0.73142- 1.10582 
No formal education 
Primary 
Secondary 
Tertiarya 
1.00000 
1.12132 
1.47738** 
3.27333*** 
 
0.17797 
0.18124 
0.74149  
 
0.82155 - 1.53055 
1.16163 - 1.87900 
2.09977 - 5.10280 
Christianitya 
Muslim 
Traditional and other 
1.00000 
1.36524**    
0.37759*** 
 
0.17779     
0.07921    
 
1.05769  - 1.76222 
0.25030  - 0.56960 
15-29 yeara 
30-39 years 
40-49 years 
50-59 years 
60 years and above 
1.00000 
1.39829 ** 
1.40372**   
1.29169 
1.03860 
  
0.22872 
0.24074 
0.23563 
0.19504      
 
1.01476  - 1.92677 
1.00299  - 1.96456 
0.90341 -  1.84686 
0.71878  - 1.50072 
Marrieda 
Never married 
Divorce/Separated  
Widowed 
1.00000 
0.98706    
0.85633    
1.43679**    
  
0.04032  
0.11147 
0.18934      
 
0.91112  - 1.06933 
0.66349 -  1.10521 
1.10975  - 1.86021          
Farmera 
Trader  
Government 
Other  
1.00000 
0.97340    
2.31625   *** 
0.90625     
 
0.13205     
0.52388     
0.11620 
 
0.74613  - 1.26988 
1.48684  - 3.60832 
0.70487  - 1.16516 
Characteristics of the individual 4.77   0.000        
Gender 0.97223    0.04196 0.89337 - 1.05806 
Chronic illness 1.88994*** 0.25241      1.45468  - 2.45545 
 
Log Pseudolikehood 
Pseudo R-squared 
Wald chi2 
Number of Observation 
 
-8747.31 
0.0552 
205.78*** 
14050 
  
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.001(i.e. statistically significantly difference at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively) 
 a Reference points 
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With regard to religion, an individual is over 0.60 times less likely to be insured if the 
household head belongs to a traditional religion compared to one who is a Christian (see 
Table 7.4). The fact that those people whose household heads are Muslim are 1.4 times 
more likely to be insured than Christians may be because the Muslim population is 
largely concentrated in the northern zone (who are more likely to insure). A higher 
percentage of traditional worshippers do not have formal education so the results on 
religion are not surprising.  
 
People are more likely to be insured if they belong to households whose household heads 
are older, but even more likely if the head of the household is aged between 30 and 49. 
This is consistent with Kirigia’s findings in South Africa (Kirigia, Sambo et al. 2005) and 
Grossman findings that because the health stock depreciation rates rises with age, it is not 
unlikely that unhealthy (old) people will make larger gross investments in health than 
healthy (young) people (Grossman 1972). However, highest levels among 30-49 years 
may again be due to compulsory membership for formal sector workers.  
 
Furthermore (but not surprisingly) people from households in which the head has never 
married (usually aged under 30) are less likely to be insured. Except for the widowed 
(more likely to be older), married persons are more likely to insure their households than 
those who are single, separated or divorced. This finding is consistent  with results 
obtained by Kirigia et al (2005), Harmon and Nolan (2001) and Trujillo (2003). Married 
couples may have a higher demand for health insurance due to the need to protect their 
children and being more averse to the risk of catastrophic health expenditures than those 
who are single, separated or divorced (Harmon and Nolan 2001) 
 
Turning to individual characteristics and how these affect the uptake of NHIS, it emerges 
that males are less likely to be insured than females which can probably be attributed to 
the Government policy in 2007/2008 of extending exemption cover or automatic NHIS 
membership to all pregnant women and for up to one year after delivery.  This policy was 
criticised for encouraging more women, especially those who might otherwise not be able 
to join the NHIS, to get pregnant. Some, especially the opposition parties, also saw this 
policy as being unsustainable and simply a ploy of government to get more votes in the 
forthcoming presidential and parliamentary elections. These criticisms notwithstanding, 
women are generally disadvantaged in many areas including health care and hence in 
equity terms this policy makes sense. It is also particularly important in the context of the 
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Millennium Development Goals of reducing maternal and infant mortality (World Health 
Organization 2008). The other characteristic that is striking but not surprising is that 
persons who reported having a chronic illness are about 1.9 more likely to be insured 
compared to those who do not have a chronic health condition. This finding is consistent 
with a study on the determinants of health insurance membership among South African 
women where it was found that the demand for health insurance was likely to be low 
among individuals who were in excellent, very good and good health. This may be a case 
of adverse selection which results in insurance having the greatest appeal to individuals 
who are more likely to fall ill or have chronic health problems (McIntyre, Doherty et al. 
2003; Kirigia, Sambo et al. 2005). Adverse selection, depending on its extent, could 
threaten the economic survival of the NHIS. Adverse selection can be curbed in the NHIS 
if the impediments that affect enrolment including ensuring effective exemption, 
graduating the premiums and improving quality of health are tackled. In private health 
insurance however, adverse selection is curbed by introducing experience rating, i.e. 
linking the insurance premium to the degree of assessed risk of falling ill (obviously this 
may have negative equity implications) and subjecting all those who apply for insurance 
cover to have a thorough medical examination. This could also potentially lead to cream-
skimming (i.e. excluding all those with higher risks of falling ill) (McIntyre 2007).  
7.3 Other quantitative views: why some households are insured or uninsured 
The household survey also collected views on insurance membership choices from three 
categories of households [those who were currently insured, those who did not renew 
their insurance membership (former members) and those who have never insured (never 
insured)].  
7.3 .1 Household members currently insured 
In the households that were currently insured, most joined the DHIS because they see it 
as a form of financial protection against future illness that they cannot predict (see Table 
7.5). This means there is a good understanding of the prepayment principle in health 
insurance. This could be the result of the massive educational campaign that preceded the 
introduction of the DHIS.  
Table 7. 5: Why join the scheme? 
Response Percentage  
Financial protection against unforeseen illness 
I believe it is a better alternative to cash and carry 
A relative/friend asked me to join 
Other  
83.51 
13.58 
1.82 
1.10 
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Similarly, the main benefit insured households expect from the DHIS is to have free 
health care in times of need. As to how they managed to pay their premiums, many 
households who were not in the formal sector sold either agricultural or other goods. 
Financial difficulties were cited as the main reason why some insured households did not 
insure some of their household members. Over 30% of insured households thought that 
the premiums were too high and close to half wanted the premiums to be reduced. Insured 
households were also asked about the appropriateness of timing of premium collection. 
Over 80% are happy with the current arrangements whereby most premiums are collected 
not only at harvest time but throughout the year. Almost all households knew that they 
needed to renew their health insurance membership card every year.  
 
Information was also collected on the knowledge of the benefits to which insured 
members are entitled. Over 95% of insured households said they knew their entitlements 
but a follow up question revealed that only 33% knew that the insurance scheme does not 
cover all illnesses. This calls for education to inform the population better about the 
benefits package.  Households saw the NHIS as being beneficial to them with many 
indicating that they save money from not having to pay hospital bills. They were also no 
longer afraid to access health facilities because of cost and did not need to borrow money 
to pay for hospital bills. The most common reason cited by those who indicated that the 
scheme had not been beneficial to them was that they hadn’t used the health service after 
joining. Distance to the nearest accredited facility was another reason for not enjoying the 
benefits of NHIS membership.  
 
Over 25% of insured households do not know about the exemption package50
7.3.2 Former members of the NHIS 
. For those 
who did know, over 30% think it should be enlarged. Respondents were also asked as to 
who in their opinion should be exempted from paying premium to join the NHIS. The 
aged, disabled, children under 18, orphans and the unemployed were the key categories 
suggested.  
Households who were no longer classified as insured were asked why they had not 
renewed their membership. The main reason cited was lack of money and a related reason 
being that the premium was seen as too expensive. Another important concern, though 
                                                   
50 The package exempts those under 18 (if the parents are insured), the aged (70+), the indigent and (a 
recent addition) pregnant women 
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not as strong, is the poor attitude of health care providers towards patients. Hence former 
members suggested they will only rejoin the scheme if staff attitudes improve and the 
premium is reduced.  
7.3.3 Uninsured household members   
In response to being asked why they were not insured, uninsured households cited lack of 
money as the main reason (see Table 7.6) rather than poor quality of care or an 
inadequate benefit package. A similar survey was carried out in India, and the researchers  
found that the uninsured were very quick to cite lack of money as their reason for not 
joining,  but on deeper probing by senior researchers, they found that lack of money was 
seldom the real reason.  More frequently, it was the case that people had not understood 
the insurance scheme or its benefits (Ranson, Sinha et al. 2007). 
 
Table 7. 6: Main reason for not joining the NHIS 
Variable Number* % 
No money 1,321 65.61 
Premiums unaffordable 174 8.64 
No confidence in scheme 94 4.71 
Poor quality of care 60 2.99 
Registration point not accessible 49 2.46 
Prefer out of pocket payment 35 1.75 
Covered by a private health insurance 24 1.21 
Waiting period too long 23 1.17 
Inadequate benefit package 20 1.03 
Don’t trust providers 16 0.82 
Timing of premium collections inappropriate 15 0.79 
No Scheme in the area 14 0.74 
Not heard about NHIS 7 0.39 
Other  154 7.69 
 *In ‘0000s (weighted figures) 
7.4 Qualitative views on key issues related to the NHIS 
As mentioned earlier, views were elicited on a number of matters relating to health 
insurance and how it can be expanded to cover all Ghanaians by making it more 
accessible and sustainable. These views were obtained from the community (both insured 
and uninsured groups), the six district51
                                                   
51 These are the districts were the SHIELD survey and all the other data were collected.  
 health insurance scheme managers and the NHIS 
headquarters in Accra (the capital city of Ghana). These qualitative interviews help to 
augment the regression and other quantitative results presented above as they provide 
unrestricted views and information that is not normally captured with a purely 
quantitative questionnaire.  
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7.4.1 Views from community and district scheme managers 
The views elicited in the qualitative investigations related to contribution levels, 
frequency of premium increases, ability to pay, benefit package, cross-subsidisation, 
perception of quality of care at health facilities, and exemptions including the criteria for 
identification of the poor. The views of the community were elicited first and the scheme 
managers were later asked to respond to these views and concerns of the community.  
The results of the community views and the reaction of the scheme managers are 
presented below. 
  
An FGD of women 
 
 
An FGD of men 
 
7.4 .1.1 Contribution levels and timing 
Results from the interviews revealed that premium levels vary markedly across the 
country as was the case when the NHIS started. Results from the six districts indicate that 
premiums vary from ¢72,000 in West Gonja to ¢250,000 in Kpeshie. By law, premiums 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
 210 
are supposed to be graduated but this is not done in practice because of the difficulty 
involved in identifying who should be charged what.  Except for West Gonja (which has 
maintained the lowest level of premium of ¢72,000 over the years due to poverty - but are 
considering an increase soon), the other districts have increased premiums more than 3 or 
4 times since the start of the NHIS. For instance, Berekum district increased premiums 
from ¢72,000 in 2004 to ¢100,000 in 2006 and further to ¢160,000 in 2008.  
 
Scheme managers justify these various increases  based on the fact that the NHIS Act 
stipulates a premium range between ¢72,000 and ¢480,000, and as long as the premium 
levels are still within that range, they are covered by the law and managers seem 
unwilling to reduce premiums. Scheme managers also justify the increases in premiums 
on two grounds. First the increasing cost of equipment and supplies for administrative 
work and secondly the increasing cost of health care. High premium levels are cited by 
the majority of FGD participants as barriers to renewal of membership, and for the 
uninsured, as one of the main barrier to their joining the NHIS. However overall the 
NHIS is seen as good and people want to join if they have the money. The following 
quotations highlight respondents’ concerns:  
The insurance is good but they should reduce the premiums to allow some of us 
also join, the premiums are too high (Uninsured man FGD, Kpehsie) 
 
The money one will get to register is our problem.  But when you are not a 
member and you go to the hospital, you are charged more than you would have 
used to become a member (Uninsured woman FGD Lawra) 
 
True true the insurance is a good thing, the only problem is that the level of 
premium is too much and it is making some people not to be able to join and some 
of us will not be able to renew our cards (Insured woman FGD, West Gonja) 
 
Participants (especially the insured) expressed concerns about the annual increases in the 
premium which, according to them, could affect their continuing membership. As 
mentioned earlier, apart from West Gonja, premiums have been increased 3 or 4 times. 
The concern of respondents is that the increases could result in many people leaving the 
NHIS and the purpose of setting up the scheme could be lost. The following quote 
illustrates this:  
At the very beginning it was ⊄72.000 and then went up to ⊄150,000 and later 
they took it to ⊄200,000, that is a problem for me because at first it was cheap so 
I don’t understand (insured woman FGD, Berekum) 
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However scheme managers think the premiums are affordable and people should be able 
to pay. A manager mentioned that:  
“Paying just ¢160,000 for a whole year that will allow one to access health care 
that can cost ¢1,600,000 is no big deal, people should have no problem but be 
grateful”.  
 
While these arguments seem valid, scheme managers tend to forget that people are not 
only paying the premiums but are contributing to health care through their daily 
consumption of goods and services on which VAT, health insurance levy and other taxes 
are imposed. In West Gonja for instance, it took one woman who wanted to join the 
scheme seven months to complete an instalment payment of the premium. The results are 
consistent with qualitative findings in Burkina Faso where high premiums were cited as a 
key issue for many people not being willing to pay for community-based health insurance 
(Dong, Kouyate et al. 2003)  
 
Though many complain about unaffordable premiums, a few (probably the better-off) see 
it differently. Their argument is that given the broad benefit package (both OPD and 
inpatient services), paying such a premium for access for a whole year of health care 
services is still better and cheaper than the infamous cash and carry system . A participant 
summarises this as follows: 
Even with the increase, to me it is still good because for the entire year I only 
have to pay ¢150,000 for health care which maybe without the insurance would 
have been ¢5,000,000 or ¢10,000,000 but now the government is paying all those 
bills, so to me it is good (insured woman FGD, Atwima Nwabiagya) 
 
On timing of premium collection, the FGDs results of community members and the 
indepth interviews of scheme managers revealed that there is awareness and an 
appreciation of the fact that all the schemes were flexible such that people could 
contribute or pay at any time. Some respondents even reported that the NHIS premium 
collectors allow people to pay on an instalment basis.   
7.4 .1.2 Ability to pay or socio-economic status 
The majority of respondents in the FGDs agreed that ability to pay is the main factor 
hindering the enrolment of most people into the NHIS (also see Table 7.6). Especially the 
uninsured from the northern districts complained of lack of jobs, crop failures and general 
deprivation which does not allow them to get the needed finances to join the scheme, as is 
the case in Burkina Faso (Dong, Kouyate et al. 2003). In the regression analysis results 
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described earlier, though not significant, the rich were more likely to belong to the NHIS 
than the poor and those who suffer from food shortages in the course of the year were 
significantly less likely to enrol. The FGDs confirm these findings as the majority of 
respondents believe that by removing financial barriers, enrolment will increase: 
It is because we have no money.  Our husbands are not employed and we are not 
also employed.  So imagine I carry fire wood to the market to sell.  If I get the 
money from the sales of the firewood, will I use it for feeding or the NHIS?  It is 
indeed very difficult (uninsured woman FGD, Lawra) 
 
Those who have registered and those they exempted have no problem.  Those of 
us who do not have the money to register are in trouble.  Imagine you do not have 
¢120,000 to register as a member of the scheme and you fall sick. How can you 
afford the cost of treatment?  That is why sometimes we fall sick and are scared of 
going to the hospital for treatment.  The NHIS is good but the poverty is 
preventing us from registering (Uninsured woman FGD, West Gonja) 
 
If there can be a way to help all of us register, it will be good.  The poverty is 
really killing us (uninsured man FGD, Berekum). 
 
In reaction to the problem of ability to pay that community members particularly the 
uninsured expressed, district scheme managers felt that the level of premiums was such 
that the majority of people should be able to pay. According to them (scheme managers), 
it is the question of people’s priority and some people don’t place much priority on their 
health. According to a scheme manager “if you go to the market now you will see those 
who claim they don’t have the money to pay the premiums drinking and enjoying 
themselves”. One scheme manager however noted that the lack of cash could be a cause 
for some people not joining and because of that he is developing a way of getting around 
the issue to increase enrolment. This involves accepting in-kind payments: “in this 
district, there is a cash-crop called sheanut which is picked freely in the bush and when 
they pick the nuts, it takes time and effort to sell”. According to the manager if he accepts 
these sheanuts as premium payments, it could bring some relief and increase his 
coverage. This innovative idea is encouraging and other scheme managers may want to 
learn from this and devise other innovative ways of increasing coverage of their schemes.   
 
The inability to pay which inhibits enrolment in the NHIS is not unique in this study but 
consistent with studies elsewhere. For instance in Senegal and Burkina Faso, ability to 
pay was cited as the main reason why people could not enrol in the community health 
insurance (Dong, Kouyate et al. 2003; Jütting 2004). A study in Kenya also revealed that 
inability to pay or lack of financial means was a key factor hindering the expansion of the 
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social health insurance (Mathauer, Schmidt et al. 2008). Generally, lack of ability to pay 
is a major barrier to the growth in community and social health insurance schemes 
(Arhin-Tenkorang 2004; Carrin and James 2004; Preker and Carrin 2004; Mills 2007). 
7.4 .1.3 Quality of care and utilisation of health care services 
Quality of care is also a key factor influencing enrolment. Some participants, especially 
the insured, believe the insured are often given inferior drugs and attribute this to the idea 
that health providers think that because they are insured, they are over-using the health 
care services (i.e. moral hazard). Both insured and uninsured respondents also reported 
that health insurance card bearers wait a longer time before receiving treatment than those 
who pay out-of-pocket. This was cited among the uninsured as one of the reasons why 
they feel reluctant to join. Among the insured, some said they may not renew their 
membership if this situation persists as they see this as discrimination. In reaction, most 
managers disagreed and contended that insured clients were not discriminated against and 
given inferior drugs but rather served with drugs contained in the NHIS drug list. “Some 
of the drugs could be generic but equally good and could explain the confusion that 
insured clients are given inferior drugs”. To some scheme managers the misconceptions 
all stem from the high levels of illiteracy of the population. There is a need for public 
education to disabuse people’s perceptions of the inferiority of generic drugs as these 
perceptions can negatively affect enrolment levels.  
 
Even though participants (especially the rural insured) admitted that drug availability at 
the health facilities improved after the introduction of health insurance, they contend that 
uninsured clients are given preferential treatment by health care providers because they 
are paying cash.  
 
Participants thought that with the increased workload as a result of the introduction of 
health insurance, health workers should be given greater incentives to make the system 
work better. They believe this could stop discrimination, wasting the time of the insured 
and providing them with inferior drugs.  
 
Another source of concern in terms of quality of care is the general attitude of health care 
providers to the insured clients. Insured participants in the FGDs complained bitterly 
about this. According to them, “once the nurses see you with a NHIS ID card, they do not 
even want to look at you, they feel you want cheap things”. Scheme managers admitted 
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having received reports about this and have raised it in their joint meetings with health 
care providers. Some managers however felt some insured clients are exaggerating the 
issue. However poor attitude among health care providers has been a recurrent issue and 
could threaten the expansion of the NHIS. In the earlier NHIS study in the Kassena-
Nankana district of Northern Ghana (Akazili, Anto et al. 2005), poor health staff attitudes 
was a major reason why some were not willing to join the NHIS. These findings are also 
consistent findings from Senegal and Burkina Faso where quality of health care relating 
to staff attitudes are issues of concern to insured clients (Dong, Kouyate et al. 2003; 
Jütting 2004). The box below captures a recent news item on the issue of staff attitudes 
and efforts to solve it in one of ten regions in the country. 
 
Box 7. 1: GHS sensitises personnel on customer care 
 
The Upper East Regional Directorate of the Ghana Health Service (GHS) is 
embarking on a regional campaign to sensitize its staff on customer care in 
order to attract more patients to its facilities. 
 
This has been necessitated by recent decline in patient attendance to some key 
public health facilities in the region following recent upsurge in private health 
facilities. 
 
The decline has partly been attributed to the lack of customer care skills by 
health providers from the GHS, thereby affecting service delivery and trust 
from members of the public who hitherto considered public health facilities as 
their first choice in seeking medical care. 
 
All nine districts in the region are expected to present 50 participants each to 
be schooled on topics such as “Good Customer Care and Customer 
Relations”, “Patient Rights and the Code of Ethics of the Service” and 
“Communication Skills”. 
The regional director indicated that the idea was also to get health staff to 
understand the modalities in customer care so that they could add more 
innovative skills in dealing with patients who patronized GHS facilities. 
           Source: http://news.peacefmonline.com/health/200909/25955.php 
 
On the issue of long queues and delays for insured clients compared to cash paying 
clients, scheme managers agreed and said the problem has to do with increased utilisation 
and the level of documentation associated with the insured. According to one scheme 
manager, out of 36,000 people who insured in 2007, 33,000 (over 90%) of them have 
used health care services. With such high utilisation rates, according to this scheme 
manager, there are bound to be long queues and delays. According to him the high 
utilisation by insured clients also threatens the very survival of the scheme and defeats the 
spirit of health insurance.  
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7.4.1.4 Cross-subsidisation 
Participants in the FGDs were asked two main questions related to cross-subsidisation. 
First, whether they were willing to pay to support the health care needs of those who are 
more prone to illness (such as chronic patients and the aged). Secondly, whether they 
were willing or not to pay to support those who could not pay at all. Answers to these 
questions are critical since they underpin the spirit and purpose of social health insurance. 
Interestingly the majority of insured respondents, especially those from the rural areas, 
were prepared to contribute to support risk and income cross-subsidies. They indicated 
that with the user fees (cash and carry) system when a member of their community was 
ill and did not have money, they either contributed or borrowed money to send the 
individual to a health facility. This clearly shows the spirit of social solidarity at work. 
This revelation explains why community health insurance schemes that started in the 
1990s spread so quickly in Ghana such that by 2002, there were over 150 community 
mutual health organisations in the country (Atim, Grey et al. 2001). Some participants 
indicated that they would feel guilty if they did not support an individual who is sick and 
the person dies. Some respondents with strong religious beliefs suggested it was a 
religious duty to help those who were in need. This spirit of social solidarity was also 
found in Kenya to be a key factor in the acceptance and growth of the social health 
insurance and in Burkina Faso, the growth of community-based health insurance. For 
instance, in Kenya there was a strong spirit of Harambee (Swahili word meaning ‘lets 
pull together’) and this means  people sharing and supporting each other within their 
community (Mathauer, Schmidt et al. 2008). 
 
However some participants, especially the men in urban areas, had some reservations and 
indicated that they would not contribute to support those who got illnesses through their 
own lifestyle choices involving drinking, smoking and immoral acts. 
7.4 .1.5 Exemptions 
Respondents in the FGDs were specifically asked whether there were certain groups of 
people who they thought should be exempted from paying premiums and registration fees 
to join the NHIS. Such information on who the community wants to see exempted could 
be more acceptable and effective than leaving such judgments to policy makers who may 
push their own agenda on who is to be exempted. There was a general consensus from 
both insured and uninsured respondents to exempt the following groups: all children, the 
aged, the sick, the disabled and the poor. Female respondents specifically mentioned 
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women who have lost their husbands and have children. Male respondents from rural 
areas would want people whose crops fail due to lack of rainfall in a particular year to be 
exempted since it was not their fault, that they are unable to pay the contribution.  
 
I probed further by asking respondents what criteria they would use to identify a poor 
person or household to be exempted. Some respondents mentioned those who have no 
source of income and depend on hand-outs of clothing and food. They also suggested 
those who cannot provide themselves with a square meal a day. As to who should play 
the role of identifying such people, some respondents felt that pastors could be trusted to 
visit people in their homes and make the assessments.  
“Since the pastors are men of God they will be able to do genuine work by going 
round the houses and assessing those who are really poor” (insured man FGD, 
Dangme West) 
 
Some suggested that traditional and community leaders could also be trusted to assess 
those who are poor since they live among the people and have good knowledge of them. 
However, a few respondents did concede that it was difficult to identify the poor since not 
all will tell the truth about their state of affairs. 
 
However scheme managers are following the NHIS Act that spells out the modalities for 
exemption. These include children under 18 (when both or one parent is registered), the 
aged (70+) and the indigent. The difficulty that was expressed by all scheme managers 
was how to identify the aged and particularly the indigent. According to some scheme 
managers, a 50 year old person could look 70 and in the absence of birth certificates this 
is posing a challenge. A more challenging category is the indigent. The NHIS Act defines 
these as the core poor who have no place of abode and who do not get support from 
anybody. This criterion is not only limiting but vague and its application and 
interpretation is left to the discretion of the scheme managers and their staff. Thus scheme 
managers who are not sympathetic to the poor will tend to register fewer indigent. It is 
not surprising that while there are overall increases in enrolment levels each year, the 
percentage of the indigent covered is reducing.  When the matter of how to improve on 
the identification of the poor for exemption was further investigated, it transpires that 
some schemes have started putting community committees in place to help them in this 
regard. Perhaps the suggestion from the focus group discussion that pastors and 
community leaders help to identify the poor could also be explored. All schemes should 
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be encouraged to develop innovative and effective ways to identify the poor as universal 
coverage cannot be achieved without that. It is also important that the exempt groups or 
the poor are not given different cards to the standard NHIS cards as this could negatively 
affect their enrolment. 
 
7.4.1.6 Other issues of concern 
Waiting period 
Waiting time (i.e. from registration to getting an ID card to access health care) can take 
up to six months or more and this is a source of concern which was expressed in the focus 
group discussions with community members. District scheme managers however 
disagreed with this and say the waiting period is currently less than 4 months. Some 
managers however admitted that it used to take up to 6 months for someone to get his or 
her NHIS card. According to them the problem was due to the lack of adequate machines 
to produce the ID cards. Managers from the northern part of the country said they used to 
have to travel more than 500kms to the south to have the ID cards processed but now they 
have the machines onsite, so the process does not take long any more. This however was 
disputed by some insured members in the FGDs. Whatever the case, there is need for 
education on how long members have to wait for their NHIS ID cards. Members must 
also be proactive in demanding their cards if it is taking too long.  
 
Benefit package 
Most respondents across the six districts did not know that certain diseases (5% of the 
disease burden) were not covered by the NHIS. This might be due to the public education 
campaign for the NHIS that explicitly indicated that “the health insurance was coming to 
take of all the health care needs”. Respondents were generally happy with the benefit 
package but wanted it extended to cover all illnesses as was initially promised.  
It will be good if they can make the health insurance to cover all illness (FGD 
Women, Lawra) 
However, adequacy of the benefit package was unanimously endorsed by the 6 district 
scheme managers. Managers also thought that the benefit package was perhaps more than 
adequate as it covers about 95% of the disease burden of Ghanaians – they felt it was too 
generous for the amount of premiums involved.  
 
Reimbursement and fraud 
There are delays in the reimbursement of claims to providers and if this not properly dealt 
with it could affect the survival of the schemes. Managers were asked about this issue in 
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the in-depth interviews. Unsurprisingly some managers laid the blame for delays in 
reimbursement at the door of health care providers. According to the scheme managers, 
providers are always out to cheat and if their claims are not properly scrutinised, they 
could defraud the scheme and cause financial loss. One cited a case where a provider 
presented claims in which names and amounts were repeated. To scheme managers, 
because they have to scrutinise the claims properly, delays are unavoidable. Another 
important factor that causes delays according to the scheme managers is the late transfer 
of funds from the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) to the district scheme to cover 
formal sector workers, exempt groups and cover for claims. Some managers indicated 
that this could cause delays of up to a year or more. For instance in 2007, the West Gonja 
scheme owed the district hospital up to ¢1 billion and this debt has been going on for over 
a year. When providers run out of patience they also stop providing services to insured 
clients which has implications for the insured members’ willingness to renew their 
membership.  
 
Another key problem mentioned by scheme managers that causes delays is lack of 
adequate staff at both ends (the scheme and providers) to quickly process claims for 
vetting. On average however, scheme managers indicated it takes 3 months to reimburse. 
Some scheme managers also suggested that once claims are presented, they pay 40% of 
the total claim to ease the burden on providers and the remainder is paid after the vetting 
of the claims. Efforts must however be made to remove all barriers to reimbursement if 
NHIS is to expand and provide universal coverage. 
 
Funding of the scheme  
The main source of funding according to scheme managers is the reinsurance transfers 
from the NHIF. These come in bulk to cover the administrative cost, formal sector 
workers and the exempted groups. Only West Gonja indicated they had funding from 
DANIDA. Premiums and registration fees constitute less than 10% of their funding 
according to scheme managers. Scheme managers complained about the inadequacy and 
delays of the funding from NHIF. This creates unnecessary friction between providers 
and the DHIS  and as the old adage says “when two elephants fight it is the grass that 
suffers”. The result of the friction between providers and the DHIS is that insured clients 
suffer and again this could affect future enrolments and renewals. 
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Community participation and sustainability of the scheme  
Most of the scheme managers interviewed said there is a high level of community 
participation in the running of the schemes at the district level. This participation 
according to them was through the boards that comprise 15 members drawn from the 
communities in the district. They meet at least four times a year to advise the scheme 
managers on the problems they identify from their communities. The boards also ensure 
that the schemes adhere to the laws that set them up. According to the scheme managers, 
the boards have been very helpful in that regard. Apart from the meetings of the boards, 
the schemes also organise annual general meetings (AGMs) of all their members to 
discuss issues related to the scheme, including premium adjustment. An innovative way 
of promoting effective community participation in the scheme was to institute health 
insurance clubs in communities and schools. This idea (when implemented) according to 
the West Gonja scheme manager will help educate its members on the whole idea of 
health insurance and assist in expanding coverage.  
 
All six scheme managers believe the schemes enjoy the support of the population and that 
is why there are annual increases in coverage.  
 
On the sustainability of the schemes, managers agree that there is need for mass public 
education, not only to improve the understanding of the principle of health insurance but 
on the need for people to live healthy lifestyles. People also need to be educated to pursue 
preventive health activities such as cleanliness. They believe this will reduce the number 
of people who ‘flock’ to the health facilities to seek care. Another issue that was raised by 
scheme managers is the problem of providers who must stop seeing the NHIS as an 
opportunity to make money by whatever means. Scheme managers think huge and 
fraudulent claims by providers threaten the survival of the NHIS.  
 
Another suggestion that scheme managers thought could help sustain the NHIS but which 
is perhaps controversial is increasing the premium levels. Some think the premiums are 
low compared to the benefit package and want to see them raised so as to increase the pot 
of funds. They make the simple comparison of the premium level and the ‘cash and carry’ 
fees and conclude that the premiums are low. However as mentioned earlier they fail to 
recognise that people are already paying through taxes on goods and services consumed 
from which the large part of the NHIS funding comes from. Scheme managers also 
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suggested incentives package to their staff which will help them to work harder to sustain 
the scheme. Such incentive issues emerged in an earlier  study on the efficiency of health 
centres as a key factor influencing health workers’ performance (Akazili, Adjuik et al. 
2008).   
7.4.2 Views from the NHIS Headquarters 
Information was also collected from the health insurance headquarters, specifically from 
a representative of the chief executive officer (CEO) of the NHIS. The main issues of 
concern raised by the focus group discussion and the indepth interviews with scheme 
managers were put to the CEO’s representative. These included the perception of the 
NHIS, the premium contribution, exemptions (especially the poor), cross-subsidisation, 
the transfer of funds/reinsurance and general challenges of the NHIS. 
 
The CEO’s representative indicated that the scheme was designed as a pro-poor financing 
arrangement just like all other social health insurance schemes such that the rich, the 
healthy and young cross-subsidise the health needs of the poor, the sick and the aged. He 
acknowledged that the premiums collected at the district levels are not adequate to cover 
the health expenses incurred by clients, so the NHIS headquarters transfer funds not only 
to cover contributions of the formal sector workers and the exempt group but to cover the 
difference between premiums and the cost of health care for insured clients at the district 
levels. On the question of the delays in the transfer of the funds to the districts, he 
attributed this delay to the district schemes. To him, some of the schemes submit 
inconsistent requests which need clarification before transfers are made. He also 
attributed delays to delays in the transfer of funds from the Ministry of Finance. 
 
On exemptions, he acknowledged that there are problems, especially in terms of the 
identification of the indigent or the poor and that a complete review of the laws is 
required to deal effectively with this problem. The following summarises his thoughts:  
See, the mechanism for identifying indigents is not working properly. It is not 
working properly because if you look at the definition of indigence in the law, 
believe me most poor people in our hometowns will not qualify. When you go to 
my hometown, the poorest person probably lives in a house you know, they belong 
to family. They live in a family home but the indigent definition is somebody who 
doesn’t have a place to stay, doesn’t have income doesn’t have…, I mean excuse 
me to say, I mean it has to be someone who lives on the street ok so the definition 
is too difficult to apply ok to capture more people, more poor people so it is one of 
our challenges ok then the schemes are semi autonomous they use their 
community agents to decide who an indigent is. So there is no equity there 
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because it is very varied ok. People…. and I said if you go strictly according to 
the law you won’t capture many indigent people so poor people are not really on 
the whole being served correctly by national health insurance so we need the 
support of everyone of you to help us review some of the things in the law (In-
depth interview NHIS headquarters). 
 
With regard to the waiting period and other issues, the CEO’s representative said that 
while the current average waiting period of 3 to 4 months is within the law, the NHIS is 
working to reduce it. To him, people should be proactive in requesting or following up on 
obtaining their ID cards. He also noted that complaints have been brought to his attention 
on health providers’ fraud, poor quality of care and the poor attitude of providers towards 
health insurance clients. Other complaints include long queues by insurance clients and 
complaints of insured clients receiving inferior drugs at health facilities. The 
Headquarters is working with the Ghana Health Services to resolve these issues.  
 
There was also a recognition that the Authority of the NHIS has not fared well in the 
monitoring and evaluation of the district schemes and this was attributed to the limited 
number of staff that the NHIS law allows them to employ. Most scheme managers 
indicated they have not had any supervisory visits from the NHIS headquarters so they do 
not know how well they are performing.  
 
On the general growth and sustainability of the scheme, the CEO’s representative’s views 
were not too different from those expressed by the district scheme managers. However, 
he added that the earmarked tax for health insurance or the health insurance levy could be 
increased to support the financial basis of the scheme since the current funding pot could 
run out if enrolment increases. He also called on international organisations to keep 
supporting the Ghana NHIS to achieve its objective.  
7.5 Summary 
The key issues emerging from examining the factors determining the enrolment in the 
NHIS include contribution levels, ability to pay, and perceived quality of care. These 
factors are also consistent with findings elsewhere; these factors also influenced 
enrolments in community-based health insurance in Senegal and Burkina Faso and the 
social health insurance in Kenya (Dong, Kouyate et al. 2003; Preker and Carrin 2004; 
Mathauer, Schmidt et al. 2008). The rich and those who did not face food shortages in the 
preceding year were more likely to be insured. The results of the interviews, especially in 
the focus groups, revealed that lack of money and high premiums are the main barriers to 
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people joining the NHIS. These revelations are consistent with a study titled “Does the 
Ghana NHIS cover the poor?” which found over 90% of the uninsured attributed their 
inability to insure to high premium levels and poverty (Asante and Aikins 2008). People 
are calling for the inclusion of all drugs and all health conditions in the benefit package as 
well as the broadening of the exemption group to cover all vulnerable groups. The 
perceived quality of care including staff attitudes also came up and it is to be hoped that 
these issues will be given the attention needed to ensure not only the survival of the 
scheme but the expansion of the scheme to provide equitable and universal cover to all 
people in the country.  
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Chapter Eight: Key issues and challenges in attaining financial 
protection and universal coverage in the Ghanaian health care system 
 
8.0 Introduction 
Many African countries, including Ghana continue to face difficulties in providing 
affordable health care for their citizens. This is aggravated by out-of-pocket payments 
that remain a significant source of financing. As stated in chapter one, OOP payments 
still account for about 45% of health care financing in Ghana. This is similar to many 
other African countries (Bate and Witter 2003; McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005). As also 
mentioned earlier, there is abundant evidence that direct payments for health care have 
negative consequences for the population, particularly the poor and vulnerable, to the 
extent that the poor often forgo seeking treatment from formal health care altogether. 
They sometimes seek to live as if they are not ill (Arhin-Tenkorang 2000; Russell and 
Abdella 2002; Xu, Evans et al. 2003; McIntyre, Thiede et al. 2005; O'Donnell, van 
Doorslaer et al. 2008; Chuma, Musimbi et al. 2009; Yates 2009). Carrin and Morris 
(2005) quantified the number of deaths in 20 African countries that occurred as a result of 
user fees and other direct payments. They obtained the startling figure of 3 million child 
deaths over the past 2 decades. For instance in Ghana some new born babies and their 
poor mothers were sometimes detained at health facilities because they could not pay for 
the services. Their husbands or carers would often have to work at these facilities for 
several days and sometimes weeks to cover the medical bills of the delivery (Nyonator 
and Kutzin 1999; Garshong, Ansah et al. 2002). OOP payments are frequently regressive 
and often catastrophic. However, with effective exemptions and subsidisation of services 
to the poor, OOP payments could be progressive (as e.g. in Malaysia). Evidence abounds 
however in many countries that exemptions often fail to ameliorate the effects of user 
fees primarily because of poor implementation (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008).  
 
So debilitating are user fees and other direct payments, that communities in a number of 
African countries have started to organise themselves into groups to support one another 
to cover health care costs. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, there were a number of 
community-based health insurance schemes (Atim, Grey et al. 2001). In Ghana for 
instance, there were 159 community-based mutual health insurance schemes by 2002 but 
these were rather small covering only 1% of the total population. The World Bank and 
IMF who hitherto advocated for user fees made a U-turn by supporting community-based 
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health insurance schemes. They also encouraged countries, especially developing ones, 
not only to remove user fees but also to incorporate health insurance into their health care 
system.  
 
The WHO has gone further and in the World Health Assembly resolution WHA58.33 
they call on all member states to “plan the transition to universal coverage of their 
citizens” (World Health Organization 2005). According to Mills (2007), all nations desire 
to provide universal coverage of health services. However the mix of financing sources 
and service provision arrangements within each country’s health system and the degree of 
equity vary. Countries like Ghana, which is yet to achieve universal coverage, are faced 
with several options with respect to strategies that will move it closer to universal 
coverage, but there is international consensus that pre-payment mechanisms (such as tax 
and insurance) should be the core of the financing system (McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005; 
World Health Organization 2005; McIntyre 2007; O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008; 
Wagstaff 2008; Yates 2009).  
 
The key question then is what options are available to Ghana to move towards universal 
coverage. The main pre-payment funding mechanisms that currently exist in Ghana are 
general tax funding and the NHI (which involves a range of contributions by the formal 
and informal sector as well as a dedicated VAT component). In addition, donor funds are 
currently, and will continue to be, a relatively large component of funding in Ghana. For 
Ghana, the issue is how to improve the collection and use of tax and NHI resources, 
supported by donor funds, to achieve universal coverage. Universal coverage (see 
conceptual framework in Chapter Three) is commonly defined as all citizens having 
access to adequate health care at an affordable cost (Davies and Carrin 2001; McIntyre, 
Gilson et al. 2005). Universal coverage relates to providing financial protection and 
access to needed health care for the whole population. This means that universal coverage 
can be achieved through a combination of different financing mechanisms including taxes 
and health insurance. 
 
In addition to improving the efficiency of the tax system and ensuring that the health 
sector gets a fair share of general tax funds, there is a need to address the problems 
associated with the NHI as it is currently being implemented.  Ghana has already elected 
to pursue a policy path of NHI as the means for achieving universal coverage.  Despite 
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achieving dramatic expansion of NHI coverage in the last few years, there are concerns 
around NHI coverage of the informal sector.  In particular, the previous chapters have 
highlighted that NHI contributions by the informal sector are regressive and that the 
affordability of NHI contributions for the informal sector is seen as the biggest constraint 
to joining the NHI. Unless coverage of the informal sector is dramatically improved, 
those who are not covered by the NHI will continue to have to make OOP payments to 
health services, but as revealed in Chapters Five and Six, OOP payments are not only a 
regressive means of financing health care but are catastrophic and have an 
impoverishment effect. The major challenge facing the Government, health planners and 
policy makers in the health sector in Ghana is how best to bring the large informal sector 
fully into the fold of the NHI.  
 
There are two main options facing the Ghanaian government. The first is to continue with 
the current arrangements but identify and resolve all the obstacles and challenges that 
stand in the way of achieving universal coverage. The second is to change the current 
structure of the financing system such that NHI contributions for the informal sector, 
from which the majority of the poor and vulnerable come, are comprehensively covered 
out of tax revenue. Each of these options is considered in some detail in the next sections. 
8.1 Option 1: Continue with informal sector contributions but address key problems 
The key problems as captured in the conceptual framework in Chapter Three and the 
findings in Chapter Seven include the inability of the scheme to implement its initial 
proposals, particularly in terms of lack of uniform premiums across the country, 
ineffective exemption mechanisms and quality of care issues. 
 
The initial proposal on premium contributions was to have a graduated premium for the 
informal sector of ¢72,000 (GH¢7.2) to ¢480,000 (GH¢48.0)52
 
. The purpose of the 
graduated premiums is to ensure equity. The assessment of who should pay what 
contribution was supposed to be based on the criteria in Table 8.1.  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
52 As indicated earlier, the Ghana currency was redenominated in July 2007 such that ¢10,000 became 
GH¢1. The name of the currency changed from “cedis (¢)” to “Ghana cedis (GH¢)”. The inter-bank 
exchange rate to the US$ at the time was ¢9400 (¢0.94) to US$1 
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Table 8. 7: Graduated premium arrangements  
Core 
Poor 
A Adults who are unemployed and do not receive any identifiable 
and constant support from elsewhere for survival 
Free  
Very 
Poor 
B Adults who are unemployed but receive identifiable and 
consistent financial support from sources of low income 
 
¢72,000 Poor C Adults who are  employed but receive low returns for their 
efforts and are unable to meet their basic needs 
Middle 
income 
D Adults who are employed and able to meet their basic needs ¢180,000 
Rich E Adults who are able to meet their basic needs and some of their 
wants. 
 
¢480,000 Very 
Rich 
F Adults who are able to meet their needs and most of their wants. 
Source: Ministry of Health 2004 
 
This initial proposal for different contributions for different socio-economic groups has 
not been implemented. Each district was supposed to categorise the population in the 
informal sector into these socio-economic groups (see Table 8.1) and charge them 
according to their income level and ability to pay. The ultimate goal was to try to ensure 
equity in contributions based on ability to pay. This would also ensure cross-subsidisation 
where the rich were to pay more to subsidize the poor.  
 
Unfortunately this noble idea and equity goal have not been implemented in practice. 
According to the implementers (the district scheme managers), the reason for this is that 
socio-economic classification is very complex, especially in the informal sector given the 
different economic activities in which people engage (farmers, traders, artisans, etc.). 
 
Yet, the findings in Chapter Seven and other studies (Adams, Darko et al. 2002; 
Garshong, Ansah et al. 2002; Bitrán and Giedion 2003; McIntyre 2003; Teshome 2005; 
Witter, Arhinful et al. 2007) indicate that universal coverage through NHI cannot be 
achieved without effective exemptions being put in place. The historical context to this 
conclusion is as follows. User fees at public health facilities were reintroduced in the late 
1960s. The main legislation governing fee exemptions are the Hospital Fees Act (No 387) 
of 1971 and the Hospital Fees Regulation (LI 1313) of 1985 (McIntyre 2003; Ministry of 
Health 2003). The Legislative Instrument (LI) specified fees for certain health services 
such as diagnostic procedures and dental and surgical services. The exemptions specified 
under these regulations focused on those diseases deemed to be of public health 
importance: immunization, ante-natal and post-natal services (Nyonator and Kutzin 1999; 
Garshong, Ansah et al. 2002). Later, exemptions on snake-bites, children under five, 
pregnant women, the elderly (70+) and paupers or the indigent were added. The unique 
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aspect to Ghana’s exemptions policy is that the MOH instituted a mechanism for re-
funding exemptions, in that facilities were refunded if they submitted a financial 
statement indicating funds lost through exemptions (Bitrán and Giedion 2003; McIntyre 
2003; McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005). 
 
However the poor implementation of these exemptions means that people, particularly the 
poor, who are meant to benefit are still paying (Gilson, Russell et al. 1998; Garshong, 
Ansah et al. 2002; Bitrán and Giedion 2003; Gilson and McIntyre 2005). For example, a 
study in the Volta region of Ghana indicated that over 90% of those who were supposed 
to benefit from exemptions were still paying or never got the exemptions (Nyonator and 
Kutzin 1999). This situation is not limited to Ghana. For instance in Zambia, only 1% of 
exemptions were granted on the basis of poverty, indicating that poor people were either 
staying away or being made to pay (Blas and Limbambala 2001; Yates 2009). As 
mentioned in Chapter Seven, the main problem concerning the exemptions in Ghana, 
which is similar to other countries, is the lack of clarity in the exemption process which 
stems from the difficulty of identifying those eligible, especially the indigents. The lack 
of understanding by health care providers of the identification process and the lack of 
funds to reimburse or pay for exemption claims are key issues that result in poor 
implementation of the exemptions policy not only in Ghana but in many African 
countries such as Zambia, Kenya, South Africa and Uganda (Bitrán and Giedion 2003; 
McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005).  
 
The problems of the exemptions under the NHIS are not different from those for user 
fees. It can be argued that the burden of informal sector NHI contributions would not 
have been regressive (see Figure 8.1) if the exemptions under the NHIS, especially those 
that seek to identify and exempt the poor, were effective. The regressivity is because, in 
practice, the informal sector is generally paying a uniform flat rate contribution. The 
impact of this is that the premium contribution of the poorest quintile represented almost 
4% of their consumption expenditure; for the richest quintile it was less that 0.4% (see 
Figure 8.1).  
 
Those in the low-income group have suffered (and continue to suffer) from the 
consequences of the current implementation problems. In the focus group discussions 
captured in Chapter Seven, both the insured and uninsured (and particularly the latter) 
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complain bitterly about what for them represent high premiums. If the premium 
graduation had been implemented, almost certainly more of those in the low-income 
group would have joined.  
 
Figure 8. 1: Informal sector NHI contribution across consumption expenditure 
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There is thus an urgent need to revisit the issue of graduated premiums. Evidence 
abounds that flat premiums as is currently the practice, even though not the policy, in 
Ghana negatively influence enrolment (Atim 1999). It is clear that the previously 
proposed system of graduation as captured in Table 8.1 is too complex and needs to be 
simplified if it is to be implemented successfully. For instance the categorisation might be 
reduced to three, i.e. the rich, the not so rich and the exempted group. The premium 
contributions would then be reduced from five to just two categories (the not so rich and 
the rich) and the rest would be exempt. What can help in placing people into these 
categories is to identify people on the basis of their economic activities. Alternatively, a 
check list of indicators of poverty could be adopted to allow categorisation of individuals 
into the rich, the not so rich and exempt group. Such checklists of detailed indicators of 
poverty (e.g. chronic illness, permanent source of income, housing condition, nutritional 
status, age, level of education, orphan, availability of clothing, ability to pay school fees 
and hospital bills, widow with large family, ownership of assets and ability to pay 
development level) which particularly aim at targeting the poor to be exempted have been 
developed and used in community-based health insurance schemes in Ghana, Zambia, 
Columbia and Thailand (Bitrán and Giedion 2003).  
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To ensure some consistency, guidelines on the indicators to be included in an ‘exemption 
questionnaire’ should be determined nationally. However, these guidelines should be 
based on initial research at community level, should be undertaken to identify indicators 
that are appropriate in the Ghanaian context. Preliminary research on this issue has 
already been undertaken by Dzikunu and Wajangi (2004).  There should also be an 
element of flexibility permitted in that some indicators may not be appropriate in certain 
communities (e.g. livestock ownership for residents of large urban areas). 
 
These kinds of indicators could be used not only for identifying those who should be 
exempted, but also to classify individuals for graduated contributions. In Columbia for 
instance, 13 variables were used to calculate the SISBEN index. The SISBEN gives a 
continuous score from 0 to 100 (poorest to richest) and divided into levels (1 to 6). Level 
1 and 2 represent people in poverty and are thus qualified for local and national poverty 
alleviation programmes (Castaneda 2005).  
 
There are concerns that if a questionnaire is used to identify those requiring exemption 
(and for categorising households for graduated contributions), respondents may not 
answer truthfully. However, if the process is undertaken at community level, not only will 
there be greater local knowledge, but those completing the forms will be able to verify the 
accuracy of at least some of the information (e.g. materials for house walls and roof). 
Such a community-based process is easier to undertake in rural than large urban areas. It 
is also very resource intensive, but does not necessarily need to be undertaken every year.  
 
As highlighted in Chapter Seven, community members, particularly the insured, think 
that community leaders such as pastors and other respected community leaders would be 
in a better position to help to identify those who are genuinely poor for exemption. 
Evidence has shown that local agents may have more and better information on 
households characteristics upon which to determine those who are in need (Conning and 
Kevane 2000; Alderman 2002; Bitrán and Giedion 2003). 
 
Premium graduation is certainly not easy to implement, but is the key to attracting the 
low-income group to join the NHI. It succeeded in attracting low income groups into the 
Gonoshasthaya Kendra Insurance scheme in Bangladesh, which ensured that the poorest 
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were subsidised (Desmet, Chowdhury et al. 1999). There is every reason to believe it 
would have similar success in Ghana.  
 
Another issue that is key to achieving universal coverage through the expansion of the 
NHI is the quality of health care in public health services. Poor quality generally makes 
the poor turn away from the subsidized services at public health facilities to patronize 
private services or not to seek care at all. In several studies in Ghana and elsewhere, poor 
staff attitudes coupled with “under-the table” payments is a key reason for the poor 
moving from the lower cost subsidized care in public facilities to the higher cost private 
providers (Gilson, Russell et al. 1995; Garshong, Ansah et al. 2002; O'Donnell, van 
Doorslaer et al. 2008; Chuma, Musimbi et al. 2009). As highlighted in Chapter Seven, 
perceived poor quality of care is one of the main criticisms that people make of the NHIS. 
In a recent study on the pre-requisites for a National Health Insurance in South Africa, 
McInytre and others observed that quality of care reflected through issues such as the 
cleanliness of public facilities and availability of drugs is key to the successful 
implementation  of the proposed NHI in South Africa (McIntyre, Goudge et al. 2009).  
 
Ensuring quality of care in public facilities is not easy but is essential to achieving 
universal coverage. Every effort must be made to improve the quality of health care. The 
NHI Act requires that the scheme signs contracts with services providers. It is thus in the 
interests of the scheme to negotiate and sign contracts based not only on the price and 
type of services but the quality of services as well. The signing of contracts is not enough. 
They need to be enforced ensuring that all parties are committed to meeting the 
agreements in the contracts. Members (the insured) must also be properly educated on 
their rights and entitlements at health facilities, as the literature points to the fact that 
equity is enhanced if the basic rights of the individual or patients, particularly vulnerable 
groups, are respected (Ngwena 2000; Evans, Whitehead et al. 2001; London 2007; 
London 2008; Tindana and Boateng 2008). Another mechanism that can be used to 
ensure quality of care is accreditation. According to the NHIS Law, the National Health 
Insurance Council (NHIC) is mandated to accredit all service providers who meet the 
appropriate quality standards as providers of services to NHIS members. To ensure that 
providers continue to improve on quality, views from insured members about providers 
should be considered when accreditation is to be renewed. If providers know that insured 
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members have a say in accreditation renewal, then this could contribute to ensuring that 
patients are treated with respect and dignity (Walker and Gilson 2004). 
 
An issue that negatively affects quality of care is the weak gate-keeper system (referral 
system) currently in place. None of the six districts sampled in this study is ensuring strict 
compliance with the gate-keeper system. This is contrary to the initial arrangements made 
under the NHIS that require all insured members to visit a primary health care facility as 
the first point of call and they can only visit a higher level facility or hospital upon 
referral. The non-enforcement of the gate-keeper system has serious implications. In the 
first place, there is inefficiency in resource use if people are allowed to seek health care 
directly from hospitals. Health care at health centres and clinics is relatively less 
expensive than at hospitals (Akazili, Adjuik et al. 2008). Another implication is that the 
quality of care insured clients are seeking by bypassing the referral system is not obtained 
because of the long queues at the hospitals since so many patients are going there. It is 
important that the referral system is properly adhered to by first educating insured 
members and for the hospitals to insist that patients are attended to only if they have been 
referred, except in the case where the person is seriously ill. Evidence shows that the 
enforcement of the referral system not only sustains the financing system but improves 
quality of care within hospitals. For example one of the major factors that contributed to 
the success of the UMASIDA scheme in Tanzania was the development of and adherence 
to a strict gate-keeper mechanism (Tibandebage 2003; Kamuzora 2005). However, the 
key issue which is highlighted in the literature that could ensure effective adherence to 
the gate-keeper system is to improve the quality of care at the primary health level 
(Walker and Gilson 2004). In Ghana, these include the CHPS and health centres.  
  
In summary, if Ghana is to achieve universal coverage within the existing NHIS 
framework, the two most important issues to address are: effectively identifying and 
exempting the poor from NHI contributions and address quality of care deficiencies, 
particularly the perceived inferior quality of care provided to NHI members. 
Alternatively, the Ghanaian government can consider changing their approach to 
covering the informal sector via the NHI. 
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8.2 Option 2: Fund informal sector contributions from tax revenue 
The current funding sources of the NHI consist of the NHIL (about 70%), formal sector 
contributions via SSNIT (about 23%) and informal sector contributions (which is less that 
6% - see Figure 8.2).  
 
Figure 8. 2: Income sources for the NHIS, 2008, Ghana  
Informal sector 
insurance premium  
5.1%
Investment income 
2.2%
Health Health 
Insurance Levy 
(NHIL) 69.5%
Contributions from 
SSNIT members 
23.2%
 
Source: Ministry of Health 2009 
 
The question that arises is whether it is worthwhile collecting the premium from the 
informal sector which constitutes less than 6%53
                                                   
53 Though this may rise as more people from the informal sector join the NHIS 
 yet collection costs may be high (Atim, 
Grey et al. 2001). Even though this study has not looked at the revenue generated relative 
to the administrative cost of collecting such revenue, considering the process involved in 
the collection, the net revenue may be very low. For instance, each of the district health 
insurance schemes (over 140) in country has about 8 permanent staff and about 20 to 30 
non-permanent or temporary staff depending on the size (population and land area) of the 
district. The temporary staff, most of whom are called “collecting agents”, are given 
logistical support including bicycles. In addition to this, they are given a monthly 
allowance which is a commission on each person they have registered. These agents are 
supervised by the permanent staff using motorbikes which is an additional cost. In some 
instances, some of the agents have absconded with the premiums they collected from the 
communities which means the affected schemes have to bear the cost. Some scheme 
managers indicated they have had some experience of bad “collecting agents”. Some 
“collecting agents” are even reported to be taking bribes from people to register them as 
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exempt. All these would certainly make the cost of collecting the premiums substantial 
and will thus limit the net revenue that will be realised.  
 
As highlighted in Chapter Seven, premiums pose a major barrier to the enrolment of 
people from the informal sector, particularly the poor. Those who are not insured 
particularly mentioned the premium as the main barrier and even some of those who are 
insured complain of not being able to renew their NHIS membership because of the 
premiums. Atim and others in their evaluation of mutual health insurance identified 
premiums as the main barrier to the growth and expansion of many community-based 
health insurance schemes (Atim, Grey et al. 2002). Premiums were a constraint to the 
Bwamanda Hospital Scheme in the Democratic Republic of Congo, to the extent that  the 
community came together to fix premiums to the value of 2 kg of Soya beans, the main 
cash crop of the region (Criel, Van Dormael et al. 1998; Criel, Van der Stuyft et al. 1999). 
Premiums (though considered low by the scheme management) also constituted a barrier 
to the expansion of the community based health insurance scheme in Burkina Faso to the 
extent that some could not renew their membership (Dong, Kouyate et al. 2003).  
 
As mentioned earlier, the exemption mechanisms designed to protect the poor and 
vulnerable from premium payments are ineffective as in the case of user fees in Ghana 
and other countries (Arhin-Tenkorang 2000; Bitrán and Giedion 2003). In Kenya for 
instance 80% of inpatients and 86% of outpatients were not aware of waivers and 
exemptions (Bitrán and Giedion 2003) and the few who were aware did not know the 
eligibility criteria. There are also reports of leakage associated with exemption to the 
extent that those who are often not supposed to be exempted end up getting an exemption 
and thus denying those who desperately need an exemption. According to Newbrander 
and others (2000), only one-third of all waivers and exemptions were accounted for by 
the poor in Kenya and two-thirds by the non-poor. The result of ineffective exemptions in 
the Ghana NHIS, as mentioned earlier, imply that many of the poor are not protected and 
as was highlighted in Chapter Six, the poor could be pushed further into poverty with 
direct out-of-pocket payments. Over 10% of Ghanaians are poor but the proportion of 
those registered or covered by the NHIS as poor is only 1% of the total number of insured 
members.  
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Based on the issues discussed above, it may be worthwhile funding the contributions of 
those outside the formal sector out of tax revenue. This will eliminate the problems 
associated with collection costs, and ineffectiveness in exemptions. Some countries (e.g. 
Thailand, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova) have taken this route towards universal coverage. In 
Moldova apart from one-third of the population that is covered by pay-roll tax through 
mandatory or social health insurance, the rest (informal sector) is covered by central 
budget transfers (tax funded) (Kutzin, Shishkin et al. forthcoming).  
 
However, the skeptics think premium payments by all are warranted to impose a sense of 
responsibility on the part of contributors. There are also concerns that if health care were 
to be “free” for the informal sector (i.e. if their premiums were paid out of tax revenues), 
such people would generally not appreciate the value of health care and moral hazard 
would arise. This may hold for health care that is zero priced at the point of consumption 
(but even that can be debated as is done shortly). There is however no such thing as 
“free” health care. All health care has an opportunity cost.  
 
There is a need here to separate out a number of strands in this argument around “free’’ 
health care. One important separation or distinction to be made is between payments at 
the point of consumption – out of pocket payments – and pre-payments such as by way of 
taxes or premiums that are not strictly paid for care per se but for allowing future access 
to care.  
 
Funding the involvement of people in the informal sector in the NHIS through tax 
revenues does not mean that the informal sector will be accessing “free” health care. 
Everybody, including those in the informal sector, pays for health care, even if they 
receive no formal income and hence do not have to pay personal income tax. 
Nevertheless in consuming various goods and services they will pay other taxes such as 
VAT and the kerosene tax which then help to fund health care. All of these taxes have 
opportunity costs in the sense that if they were not collected, people would have more 
money available for other goods and services.  
 
Removal or reduction of user fees could result in a charge of creating moral hazard with 
increased ‘demand’ for services as a result of lower ‘prices’ and in the theory of moral 
hazard a resultant loss of welfare. This loss is assumed to arise because it is argued that 
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interfering with market prices, in this case lowering them, would mean not only ‘excess’ 
consumption of health care beyond the optimal market efficient level, but consumption of 
other goods at a level below the optimal market efficiency level for them (Bennett 1991; 
Mooney 2009).  
 
The question of frivolous use of health care if it is zero priced at the point of consumption 
is related to this question of moral hazard.  There are two issues here. First the fact that 
services are zero priced does not mean they have no cost associated with them for the 
user. There are always other user costs, such as transport costs, in accessing health care. 
In Ghana these can be higher for people in the rural areas than those in urban areas than 
even the costs of drugs and consultations. There is also a time cost in attending a facility 
for health care. Second, there is the question of what constitutes frivolous use and who 
decides what is frivolous – the potential user or the provider? It can be argued that the 
provider is better placed to make such a judgment but if the potential user, particularly the 
poor, is prevented from seeking care because of the current premium (and if not insured, 
being faced with user fees), the provider is not given the opportunity to judge if the 
problem is ‘frivolous’ or not. The patient does not present. Due to the key imperfection in 
the health care market of asymmetry of information, potential users are not in a position 
to determine if a health problem is trivial or not. There is empirical evidence for example 
(Arhin-Tenkorang 2000; Russell 2001; Russell 2004; McIntyre, Thiede et al. 2005; 
Chuma, Musimbi et al. 2009; Kruk, Goldmann et al. 2009) that fees result in some 
instances in non-trivial problems not being presented (Kutzin 2000). Earlier evidence 
from the Rand Health Insurance study showed that those faced with higher co-payments 
were as likely to reduce their consumption of effective to ineffective care (Welch, Hay et 
al. 1987; Wagner and Bledsoe 1990). 
 
In essence these issues of moral hazard and the trivial nature of use in the absence of 
premium payment go to the heart of the economic basis of health care: is it to be demand 
based or needs based? The underlying tenet and the driving force of the NHIS in Ghana is 
that it is and should be needs based. It is also potentially about the trade-off between 
efficiency and equity. Thus an additional point to be made regarding moral hazard is that 
even if the presence of moral hazard could be argued successfully here (and above it has 
been suggested that it cannot), such moral hazard is about the efficient use of resources. 
The key consideration of the thesis on the question of the costs to the consumer however 
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relates to equity and not efficiency. The thesis has shown very clearly that out of pocket 
expenses including user fees are inequitable.  
 
Thus the potential for problems arising from “free” care as a result of the premiums of the 
informal sector being paid out of taxes is according to the above analysis limited. There 
are others who think that introducing a co-payment would help solve the problem of 
moral hazard and the so-called frivolous use of health care resulting from the removal of 
premiums. However, I agree with other literature that argues that the introduction of co-
payments is equivalent to introducing some form of user fees (Arhin-Tenkorang 2001; 
McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005). Thailand has eventually removed the 30 Baht co-payment 
(Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2007). Co-payments are generally flat 
payments and the burden naturally falls more on the poor than the well-off. Perhaps what 
should be done to reduce the potential problem of moral hazard is to ensure that the gate-
keeper system mentioned previously is strictly adhered too. This can successfully be done 
if the primary health system, and in Ghana the CHPS, is strengthened in terms of quality, 
including through addressing staff motivation. It has been found that  providing 
incentives and motivation to health staff has a great potential to improve the quality of 
health care delivery (Walker and Gilson 2004; MOH 2005). If health care staff are well 
motivated, they will enforce the gate-keeper system. Enforcement of the gate-keeper 
system will result in the limiting health care spending levels by decongesting the higher 
level facilities.   
 
In essence, concerns about potential moral hazard are not a legitimate basis for ignoring 
the option of funding the contributions of those outside the formal sector from tax funds. 
This would be the most reliable way of achieving universal coverage and is in line with 
what other countries are doing. Other mechanisms can be put in place, such as strong 
gate-keeping, to avoid potential moral hazard problems. 
 
8.3 Other issues that have to be addressed in NHI 
Irrespective of which option is pursued, there are a number of other issues identified in 
this study that need to be addressed if universal coverage and equitable financing are to 
be achieved in Ghana.   
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For the sustainability and growth of the NHI and its potential to provide universal 
coverage, there is an urgent need to increase the pre-payment pool. As more people are 
enrolled into the NHIS, this will put pressure on the resources of the NHIS. The NHIF 
then needs to grow to provide good quality health care for all. Currently there is 
significant donor support to the scheme but given the potential unreliability of such  
support (McIntyre, Gilson et al. 2005), it is strongly recommended that innovative ways 
are found to grow the pre-payment pool (NHIF) from domestic sources. There are a 
number of ways to do this. These include the general growth of the economy (GDP) 
which will result in increased tax revenue; improving the efficiency of tax revenue 
collection and/or perhaps increasing the earmarked tax (NHIL) for NHI. Wagstaff (2007) 
has recently questioned the common assumption that governments cannot increase 
general revenues to increase health expenditure but can make social health insurance 
contributions mandatory. He argues that raising additional tax revenue is feasible, and 
indeed has been done successfully by a number of countries. He adds that it does not 
seem any more difficult to collect general tax than SHI revenues. Fortunately in Ghana, 
the earmarked tax (NHIL) has been found to be progressive (see Chapter Five). It would 
thus be possible to increase progressively the NHIL to strengthen funding of exemptions. 
However this must be carefully done to avoid inflation and any possible disincentives on 
productivity. Care must also be taken that goods largely consumed by the poor continue 
to be exempted from the NHIL. There will thus be a need to continue to assess 
periodically the incidence of the NHIL to ensure that the burden is not shifted to the poor.   
 
There is also a need to ensure sustained economic growth and development in the 
country. Economic growth has played a key role in the journey to universal coverage in 
some countries (e.g. Thailand, Korea and Germany). As has been highlighted in Chapter 
Five, formal sector NHI contributions (which is a payroll deduction is very progressive) 
but the formal sector is less than 30% of the economy and so if the economy grows and 
more jobs are created the number of people in the formal sector will increase and will 
make contributions to the NHI (Ministry of Health 2009). In other words, the formal 
sector will increase with the growth of the economy and since it is compulsory for formal 
sector workers to belong to the NHIS, it will then be easier to expand the scheme. The 
GDP growth rates of Ghana have shown some improvement in recent years. For instance 
GDP growth increased from 3.7% in 2000 to 5.5% in 2004 and again to 6.8% in 2008 
(Ministry of Health 2009; Price WaterHouse Coopers 2009). There is also a need for a 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
 238 
better and fairer distribution of existing resources. Again Ghana has recently had some 
debt relief under the World Bank/IMF heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative. 
This however has not made much difference to job creation and increasing the formal 
sector of the economy. The recent discovery of oil, if managed properly, may lift the 
economy and create more jobs but experience from neighbouring countries like Nigeria 
and Cameroon shows that oil may not be a panacea to poverty and job creation. What is 
essential is prudent management of the resources by the national leadership. In addition, 
the removal of trade barriers by developed economies to allow for fair trade between the 
developed and developing countries can also generate the needed jobs and raise more 
households out of poverty. 
 
Currently, the way in which, funds flow in the NHIS is too bureaucratic and causes a lot 
of delays. This does not augur well for the smooth operation of the NHI. Figure 8.4 
depicts the current funding flows in the Ghana health system. It can be observed that the 
NHIL, which is VAT of 2.5%, goes to the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance 
then allocates this revenue to the NHIS. The NHIS also remits funds to the DHIS through 
a request for the contributions of formal sector workers and subsidies for the exempt 
group and for a reimbursement grant to cover the expenditure incurred over and above the 
premiums collected from the informal sector, the contributions of formal sector workers 
(via SSNIT to NHIS) and the subsidies for exempt groups. These processes currently take 
a long time and cause undue delays (up to a year in some instances) in reimbursements 
reaching providers.  
 
Another major problem that needs to be assessed urgently is that providers (see Figure 
8.4), who are mainly made up of GHS facilities, the Christian Health Association of 
Ghana (CHAG) and other private health facilities such as clinics, pharmacies and 
chemical sellers, complain of not getting their claims reimbursed on time, leading to the 
accumulation of debts. It is reported that at the end of 2008, the total debt that the NHIS 
owed to providers nationwide was GH¢49 million54
                                                   
54 The inter bank exchange rate of the GH¢ to the US$ in 2008 was about GH¢1.2 to US$1 
(Ministry of Health 2009). The 
responsibility for these delays lies with both the providers and the NHIS. At the district 
health insurance scheme level for instance, there are complaints of lack of qualified staff 
to process claims and concerns that claims submitted by providers are inaccurate (see 
Figure 8.4). On the provider side, issues arise regarding the lack of staff to prepare claims 
and the complexity of the forms to be filled in (see Figure 8.4). The delays affect both the 
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delivery and the quality of health care and this negatively affects the insured (unlike their 
uninsured clients who pay directly). Some providers simply stop providing health care 
services to the insured clients, if their claims are delayed. It is not surprising that the 
results of the focus group discussions revealed that the insured complain bitterly about 
receiving poorer quality of care compared to the uninsured.  
 
Figure 8. 3: Chain of delay in NHIS reimbursement 
 
Source: Ministry of Health 2009 
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revenues with Bank of Ghana 
Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) 
National Health 
Insurance Scheme 
National Health 
Insurance Scheme 
District Health 
Insurance Scheme 
Facilities 
-NHIS has to request transfers of the levy from MoF-
these requests are sometimes delayed by up to two 
months 
-MoF sometimes borrows monies from Levy funds, 
though this is repaid 
Payment from SSNIT and NHIF sometimes delay 
NHIS quarterly transfers are regular, but subsidy per 
member may be inadequate to cover actual costs 
-Lack of staff to process claims 
-Problems with new IT system 
-Cash short falls-increases in distressed schemes 
-Lack of medically trained staff to vet claims and 
manual processing 
-Querying of claims leads to hold-up and/or arbitrary 
reduction in payments to providers 
-Reluctance to apply for ‘reassurance’ when funds are 
exhausted  
 
-Lack of staff to prepare claims especially in hospitals 
with higher volumes 
-Fraud or inappropriate billing 
-Limiting capacity and motivation by staff 
-Complexity of forms to be filled 
-Lack of familiarity with new tariffs 
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Figure 8. 4: Cash flows of the NHIS 
 
 
With regard to overall funding flows to the health facilities, there are two main funding 
flows: one from the MoH/GHS and the other from the DHIS. The MoH/GHS funding 
comes in the form of a budget (i.e. with largely historical incremental budgets) whilst the 
DHIS pays facilities according to the amount of services rendered to insured members. 
The other source of funding to facilities, which is reducing but still significant, is fees 
from uninsured patients (see Chapter Two). The current system of funding health 
facilities, particularly the public ones, can entrench resource disparities between facilities.  
Historical incremental budgeting results in already well resourced facilities (particularly 
in terms of human resources) receiving a relatively large share of budget resources on an 
ongoing basis. These facilities tend to be in urban areas and areas with higher socio-
economic status residents, which in turn will have a disproportionate share of NHI 
members (formal sector and higher income informal sector workers). Hence, these 
facilities will also be able to generate more revenue from providing services to NHI 
members than facilities in rural and deprived areas. This can create considerable 
inequities in the resourcing of facilities.  
 
This problem can be addressed in different ways. The allocation of MOH/GHS resources 
can be based more directly on the relative need for health services (than on historical 
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budgets) and very importantly, adjusted for revenue that each health authority and facility 
is able to generate from serving NHI members. Alternatively, if allocations from general 
tax revenue were integrated with mandatory NHI contributions (e.g. if tax resources were 
used to fully subsidise NHI contributions for everyone outside the formal sector), there 
would be a single, integrated mechanism for funding health services. In order to promote 
equity in the Ghanaian health system, it is essential that budget allocations via the 
MoH/GHS take account of resource allocations via the DHIS/NHI.  
 
A related issue of concern is the difficulty that districts face in getting subsidies from the 
NHIS. Currently the district health insurance schemes have to more or less lobby to get 
their subsidies and reimbursement grants paid to them. In other words, the district 
schemes have to justify why they need whatever amount they are asking for. Sometimes 
these requests are queried as being in some sense or other improper (such as not 
submitting all necessary documentation). Schemes in relatively poor districts are 
disadvantaged by this method of getting reimbursement since some of them do not have 
the necessary logistics including communication facilities to help with their 
reimbursement process. It is proposed that the Government revisit this method and work 
out how much money is required to subsidise the contributions of those in the informal 
sector in each district. This will enable the Government to get estimates of how many 
people in each district are completely unable to contribute and allocate a subsidy per 
person that would cover the full cost of services for them, what contribution level others 
in the informal sector in that district can afford and what subsidy needs to be provided 
(i.e. the difference between the full cost of services and what those in the district can 
contribute themselves). This requires the government to allocate enough general tax and 
donor funds to NHIF to cover all the contribution subsidies (full for the poor and partial 
for the non-poor) needed for the informal sector.  
 
The NHIF should allocate all of this on the basis of the needs (i.e. based on estimates of 
poverty levels) in each district for these subsidies up-front rather than on the current 
‘reimbursement’ basis, which also involves major administrative costs. If this were to be 
done, a relatively large proportion of funds (illustrated by the thicker arrow in Figure 8.5) 
for DHIS in the poor rural districts would be channelled from the NHI fund since most 
insured members would require partially or fully subsidised membership (Figure 8.5). 
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 Figure 8. 5: Proposed resource allocation to District schemes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
McIntyre et al. (2005) 
 
This resource allocation process could be further strengthened to promote equity with the 
standard resource allocation formula which is used in many countries. Fortunately, Ghana 
has some experience of this as the allocation of tax and donor-pooled health funds to its 
regions have been guided by a formula that includes regional population size, poverty 
levels and under-five mortality since 2004 (Asante, Zwi et al. 2006). Needs-based 
application of resource allocation was earlier applied in the 1970s in countries such as 
England, Scotland, Wales Ireland an Portugal (McIntyre 2007). In recent times, some 
countries in Africa (Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia), Latin America (Chile, Columbia and 
Mexico) and Asia (Cambodia) are applying versions of the needs-based resource 
allocation formula in disbursement of their tax and donor support funds (McIntyre 2007). 
Needs-based resource allocation could also be applied in the case of the allocation of 
funds from the NHIF to the DHIS and to ensure equity, the allocation should take into 
consideration the population outside the formal sector, age, sex, socio-economic status 
and a measure of the burden of ill-health, such as  under-five mortality (Asante, Zwi et al. 
2006). If this is done then poorer rural DHIS will be getting more resource allocation 
from the NHIF as illustrated in Figure 8.5.  
8.4 Summary 
The chapter discusses the key challenges and the way forward to attaining financial 
protection and universal coverage in Ghana. From the analysis of the previous chapters, it 
emerged quite clearly that OOP payments, which are currently a significant source of 
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health care financing, are very regressive and have potentially catastrophic effects on the 
populace. This means the options available to Ghana to attain universal coverage are 
general tax and the NHI. The financing mechanisms are also inline with the WHO 
resolution that has asked all its member countries to move increasingly to some form of 
pre-payment in their health care system so as to avoid the catastrophic effect of OOP 
payments. Ghana has chosen a form of NHI which is largely (about 70%) funded by tax 
revenue. About 22% of the NHI funding is from payroll deductions whilst less than 6% is 
currently coming from the informal sector through premium collections. Though the NHI 
is mandatory, it is only the formal sector whose contributions are compulsorily deducted 
for NHI. The key challenge is how to bring the large informal sector (who are also 
expected to pay premiums) into the NHI.  
 
To achieve financial protection and ultimately universal coverage, there will be the need 
either to address the challenges inherent in the existing structure of the NHI (effective 
exemption of the poor and implementing the graduated premium) or to fund completely 
the informal sector contributions from tax revenue. In considering these options, two 
things must be noted. First premiums from the informal sector represent only 5% of the 
total resources of the NHI (see Figure 8.2). Second the administrative costs of collection 
and of trying to identify the poor may be higher than the amount collected. This 
effectively means that it may be best to opt for the new government proposal of a once-
off premium (i.e. full tax funding of informal sector and only expected to go to register 
once and make a token registration contribution). Whatever option is considered, there is 
an urgent need to address not only the delays in the flow of funds from the NHIS to the 
district health insurance schemes but also the fragmentation between the district pools of 
funds. The delay in reimbursing providers must also be addressed as it affects the quality 
of health services which is one of the main sources of dissatisfaction among the insured. 
There is also the need to boost the pre-payment pool and this can be done through 
promoting economic growth, improving the efficiency of the tax collection system and 
increasing the taxes that have been found to be progressive (Chapter Five). Finally, there 
is a need to address equity in the allocation of NHIS funds to districts and to ensure that 
there is greater co-ordination between the allocation of NHIS and the MoH/GHS funds to 
districts and individual facilities.  
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion and Recommendation 
9.0 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the main findings of the study in terms of the objectives set out 
at the beginning of the research. The chapter brings together the findings of the thesis 
which provide answers to the various research questions posed. In doing so it also serves 
to demonstrate that the research objectives have been met. The chapter also highlights the 
new contributions as well as the key limitations of the study. The chapter concludes with 
some recommendations for policy and for further research.  
9.1 Have the objectives of the study been met?  
9.1.1 Catastrophic and impoverishment effect of health care payments 
Ghana is one of the few countries in Africa that religiously implemented user fees to the 
letter, to the extent that the country was able to recover the target of 15% of health care 
spending. Many countries could not even recover up to 5% of spending (Gilson 1998). As 
mentioned in earlier chapters, the impact of user fees, christened ‘cash and carry’ in 
Ghana, had a negative effect on the population (Arhin-Tenkorang 2000). It is well 
documented that the introduction of user fees saw substantial declines in health care use, 
particularly amongst the poorest (Bitrán and Giedion 2003). Carin and others quantified 
the number of deaths in 20 African countries that occurred as a result of users fees and 
other direct payments and found a staggering figure of 3 million child deaths that could 
have been averted over the previous 20 years had fees not been charged (Carin, Morris et 
al. 2005). Exemptions that were introduced to cushion the effect of user fees didn’t work 
due to inadequate funds and lack of clarity in the exemptions process, which relates to the 
difficulty of identifying those (particularly the poor) to be exempted (Garshong, Ansah et 
al. 2002). 
 
So debilitating was ‘cash and carry’ in Ghana, that a search for alternative financing was 
seen as critical. This led to the development and expansion of community-based health 
insurance schemes largely supported by missionaries and other NGOs. However, these 
community-based health insurance schemes, though many (159 by 2002), covered only 
1% of the population (Atim, Grey et al. 2002). Ghana took the boldest step in 2003 and 
rolled out a mandatory health insurance scheme to cover both the formal and informal 
sector workers of the country. The aim of the mandatory health insurance was not only to 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
 245 
replace user fees and other forms of out-of-pocket payments but progress to universal 
coverage and thus to offer financial protection to the population. However, the key 
question that was asked in the study is the extent to which the population is financially 
protected from the current health care payments. For instance, knowing the extent to 
which direct out-of-pocket payments are catastrophic and impoverish households will be 
important evidence for policy makers and planners for assessing the extent of financial 
protection in the current health system and hence the degree of urgency of expanding pre-
payment financing mechanisms. This information can be gathered by examining the 
catastrophic and impoverishing nature of direct health care payment as detailed in 
Chapter Six and summarised below. 
   
Households without comprehensive health insurance or tax financing cover are exposed 
to the risk of large expenditures when a household member falls ill. This can be 
“catastrophic”. However, there is no consensus in the literature regarding what proportion 
of household expenditure is to be defined as catastrophic (Xu, Evans et al. 2003). 
Thresholds of 10% and 40% for total expenditure and non-food expenditure respectively 
are often cited as representing the points at which the absorption of household resources 
by spending on health care is considered to create severe disruption to living standards 
and thereby merits being classed as “catastrophic” (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003; 
Xu, Evans et al. 2003; Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2007; van Doorslaer, 
O'Donnell et al. 2007). On this basis, many Ghanaians can be said to be making 
catastrophic health care payments, as was demonstrated in Chapter Six. In 2005/6 over 
5% of Ghanaian households spent over 10% of their total household resources on health 
care and over 2% spent over 40% of the their non-food consumption expenditure on out-
of-pocket expenditures. These figures are high compared to countries like Malaysia, Sri-
Lanka and Thailand but lower than those for Nepal, China and Indonesia where OOP 
payments are yet more significant. It was also indicated that poorer households are more 
likely than higher income groups to make catastrophic health care payments at these 
thresholds (10% and 40%). This at least in part reflects the weak implementation of 
poverty reduction strategies and more importantly the user fee exemption package.  
 
 As also detailed in Chapter Six, a widely used measure of poverty is the poverty 
headcount index. This simply measures the proportion of the population who are deemed 
to be poor and, in this particular case, those who are poor before making health care 
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payments (pre-payment) and those who became poor after making health care payments 
(post-payment). This study represents what appears to be the first time that this poverty 
measurement approach has been applied in Ghana. Taking the poverty headcount in both 
pre- and post-payment periods as being those living on $1.25 (World Bank lower poverty 
line) or lower per day, it is found that health care payments increase the numbers in 
poverty in Ghana from 17% to 18.6%. Given an estimated population in Ghana of 22 
million people, this translates into about 352,000 more people being impoverished as a 
result of spending on health care. The findings of the thesis also show a huge difference 
in rural and urban poverty with the former having a greater burden of poverty. The 
impoverishment effect of out-of-pocket payments is however slightly higher among urban 
households. This suggests that rural households are either accessing low cost health care 
or are unable to access health care at all. With regards to the differences in the geographic 
belts, the poor northern areas are hardest hit by impoverishment. Thus, due to health care 
payments, the results of the thesis indicate that expenditures on health care in Ghana 
increase impoverishment.  
9.1.2 The progressivity of health care payments 
An important goal of the mandatory health insurance or national health insurance (NHI) 
is to ensure both income and risk cross-subsidization. The key question here is whether 
the NHI embodies the key characteristics of income cross-subsidies such that the rich pay 
more to subsidize the health care needs of the poor? Cross-subsidization is a key 
requirement if NHI is to progress to universal coverage. The NHI is largely financed by 
tax revenue and so to answer the question of whether the NHI embodies elements of 
cross-subsidization, it is important to understand the burden of various health care 
financing mechanisms in the country, particularly taxes.  
 
A number of studies internationally have been undertaken to quantify the relative 
progressivity of different health care financing mechanisms. Until recently these have 
been limited to developed countries (Europe and USA in the “Ecuity project”) (Wagstaff, 
van Doorslaer et al. 1999). More recently there have been studies in Asia of the 
progressivity of their health care financing systems (“EQUITAP project”) (O'Donnell, 
van Doorslaer et al. 2008) and such studies are currently underway in some Latin 
American countries.  
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African countries face many challenges in health care financing, not least being the 
inadequacy of funding and the high direct out-of-pocket payments for health care. In the 
context of many African countries, there is a critical need for a comprehensive analysis of 
the progressivity of health care financing to inform debate on different systems of health 
care financing. This is especially the case for Ghana at a time when the country is still in 
the process of restructuring its health care financing in the wake of the introduction of a 
national health insurance system. That analysis for Ghana is a key focus of this thesis. 
The findings in Chapter Five show that direct taxes which comprise personal income tax 
and corporate tax are progressive, as depicted by positive Kakwani indices. The 
progressivity of personal income tax is consistent with findings elsewhere. Indeed in 
almost all countries examined to date, personal income tax is progressive in essence 
because personal income taxes are explicitly structured to be progressive. In the 
examination of corporate tax in Ghana in this study, two assumptions were made: first 
that the burden was shared equally between consumers and shareholders; and second that 
100% of the burden falls on consumers. On the basis of both assumptions, corporate tax 
was found to be progressive but has a lower Kakwani index than does personal income 
tax. Taken together, this means of course that direct taxes are progressive which is 
consistent with the results of other published empirical studies (Limwattananon, 
Tangcharoensathien et al. 2005; O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008; Yu, Whynes et al. 
2008). 
 
On the other hand, the international evidence on indirect taxes suggests that these tend to 
be regressive in some countries but progressive in others. They have been found to be 
regressive in Sweden, Denmark, Japan, Sri Lanka and South Africa (Wagstaff, van 
Doorslaer et al. 1999; O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008; Ataguba and McIntyre 2009) 
but progressive in many low and middle income countries in Asia (e.g. Bangladesh, 
Thailand and China) (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008) . In Ghana, indirect taxes 
analyzed in this study include import duty, fuel levy, VAT and the NHIL. With the 
exception of the fuel levy, the other elements of indirect taxes were found to be 
progressive. Fuel is regressive because of the influence of taxes on kerosene which is 
largely consumed by the poor. VAT is progressive because of the wide range of 
exemptions on agricultural goods and other goods largely consumed by the poor. This 
progressivity of VAT is important in Ghanaian health care financing since the NHIL 
(which is a component of VAT) is the main funding source (about 70%) of the national 
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health insurance scheme. However the Kakwani index is less than 0.10. It is necessary to 
sound a warning here that if, as is likely, the economy becomes more formalized55
 
 and 
many more people are covered by VAT, VAT and NHIL might well move to be being 
proportional or even regressive. This possible change needs to be acknowledged but 
beyond that there is a need for continual monitoring of the incidence of this financing 
mechanism (NHIL) so that Ghana does not end up using a regressive financing 
mechanism to fund the NHI. Bringing all the indirect taxes together, the results of the 
thesis show these to be progressive as demonstrated by a positive Kakwani index. This is 
consistent with other low income countries like Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Tanzania.  
The national health insurance contributions which are made up of formal sector payroll 
deductions and informal premium contributions are overall progressive. This 
progressivity is largely a function of the payroll deductions. However, the informal 
sector’s premium contributions, which are the basis for the expansion of the NHI to 
universal coverage, were found to be very regressive. The poor are thus bearing the brunt 
of the NHI contributions compared to the rich. This is because everybody in the informal 
sector pays the same amount which in turn is the result of the failure to implement the 
system of graduated premiums that was part of the original design of the NHIS. This 
revelation from the thesis means that policy makers, government and all stakeholders of 
the NHIS must review the design of the NHIS and its implementation, not just the 
financing per se but also the other institutional arrangements such as the graduation of 
premiums and the policy on the operation of exemptions. As the thesis demonstrates, 
these are simply not working. The NHIS financing arrangements are supposed to be pro-
poor. As the scheme operates currently, they are not (Witter and Garshong 2009). 
 
Apart from taxes and the NHI, the Ghana health care system is significantly funded by 
direct out-of-pocket (OOP) payments. These accounted for 45% of total health care 
financing in 2005/2006. This form of financing has been found (with few exceptions) to 
be regressive. Indeed as is the case in Ghana, OOP payments have been found elsewhere 
to be more regressive (or at best, less progressive) than any other form of health care 
financing. Even in countries (such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Philippines and Korea) 
                                                   
55 Currently a lot of goods that should be covered by VAT are not covered because they are sold in local 
market places and other informal arrangement swhich makes it easier to evade VAT.   
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where OOP payments are progressive, the reason for this is that poor households simply 
cannot afford to pay for health care and therefore do not access health services. In other 
words, the seemingly ‘progressive’ OOP payments can be simply attributed to the fact 
that the poorest of the poor do not use health services when they are required to pay.   
 
Taken together, overall health financing was found to be progressive. This finding is 
largely driven by the progressivity of most of the taxes involved, which make up over 
50% of total health financing. It remains the case however, as the thesis has 
demonstrated, that the fuel levy and out-of-pocket payments are regressive thereby 
diminishing the level of overall progressivity in health care funding.  
9.1.3 Factors influencing enrolment in the National Health Insurance Scheme 
As mentioned earlier, Ghana has elected to achieve universal coverage through the 
expansion of the NHI. Even though the NHI is mandatory, in practice it is only the formal 
sector workers’ contributions that are compulsorily deducted to the NHI. While informal 
sector workers are required to pay a premium, it is difficult to enforce the mandatory 
nature of the scheme for this group. In this respect, the key challenge is how to persuade 
the large informal sector to join the NHI as well as ensure that formal sector workers, 
some of whom belong to strong unions, continue to have an interest in the scheme and 
not agitate for a break away. Even though currently there is no opting out in the NHI, in 
contrast to Chile where formal sector workers can opt out, workers unions could agitate 
to break away from the NHI if they become dissatisfied with what it offers. With this in 
mind, it was worthwhile in this study to explore and evaluate the factors influencing 
participation in the NHI. 
 
Chapter Seven thus provides an analysis of the factors affecting enrolment in the national 
health insurance (NHI). There it was found that the rich and those who had not faced food 
shortages in the preceding year were more likely to be insured. The results of the 
interviews, especially in the focus group discussions, revealed that lack of money and 
high premiums are the main barriers to people joining the NHIS. These findings are 
consistent with a previous study titled “Does the Ghana NHIS cover the poor?” which 
found over 90% of the uninsured attributed their inability to insure to high premium 
levels and poverty (Asante and Aikins 2008). In addition, some are calling for the 
inclusion of all drugs and all health conditions in the benefit package as well as the 
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broadening of the exemption group to cover all vulnerable groups. The perceived quality 
of care, including staff attitudes, was  also raised in the focus groups as a concern and it is 
to be hoped that these issues will be given the attention needed to ensure not only the 
survival of the scheme but its expansion. 
9.2 What are the new contributions and key limitations of the study?  
9.2.1 New contributions  
The study has made a number of key contributions to the health care financing literature 
and to financing policy discussions in Ghana. 
 
• As mentioned earlier in this study, comprehensive analysis of health care 
financing in relation to equity is very limited in Africa, with none having been 
undertaken in Ghana, despite the fact that Africa has problems in terms of 
providing adequate and equitable financial protection to its population. This study 
represents the most extensive analysis of these issues in Africa to date. 
 
• An analysis of the catastrophic and impoverishment effects of direct health care 
payment was undertaken for the first time in Ghana and has highlighted the extent 
to which direct out-of-pocket payments impoverish households. This is important 
evidence for policy makers and planners as to the lack of adequate financial 
protection in the current health care system and has thus provided evidence of the 
urgent need to financially protect the population from the effect of direct health 
care payments. 
 
• As mentioned earlier, the NHI is largely financed by VAT which is frequently a 
regressive form of taxation. No study has been undertaken on the burden of this 
tax on the population in Ghana and so this study, by revealing that VAT is 
progressive, provides some reassurance to policy makers and planners that NHI is 
largely financed by a progressive financing mechanism. The study however 
cautioned that the progressivity of VAT needs to be monitored as it could become 
regressive over time, particularly if VAT is extended to goods and services largely 
consumed by the poor.  
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• Contrary to the belief that the current premiums are designed to be pro-poor and 
affordable (and that those who cannot pay are exempted), the study revealed for 
this first time in the implementation of the NHI that the premiums paid by those 
outside the formal sector are very regressive and exemptions, particularly those 
aimed at the poor, are weakly implemented. This finding is also relevant to other 
low and middle income countries planning to implement some mandatory health 
insurance as part of a strategy for moving to universal coverage. Also contrary to 
the belief by policy makers and implementers of the NHI that the premiums are 
affordable, the findings of the study revealed that the premiums are not affordable 
to many and is the main barrier to enrolment and even threatens renewal of 
membership by those who are already insured, this information should inform 
government plans to reform the NHI scheme in the country.  
 
• Another key contribution of the study is the revelation that quality of care, 
particularly in relation to staff attitudes and waiting time, is key to the expansion 
of the NHI. This finding is consistent with findings elsewhere. For instance, in 
South Africa, improved quality of care in relation to staff attitudes is seen as a 
pre-requisite for the development of the NHIS (McIntyre, Goudge et al. 2009). 
 
• The study has also provided a baseline for monitoring progress with the 
implementation of NHI and the extent to which NHI is offering financial 
protection to the population. 
A methodological strength of this study was the ability to pool several primary and 
secondary data sets together and through triangulation and other methods, able to 
answer important policy relevant questions. The study was also successful in applying 
equity measures that are frequently used in developed countries to a data poor country 
like Ghana. 
9.2.2 Key limitations of the study 
The study is not without limitations. The main limitation of the study relates to the 
secondary data used in the calculation of the health financing incidence. The GLSS is a 
large national household survey of reported income and expenditure. This national dataset 
has been designed for several purposes and did not provide all the appropriate 
information needed to analyze the incidence of the various financing mechanisms. For 
instance there were no direct questions on income tax payments. The GLSS asked 
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whether members of each household paid income tax. The appropriate information for the 
purpose of this study would have been the amount of income tax paid by each member of 
the household. With regard to ownership of shares, a broad question was asked on 
whether any member of the household received dividends, gifts, and other remittances in 
the past year. For the purpose of this study, receipt of dividends should be separated from 
gifts and other remittances. To overcome the data limitations of the GLSS, extensive 
triangulations with a wide range of secondary data from various institutions was 
undertaken including the Ministry of Finance, Revenue Agency Governing Boards 
(RAGB), Custom Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) and Social Security and 
National Insurance Trust (SSNIT). Poor data quality and sometimes general lack of 
certain specific data hampered detail analysis of certain issues. An extensive primary 
household survey (SHIELD)56
 
 undertaken in six districts also helped to fill gaps in the 
data provided the needed information to fill in data gaps. For instance the GLSS was 
undertaken at the time when the National health insurance had just started and therefore 
the GLSS did not capture comprehensive data on it.  
It is also important to indicate as a limitation that the SHIELD survey was undertaken in 
only six of the over 140 districts in the country and even though the data was weighted, 
the survey may not be fully nationally representative. Unfortunately, due to resource 
constraints, it was not feasible to undertake a survey in all districts. 
 
Another limitation of this study is the use of household consumption expenditure as the 
socio-economic measure given certain drawbacks of this measure. For instance 
households tend to under-declare what they spend on luxuries (e.g. alcohol, cigarettes) or 
illicit items (e.g. drugs, prostitution). The amount that a household said they spent on 
alcohol according to the 1972/73 household budget survey in the US was just half of the 
amount that companies said they sold (World Bank 2005). Another drawback is that, 
consumption choices made by households may be misleading (e.g. for instance if a rich 
household chooses to live simply, that does not mean that household is poor and if a poor 
person makes high payments for health through borrowing, it does not mean that 
household is rich). Despite these drawbacks, consumption expenditure is widely accepted 
as a better measure of socio-economic status than income particularly in developing 
countries with a large informal sector. 
                                                   
56 This was weighted to approximated national estimates 
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One limitation of this study is that, the study is cross-sectional in that it considers 
financing incidence at one point in time (i.e. is a snapshot). Over time, financing 
incidence will change, not least of all because people may change their consumption 
patterns or there may be changes in employment patterns in response to health care 
financing policies. As I explain in the case of VAT, it will be important to monitor how 
incidence changes over time, particularly in response to any financing policy changes. 
Fortunately the GLSS survey data is collected every five years and so incidence monitor 
will be possible 
9.3 Recommendations for policy on how to promote equitable health care financing 
in Ghana. 
What is apparent from this thesis is that the goals set for the NHIS are not being realised 
to the extent intended. The evidence presented in the thesis is clear: Ghana is still far 
from achieving universal access; there is not adequate financial protection for those 
outside the formal sector; and there remains considerable inequity in health care 
financing. 
 
While that is disappointing given the aspirational goals of the NHI, the thesis provides 
some important insights into what now needs to be done to overcome these deficiencies. 
The key issues are these: 
• General tax revenues should be used to meet the costs of premiums for the poor. 
• Government should seriously consider funding the contributions of those outside 
the formal sector from tax funds, given that their NHI contributions are regressive. 
This would be the most reliable way of achieving universal coverage and is in line 
with what other countries are doing. 
• If Ghana is to achieve universal coverage within the existing NHIS framework, 
there is a need to effectively identify and exempt the poor from NHI contributions  
• The current graduated premiums (if premiums are to be maintained for the 
informal sector) should be simplified into the rich, the not so rich and the poor. 
• Quality of care deficiencies, particularly the perceived inferior quality of care 
provided to NHI members, must be addressed. 
• To avoid a potential for moral hazard problems in the NHI, it is recommended 
that a strong gate-keeping system is put in place and this can be done by 
strengthening the primary health care system. 
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• The current system of funding health facilities, particularly public sector facilities, 
can entrench resource disparities between facilities to the detriment of poor rural 
facilities, and it is therefore recommended that budget allocations via the 
MoH/GHS to facilities take account of resource allocations via the DHIS/NHI to 
ensure equity and fairness.  
• Currently there exist fragmented district pools of funds to the point that some 
district health schemes have extra funds whilst others are in deficit, and it is 
recommended that efforts are made to pool these funds together. 
• Problems (such as lack of staff, complexity of forms, and bureaucracy in the 
release of funds) leading to delays in reimbursement to providers need to be 
urgently addressed as this has the potential of affecting the quality of services 
provided at the health facilities. 
• Finally the government needs to embark on a national campaign to acquaint the 
population with these changes, especially the well-off, to help them to recognise 
the need for a more equitable system of health care financing which will be to the 
advantage of all Ghanaians. 
9.4 Recommendation for future research  
This dissertation has identified a number of issues that require further consideration and 
/or research. These are as follows: 
• There is a need for regular monitoring of the incidence of taxes, particularly the 
earmarked tax (NHIL) which is the main funding source of the NHI. For now, it is 
progressive but only marginally and this could easily be threatened as the 
economy becomes more formalized.  
 
• Difficulties in the implementation of some of the design features of the NHI have 
been highlighted, including the graduation of premiums and the exemption 
system. The major issue in terms of the exemption system is the identification of 
the poor. The thesis has suggested some ways forward on this question but there is 
a need to undertake a comprehensive study on how to identify the poor for 
exemption from both NHI contributions and user fees if not yet a member of the 
NHI. 
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• The study has indicated that there are many Ghanaians who are not financially 
protected from the catastrophic and impoverishment effect of direct health 
payments (see Chapter Six). This can be a basis for monitoring changes in the 
impoverishment from health care payments, which can be a clear indicator of the 
extent to which NHI is (or is not) providing more financial protection.   
 
• The key challenge for the Ghana NHI highlighted in this dissertation is how to 
expand NHI cover in the informal sector. NHI contributions by those outside the 
formal sector are very regressive and there are many challenges to collecting these 
premiums. A study on the value of the premiums collected compared with the 
administrative cost of collecting them will provide empirical evidence on the net 
revenue from those outside the formal sector. This will contribute to consideration 
of the new government proposal to fund the contributions of all outside the formal 
sector from general tax revenue.  
 
• This study concentrated on issues in health care financing and found inter alia that 
Ghana’s health care financing is generally progressive. However, in order to 
assess overall health system equity, it is also important to assess “who are those 
who are benefiting from the progressive financing?” In other words: “what is the 
benefit incidence of health care financing in Ghana?” Fortunately, this research is 
already underway. 
 
• This dissertation did not consider the redistributive effect of health care financing. 
This is important in determining the extent of redistribution of disposable income 
as a result of contributions to health care. One way of measuring this is to 
compare the inequality in pre-payment incomes as measured by, for instance the 
Gini coefficient, with inequality in post-payment incomes. It is recommended that 
such an analysis is undertaken.   
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Appendix A: Questionnaire for SHIELD household survey 
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL QUESTIONNAIRE 2008 
STRATEGIES FOR HEALTH INSURANCE FOR EQUITY IN LESS 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (SHIELD)  
Health Care Financing and Benefit incidence study in Ghana 
\INTRODUCTION AND INFORMED CONSENT  
Hello.  My name is [         ].  I work for the Health Research Unit of the Ghana Health Service, and we are 
conducting a study about health care payment and benefits in your district.   The purpose of the study is to 
learn how issues of health care payment and benefits affect people at the household level. The study will 
also be looking at the factors that affect health care payments and benefits. Critical broad questions that will 
be asked include who pays for health care and who benefits. As part of the questionnaire, I will be asking 
about all the people who reside in your household, and whether or not they have been ill in the past four 
weeks, and whether they have given birth or have been hospitalized in the past year.  For those family 
members who have been ill or hospitalized or given birth, I would then like to ask some additional 
questions about their experience(s) receiving health care services. Issues that would be discussed with you 
include socio-economic and demographic characteristics, health seeking behaviour and health care 
payments and benefits, health insurance enrollment, household characteristics, household consumption and 
expenditure, and household assets. I would like to assure you that your responses will be confidential, and 
will only be used for the purposes of this study.   You will not be penalized or lose your health insurance 
membership if you decide not to participate in this survey. You have the right to refuse to answer any 
question, and you can terminate the interview at any time.  This survey is voluntary, and will take 
approximately 45 minutes to complete.   If you have any questions or concerns about this study, you may 
contact the following: Prof. John Gyapong, Bertha Garshong or James Akazili on 021-681109 
 
Do you agree to participate in this survey? Yes……..1 (continue), No………2 (end interview) 
SECTION 1: IDENTIFICATION 
H 
1.1 
FORM NUMBER 
 
       
H 
1.2 
RESPONDENT (HOUSEHOLD HEAD=1,  SPOUSE= 2, 
OTHER ADULT=3) 
1 2 3 
H 
1.3 
SEX OF RESPONDENT MALE….1 FEMALE……
…..2 
H 
1.4 
HOUSEHOLD LOCATION RURAL/URBAN  RURAL...1 URBAN.……..
….2 
H 
1.5 
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS IN THE HOUSE   
H 
1.6 
HOUSE ADDRESS/NUMBER 
H 
1.7 
NAME OF COMMUNITY/VILLAGE/TOWN 
H 
1.8 
REGION UPPER WEST…………………………1 
NORTHERN………………………….. 2 
BRONG AHAFO………………………3 
ASHANTI………………………………4 
GREATER ACCRA……………………5 
H 
1.9 
DISTRICT LAWRA………………………………..1 
WEST GONJA…………………………2 
BEREKUM…………………………….3 
ATWIMA NWABIAGYA.…………....4 
KPESHIE……………………………....5 
DANGME WEST……………………...6 
H 
1.1
0 
DATE OF INTERVIEW (DD/MM/YY)       
Start time 
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H 
1.1
1 
ENUMERATOR’S NAME/ INITIALS   
H 
1.1
2 
RESULT OF INTERVIEW,   COMPLETE  1 
OTHER(SPECIFY)_____________________________
_ 
2 
H 
1.1
3 
 
EDITED BY SUPERVISOR (NAME) 
NAME_____________________________DATE _____/_____/______ 
 
H 
1.1
4 
 
Is this  household insured (either spouse has a valid 
DHIS card)  
 
Yes…..1 
 
No………
.2 
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SECTION 2: HOUSEHOLD ROSTER 
I would like to ask you about all the people who live in this household (i.e. those who share meals and living arrangements in this household), starting 
from the head of household (the people I am asking about are those currently living here or have been absent for less than 3 months)   (Table 1) 
Line 
No.  
Usual 
Resident
s  
Relationship 
to Head of 
Household 
Age Sex Marital status 
Highest level 
of education 
completed Employment 
Status 
Health 
Insurance 
Membership 
status 
Recent use of a 
health service 
other than 
inpatient and 
delivery 
(screening for 
module 1) 
Hospitaliza
tion 
(screening 
for mod.2) 
Currently 
pregnant 
(Screening 
for mod.3) 
Recent 
Birth  
(Screening 
for module 
3) 
 
 
  First 
Name 
HH head…..….1 
Spouse……….2 
Child…………3 
Grandchild…...4 
Other 
relative…5 
Domestic 
wker..6 
Friend…………
7 
In-
law..……….8 
Other……...…9
6 
 
How old 
is this 
person in 
complete
d years? 
 
 
Male…….
…1 
 
Female…
….2 
Married…….1 
Never 
married……..2 
Divorced……3 
Windowed….4 
Separated…..5 
Living 
together……6 
Child……….7 
Other……...96 
 
 
None….........1 
Child………2 
Pre-primary...3 
Primary..........4 
Middle/JSS…5 
Tech/voc…...6 
Secondary…7 
Tertiary……8 
 
Employed (Full 
time)…………..1 
Self employed...2 
Casual………....3 
Unemployed…..4 
Pensioner……...5 
Student/learner..6 
Child …………7 
Apprentice……8 
Other……….. 96 
Registered for 
DHIS………1 
Other HIS….2 
Both DHIS & 
other HIS…..3   
Former 
member DHI.4 
Never 
member.........5 
Has anyone in 
this household 
used any health 
service in the 
past month? 
Yes………..1 
No…………2 
 
Has [name] 
been 
hospitalized 
in the past 12 
months? 
Yes….1 
No.......2 
 
Yes….…..1 
No……....2 
NA……...9 
 
(only women 
between 12 to 
55 years old) 
Has [woman] 
given birth in 
the past 12 
months? 
Yes...……..01 
No………...02 
NA………..99 
(only women 
between 12 to 
55 years old) 
H2.
1 
H2.2 H2.3 H2.4 H2.5 H 2.6 H2.7 H2.8 H2.9 H2.10 H2.11 H2.12 H2.13 
 
1.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
2.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
3.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
4.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
5.  
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Line 
No.  
Usual 
Resident
s  
Relationship 
to Head of 
Household 
Age Sex Marital status 
Highest level 
of education 
completed Employment 
Status 
Health 
Insurance 
Membership 
status 
Recent use of a 
health service 
other than 
inpatient and 
delivery 
(screening for 
module 1) 
Hospitaliza
tion 
(screening 
for mod.2) 
Currently 
pregnant 
(Screening 
for mod.3) 
Recent 
Birth  
(Screening 
for module 
3) 
 
 
  First 
Name 
HH head…..….1 
Spouse……….2 
Child…………3 
Grandchild…...4 
Other 
relative…5 
Domestic 
wker..6 
Friend…………
7 
In-
law..……….8 
Other……...…9
6 
 
How old 
is this 
person in 
complete
d years? 
 
 
Male…….
…1 
 
Female…
….2 
Married…….1 
Never 
married……..2 
Divorced……3 
Windowed….4 
Separated…..5 
Living 
together……6 
Child……….7 
Other……...96 
 
 
None….........1 
Child………2 
Pre-primary...3 
Primary..........4 
Middle/JSS…5 
Tech/voc…...6 
Secondary…7 
Tertiary……8 
 
Employed (Full 
time)…………..1 
Self employed...2 
Casual………....3 
Unemployed…..4 
Pensioner……...5 
Student/learner..6 
Child …………7 
Apprentice……8 
Other……….. 96 
Registered for 
DHIS………1 
Other HIS….2 
Both DHIS & 
other HIS…..3   
Former 
member DHI.4 
Never 
member.........5 
Has anyone in 
this household 
used any health 
service in the 
past month? 
Yes………..1 
No…………2 
 
Has [name] 
been 
hospitalized 
in the past 12 
months? 
Yes….1 
No.......2 
 
Yes….…..1 
No……....2 
NA……...9 
 
(only women 
between 12 to 
55 years old) 
Has [woman] 
given birth in 
the past 12 
months? 
Yes...……..01 
No………...02 
NA………..99 
(only women 
between 12 to 
55 years old) 
 
6.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
7.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
8.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
9.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
10. 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
11. 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
12. 
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Line 
No.  
Usual 
Resident
s  
Relationship 
to Head of 
Household 
Age Sex Marital status 
Highest level 
of education 
completed Employment 
Status 
Health 
Insurance 
Membership 
status 
Recent use of a 
health service 
other than 
inpatient and 
delivery 
(screening for 
module 1) 
Hospitaliza
tion 
(screening 
for mod.2) 
Currently 
pregnant 
(Screening 
for mod.3) 
Recent 
Birth  
(Screening 
for module 
3) 
 
 
  First 
Name 
HH head…..….1 
Spouse……….2 
Child…………3 
Grandchild…...4 
Other 
relative…5 
Domestic 
wker..6 
Friend…………
7 
In-
law..……….8 
Other……...…9
6 
 
How old 
is this 
person in 
complete
d years? 
 
 
Male…….
…1 
 
Female…
….2 
Married…….1 
Never 
married……..2 
Divorced……3 
Windowed….4 
Separated…..5 
Living 
together……6 
Child……….7 
Other……...96 
 
 
None….........1 
Child………2 
Pre-primary...3 
Primary..........4 
Middle/JSS…5 
Tech/voc…...6 
Secondary…7 
Tertiary……8 
 
Employed (Full 
time)…………..1 
Self employed...2 
Casual………....3 
Unemployed…..4 
Pensioner……...5 
Student/learner..6 
Child …………7 
Apprentice……8 
Other……….. 96 
Registered for 
DHIS………1 
Other HIS….2 
Both DHIS & 
other HIS…..3   
Former 
member DHI.4 
Never 
member.........5 
Has anyone in 
this household 
used any health 
service in the 
past month? 
Yes………..1 
No…………2 
 
Has [name] 
been 
hospitalized 
in the past 12 
months? 
Yes….1 
No.......2 
 
Yes….…..1 
No……....2 
NA……...9 
 
(only women 
between 12 to 
55 years old) 
Has [woman] 
given birth in 
the past 12 
months? 
Yes...……..01 
No………...02 
NA………..99 
(only women 
between 12 to 
55 years old) 
13. 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
14. 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
15. 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
H2.14    Total number of household members: 
 
  H 2.15   Total number of household members in DHIS:     
(count all for whom H2.9 =1,3 or 4)                                   
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Table 2 
No 
 
 
First name Chronic Illness 
Type of 
chronic 
illness 
Taking drugs for 
chronic illness 
Reasons for not 
taking drugs 
for chronic 
illness 
 
 
General 
Health Status 
Recent 
Illness 
 Type of 
illness 
 
If ill, did 
name seek 
care? 
  
  
If name 
did not 
seek care, 
why did 
name not 
seek care? 
  
Name (the  
same order as 
above) 
Has any household 
member been taking a 
drug regularly for the past 
6 months or more 
prescribed by a 
doctor/nurse for blood 
pressure or any long term 
illness?  
Yes……….........1 
No……………..2 
Don’t know…....88 
(If 2 or 88 skip to H2.20) 
What type 
of chronic 
illness 
does this 
household 
member 
suffer 
from? 
 
Is household 
member currently 
on drugs, for the 
chronic illness? 
 
Yes………1 
No……….2 
DK……...88 
NA……...99 
(If 1 or 88 skip to 
H2.20) 
 
Why is 
household 
member not on 
drugs for the 
chronic illness? 
 
What is 
(NAME) 
health in 
general? 
 
Very good...1 
Good………2 
Average…...3 
Poor……….4 
Has (name) 
been ill or 
injured in the 
past month? 
 
Yes……….1 
No….........2 
 
(If 2 skip to 
H 3.1) 
 
 
What 
illness? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If ill, did 
name seek 
care? 
  
 Yes……..1        
  No……...2 
NA……..9 
 
(If yes skip 
to H 3.1) 
 
  H2.16 H 2.17 H2.18 H2.19 H2.20 H2.21 H2.22 H2.23 H2.24 
1           
2       
 
   
3       
 
   
4       
 
   
5       
 
   
6       
 
   
7       
 
   
8       
 
   
9       
 
   
10       
 
   
11       
 
   
12       
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No 
 
 
First name Chronic Illness 
Type of 
chronic 
illness 
Taking drugs for 
chronic illness 
Reasons for not 
taking drugs 
for chronic 
illness 
 
 
General 
Health Status 
Recent 
Illness 
 Type of 
illness 
 
If ill, did 
name seek 
care? 
  
  
If name 
did not 
seek care, 
why did 
name not 
seek care? 
  
Name (the  
same order as 
above) 
Has any household 
member been taking a 
drug regularly for the past 
6 months or more 
prescribed by a 
doctor/nurse for blood 
pressure or any long term 
illness?  
Yes……….........1 
No……………..2 
Don’t know…....88 
(If 2 or 88 skip to H2.20) 
What type 
of chronic 
illness 
does this 
household 
member 
suffer 
from? 
 
Is household 
member currently 
on drugs, for the 
chronic illness? 
 
Yes………1 
No……….2 
DK……...88 
NA……...99 
(If 1 or 88 skip to 
H2.20) 
 
Why is 
household 
member not on 
drugs for the 
chronic illness? 
 
What is 
(NAME) 
health in 
general? 
 
Very good...1 
Good………2 
Average…...3 
Poor……….4 
Has (name) 
been ill or 
injured in the 
past month? 
 
Yes……….1 
No….........2 
 
(If 2 skip to 
H 3.1) 
 
 
What 
illness? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If ill, did 
name seek 
care? 
  
 Yes……..1        
  No……...2 
NA……..9 
 
(If yes skip 
to H 3.1) 
 
13       
 
   
14       
 
   
15       
 
   
 
 Codes for H2.17 
 
Diabetes…………1  
Hypertension ……2 
Arthritis………….3 
Gastric ulcer……..4 
Gout…………......5 
Schizophrenia ......6  
Asthma ………….7 
Sinusitis………….8  
Other (specify)......96 
 
Codes for H2.19 
 
Drugs expensive…………………...1 
Don’t know that drugs are  
supposed to be taken…………….....2 
Drugs not available in community…3 
No money to buy…………………...4 
No need for drugs……..……………5 
Feel ok……………………………...6 
Other (specify)_________________96 
DK…………………………………88 
NA………………………………….99 
Codes for Illness (H2.22) 
 
Malaria……………1 
ARI……………….2 
Diarrhea…………..3   
Skin disease………4 
Fracture…………...5 
Aches and pains…..6 
Other (specify)……96 
       NA………………..99 
Codes for not seeking care (H2.24) 
       Thought it was not serious……………………....1 
Could not afford transport costs………….……...2 
Could not afford health care costs……………….3 
Health facility/provider too far…………………..4 
Could not get time off work……………………..5 
Could not afford to take time off work………….6 
Queues too long at the health facility…………...7 
Care available unlikely to make me get better.….8 
Will not be treated respectfully…………….……9 
Facility does not offer the services needed………10 
Facility can’t solve my particular health problem..11 
       Other (Specify)………………..………………….96 
      NA……………………………………………99 
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SECTION 3:  DISTRICT MUTUAL HEALTH INSURANCE MEMBERSHIP 
Please copy the line number (H2.1) and name (H2.2) of each person in the Household Roster who is registered with the DHIS. That is, everyone for 
whom H2.9 = 1, 3 or 4. 
The total number of people recorded in this table should be equal to H2.15.  
 
Line 
No.  Name of Person 
When was the last 
time this person was 
registered for the 
DHIS? 
 
Was s/he exempt 
from paying DHIS 
premium for this 
registration? 
 
How much did you 
pay for this 
person’s DHIS 
premium? 
 
How much did you 
pay for this person’s 
DHIS registration 
fee? 
 
Total amount paid 
for DHIS 
membership for 
last registration? 
Did s/he receive 
the DHIS card 
for this last 
registration? 
When did s/he receive 
this DHIS card? 
Enumerator, copy (from 
Household Roster) the 
line number and name 
only for the members of 
the DHIS (H 2.9=1, 3 or 
4) 
 
Record Month and Year 
 
Don’t know…………..88 
NA…………………...99 
 
YES………………..1 
NO…………………2 
Don’t know………88 
NA……………….99 
 
Record amount in old 
Cedis 
Don’t know………888 
NA……………….999 
 
Record amount in old 
Cedis 
Don’t know………..888 
NA………………...999 
 
Record amount in 
old Cedis.  
Don’t know……..888 
NA………………999 
 
YES……………...1 
NO…………….   2 
Don’t know…….88 
NA……………..99 
Record Month and 
Year 
Don’t know………….88 
N/A(Did not receive 
card)……………..….99 
H3.1 H3.2 H3.3 H3.4 H3.5 H3.6 H3.7 H3.8 H3.9 
  Month   
Year   
 
 
 
 
………………… 
 
………………… 
 
…………………  
 
Month   
Year   
 
  Month   
Year   
 
 
 
 
………………… 
 
………………… 
 
…………………  
 
Month   
Year   
 
  Month   
Year   
 
 
 
 
………………… 
 
………………… 
 
…………………  
 
Month   
Year   
 
  Month   
Year   
 
 
 
 
………………… 
 
………………… 
 
…………………  
 
Month   
Year   
 
  Month   
Year   
 
 
 
 
………………… 
 
………………… 
 
…………………  
 
Month   
Year   
 
  Month   
Year   
 
 
 
 
………………… 
 
………………… 
 
…………………  
 
Month   
Year   
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Line 
No.  Name of Person 
When was the last 
time this person was 
registered for the 
DHIS? 
 
Was s/he exempt 
from paying DHIS 
premium for this 
registration? 
 
How much did you 
pay for this 
person’s DHIS 
premium? 
 
How much did you 
pay for this person’s 
DHIS registration 
fee? 
 
Total amount paid 
for DHIS 
membership for 
last registration? 
Did s/he receive 
the DHIS card 
for this last 
registration? 
When did s/he receive 
this DHIS card? 
Enumerator, copy (from 
Household Roster) the 
line number and name 
only for the members of 
the DHIS (H 2.8=1, 3 or 
4) 
 
Record Month and Year 
 
Don’t know…………..88 
NA…………………...99 
 
YES………………..1 
NO…………………2 
Don’t know………88 
NA……………….99 
 
Record amount in old 
Cedis 
 
Don’t know………888 
NA……………….999 
 
Record amount in old 
Cedis 
 
Don’t know………..888 
NA………………...999 
 
Record amount in 
old Cedis.  
Don’t know……..888 
NA……………...999 
 
YES……………...1 
NO…………….   2 
Don’t know…….88 
NA……………..99 
Record Month and 
Year 
Don’t know………….88 
N/A (Did not receive 
card)…...…………….99 
  Month   
Year   
 
 
 
 
………………… 
 
………………… 
 
…………………  
 
Month   
Year   
 
  Month   
Year   
 
 
 
………………… ………………… ………………… 
 
 
Month   
Year   
 
   Month  
 
 
Year   
 
 
 
………………… ………………… ………………… 
 
 
Month   
Year   
 
  Month   
Year   
 
 
 
………………… ………………… ………………… 
 
 
Month   
Year   
 
  Month   
Year   
 
 
 
………………… ………………… …………………  
 
Month   
Year   
 
 
H3.10    Total Paid for All (in old Cedis) 
 
 
 
………………… 
 
 
………………… 
 
 
………………… 
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SECTION 4: NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 
(Now I would like to ask you more issues concerning the national health insurance scheme) 
H4.1 Have you heard of the DHIS? 
Ask only those who have never been members of 
DHIS; Circle 99 for former and current members 
Yes……………………………………...1 
No……………………………...………2 
NA…………………………………….99 
If 2 go 
to H4.4 
H4.2 From which main source did you hear about 
DHIS? 
(ask if 4.1 is 1…Yes and 99….NA) 
 
At the health facility/provider.……........1 
Over the radio…………………………..2 
On TV…………………………………..3 
Health Insurance agent…………………4 
From a relative………………………….5 
From a friend…………………………...6 
From an information van………………..7 
Other (Specify)………………………….96 
DK………………………………………88 
NA………………………………………99 
 
H4.3 What do you know about DHIS? 
 
Prepayment for health care………………1 
Paying tax to government………………..2 
Free health care delivery by gov’t….........3 
Other (specify)______________________96 
NA…………………………………….99  
 
H4.4 What criteria do you think should be used to 
identify a poor person?  
 
(CIRCLE ALL MENTIONED) 
 
The disabled……………..……….………..1 
Old/aged people…………………………...2 
Unemployed/cannot earn a living………...3 
Those with no say/voice ………………….4 
Those who cannot provide own need…….5 
One with many children…………………..6 
Homeless………………………………….7 
Person who cannot get food ……….……..8 
Person in tattered clothing……..………..…9 
Person without farm or animals………..….10 
Other (specify)______________________96 
 
          
Households that are currently insured with the DHIS  
H4.5 Why did you or members of your household 
join the scheme? 
Financial protection against unforeseen 
illness………………...................................1 
I believe it is a better alternative 
to the cash and carry ……………................2 
A relative/friend asked me to join…………3 
Other (Specify)______________________96 
NA………………………………………...99 
 
H4.6 Why are some household members enrolled in 
the DHIS and others not? 
 
 
ASK, IF SOME HOUSE HOLD MEMBERS 
ARE NOT PART OF THE DHIS IN H2.9 
Insured only those exempt from premiums…1 
Coverage elsewhere (e.g. employer)………..2 
Can only afford to insure some members…..3 
Have insured sick/ill members only………..4 
Financial difficulties………………………..5 
Card not ready……………………………...6 
Other (specify)_______________________96 
Don’t Know………………………………..88 
NA…………………………………………99 
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H4.7 As an insured household, what are the benefits 
that you expect from the scheme? 
 
MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED 
 
Early attendance at health facilities…….….1 
Prompt treatment and services……………..2 
Availability of drugs………………………..3 
Good attitude of health staff………………..4 
Free health care in times of need…………...5 
Other (Specify)______________________ 96 
DK ………………………………...............88 
NA ………………………………...............99 
 
H4.8 Do you know whether you need to renew the 
DHIS membership for your household 
members? 
Yes, need to renew…………………………1 
Don’t need to renew/only need to register 
once………………………………………...2 
DK…………………………………………88 
NA…………………………………………99 
If 2 or 
88 go to 
H4.11 
H4.9 Do you know how often you need to renew 
membership with the DHIS? 
Yes…………………………………………1 
No………………………………………….2 
DK…………………………………………88 
NA………………………………………...99 
If 2 or 
88 go to 
H4.11 
H4.10 How often do you need to renew DHIS 
membership?  
Every year…………………………………1 
Other (Specify)______________________96 
DK………...………………………………88 
NA………………………………………..99 
 
Ask if 
4.9 is 
Yes=1 
H4.11  How do you find the registration fee? High ……..…………………………….….1 
Moderate/Affordable……………...………2 
Low………..………………………….…...3 
DK…………….………………..………...88 
NA……………………………………..…99 
 
H4.12 How do you find the premium level? 
(Ask all members and find from formal 
workers how they find the 2.5% deduction) 
High ………………………..……………...1 
Moderate…………………..……………….2 
Low…………………………..………….....3 
DK…………………………………………88 
NA………………………….……...............99 
 
H4.13 What would you like to be done about the 
current premium levels? 
The current levels should be maintained…..1 
It should be revised upwards………..……..2 
It should be revised downwards……………3 
Other (specify)_______________________96 
DK…………………………………………88 
NA…………………………………………99 
 
H4.14 How do you find the timing of premium 
collection and registration? (ask all members 
and find out from formal sector workers 
their monthly deductions) 
Appropriate ……………………………….1 
Inappropriate ……………………………...2 
NA…………………………….…………..99 
   If 1 
go to   
H4.16 
H4.15 When should it be? 
(ask all members and find from formal sector 
workers the monthly deductions) 
First quarter of the year…………………..1 
Second quarter of the year………….….....2 
Third quarter of the year…………….……3 
Last quarter of the year……………….......4 
Throughout the year……………….….......5 
Yearly…………………………………….6 
Other (specify)_____________________  96 
NA……………………………..………….99 
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H4.16 From what source/s of money did you pay the 
registration fees and premiums? 
 
MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED 
 
SALARY …………………………………………1 
SOLD AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE ……….2 
SOLD ASSETS (HOUSEHOLD TOOLS)…….3  
TOOK MONEY FROM SAVINGS (BANK) …4 
TOOK MONEY FROM SUSU COLLECTOR.5 
BORROWED FROM FRIEND/RELATIVE…6 
BORROWED FROM MONEY LENDER…... 7 
RECEIVED A GIFT ……………………….....8 
OTHER (SPECIFY)_____________________96 
DK…………………………………………….88 
NA……………………………………………..99 
 
H4.17 Have you or any member of your household 
used your ID cards to seek health care in a 
hospital, health centre or clinic? 
Yes………….……………………….........1 
No……….………………………….……..2 
DK……………………………………..…88 
NA……………………………………..…99 
If  2 
skip to 
H 4.21  
H4.18 Why did you or any member of your household 
seek health care after joining the scheme? 
Was genuinely ill………………………….1 
Just testing the scheme………………….…2 
Once paid I had to go……………………....3 
Other (specify)______________________96 
NA……………………………...................99 
 
H4.19 Were you or other members of the household 
satisfied with the services provided at the health 
facility? 
 
Yes………….………………….................1 
No……….………………………………..2 
NA……………………………………….99 
If 1 
skip to 
H4.21 
H4.20 Why were you or any member of your 
household not satisfied with the services at the 
health facility? 
(MULTIPLE RESPONSES) 
Did not get drugs in the facility…………….1 
Refuse drugs because scheme owes facility..2 
Bad attitude of the health staff……………...3 
Long waiting period……………..................4 
Other (specify)_______________________96 
NA………………………………................99 
 
H4.21 For how many years have you been a member 
of the scheme? 
 
FOR THE RESPONDENT 
Less than one year…………………………1 
One year………………………...…………2 
Two years……………………..…...............3 
Three years…………………...…………....4 
Four years………………………………….5 
Five years………………………………….6 
More than five years………..………..…...7 
NA………………………………...............99 
 
H4.22 Do you know the benefits you and your 
household are entitled to as members of the 
DHIS? 
YES………………………………………….…...1 
NO………………………………….……………2 
DON’T KNOW………………………….……….88 
NA…………………………………………….99 
If 2 or 
88 skip 
to       
H4.24 
H4.23 
 
What are the benefits that you and your 
household are entitled to? 
FREE HEALTH CARE FOR ALL ILLNESSES…..…..1 
FREE HEALTH CARE FOR SELECTED 
ILLNESSES……………………………………..2 
OTHER (SPECIFY)_______________________96 
NA……………………………………….…..99 
 
H4.24 Has joining the District Health Insurance 
Scheme been beneficial to you? 
Yes ..................................................................... 1 
No ...................................................................... 2 
NA……………………………………………...99 
If 2 
skip to 
H4.26 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
 282 
H4.25  What has been the benefit(s)? 
 
MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED 
 
 
 
 
 Saved money from paying hospital bills…...1 
 
Did not need to borrow to pay for hospital 
bills………………………………………….2 
 
Was not afraid using health facilities because 
of cost……………………………………….3 
 
Can now use health services to prevent illness  
becoming severe…………………………….4 
 
Other (specify)_______________________96 
NA………………………………………....99                                                                
 
 
 
If ANY 
skip to 
H 4.27 
H4.26 Why has joining the DHIS not been beneficial 
to you? 
Does not cover everything………………….1 
Never use the health service after joining….2 
My choice of health facility excluded……...5 
Health facility too far………………………4 
Other (specify)______________________96 
NA………………………………………..99 
 
H4.27 Do you know about the exemption package 
under the DHIS 
Yes………….………………….................1 
No……….………………………………..2 
NA…………………………………….....99 
If 2 go 
to   
H4.31 
H4.28 What is your perception about the exemption 
package? 
Adequate….………………………………1 
Inadequate….…………………………......2 
Other (specify)_____________________96 
NA……………………………………….99 
 
 
H4.29 What would you like to be done about the 
exemptions package? 
Should be maintained………………….….1 
Should be enlarged………………………..2 
Should be reduced………………………...3 
Other (specify)______________________96 
DK………………………………………..88 
NA………………………………………..99 
 
H4. 30 Who in your opinion should be exempted under 
the health insurance scheme? 
 
MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED 
 
The poor in general……………………….1 
Widowed...……………………..................2 
Aged ……..…………………….................3 
Mental patients…...…………….................4 
The disabled……..…………..…................5 
Pregnant women….…………….................6 
Children (U5)…….…………..……….…..7 
From 5 to 17 years old……………………8 
Other (specify)_____________________  96 
NA.……………………………………......99 
 
 
H4.31 Will you continue to be a member of the District 
Health Insurance Scheme? 
Yes………….…………………..................1                 
No……….………………………………...2 
NA…………………………..………..99 
   If 2 
go to 
H4.33 
         
H4.32 Why will you like to continue to be member of 
the DHIS? 
Financial protection against unforeseen 
illness………………...................................1 
I believe it is a better alternative 
to the cash and carry ……………................2 
Other (specify)……………………………..3 
NA…………………………………………99 
If 1, 2 
or 3 
skip to 
H4.42 
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H4.33 Why would you not continue to be a member of 
the District Health Insurance Scheme? 
 
I don’t see why I should continue  
 
Has not been sick 
Amount (premium) being paid is high 
Not getting the services I needed 
 
I still buy drugs after the service  
 
Other (Specify) 
 
 
 
                                          Yes    No    DK 
Don’t see why I should 
 Continue…………………1        2      88 
Not been sick……………..1         2     88 
Premium too high…………1        2     88 
  Not getting services  
I need……………………   1        2     88 
Still buys drugs after  
Service…………………….1        2     88                                     
Other (Specify)__________________96 
NA……………………………………99 
 
Former members of the NHIS  
H4.34 Why have you not renewed your membership?                                                  
No money 
No confidence in scheme again… 
Not satisfied with provider(s) 
Premium too expensive 
Registration fee expensive 
Inappropriate timing of premium 
Benefit package inadequate 
Did not use services previous year 
Not available at time of registration 
Difficulty in accessing services 
Waiting period too long 
Poor quality of care 
Other (specify)  
 
           Yes   No    DK 
No money………………………   1      2      88 
No confidence in scheme again… .1      2      88 
Not satisfied with provider(s)...…..1      2      88 
Premium too expensive…………..1      2       88 
Registration fee expensive...……...1     2       88 
Inappropriate timing of premium…1     2       88 
Benefit package inadequate…….…1     2      88 
Did not use services previous year...1    2      88 
Not available at time of registration.1    2      88 
Difficulty in accessing services…    1    2      88 
Waiting period too long…………... 1    2      88 
Poor quality of care………….……  1    2      88 
Other (specify)________________________96 
NA………………………………… ………..99 
 
H4.35 What would make you rejoin the health 
insurance scheme?  
Availability of drugs………………………..1 
Improved attitude of health staff...………….2 
Improving the benefit package……………...3 
Reducing premium……………………….....4 
If health facility is closer …………………...5 
Other (specify)________________________96 
NA………………………………………......99 
 
H4.36 What is the main reason no one from your 
household is enrolled in the district health 
insurance scheme? 
Not aware of district HI scheme…………….1 
Just recently learned of HI scheme………….2 
Premiums is unaffordable…………………...3 
Benefits/services are not adequate…………..4 
Not confident in scheme…………………….5 
Don’t trust provider…………………………6 
Waiting period too long……………………..7 
Registration point not accessible…………....8 
Covered elsewhere(e.g. employer)………….9 
No perceived need for insurance…………...10 
Prefer to go to private provider/not 
participating in DHIS……………………….11 
Card just expired…………………………….12 
Other (specify)________________________96 
DK……………………………………………88 
NA…………………………………………...99 
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H4.37 Why are some household members enrolled in 
the DHIS and others not? 
 
 
ASK, IF SOME HOUSE HOLD MEMBERS 
ARE PART OF THE DHIS 
Insured only those exempt from premiums…1 
Coverage elsewhere (e.g. employer)………..2 
Can only afford to insure some members…..3 
Have insured sick/ill members only………..4 
Financial difficulties………………………..5 
Other (specify)_______________________96 
DK…………………………………………88 
NA…………………………………………99 
 
 
H4.38 Are there other reasons why no one from your 
household is enrolled? 
 
 
MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED 
Not aware of district HI scheme…………….1 
Just recently learned of HI scheme………….2 
Premiums is unaffordable…………………...3 
Benefits/services are not adequate…………..4 
Not confident in scheme…………………….5 
Don’t trust provider…………………………6 
Waiting period too long……………………..7 
Registration point not accessible…………....8 
Covered elsewhere(e.g. employer)………….9 
No perceived need for insurance…………...10 
Prefer to go to private provider/not 
participating in NHIS……………………….11 
Don’t understand the scheme……………….12 
Other (specify)________________________96 
DK……………………………………………88 
NA…………………………………………...99 
 
 
Never been members (not insured) of the NHIS  
 
H4.39 Why are you or members of your household not 
insured (never been insured) with the scheme?  
 
(MAIN REASON) 
Not heard about NHIS…….……...................1 
No Scheme in the area….………...................2 
Timing of premium collections 
inappropriate………………………………...3 
Poor quality of care………………………….4 
Premiums unaffordable……………………...5 
Inadequate benefit package….………….…...6 
Waiting period too long……..……….………7 
Don’t trust providers……………....................8 
No confidence in scheme…………………….9 
No money……………………………............10 
Prefer out of pocket payment………………...11 
Registration point not accessible…………….12 
Covered by a private health insurance……….13 
Other(specify)_________________________96 
NA…………………………….……………..99 
 
 
 
H4.40 Why are some household members enrolled in 
the DHIS and others not? 
 
 
ASK  IF SOME HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS ARE 
PART OF THE DHIS  
Insured only those exempt from premiums…1 
Coverage elsewhere (e.g. employer)………..2 
Can only afford to insure some members…..3 
Have insured sick/ill members only………..4 
Financial difficulties………………………..5 
Other (specify)_______________________96 
DK…………………………………………88 
NA…………………………………………99 
 
 
H4.41 What would make you join the health insurance Availability of drugs…………………….1  
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scheme? (Main reason) Improved attitude of health staff...……...2 
Improving the benefit package………….3 
Reducing premium………………...........4 
If health facility is closer ……………….5 
Active purchasing of services by          
insurers…….…………………….……...6 
Attitude of DHIS staffs………………….7 
Other (specify)____________________96 
NA……………………………………..99 
FOR ALL RESPONDENTS (INSURED AND UNINSURED MEMBERS) 
H4.42 What aspects of good quality 
care at public clinics or health 
centres (HC) would give you 
trust and confidence in the 
service?  
 
I will read out a list; please can 
you tell me which is most 
important to you, which is the 
second most important and so on.  
 
WRITE 1 FOR THE MOST 
IMPORTANT, 2 FOR THE 
NEXT MOST IMPORTANT 
ETC 
 
If I knew that nurses at clinics or HC are properly trained to 
treat my illness 
 
If I was sure that I would be referred to see a doctor if the 
clinic or HC nurse could not treat my illness 
 
If I only had to wait ½ hour before being treated at the clinic 
or HC 
 
 
 
If I could see the same nurse at the clinic or HC every time I 
go there 
 
 
If the staff at the clinic or HC are kind and understanding  
If the clinic or HC always had the drugs that I needed  
 
 
H4.43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What aspects of good quality 
care at public hospitals would 
give you trust and confidence in 
the service? 
I will read out a list; please can 
you tell me which is most 
important to you, which is the 
second most important and so on.  
 
WRITE 1 FOR THE MOST 
IMPORTANT, 2 FOR THE 
NEXT MOST IMPORTANT 
ETC 
If the hospital was clean  
If I could make an appointment to see a doctor at the 
hospital at a specific time 
 
If I was sure that I would be listened to and understood by 
doctors and nurses and that I would understand what they 
tell me about my condition and treatment 
 
If I was sure that hospital staff would keep my health 
problems confidential 
 
If transport was provided to and from a hospital if I was 
referred there 
 
H4.44 What other aspects of good 
quality care at public hospitals 
would give you trust and 
confidence in the service? 
I will read out a list; please can 
you tell me which is most 
important to you, which is the 
second most important and so on.  
 
WRITE 1 FOR THE MOST 
IMPORTANT, 2 FOR THE 
NEXT MOST IMPORTANT 
ETC 
If the staff at the hospital are kind and understanding  
If I only had to wait one hour before being treated at the 
hospital 
 
If I was able to see a nurse or doctor and discuss my health 
problems in private 
 
If the hospital always had the drugs that I needed  
If I could lay a complaint about the service I received and 
knew that it would be acted on 
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ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME 
Statement Strongly 
agree 
Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Don’t 
Know 
H4.45 Insured members are given poor quality drugs 1 2 3 4 88 
H4.46 Insured are not treated well as those who are not insured 1 2 3 4 88 
H4.47 Too much time is spent at the public health facility therefore it is better to visit private health facilities. 1 2 3 4 88 
H4.48 It is not useful to insure if you don’t fall sick often 1 2 3 4 88 
H4.49 Only those who fall sick often should pay to get insured with the NHIS. 1 2 3 4 88 
H4.50 It’s good to pay to become an NHIS member even if I don’t fall sick. 1 2 3 4 88 
H4.51 The benefit package is not broad enough.  1 2 3 4 88 
H4.52 It is good to renew my membership by paying every year even if I don’t use the facility within the 
insurance year. 
1 2 3 4 88 
H4.53 I think those who are uninsured get better care at the health facility. 1 2 3 4 88 
H4.54 I think members of the scheme should be free to go to which ever facility they choose to go to. 1 2 3 4 88 
H4.55 Staff attitude towards insured clients is bad. 1 2 3 4 88 
H4.56 Insured clients spend too much time in the health facility compared to the uninsured. 1 2 3 4 88 
H4.57 
 
If I or a family member were to become ill and had to go to the hospital we would be able to afford the 
bill of the doctor, tests and medicines prescribed. 
1 2 3 4 88 
H4.58 
 
I would agree to pay a small amount of money each year for free medical care when I need it even if I’m 
not sick now. 
1 2 3 4 88 
H4.59 The District Health Insurance Schemes act in the best interest of their members. 1 2 3 4 88 
H4.60 People should get equal treatment whether you are an insured member or not 1 2 3 4 88 
  
 
 
H4.61 
 
I will like to ask you about your views on how much different people should pay towards health care  
The DHIS is in place to provide full cost of the day to day health care needs of the people. Payments to enrol as a member are in various categories. 
On this card, there are three classes of people and each has a different income.  Which of these options do you think best indicates what you think 
each person should contribute towards the health insurance scheme? (SHOW CARD A and write option number in the  box) 
 
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
 287 
SECTION 5 
  SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENT 
AND HOUSEHOLD 
(Either household head or an adult member of household if household head is absent) 
 
No Questions Coding category Skip 
H5.1 What is your ethnic background? Dagare……………………………….….1 
Wala...………….….................................2 
Akan……………………….....................3 
Ga………………………………………..4 
Dangme………………......................…..5 
Dagomba..................................................6 
Gonja........................................................7 
Ewes…………………………………….8 
Mamprusis………………………………9 
Other(specify)____________________96 
 
H5.2 What is your religion? Traditional……………..….....................1 
Christian………………………………..2 
Muslim………………………………....3 
Other (specify)____________________96 
 
H5.3 What is your main occupation? Subsistence farmer…………………..…1 
Large scale farmer……………………..2 
Trader……….……………………….....3 
Government worker…………………....4 
Private formal worker…………………..5 
At school………………..……………....6 
Artisan…………………………………..7 
None…………………………………….8 
Other (specify)____________________96 
 
H5.4 Is the house you are staying in 
your own, family house or 
rented? 
Own…………………………..…………...1 
Family house……………………………...2 
Rented..……………………..……………..3 
Other 
(specify)______________________96 
 
H5.5 How many rooms, including 
kitchens does your home have? 
                          
                            
 
H5.6 How many sleeping rooms are in 
your household? 
                             
H5.7 Does this household have a 
modern design?  
(i.e. zinc/aluminum roofing 
excluding animal pond) (observe) 
Yes………………………………………...1 
No…………………………..……………..2 
 
H5.8 What is the main material for the 
wall? 
(observe) 
Concrete……………………..……………1 
Mud……………………………………….2 
Bricks…………………………..................3 
 
H5.9 What is the main roofing material 
(excluding animal compounds) 
Zinc/Aluminium……………………1 
Concrete……………………..……..2 
Asbestos…………………………….3 
Thatch……………..……………….4 
Concrete tiles...…………………….5 
Other (specify)________________96 
 
H5.10 Does the household have 
electricity? 
(Ask and observe) 
Yes...………………….……………..1 
No………………………….………..2 
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H5.11 
 
What cooking utensils are 
frequently used in this 
household? 
Earth bowls…... ………. ………..…1 
Aluminum pans…..…………….......2 
Other (specify)________________ 96 
 
H5.12 What type of cooking fuel do you 
use (main)? 
Gas………………………………...1 
Electricity…………………………2 
Wood……………………………...3 
Charcoal…………………………..4 
Stalks……………………………...5 
Other (specify)_______________96 
 
H5.13 
 
 
What is the common toilet 
facility used by this household? 
 
 
 
Free range……………………………1 
Shared Pit latrine……………………2 
Own Pit latrine………………………3 
Shared KVIP………………………..4 
Own KVIP………………………….5 
Own flush toilet……………….…....6 
Shared flush toilet………………….7 
Other (specify)________________96 
 
H5.14 
 
What is the main source of 
drinking water for this 
household? 
Pipe borne water …………………..1 
Bore-hole…………………………...2 
Well water…………………….….…3 
Dam/dugout….……………..………4 
Stream……………………….……..5 
Bottle water…………………….…..6 
Sachet water…………………….….7 
Other (specify)________________96 
 
H5.15 During the season when food 
prices are highest, does your 
household face food shortage? 
Yes………………………..………….1 
No………………………….………...2 
 
H5.16 Did you farm in the last farming 
season? 
Yes………………………..………….1 
No………………………….………...2 
If 2 
skip 
to 
H5.18 
H5.17 
 
In the last farming season, what 
would be the market value of 
your total yield of all your 
farming activities? (ESTIMATE 
in old Ghana cedis) 
 
Amount   ¢_____________________ 
Don’t Know……………………….88 
NA………………………….……..99 
 
H5.18 What is the main source of 
income in your household? 
Salaries and/or wages………………1 
Remittances………….……………..2 
Pensions and grants……………..….3 
Sales of farm products………….......4 
Other non-farm income………….....5 
No income……………………….....6 
Other (specify)________________96 
 
H5.19 [SHOW CARD B] I would like 
to ask you to indicate how 
‘well-off’ your household is 
compared to other households 
in Ghana? [WRITE NUMBER 
OF BLOCK ON CARD 
INDICATED BY RESPONDENT; 
I.E. 1 TO 5] 
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SECTION 6 
HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITUE AND DURABLES/ASSETS 
In the last month, did the household spend money on the following items? ESTIMATES (If 
No…..2, enter 00 but if yes….1, provide amount but if don’t know amount put 88) 
No Item     
Amount 
if Yes=1 
H6.1 Health care: clinics/HC/hospitals fees, buying drugs from 
private/market dispensaries, traditional/herbal treatment fees.  
 
Ask, apart from premium and registration fees payments (for 
insured), how much do you think you have incurred for the 
health care of you and your household members within the past 
one month? 
 
Yes……1 
No……..2 
 
 
H6.2 Malaria: HH expenditure on malaria (from H 6.1 ask what was 
spent on malaria care)  
Yes……,1 
No……..2 
DK…….88 
NA…….99 
 
H6.3 Education: children school fees, books and other materials, 
P.T.A and other school contributions 
Yes……1 
No……..2 
 
H6.4 Farming activities: fertilizer, insecticides, purchase of seeds, 
irrigation, hired labour, renting equipments, animal feeding, etc 
Yes……1 
No……..2 
 
H6.5 Foods: including rice, millet, maize, cassava, yam, plantain, 
cocoyam, beans groundnuts, salt, pepper, etc. 
Yes……1 
No……..2 
 
H6.6 Clothing and shoes: for both adults and children 
 
Yes……1 
No……..2 
 
H6.7 Utility services: water, electricity,  
 
Yes……1 
No……..2 
 
H6.8 Fuel for transportation: petrol, taxis and trotro/bus fares etc.   
 
Yes……1 
No……..2 
 
H 6.9 Fuel for lighting and cooking: gas for cooking, kerosene, 
charcoal, firewood 
Yes……1 
No……..2 
 
H6.10 Household utensils: bowls, pans, buckets, cutlery, pots and other 
kitchen utensils 
Yes……1 
No……..2 
 
H6.11 Capital goods: motor vehicle, motor, bicycles, radio, buildings 
and building materials, grinding mills, etc 
Yes……1 
No……..2 
 
H6.12 Rent (only ask if person is renting house) 
 
Yes……...1 
No………2 
DK…….88 
NA…….99 
 
H6.13 Direct taxes 
 
Yes……1 
No……..2 
DK…….88 
 
H6.14 Drinks/cola nuts/tobacco/funeral celebration, marriages  
 
Yes……1 
No……..2 
 
H6.15 Paying of debts 
 
Yes……1 
No……..2 
 
H6.16 Others(specify) Yes……1 
No……..2 
 
H6.17 Total expenditure (Excluding amount in H 6.2)  
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HOUSEHOLD DURABLE (GOODS & ASSETS) (if Yes….1, provide number, if No….2 
Enter 00) 
 
No 
 
Items 
 
Category  
 
Number 
H6.18 Do you or any member of this household own functioning 
bicycles? 
Yes…1 
No….2 
 
H6.19 Do you or any member of this household own functioning 
motorbikes? 
Yes…1 
No….2 
 
H6.20 Do you or any member of this household own functioning 
cars/vehicles? 
Yes…1 
No….2 
 
H6.21 Do you or any member of this household own functioning 
tractors? 
Yes…1 
No….2 
 
    
H6.22 Do you or any member of this household own wooden/iron beds? Yes…1 
No….2 
 
H6.23 Do you or any member of this household own functioning radio 
sets? 
Yes…1 
No….2 
 
H6.24 Do you or any member of this household own functioning TV 
sets? 
Yes…1 
No….2 
 
    
H6.25 Do you or any member of this household own functioning sewing 
machines? 
Yes…1 
No….2 
 
H6.26 Do you or any member of this household own functioning electric 
bulbs and lanterns? 
Yes…1 
No….2 
 
H6.27 Do you or any member of this household own functioning 
traditional lamps? 
Yes…1 
No….2 
 
H6.28 Do you or any member of this household own functioning coal 
pots or kerosene stoves? 
Yes…1 
No….2 
 
H6.29 Do you or any member of this household own functioning 
electrical or gas cookers? 
Yes…1 
No….2 
 
H6.30 Do you or any member of this household own functioning 
refrigerators/deep freezers? 
Yes…1 
No….2 
 
    
H6.31 Do you or any member of this household own functioning 
DVD/VCD/VHS players? 
Yes…1 
No….2 
 
H6.32 Do you or any member of this household own functioning 
telephones (landline)? 
Yes…1 
No….2 
 
H6.33 Do you or any member of this household use Cell phones? Yes…1 
No….2 
 
H6.34 Do you or any member of this household have Personal Yes…1  
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computer? No….2 
H6.35 Do you or any member of this household have bank account? Yes…1 
No….2 
 
    
H6.36 Do you or any member of this household own cattle? Yes…1 
No….2 
 
H6.37 Do you or any member of this household own sheep? Yes…1 
No….2 
 
H6.38 Do you or any member of this household own goats? Yes…1 
No….2 
 
H6.39 Do you or any member of this household own pigs? Yes…1 
No….2 
 
H6.40 Do you or any member of this household own donkeys? Yes…1 
No….2 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR RESPONSES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
End time 
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MODULE 1 
 
INDIVIDUAL WHO USED ANY HEALTH SERVICES OTHER THAN FOR 
DELIVERIES OR INPATIENT CARE QUESTIONNAIRE 2008 
STRATEGIES FOR HEALTH INSURANCE FOR EQUITY IN LESS 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (SHIELD)  
Health Care Financing and Benefit incidence study in Ghana 
 
 
SECTION 1: IDENTIFICATION 
 
U 1.1 FORM NUMBER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
U 1.2 RESPONDENT [THE INDIVIDUAL (User of health service)=1,  
CARETAKER=2] 
1 2 
U 1.3 HOUSEHOLD LOCATION RURAL/URBAN  RURAL...1 URBAN...…….2 
U 1.4 NAME COMMUNITY/VILLAGE/TOWN 
U 1.5 REGION UPPER WEST…………………………1 
NORTHERN………………………….. 2 
BRONG AHAFO………………………3 
ASHANTI………………………………4 
GREATER ACCRA……………………5 
U 1.6 DISTRICT LAWRA………………………………..1 
WEST GONJA….………………………2 
BEREKUM……………………………..3 
ATWIMA NWABIAGYA.…….……....4 
KPESHIE……………………………....5 
DANGME WEST….…………………..6 
U 1.7 DATE OF INTERVIEW (DD/MM/YY)       
U 1.8 ENUMERATOR’S NAME/ INITIALS   
U 1.9 RESULT OF INTERVIEW,   COMPLETE  1 
 OTHER(SPECIFY)______________________________ 2 
U 1.10 
 
EDITED BY SUPERVISOR (NAME) 
NAME_____________________________DATE _____/_____/______ 
 
 
 
SECTION 2 
 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF USER OF 
HEALTH SERVICES 
 
No Questions  Coding category  SKIP 
U 
2.1 
Which code in H2.1 is the user 
of health service? 
                     
U 
2.2 
What is user’s ethnic 
background? 
Dagare………………………………………1 
Wala...………….….......................................2 
Akan………………………...........................3 
Ga……………………………………………4 
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Dangme………………......................……….5 
Dagomba.........................................................6 
Gonja...............................................................7 
Ewes………………………………………….8 
Mamprusis……………………………………9 
Other(specify)_________________________96 
U 
2.3 
What is user’s current marital 
status? 
Married…………………….…………….……1 
Never married…… ……………………..….…2 
Divorced………………………………..…..…3 
Widowed…………………………….….….…4 
Separated……… ……………………..………5 
Living together………………………………..6 
Child ………………………………………….7 
Other (specify)________________________ 96 
 
 
U 
2.4 
What is user’s religion? Traditional………………………..….………..1 
Christian………………………………………2 
Muslim………………………………..………3 
Other (specify)________________________96 
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U 2.5 During the past month did (name) use any of the following:  
       U 2.6 Total cost of use 
1 = Public hospital [Specify name of hospital] 
2 = Public clinic/Community Health Centre 
3 = Clinic at workplace 
4 = Private General Practitioner/nurse 
5 = Private specialist 
6 = Private hospital 
7 = Private Dentist 
8 = Private pharmacy  shop 
 9 = Chemical seller with prescription 
10= Chemical seller without prescription 
11 = Community health worker 
12 = Private Midwife 
13 = Traditional birth attendant 
14 = Traditional Healer/herbalist 
15= Spiritualist 
16=Drug Peddlers  
17 = Treated self with herbs/or left over drugs at home. 
96 = Other [Specify] 
99= NA 
      IF NOT USED CODE 0 
If used then record the number of visits, e.g. 1 for one visit, 2 for two visits and so on.   
 
Use/cost 1 Specify 
Hospital/plac
e you sought 
treatment 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Other 
Specify  
Grand 
total  
 
Number of 
use/visits 
                    
Total cost 
(indicate 
for all use 
except for 
the most 
recent use) 
  
 
 
 
 
                  
 
U 2.7 The most recently used informal care (write code in box (10 to 17 + 96)  
 
U 2.8 The most recently used formal care (write code in box) (1-9 + 96)  
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SECTION 3 
 
 
A 
 
MOST RECENTLY USED INFORMAL HEALTH CARE (including self 
treatment at home) 
 
SKIP  
U 
3.1 
Where did you go for the informal 
treatment for (NAME)? 
Self treatment with orthodox medicines. ..1 
Self treatment with herbs………….……..2 
Traditional healer/spiritualist…………….3 
Chemical seller with prescription………...4 
Chemical seller without prescription……..5 
Pharmacy…………………………………6 
Other(Specify)_____________________96 
NA………………………………………99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U 
3.2 
Did (NAME) have to pay for the 
treatment in cash (that is out-of-
pocket)? 
Yes………………………………….…...1 
No………...………………………..….…2   
Don’t Know……………………………..88 
NA………………………………….……99 
 
If 2 skip 
to U 3.4 
U 
3.3 
How much in cash did (Name) or 
the household pay for treatment at 
this place? 
(record in old cedis) 
 
Amount in ¢________________________ 
Don’t Know…………………………..8888 
NA……………………………….……9999 
        
        
U 
3.4 
Did you make any in-kind 
payment for (Name) treatment? 
Yes…………………………………..1 
No………...…………………………2   
Don’t Know………………………..88 
NA…………………………………99 
If 2 or 88 
skip to  
    U 3.6 
U 
3.5 
What was the value of the in-kind 
payment? 
(record in old cedis) 
 
Amount in ¢_________________ 
Don’t Know……………………..8888 
NA………………………………9999 
 
U 
3.6 
Why did (Name) or the household 
not have to pay for treatment at 
this place?  
 
 
Service was offered free of charge ....1 
Given drug on credit………………...2 
Other (Specify) ________________96 
NA…………………………………99 
 
 
U 
3.7 
Did you pay for transport to this 
place for (Name)? 
Yes…………………………………..1 
No………...…………………………2 
NA…………………………………99 
 
 
   If 2 
skip to  
U4.1 if 
applicable 
U 
3.8 
How much did (Name) pay? 
(record in old cedis) 
 
Amount in ¢_________________ 
Don’t Know……………………..8888 
NA………………………………9999 
 
 
END INTERVIEW HERE IF NO FORMAL CARE WAS SOUGHT FOR [NAME] 
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SECTION 4 
  
MOST RECENTLY USED FORMAL CARE  
 
U 
4.1 
(If person used more than one provider, 
ask)  
 
Where did (NAME) seek treatment from 
most recently? 
Regional Hospital…………….……..1 
District Hospital…………………….2 
Private hospital……………………...3 
Health Centre……………………......4 
Public Clinic…………………….…..5 
Private clinic………………….……..6 
CHPS compound…………………....7 
Other (specify)………………………96 
NA…………………………………..99 
 
U 
4.2 
Why was (NAME) taken there instead of 
other facility (main reason)? 
Nearness……………….…………….….1 
Quick service…………..……..………...2 
Less medical bill………..……..……….3 
Less waiting time………..….………….4 
Good quality service………..………….5 
Emergency/was taken there…………….….6 
Do not have to pay…………………………7 
Told to go there by doctor/nurse…………...8 
Told to go there by DHIS………………..9 
Know care available will help me get better.10 
Know I will be treated respectfully…………11 
Other(specify)________________________96 
 
U 
4.3 
Who took the decision? Self………………………………….1 
Spouse ……………….……….…….2 
Household head……………….…….3 
Relative/friends/Neighbours….….….4 
Referral health worker…………..…..5 
Other(Specify)_________________96 
DK…………………………….……88 
NA………………………………….99 
 
U 
4.4 
How many days after illness was the 
decision taken? 
Same  day…………….……………..1 
Next day…………….………………2 
Third day……………………………3 
Fourth day………………….……….4 
After fourth day……………..………5 
Other(Specify)_________________96 
DK………………………………….88 
NA………………………………….99 
 
U 
4.5 
How serious was the illness/injury? Very serious………….………….…..1 
Serious……………………….….…..2 
Not serious………….…….……..…..3 
Other(Specify)_________________96 
DK…………………………………88 
NA…………………………………99 
 
U 
4.6 
Did (NAME) or household have to pay for 
the treatment in cash (that is out-of-
pocket)? 
Yes…………………………………..1 
No………...…………………………2 
DK…………………………………..88 
NA…………………………………..99 
If 1 skip  
 U 4.8 
U 
4.7 
Why did (NAME) or the household not 
have to pay for treatment at this place? (If 
4.6 is 2) 
Service was offered free of charge….1 
Covered by health insurance………..2 
Exempted due to inability to pay……3 
Other (specify)__________________96 
DK…………………………………..88 
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NA…………………………………..99 
U 
4.8 
How much did (NAME) or the household 
pay for this visit in cash (that is out-of-
pocket)? 
(record in old cedis) 
 
Amount in ¢_________________ 
DK………………………………8888 
NA………………………………9999 
 
U 
4.9 
Did (NAME) or household  have to make 
any unofficial payment to the service 
provider (that is under-the-table)? 
 
Yes…………………………………..1 
No………...…………………………2 
DK…………………………………..88 
NA…………………………………..99 
 
If 2 or 
88 skip 
to 
U 4.11 
 
U 
4.10 
How much did you pay (under-the-table 
payment)? 
 
 
Amount in ¢___________________ 
DK………………………………8888 
NA………………………………9999 
 
U 
4.11 
How long did it take (NAME) to travel 
from home to this facility/provider?  
 
TIME IN  MINUTES 
 
Time in minutes__________________ 
DK………………………………8888 
NA………………………………9999 
 
U 
4.12 
Did (NAME) or household have to pay 
anything for transport to this facility/ 
provider? 
 
Yes…………………………………..1 
No………...…………………………2 
DK…………………………………..88 
NA…………………………………..99 
If 2 skip 
to U 
4.14 
 U 
4.13 
How much did (NAME) or household pay 
for transport to this facility? (record in old 
cedis) 
 
Amount in ¢_____________________ 
DK………………………………8888 
NA………………………………9999 
 
 
U 
4.14 
Were you or (NAME) accompanied by 
somebody or persons to the health facility? 
Yes………………………………….1 
No…………………………………..2 
 
If 2 skip 
to 4.17 
U 
4.15 
How much did the person(s) who 
accompanied you pay for transport? 
 
Amount in ¢_____________________ 
DK………………………………8888 
NA………………………………9999 
 
U 
4.16 
What would the lead (If more than one 
person accompanied) person have used the 
time for, if s/he/they had not accompanied 
you or NAME to the health facility (main 
used)? 
 
 
 
On the farm………………………..……..1 
Trading ………………………………..…2 
Resting…………………………………...3  
At the office (government)………………4 
DK………………………………………88 
Other (Specify)………………………….96 
NA……………………………………….99 
 
 
 
 PAYMENT FOR SERVICES AT FORMAL HEALTH  FACILITY (indicate if you 
receive this service and how much you paid) 
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Services 
 
U 4.17 
During this 
Visit/inpatient 
admission; 
did 
(Name)/you 
receive any of 
the following 
services? 
Yes….….1 
No………2 
DK….....88 
NA...…..99 
U 4.18 
Were you 
asked to 
pay for the 
service? 
 
(If 2 skip to 
U 4.21)  
    
 
Yes……..1 
No……...2 
DK…….88 
NA …....99 
U 4.19 
How much 
did you pay 
for the 
service? 
(record in 
old cedis) 
 
 
 
Amount in ¢ 
DK…...8888 
NA …..9999 
U 4.20  
(For insured 
clients only) 
 
Why did you pay 
for the service? 
 
Disease not 
covered by 
HI……….1 
Drugs not covered 
by HI……….…2 
Forgot to take my 
card…….3 
Lost the HI 
card………..4 
 Other 
(specify)…..96 
NA………..99 
(If provided skip 
to U4.22) 
U 4.21 
Why did you 
not pay for 
this service? 
 
Exempted…1 
Covered by 
HI…………2 
Could not 
afford..........3 
Covered by 
employer….4 
Other 
(specify) _ 96 
NA ….......99 
 
Consultation 
 
     
 
        
¢__________ 
        
 
      
 
     
 
Laboratory 
 
      
 
        
¢_________ 
 
              
X-ray                
¢__________ 
                        
Scan  
     
 
      
  
¢________ 
        
        
  
       
Other 
(specify) 
    
  
      
       
 
¢__________ 
       
       
    
  
 DRUGS (now lets talk about drugs)  
U 
4.22 
Did you get prescription for drugs? Yes…………………………………..1 
No………...…………………………2 
If 2 skip 
to U 
4.30 
U 
4.23 
Did you receive all the prescribed drugs from this 
facility? 
Yes, all drugs………………………...1 
Some drugs………………………….2 
None of the drugs…………………...3 
Other (specify)_________________96 
DK…………………………………..88 
NA…………………………………..99 
If 3 skip 
to U 
4.28 
U 
4.24 
Did you have to pay for the prescribed drugs 
received? 
Yes…………………………………..1 
No………...…………………………2 
If 2 skip 
to U 
4.26 
U 
4.25 
How much did you pay for the drugs you received? 
(record in old cedis) 
Amount in ¢___________________ 
DK………………………………8888 
NA………………………………9999 
If 
amount 
is given 
skip to 
U 4.27 
U 
4.26 
Why did you not pay for the drugs you received? 
 
( if person did not pay (pays nothing) i.e. 00 
Exempted ……………………………1 
Covered by HI scheme………………2 
Could not afford the drugs…………..3 
Covered by employer………………..4 
Other (Specify)………………………96 
NA…………………………………...99 
 
U How satisfied were you that these drugs helped to Very satisfied……….……………….1  
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4.27 improve your health? 
 
Satisfied…………….……………….2 
Somewhat satisfied………………….3 
Dissatisfied………….………………4 
Very dissatisfied…….………………5 
DK……………………….………….88 
NA…………………………………..99 
U 
4.28 
If you did not get all drugs from the health facility, 
did you purchase the rest of your drugs elsewhere? 
Yes…………………………………..1 
No………...…………………………2 
NA…………………………………..99 
If 2 skip 
to U 
4.30 
U 
4.29 
How much did you pay for the drugs elsewhere? 
(record in old cedis) 
Amount in ¢_____________________ 
DK………………………………8888 
NA………………………………9999 
 
U 
4.30 
Did you pay for transport to buy drugs 
elsewhere? 
Yes…………………………………..1 
No……………………………………2 
DK…………………………………..88 
NA…………………………………..99 
If 2 skip 
to U 
4.32 
U 
4.31 
How much did you pay for transport to get to this 
place?   (record in old cedis) 
 
Amount in ¢____________________ 
DK………………………………8888 
NA………………………………9999 
 
U 
4.32 
Did you or (NAME) have to pay for supplies (i.e. 
gauze, syringe, plaster, disinfectants, etc) either in 
the facility or outside the facility? 
Yes…………………………………...1 
No…………………………………….2 
DK……………………………………88 
NA……………………………………99 
If 2 skip 
to U4.34 
U 
4.33 
How much did you or (Name) pay for the supplies?  
Amount in ¢_____________________ 
DK………………………………8888 
NA………………………………9999 
 
 
U 
4.34 
Did you have to pay for special food which 
contributes to the treatment of (NAME) illness? 
Yes…………………………………..1 
No………...…………………………2 
DK…………………………………..88 
NA…………………………………..99 
If 2 or 
88 skip 
to  U 
4.36 
U 
4.35 
If 4.34, is 1, how much did you spend on this 
special food for (NAME) illness? 
(record in old cedis) 
 
Amount in ¢_____________________ 
DK…………………………………8888 
NA…………………………………9999 
 
 
U 
4.36 
Is there any other expenditure related to the 
illness/injury of (NAME) that you have incurred? 
 
Yes…………………………………..1 
No………...…………………………2 
DK…………………………………..88 
NA…………………………………..99 
If 2 or 
88 skip 
to U 
4.38 
U 
4.37 
If 4.36, is 1, how much was this? 
(record in old cedis) 
 
Amount in ¢___________________ 
DK…………………………………8888 
NA…………………………………9999 
 
 
 
 
 REFERRALS  
U 4.38 Were you referred to go to 
another facility? 
Yes…………………………………..1 
No………...…………………………2 
NA…………………………………..99 
If 2 skip to 
U 4.46 
U 4.39 Did you go to the referral point? Yes…………………………………..1 If 2 skip to 
U 4.43 
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No………...…………………………2 
NA…………………………………..99 
U 4.40 Did you pay at the point of 
referral for treatment? 
Yes…………………………………..1 
No…………………………………...2 
NA…………………………………..99 
If 2 skip to 
U 4.42 
U 4.41 How much did you have to pay at 
this referral point? 
Amount in ¢_____________________ 
DK………………………………8888 
NA………………………………9999 
If amount 
provided 
skip to 
U4.44 
U 4.42 Why did you not pay at the point 
of referral? 
Service was offered free of charge….1 
Covered by health insurance………..2 
Exempted due to inability to pay……3 
Other (specify)__________________96 
DK…………………………………..88 
NA…………………………………..99 
 
U 4.43 What was the reason for not 
going to the referral point? 
Do not have money…………………1 
Distance too far……………………..2 
Condition became better…………….3 
Do not like the referred place……….4 
Other  (specify)________________ 96 
NA…………………………………99 
 
U 4.44 Did you and your household have 
enough cash in the home to pay 
your bill? 
 
Yes…………………………………..1 
No…………………………………...2 
NA…………………………………..99 
If 1 skip to 
U 4.46 
U 4.45 If U 4.44 is 2, how did you and 
your household get money to pay 
for this (main source)? 
Sold agricultural produce…………...1 
Sold assets(household tools)………..2 
Took money from savings (Banks)…3 
Took money from Susu collector......4 
Borrowed from friend or relative…...5 
Borrowed from money lender………6 
Received a gift……………………...7 
Paid bill in instalments……………...8 
Bill left unpaid……………………...9 
Other (specify)_________________96 
NA…………………………………99 
 
 QUALITY OF CARE   
U 4.46 How do you rank the attitude of 
health providers? 
 
Very  good……………………..…….1 
Good …………………………………2 
Satisfactory…………………………..3 
Fair………………………..……….....4 
Poor………………………………….5 
Other (Specify)________________ 96 
DK………………………………….88 
NA…………………………………99 
 
U 4.47 How satisfied were you with the 
cleanliness at the health facility? 
Very satisfied……….……………….1 
Satisfied…………….……………….2 
Somewhat satisfied………………….3 
Dissatisfied………….………………4 
Very dissatisfied…….………………5 
DK……………………….………….88 
NA…………………………………..99 
 
U 4.48 How satisfied were you that you 
were treated with respect and 
dignity by the facility staff? 
Very satisfied……….……………….1 
Satisfied…………….……………….2 
Somewhat satisfied………………….3 
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Dissatisfied………….………………4 
Very dissatisfied…….………………5 
DK……………………….………….88 
NA…………………………………..99 
U 4.49 Will you visit the health facility 
again? 
Yes…………………………………..1 
No………...…………………………2 
NA…………………………………..99 
If  2 skip to 
U 4.51 
U 4.50 If U 4.49 is 1, what will be the 
main reason that will make you 
visit this facility again? 
Good attitude of health staff…………1 
Cleanliness of the facility……………2 
Prompt care/treatment………….…….3 
Easy access to doctor/nurse………….4 
Other (specify)__________________96 
NA……………………………..____99 
If ANY skip 
to  
D 3.48 
U 4.51 If 4.49 is 2, what is the main 
reason why you will not visit this 
facility again? 
Staff were rude/poor manner……….......1 
Waiting time too long…………………..2 
Drugs were not available……………….3 
Services were too expensive……………4 
Lack of privacy…………………………5 
Staff did not explain treatment………….6 
Facility was not clean…………………...7 
Did not get to see a Doctor……………...8 
No injection given……………………....9 
Other (specify)____________________96 
NA……………………………………...99 
 
U 4.52 How satisfied were you with the 
overall quality of care received 
there? 
Very satisfied……….……………….1 
Satisfied…………….……………….2 
Somewhat satisfied………………….3 
Dissatisfied………….………………4 
Very dissatisfied…….………………5 
DK……………………….………….88 
NA…………………………………..99 
If 4.52 is 1 
or 2 END 
Interview 
U 4.53 Why were you not fully satisfied 
with the care provided?  (Ask if 
4.52 is 3, 4. or 5) 
 
MULTIPLE RESPONSES 
ALLOWED 
 
Staff were rude/poor manner……….......1 
Waiting time too long…………………..2 
Drugs were not available……………….3 
Services were too expensive……………4 
Lack of privacy…………………………5 
Staff did not explain treatment………….6 
Facility was not clean…………………...7 
Did not get to see a Doctor……………...8 
No injection given……………………....9 
Other (specify)____________________96 
NA……………………………………...99 
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MODULE 2 
 
INDIVIDUAL (HOSPITALISED) LEVEL QUESTIONNAIRE 2008 
STRATEGIES FOR HEALTH INSURANCE FOR EQUITY IN LESS 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (SHIELD)  
Health Care Financing and Benefit incidence study in Ghana 
 
SECTION 1 
 
IDENTIFICATION 
 
P1.1 FORM NUMBER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
P1.2 RESPONDENT (THE INDIVIDUAL (Person Hospitalised or 
Admitted ) =1,  CARETAKER=2) 
         1              2 
P1.3 HOUSEHOLD LOCATION RURAL/URBAN  RURAL...1 URBAN...…….2 
P1.4 NAME COMMUNITY/VILLAGE/TOWN 
P1.5 REGION UPPER WEST…………………………1 
NORTHERN………………………….. 2 
BRONG AHAFO………………………3 
ASHANTI………………………………4 
GREATER ACCRA……………………5 
P1.6 DISTRICT LAWRA………………………………..1 
WEST GONJA….……………………...2 
BEREKUM…………………………….3 
ATWIMA NWABIAGYA.…….……....4 
KPESHIE……………………………....5 
DANGME WEST….…………………..6 
P1.7 DATE OF INTERVIEW (DD/MM/YY)       
P1.8 ENUMERATOR’S NAME/ INITIALS   
P1.9 RESULT OF INTERVIEW,   COMPLETE  1 
OTHER(SPECIFY)______________________________ 2 
P1.10 
 
EDITED BY SUPERVISOR (NAME ) 
NAME_____________________________DATE _____/_____/______ U
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SECTION 2 
 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENT 
 
No Questions  Coding category  SKIP 
P 
2.1 
Which code in H2.1 is the 
person hospitalised/admitted? 
                     
P 
2.2 
What is the ethnic background 
of the person 
hospitalised/admitted? 
Dagare………………………………………1 
Wala...………….….......................................2 
Akan………………………...........................3 
Ga……………………………………………4 
Dangme………………......................……….5 
Dagomba.........................................................6 
Gonja...............................................................7 
Ewes………………………………………….8 
Mamprusis……………………………………9 
Other(specify)_________________________96 
 
 
P 
2.3 
What is the current marital 
status of the person 
hospitalised/admitted? 
Married…………………….…………….……1 
Never married…… ……………………..….…2 
Divorced………………………………..…..…3 
Widowed…………………………….….….…4 
Separated……… ……………………..………5 
Child………………………………………….6 
Other (specify)________________________ 96 
 
 
P 
2.4 
What is the religion of the 
person hospitalised/admitted? 
Traditional………………………..….………..1 
Christian………………………………………2 
Muslim………………………………..………3 
Other (specify)________________________96 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 3 
 
HOSPITALISATION WITHIN THE PAST ONE YEAR 
 
No Questions Coding category Skip 
P 
3.1 
For what main sickness were you 
hospitalized within the past one year?  
 
 
Malaria…...……...………........…......1 
ARI………....……………….............2 
Diarrhoea...…………………….........3 
Skin disease....…….......…....….…....4 
Other (specify)_________________96 
DK…..……………………………..88 
 
P 
3.2 
In which health facility were you 
hospitalized for (NAME OF 
AILMENT) within the past one year? 
Regional Hospital……………...……1 
District Hospital……………..….......2 
Health Centre………………..……...3 
Public Clinic………………………...4 
Private clinic………………………...5 
CHPS compound……………………6 
DK…..……………………………..88 
Other (specify).....………………….96 
 
P 
3.3 
In the past year, that is since [July 
2007) how many different times has 
name/you been admitted to a 
hospital/clinic for one night or more?   
 
Write the number of admissions  
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P 
3.4 I would like to ask some questions 
about the most recent stay in 
hospital/clinic for one night or more. 
Which hospital/clinic was … 
admitted to? 
 
Name of hospital/clinic here.  
P 
3.5 
Who took the decision? Self …………………………………1 
Spouse. ……………….……….……2 
Household head……………….…….3 
Relative/friends/Neighbours….……..4 
Referral health worker…………........5 
Other(Specify)_________________96 
DK…………………………………88 
 
 
P 
3.6 
Did you have to pay transport to this 
facility? 
Yes………………………………...1 
No………...……………………….2 
DK………………………………...88 
If 2 or 
88 
skip to 
3.8 
P 
3.7 
If 3.6 is 1, how much did you pay for 
transport to this facility?  
 
Amount in ¢________________ 
DK…………………………….8888 
NA…………………………….9999 
 
P 
3.8 
How many nights were you admitted?  
                     
 
 
P 
3.9 
Were you detained after discharge 
because you were unable to pay for 
services rendered?   
 
Yes………….…………….………...1  
No………….……………….………2 
 
If 2 
skip to 
3.11 
P 
3.1
0 
 
How many nights were you detained 
after discharge because you were 
unable to pay for services rendered? 
   
 
  
                  
                      
 
 
 
 PAYMENT FOR SERVICES AT FORMAL HEALTH  FACILITY (indicate if you 
receive this service and how much you paid) 
 
  
 
Services 
 
P 3.11 
 
During 
this 
visit/inpa
tient 
admissio
n, did 
(NAME) 
/you 
receive 
any of 
the 
followin
g 
services? 
 
P 
3.12 
 
Were 
you 
asked 
to 
pay 
for 
the 
servic
e? 
 
 
Yes
…….
1 
P 3.13 
 
How much 
did you pay 
for the 
service? 
 
(record in 
old cedis) 
Amount in 
¢………. 
 
DK……...88 
NA……...99 
 
P 3.14 
 
(For insured 
clients only) 
 
Why did you pay 
for the service? 
Disease not 
covered by 
HI…………....1 
Drugs not 
covered by 
HI………….…2 
Forgot to take my 
card………..……
.3 
 Other 
P 3.15 
 
Why 
did you 
not pay 
for this 
service
? 
 
 
Exempt
ed…..1 
Covere
d by 
HI……
…….2 
Could 
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Yes…….
1 
No……..
2 
DK……
88 
If  2 go 
to next 
No…
…..2         
DK
……
88 
 
(If 2 
skip 
to 
P 
3.15) 
(specify)………..
96 
NA……………..
99 
 
(If provided skip 
to P 3.16) 
not 
afford
……...3 
Other_
_____9
6 
NA…
……..9
9 
Consultation   
      
 
 
        
 
  
¢________ 
 
¢________ 
  
      
 
 
Laboratory 
 
 
       
 
 
        
 
  
¢________ 
 
¢________ 
      
      
 
X-ray  
       
 
 
        
 
  
¢________ 
 
¢________ 
  
      
 
 
Scan  
       
 
 
        
 
  
¢________ 
 
¢________ 
  
      
 
 
Hospitalisation/admission  
       
 
 
        
 
  
¢________ 
 
¢________ 
 
      
 
 
Other (specify)  
        
 
      
        
 
  
¢________ 
 
¢________ 
 
      
 
 
 DRUGS (now lets talk about drugs) 
 
 
P 
3.1
6 
Did you get prescription for drugs? Yes………………………………...1 
No………...……………………….2 
If 2 
skip to 
3.22   
P 
3.1
7 
Did you receive all the prescribed drugs 
from this facility? 
Yes all drugs………………………1 
Some drugs………………………..2 
None of the drugs…………………3 
Other (specify)_______________96 
NA…….…………………………99 
If 2 or 
3 skip 
to 
3.20 
    
P 
3.1
8 
How much did you pay for the drugs you 
received? 
 (record in old cedis) 
 
Amount in ¢________________ 
DK…………………………….8888 
NA…………………………….9999 
 
P 
3.1
9 
How satisfied were you that these drugs 
helped to improve your health? 
Very satisfied……….……………….1 
Satisfied…………….……………….2 
Somewhat satisfied………………….3 
Dissatisfied………….………………4 
Very dissatisfied…….………………5 
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DK……………………….………….88 
NA…………………………………..99 
P 
3.2
0 
If you did not get all drugs from the health 
facility, did you purchase the rest of your 
drugs elsewhere? 
Yes………………………………...1 
No………...……………………….2 
NA………………………………..99 
If 2 
skip to 
3.24 
P 
3.2
1 
How much did you pay for the drugs 
elsewhere? 
(record in old cedis) 
 
Amount in ¢________________ 
DK…………………………….8888 
NA…………………………….9999 
 
P 
3.2
2 
Did you pay for transport to go elsewhere 
for the drugs? 
Yes………………………………...1 
No………...……………………….2 
If 2 
skip to 
3.24 
P 
3.2
3 
How much did you pay for transport to 
get to this place? 
(record in old cedis) 
 
Amount in ¢________________ 
DK…………………………….8888 
NA…………………………….9999 
 
P 
3.2
4 
Were you or (Name) accompanied by 
somebody to the health facility? 
Yes…………………………………..1 
No………...…………………………2 
If 2 
skip  
3.27 
P 
3.2
5 
How much did the person who 
accompanied you pay for transport? 
 
Amount in ¢________________ 
DK…………………………….8888 
NA…………………………….9999 
 
P 
3.2
6 
What would the person have used the time 
for, if s/he had not accompanied you to the 
health facility? 
On the farm………………..………....1 
Trading ………………………………2 
Resting……………………………… 3  
At the office (government)…………..4 
Other (Specify)……………….…….96 
DK………………………………….88 
NA………………………………….99 
 
P 
3.2
7 
Did you have to pay for special food 
which contributes to the treatment of 
(NAME) illness? 
Yes………………………………...1 
No………...……………………….2 
NA……………………………….99 
If 2 
skip to 
3.29 
P 
3.2
8 
How much did you spend on these for 
(NAME) illness? 
(record in old cedis) 
 
Amount in ¢________________ 
Covered by Health Insurance……1 
DK…………………………….8888 
NA…………………………….9999 
 
P 
3.2
9 
Is there any other expenditure related to 
the illness of (NAME) that you have 
incurred? 
 
Yes………………………………..1 
No………...………………………2 
DK………………………………88 
NA………………………………99 
If 2 
skip to 
3.31 
 
P 
3.3
0 
How much was this? 
(record in old cedis) 
 
Amount in ¢________________ 
DK…………………………….8888 
NA…………………………….9999 
 
 
 SOURCE OF MONEY TO PAY BILLS  
P 
3. 
31 
Did you and your household have enough 
cash in the home to pay your bill? 
 
Yes…………………………………..1 
No…………………………………...2 
NA…………………………………..99 
 
If 1 
skip to 
P 3.33 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
 307 
P 
3.3
2 
If P 3.31 is 2, how did you and your 
household get money to pay for this (main 
source)? 
Sold agricultural produce…………...1 
Sold assets(household tools)………..2 
Took money from savings (Banks)…3 
Took money from Susu collector......4 
Borrowed from friend or relative…...5 
Borrowed from money lender………6 
Received a gift……………………...7 
Paid bill in instalments……………...8 
Bill left unpaid……………………...9 
Other (specify)_________________96 
NA…………………………………99 
 
 
 QUALITY  OF SERVICE AT FACILITY  
P 
3.3
3 
What was your main reason for 
choosing this health facility?  
Nearness……………….………….1 
Quick service…………..……..…..2 
Less medical bill………..……..….3 
Less waiting time………..….…….4 
Good quality service………..…….5 
Emergency/was taken there………….6 
Do not have to pay……………………7 
Told to go there by doctor/nurse……...8 
Told to go there by DHIS…………..9 
Know care available will help me get 
better………………………………...10 
Know I will be treated respectfully…11 
Other(specify)__________________96 
 
Now I want to ask you about hospital services.  Please tell me how satisfied you are with the following aspects 
of the hospital service.  Rate your satisfaction using a five point scale where one is very satisfied and five is 
very dissatisfied. 
P 
3.3
4 
How satisfied are you with services 
given by   this facility? 
 
Very satisfied……….……………….1 
Satisfied…………….……………….2 
Somewhat satisfied………………….3 
Dissatisfied………….………………4 
Very dissatisfied…….………………5 
DK……………………….………….88 
 
 
P 
3.3
5 
How satisfied were you with the 
cleanliness at the health facility? 
Very satisfied……….……………….1 
Satisfied…………….……………….2 
Somewhat satisfied………………….3 
Dissatisfied………….………………4 
Very dissatisfied…….………………5 
DK……………………….………….88 
 
 
P 
3.3
6 
How satisfied were you that you were 
treated with respect and dignity by 
the facility staff? 
Very satisfied……….……………….1 
Satisfied…………….……………….2 
Somewhat satisfied………………….3 
Dissatisfied………….………………4 
Very dissatisfied…….………………5 
DK……………………….………….88 
 
 
P 
3.3
7 
How do you rank the attitude of health 
providers? 
Very satisfied……….……………….1 
Satisfied…………….……………….2 
Somewhat satisfied………………….3 
Dissatisfied………….………………4 
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Very dissatisfied…….………………5 
DK……………………….………….88 
 
P 
3.3
8 
How satisfied were you that you 
received medical attention as soon as 
possible, i.e. without having to wait 
unnecessarily? 
Very satisfied……….……………….1 
Satisfied…………….……………….2 
Somewhat satisfied………………….3 
Dissatisfied………….………………4 
Very dissatisfied…….………………5 
DK……………………….………….88 
 
 
P 
3.3
9 
How satisfied were you that these drugs 
helped to improve your health? 
Very satisfied……….……………….1 
Satisfied…………….……………….2 
Somewhat satisfied………………….3 
Dissatisfied………….………………4 
Very dissatisfied…….………………5 
DK……………………….………….88 
 
 
P 
3.4
0 
Would you visit this health facility 
again for hospitalization? 
Yes ……………………………….1 
 No………………………….....….2 
 If 1 
skip 
to 
3.42   
P 
3.4
1 
What is the main reason why you will not 
visit this facility again?  
Staff were rude/poor manner…….......1 
Waiting time too long………………..2 
Drugs were not available…………….3 
Services were too expensive…………4 
Lack of privacy………………………5 
Staff did not explain treatment……….6 
Facility was not clean………………...7 
Did not get to see a Doctor…………...8 
No injection given…………………....9 
Other (specify)__________________96 
NA…………………………………...99 
 
 
P 
3.4
2 
How satisfied were you with the overall 
quality of care received there? 
Very satisfied……….……………….1 
Satisfied…………….……………….2 
Somewhat satisfied………………….3 
Dissatisfied………….………………4 
Very dissatisfied…….………………5 
DK……………………….………….88 
 
 
P 
3.4
3 
Why were you not fully satisfied with the 
care provided?  (Ask if 3.42 is 3, 4. or 5) 
 
MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED 
 
Staff were rude/poor manner………...1 
Waiting time too long……………….2 
Drugs were not available……………3 
Services were too expensive………..4 
Lack of privacy……………………..5 
Staff did not explain treatment………6 
Facility was not clean……………….7 
Did not get to see a Doctor……….....8 
No injection given…………………...9 
Other (specify)__________________96 
NA…………………………………..99 
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MODULE 3 
INDIVIDUAL (PREGNANCY/DELIVERY) LEVEL QUESTIONNAIRE 2008 
STRATEGIES FOR HEALTH INSURANCE FOR EQUITY IN LESS DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES (SHIELD)  
Health Care Financing and Benefit incidence study in Ghana 
 
SECTION 1: IDENTIFICATION 
 
D 1.1 FORM NUMBER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
D 1.2 RESPONDENT (PREGNANT ……….1,  DELIVERED….2)       1           2 
D 1.3 HOUSEHOLD LOCATION RURAL/URBAN  RURAL...1 URBAN...…….2 
D 1.4 NAME COMMUNITY/VILLAGE/TOWN 
D 1.5 REGION UPPER WEST…………………………1 
NORTHERN………………………….. 2 
BRONG AHAFO………………………3 
ASHANTI………………………………4 
GREATER ACCRA……………………5 
D 1.6 DISTRICT LAWRA………………………………..1 
WEST GONJA….………………………2 
BEREKUM……………………………..3 
ATWIMA NWABIAGYA.…….……....4 
KPESHIE……………………………....5 
DANGME WEST….…………………..6 
D 1.7 DATE OF INTERVIEW (DD/MM/YY)       
D 1.8 ENUMERATOR’S NAME/ INITIALS   
D 1.9 RESULT OF INTERVIEW,   COMPLETE  1 
OTHER(SPECIFY)______________________________ 2 
D 1.10 
 
EDITED BY SUPERVISOR (NAME) 
NAME_____________________________DATE _____/_____/______ 
SECTION 2 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENT 
 
No Questions  Coding category  SKIP 
D 2.1 Which code in H2.1 is the 
respondent (person pregnant 
or recently delivered)? 
                     
D 2.2 What is the ethnic background 
of person pregnant or recently 
delivered? 
Dagare………………………………………1 
Wala...………….….......................................2 
Akan………………………...........................3 
Ga……………………………………………4 
Dangme………………......................……….5 
Dagomba.........................................................6 
Gonja...............................................................7 
Ewes………………………………………….8 
Mamprusis……………………………………9 
Other(specify)_________________________96 
 
 
D 2.3 What is the current marital 
status of person pregnant or 
recently delivered? 
Married…………………….…………….……1 
Never married…… ……………………..….…2 
Divorced………………………………..…..…3 
Widowed…………………………….….….…4 
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Separated……… ……………………..………5 
Other (specify)________________________ 96 
D 2.4 What is the religion of person 
pregnant or recently 
delivered? 
Traditional………………………..….………..1 
Christian………………………………………2 
Muslim………………………………..………3 
Other (specify)________________________96 
 
 
 
SECTION 3 
DELIVERY WITHIN THE PAST ONE YEAR AND CURRENTLY PREGNANT 
 
No Questions Coding category Codes/skip 
D 3.1 How many children have you ever 
given birth to (both dead and alive; 
excluding miscarriages and 
stillbirths)? 
Number of children  
  
 
If 00 skip to 
D3.4 
D 3.2 How many of your children are 
alive? 
Children alive 
  
 
 
D 3.3 How old is your most recent child? 
 
DK ...………………..……...88 
NA ...……………………….99 
Days   
Weeks   
Months   
Years   
 
D 3.4 Did/Do you have complications with 
this pregnancy? 
Yes ………………………….1 
 No……………………….….2 
                                                                                                                         
D 3.5 How old is this pregnancy (for 
pregnant women only)? 
 NA………………………..99 
 
WEEKS   
MONTHS   
 
 ANC SERVICES  
D 3.6 Did/do you receive ANC during 
the/this pregnancy? 
 Yes ………………...……….1 
 No…………………....……..2 
If 1 skip to  
     D 3.8 
D 3.7 If no, why did/are you not attend(ing) 
ANC? 
Long distance to  facility…....1 
Attitude of health providers…2 
No money…………………...3 
Not Sick……………………..4 
Not facing complications……5 
Other(Specify)___________96 
DK…………….……….......88 
NA………………………….99 
 
 
 
  IF ANY skip  
to  
   D 3.27  
     
D 3.8 How old was/is the pregnancy when 
you began attending ANC? 
DK…………………………….88 
NA ……………………………99 
DAYS   
WEEKS   
MONTHS   
 
D 3.9 How many ANC visits did you make 
before delivery/How many ANC 
visits have you made so far? 
 
Number of visits 
  
NA………………………….99 
 
 
 
 
D 3.10 Where did/do you obtain the ANC Regional Gov’t Hosp………….1  
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services? District Hosp………………......2 
Health Centre………………….3 
Private clinic………………......4 
Private hospital……………......5 
Private maternity home……......6 
CHPS Compound……………...7 
At home……………….…........8 
Other (Specify)____________96 
D 3.11 What is/was your main reason for 
choosing this health facility for your 
ANC services? 
Nearness………..……………1 
Quick service………………..2 
Less medical bill…………….3 
Less waiting time……………4 
Quality service………………5 
No  other option……………..6 
Other(Specify)___________96 
NA………………………….99 
 
D 3.12 Who did/do you primarily consult for 
ANC? 
A doctor……………..………1 
A nurse…………………........2 
A midwife…………………...3 
A trained TBA………………4 
An Untrained TBA………….5 
Other(Specify)___________96 
DK……….………….……..88 
NA…………………………99 
 
  
D 3.13 Are/Were you always physically 
examined by the person who 
attended to you on each visit? 
Yes…………………………..1 
No…………………………....2 
NA…………………………..99 
 
  
 PAYMENT FOR ANC SERVICE 
 
 
D 3.14 Are/Were you asked to pay for this 
ANC service? 
Yes…………………………..1 
No……………………………2 
NA…………………………..99 
 
 If 2 skip to  
   D 3.17 
 
D 3.15 How much did you pay for ANC 
service 
 
Amount in ¢________________ 
NA………………………9999 
DK………………………8888 
 
D 3.16 
 
 From which source did you get 
money to settle your bill? 
Sold agricultural produce………...1 
Sold assets(household tools)……..2 
Took money from savings (Banks)3 
Took money from Susu collector...4 
Borrowed from friend or relative...5 
Borrowed from money lender……6 
Received a gift…………………...7 
Paid bill in instalments…………...8 
Bill left unpaid…………………...9 
Other (specify)_______________96 
NA………………………………99 
  
 
 
If ANY skip 
to D 3.18 
D 3.17 Why were you not asked to pay for 
ANC? 
ANC is free………………….1 
Covered by NHIS……………2 
Exempted due inability to pay.3 
Other(Specify)___________96 
NA…………………………99 
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 TRANSPORTATION FOR ANC SERVICE 
 
 
D 3.18 How far is the distance from your 
home to the health facility where you 
obtain/obtained ANC? 
Less than 1km……….……...1 
1 to less than 3 km………......2 
3 km………………………....3 
More than 3km…….………...4 
Other (Specify)__________ 96 
DK…………………..……...88 
NA………………………….99 
  
D 3.19 Do/Did you have to pay for 
transportation on each ANC visit? 
Yes…………………………..1  
No……………….…………..2 
NA………………………….99 
 If 2 skip to             
D 3.22  
D 3.20 If yes, how much did/do you have to 
pay on each visit as transport 
expenses? 
 
Amount in ¢_________________ 
DK…………………………8888 
NA…………………………9999 
 
 
D 3.21 Is transportation cost a hindrance to 
you seeking ANC? 
Yes…………………………….1  
No……………………………..2 
NA……………………………99 
 
 
 DRUGS 
 
 
D 3.22 Are/Were some drugs prescribed for 
you on each visit? 
Yes ………….….………..……1 
 No…………….….…………...2 
NA……………………………99 
 
If 2 skip to 
      D 3.26 
D 3.23 How much did you pay in total for 
drugs provided at this  facility (if yes 
in D3.22 but had no drugs at 
facility record 00 for amount paid) 
 
Amount in ¢_________________ 
DK………………………..8888 
NA………………………..9999 
 
 
D 3.24 Did/Do you have to buy drugs outside 
this facility in addition to what was 
obtained from the health facility? 
Yes ………….….….…….……1 
No…………….….…….……...2 
NA…………………………….99 
If 2 skip to 
      D 3.26 
D 3.25 How much did you pay in total for 
drugs outside this facility for ANC? 
 
Amount in ¢_________________ 
DK………………………..8888 
NA………………………..9999 
 
 
 DELIVERY (Do not ask women  who are currently pregnant) 
 
 
D 3.26 Where did you go to give birth to 
your child? 
Regional Gov’t Hosp………….1 
District Hosp………………......2 
Health Centre………………….3 
Private clinic………………......4 
Private hospital……………......5 
Private maternity home……......6 
CHPS Compound……………...7 
At home……………….…........8 
Other (Specify)____________96 
NA…………………………….99 
 
If 8 skip to        
      D  3.28 
D 3.27 If at the health facility, who assisted 
you to deliver? 
A medical doctor.………….......1 
A nurse……….………………..2 
A midwife…………………......3 
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A community health nurse…….4 
A health professional….………5 
Other(Specify)____________ 96 
DK…….……………………...88 
NA…………………………….99 
D 3.28 Were there complications during 
delivery? 
Yes………..…………………...1  
 No……..…………….………. .2 
 
D 3.29 Was your baby delivered normally or 
surgically (by caesarean delivery)? 
Normally…………..………......1 
Surgical……………………......2 
Other (Specify)____________ 96 
NA……………………………99 
 
 PAYMENT FOR DELIVERY (Do not ask women  who are currently 
pregnant) 
 
 
D 3.30 Did you have to pay for the delivery 
services?  
Yes………..…………………...1  
No……..…………….………..2 
NA…………………………….99 
If  2 skip to  
D 3.32 
D 3.31 How much did you and your family 
pay for the delivery? (record in old 
cedis) 
 
Amount in ¢________________ 
DK……………………….. 8888 
NA……………………….. 9999 
 
D 3.32 Why did you and your family not 
pay for the delivery services? (ask if 
3.30 is No=2) 
Delivery is free………………...1 
Delivered by a relative/friend….2 
Covered by the NHIS………….3 
Paid by a Philanthropist……….4 
Other (specify)_____________96 
NA……………………………99 
 
D 3.33 Did you have to make any under-
the-table payment for the delivery at 
the facility?  
Yes………..…………………...1  
No……..…………….………..2 
DK……………………………88 
NA……………………………99 
If  2 or 88 
skip to       D 
3.35 
D 3.34 How much was this under-the-table 
payment? 
(record in old cedis) 
 
Amount in ¢________________ 
DK……………………….. 8888 
NA……………………….. 9999 
 
D 3.35 Did you have to make any in-kind 
payment for the delivery (applicable 
to all places of birth D 3.26)? 
Yes………..…………………...1  
No……..…………….………..2 
DK……………………………88 
NA……………………………99 
If 2 or 88 skip 
to D 3.37 
D 3.36 What was the value of the in-kind 
payment 
 
Amount in ¢________________ 
DK……………………….. 8888 
NA……………………….. 9999 
 
D 3.37  From which source did you and your 
family get money to pay these bills? 
(Only ask if 3.30 is Yes=1 or 3.33 is 
Yes=1 or 3.35 is Yes=1) 
 
MULTIPLE RESPONSES 
ALLOWED 
Sold agricultural produce………...1 
Sold assets(household tools)……..2 
Took money from savings (Banks)3 
Took money from Susu collector...4 
Borrowed from friend or relative…5 
Borrowed from money lender……6 
Received a gift…………………...7 
Paid bill in instalments…………...8 
Bill left unpaid…………………...9 
Other (specify)_______________96 
NA……………………………….99 
 
 
 
If ANY skip 
to D 3.36 
 POSTNATAL SERVICE   
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(Do not ask mothers who are pregnant or whose babies are less than six 
weeks) 
 
D 3.38 After delivery, did you go back to the 
facility or any other facility at six 
weeks for Postnatal care?  
Yes………..……………….......1  
 No……..……………………...2 
 NA……………………………99 
If  1 skip to D 
3.40 
D 3.39 Why did you not go back to the 
facility or any other facility for 
postnatal care? 
Staff were rude/poor manner…......1 
Waiting time too long……………2 
Drugs were not available……..….3 
Services were too expensive……..4 
Lack of privacy…………………..5 
Staff did not explain treatment…..6 
Facility was not clean……………7 
Did not get to see a Doctor………8 
No injection given……………….9 
Other (specify)_______________96 
NA……………………….……...99 
 
If any skip to 
D 3.44 
D 3.40 If 1 in D3.38, did you pay for the 
postnatal services? 
Yes………..…………………...1  
No……..…………….……........2 
NA…...……………………….99 
 
If 2 skip to D 
3.42 
D 3.41 How much did you pay for the 
postnatal services? 
 
Amount in ¢________________ 
DK…………………………8888 
NA …………………….......9999 
 
 
D 3.42 Why did you not pay for the 
postnatal services? 
Post natal service is free...…......1 
Covered by the NHIS………….2 
Paid by a Philanthropist……….3 
Other (specify)____________ 96 
NA…………………………....99 
 
D 3.43 How much did you pay as transport 
cost to seek postnatal care? 
Amount in ¢________________ 
DK…………………………8888 
NA …………………….......9999 
 
 QUALITY OF CARE (ANC) 
(ASK ALL: both currently pregnant and women who have given birth) 
 
D 3.44 How satisfied are you with services 
given by this facility? 
Very satisfied……….…………….1 
Satisfied…………………………..2 
Somewhat satisfied……………….3 
Dissatisfied…….…………………4 
Very dissatisfied…………………5 
Other(specify)______________ 96 
DK………………….………….88 
NA……………………………..99 
 
D 3.45 How satisfied were you with the 
cleanliness at the health facility? 
Very satisfied…………………….1 
Satisfied………………………….2 
Somewhat satisfied…………….3 
Dissatisfied………….…………4 
Very dissatisfied…….…………5 
Other(specify)______________ 96 
DK……………………….……88 
NA……………………………..99 
 
D 3.46 How do you rank the attitude of 
health providers? 
Very good…………...………...1 
Good…………………………..2 
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Satisfactory……..……………..3 
Fair……………….……….......4 
Poor……….…………………..5 
Other (Specify)____________96 
DK……………………………88 
NA……………………………99 
D 3.47 Would you visit this health facility 
again for ANC services? 
Yes ……………………………1 
No…………………….……….2 
NA……………………………..99 
If 2 skip to D 
3.49 
D 3.48 If yes in D 3.47, what will be the 
main reason that will make you visit 
this facility for ANC services again? 
Good attitude of health staff……1 
Cleanliness of the facility………2 
Prompt care/treatment………….3 
Easy access to doctor/nurse…….4 
Other (specify)______________96 
NA……………………………..99 
If ANY skip to  
D 3.50 
D 3.49 What is the main reason why you 
will not visit this facility again for 
ANC services? 
Staff were rude/poor manner…......1 
Waiting time too long……………2 
Drugs were not available……..….3 
Services were too expensive……..4 
Lack of privacy…………………..5 
Staff did not explain treatment…..6 
Facility was not clean……………7 
Did not get to see a Doctor………8 
No injection given……………….9 
Other (specify)_______________96 
NA……………………….……...99 
 
 QUALITY OF CARE (DELIVERY SERVICES) (Do not ask women who are currently 
pregnant) 
 
D 3.50 How satisfied are you with services 
given to you during your delivery by 
this facility? 
Very satisfied….…………….….1 
Satisfied……….………………...2 
Somewhat satisfied……………...3 
Dissatisfied………….…….….…4 
Very dissatisfied…….………..…5 
Other(specify)_______________96 
DK……………………….…..….88 
NA………………………………99 
 
D 3.51 How satisfied were you with the 
cleanliness at the health facility? 
Very satisfied…………………….1 
Satisfied………………………….2 
Somewhat satisfied………………3 
Dissatisfied………….……………4 
Very dissatisfied…….…………....5 
Other(specify)_______________ 96 
DK……………………….………88 
NA…………………………….....99 
 
D 3.52 How do you rank the attitude of 
health providers during delivery at 
this facility? 
Very good…………...………...1 
Good…………………………..2 
Satisfactory.…………………..3 
Fair……………….……….......4 
Poor……….…………………..5 
Other (Specify)____________96 
NA……………………………99 
 
D 3.53 Would you visit this health facility 
again for delivery?  
Yes ……………………………1 
No…………………….……….2 
NA……………………………99 
If 2 skip to D 
3.55 
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D 3.54 If yes in D 3.53, what will be the 
main reason that will make you visit 
this facility for delivery services 
again? 
Nearness………….………….….1 
Quick service……..……………..2 
Less medical bill……..………….3 
Less waiting time….….…….…..4 
Good quality service……..……..5 
Emergency/was taken there…….6 
Do not have to pay………………7 
Told to go there by doctor/nurse...8 
Told to go there by DHIS……..9 
Know care available will help me get 
better………………………….....10 
Know I will be treated 
respectfully……………………..11 
Other(specify)_______________96 
NA………………………………99 
 
D 3.55 What is the main reason why you 
will not visit this facility again for 
delivery services? 
Staff were rude/poor manner…......1 
Waiting time too long……………2 
Drugs were not available……..….3 
Services were too expensive……..4 
Lack of privacy…………………..5 
Staff did not explain treatment…..6 
Facility was not clean……………7 
Did not get to see a Doctor………8 
No injection given……………….9 
Other (specify)_______________96 
NA……………………….……...99 
 
QUALITY OF CARE (POST NATAL SERVICES)  
(Do not ask mothers who are pregnant or whose babies are less than six weeks) 
D 3.56 How satisfied are you with services 
given by this facility during post 
natal services? 
Very satisfied…………………….1 
Satisfied………………………….2 
Somewhat satisfied……………….3 
Dissatisfied………….……………4 
Very dissatisfied…….……………5 
Other(specify)_______________96 
DK………………………………88 
NA………………………………99 
 
D 3.57 How satisfied were you with the 
cleanliness at the health facility? 
Very satisfied…………………….1 
Satisfied………………………….2 
Somewhat satisfied……………...3 
Dissatisfied………….…………..4 
Very dissatisfied…….…………..5 
Other(specify)_______________96 
DK……………….…………….88 
NA……………………………..99 
 
D 3.58 How do you rank the attitude of 
health providers during post natal 
services? 
Very good…………...………...1 
Good…………………………..2 
Satisfactory………..…………..3 
Fair……………….……….......4 
Poor……….…………………..5 
Other (Specify)____________96 
NA……………………………99 
 
D 3.59 Would you visit this health facility 
again for postnatal services? 
Yes ……………………………1 
 No…………………….……….2 
NA……………………………99 
If 2 skip to D 
3.61 
D 3.60 If yes in D 3.57, what will be the 
main reason that will make you visit 
Nearness………….………….….1 
Quick service……..……………..2 
 
If ANY END 
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this facility for postnatal services 
again? 
Less medical bill……..………….3 
Less waiting time….….…….…..4 
Good quality service……..……..5 
Do not have to pay………………6 
Told to go there by doctor/nurse...7 
Told to go there by DHIS……..8 
Know care available will help me get 
better………………………….....9 
Know I will be treated respectfully.10 
Other(specify)_______________96 
NA………………………………99 
interview 
D 3.61 What is the main reason why you 
will not visit this facility again for 
post natal services? 
Staff were rude/poor manner…......1 
Waiting time too long……………2 
Drugs were not available……..….3 
Services were too expensive……..4 
Lack of privacy…………………..5 
Staff did not explain treatment…..6 
Facility was not clean……………7 
Did not get to see a Doctor………8 
No injection given……………….9 
Other (specify)_______________96 
NA……………………….……...99 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME 
 
 
Question H4.61 
CARD A: Card on contribution levels to DHIS 
Option 1: Everyone pays the same amount 
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Option 2: The poorest don’t have to pay 
 
       
 
 
                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
Option 3: All must pay something, but pay according to their income 
 
       
 
`  
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Option 4:  All must pay something, but the poorest pay very little 
 
       
 
 
 
 
Question H 5.19 
 
CARD B: Card on perceived place in socio-economic hierarchy 
 
 
 
             
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
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Appendix B: Focus Group Discussion guide for insured and uninsured  
 
Focus Group Discussion (FGD) for Un-Insured members 
      A. Knowledge of the NHIS 
1. Do you know about the NHIS? 
2. What do you know about it? (Probe for, Premium, waiting period and the benefit 
package) 
3. How did you learn about the NHIS? 
4. Can you please describe what the NHIS is? How does it work?  
5. Do you know why the NHIS was created by the government? 
6. Do you know what services are covered by the NHIS? 
7. Do you know about the NHIS exemption policy and procedures?  If yes, how does the 
exemption system work? 
 
B.   Attitudes towards the NHIS 
1. Why have you not joined the scheme?  
2. What will attract you to join the scheme? 
3. What do you think about the NHIS? (Probe for whether it is Pro-poor ) 
4. Any suggestions as to how best the scheme should operate.  
 
C. Utilization of Health Services 
1. Where do you go for health services?  
2. Can you share some of your thoughts about the services you received from health 
facilities that participate in the NHIS? (Probe for experience with staff attitude to 
clients, waiting time and availability of drugs.) 
3. Do you think you receive better or poorer services at the health facility, compared to NHI 
 members? 
4. Are you satisfied with the health facility you use in this district? Why and why not? 
 
D. Community Involvement/ownership  
1. Do you know if they hold meetings on the insurance scheme?  
2. Have you attended any NHIS meetings since its inception in your area? 
3. If yes how many times have you attended such meetings? If not, why did you not attend? 
4. What are the key things discussed at the meeting(s)? 
 
E. Access to Health Services (Affordability, Availability, Acceptability) 
1.  Is your non-membership of the NHIS a result of your inability to afford the premium and 
the registration    fees? Why and why not? 
2. Is the distance to the registration point a hindrance to you being a member of the scheme? 
Why and why not? 
3. Is the distance to the health facility a hindrance to you being a member of the scheme? 
Why and why not? 
4. Is your non-membership of the NHIS a result of the poor quality of service at the health 
facility? Why and why not? 
5. Is the operation or design of the scheme (i.e. premium collection, level of premium, 
registration fees, waiting time for cards) a hindrance to you being a member of the 
scheme? Why and why not? 
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Focus Group Discussion (FGD) for Un-Insured members 
 
      A. Knowledge of the NHIS 
1. Do you know about the NHIS? 
2. What do you know about it? (Probe for, Premium, waiting period and the benefit 
package) 
3. How did you learn about the NHIS? 
4. Can you please describe what the NHIS is? How does it work?  
5. Do you know why the NHIS was created by the government? 
6. Do you know what services are covered by the NHIS? 
7. Do you know about the NHIS exemption policy and procedures?  If yes, how does the 
exemption system work? 
 
B.   Attitudes towards the NHIS 
1. Why have you not joined the scheme?  
2. What will attract you to join the scheme? 
3. What do you think about the NHIS? (Probe for whether it is Pro-poor ) 
4. Any suggestions as to how best the scheme should operate.  
 
C. Utilization of Health Services 
1. Where do you go for health services?  
2. Can you share some of your thoughts about the services you received from health  
facilities that participate in the NHIS? (Probe for experience with staff attitude to 
clients, waiting time and availability of drugs.) 
3. Do you think you receive better or poorer services at the health facility, compared to 
NHIS members? 
4. Are you satisfied with the health facility you use in this district? Why and why not? 
 
D. Community Involvement/ownership  
1. Do you know if they hold meetings on the insurance scheme?  
2. Have you attended any NHIS meetings since its inception in your area? 
3. If yes how many times have you attended such meetings? If not, why did you not attend? 
4. What are the key things discussed at the meeting(s)? 
 
E. Access to Health Services (Affordability, Availability, Acceptability) 
1.   Is your non-membership of the NHIS a result of your inability to afford the premium and 
the registration    fees? Why and why not? 
2. Is the distance to the registration point a hindrance to you being a member of the scheme? 
Why and why not? 
3. Is the distance to the health facility a hindrance to you being a member of the scheme? 
Why and why not? 
4. Is your non-membership of the NHIS a result of the poor quality of service at the health 
facility? Why and why not? 
5. Is the operation or design of the scheme (i.e. premium collection, level of premium, 
registration fees, waiting time for cards) a hindrance to you being a member of the 
scheme? Why and why not? 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
 322 
Appendix C: Indepth interview guide for DHIS managers 
 
IDI with District Scheme Mangers 
 
1. Name, Educational qualification, No of years with the scheme, name of scheme, region 
 
2. How does the scheme operate? Probe for registration period, specify months of the year 
when registration is under taken.   
♦ What is the current premium level?   
♦ Do different people pay different premiums? Can you give me specific examples and 
what is the basis for the different premiums? 
♦ What is the criterion for granting exemptions in this district? Are there other mutual 
health insurance scheme(s) (private mutual and private commercial) in this district? 
 
3. Is there a range of premiums payable in your district? What is the reason for the range?  
♦ How do you identify different income groups especially for those in the informal sector? 
What is the average payment?  
♦ How are premiums collected? (Probe for payment upfront or instalment basis).  
♦ Are exempt categories issued with the same type of insurance cards? Why and why not? 
 
4. Are there challenges with regards to the issuance of cards?  
♦ What are the problems and how do you envisage solving this?  
♦ What is the average waiting period between registration and issuance of insurance card? 
 
5. W hat checks do you put in place for providers’ claims for reimbursement? 
♦ On average how long does it take to reimburse them? 
♦  In your opinion, are there delays in the reimbursement process?  
♦ What do you think accounts for the delays in reimbursement to service providers? 
  
6. What are the processes and indicators you use to identify the poor to be exempted?  
 
7. How is the DHI funded? (Sources of funding).  
♦ Do you get funding from the NHIS headquarters (from National Health Insurance Fund-
NHIF)? 
♦ How are funds transferred from NHIF meant for (Probe: cross-subsidisation, SSNIT 
members, indigents, exempt group, administrative issues). What can you say about the 
funding support from NHIF (adequacy and timing)?  
♦ What other funding sources are available to the scheme? 
 
8. How do you ensure that clients are getting the monies worth of services (ensuring 
purchasing of adequate and qualitative services from providers) 
 
9. Have you had supervisory visits or monitoring from NHIS headquarters? (Probe: 
What are the purpose of these visits or why no visits) 
 
10. Has the scheme got mass support from the populace in general (if yes, why enrolment is 
not more than what it is now and if no why?) 
 
11. What in your opinion can be done to ensure the sustainability of the scheme? 
 
12. What is your opinion about the benefit package (adequate, inadequate and why?) 
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13. How does the community participate in the running of the scheme? Do you have a 
Board? Is the board active (how?).  
♦ What has the Board done to support the scheme? 
 
14. What are the challenges (registration, logistics, satisfaction of clients, attitude of your 
staff, administrative, etc) you are facing and what can be done to tackle them? 
 
15. Anecdotal information has it that registration agents collect bribes from people to register 
them as indigents so that they can exempted-is this a problem in your scheme. If this is 
true, how have you dealt with it or how will you deal with it? 
♦ Do you know of other schemes that have encountered this problem or similar problems?   
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME 
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Appendix D: Indepth interview guide for NHIS headquarters 
 
A. Perception of NHIS 
1. What are your perceptions about the NHIS?  
♦ Is it a pro-poor financial arrangement? 
♦ Why do you say it is (or not) a pro-poor financial arrangement? 
2. What is the major health problem (among the health problems) that NHIS stands to 
address? (If malaria, why?) 
 
B. Premiums and registration fees 
3. Do you think Ghana is in a position to sustain this NHIS? (why or why not) 
4. You propose a sliding scale payment of premiums according to ATP, is it the case? (If 
YES how effective is its implementation and if NO why?) 
5. Are there variations in the amount of premium levels among districts (If YES is this 
acceptable?) 
6. How   does the premium affect the number of people who enroll in the scheme?  
7. Who determines how much should be charged as registration fee? 
8. What is the purpose of the registration fee and are there variations in the registration fee 
charged among districts (If YES is this acceptable?) 
9. What is your opinion about the timing of premium collections in the districts (is it 
appropriate, why or why not?) 
 
C. Waiting time and support for scheme 
10. What is the average waiting period (after payment and being able to access health care), 
how does this affect enrolment especially among the poor? 
11. Has the scheme got the mass support from the populace in general (if yes, why enrolment 
is not more than what it is now if no why)? 
12. Does the scheme also enjoy support (financial) from International organizations? (If high 
donor support, how sustainable is NHIS if donor pool out?) 
13. Can those on payroll opt out of the NHIS (why or why not)? 
 
D. Monitoring  
14. How do you monitor the performance of the DHIS (the criteria used to monitor)? 
♦ What  are the indicators of good or poor performance of a DHIS 
♦ What is the reward for good performing DHIS and how do you support poor performing 
DHIS to improve on their performance? 
♦ How do you check the authenticity of exempted list from DHIS? 
♦ What are the criteria for exemptions? 
 
 
E. Subsidy and benefit package 
15. Do you support the DHIS with subsidy? (How is this done? money to cover SSNIT 
contributors at the district level or subsidy for indigents?)  
16. How is the subsidy to the DHIS arranged (through need based, historical basis)? 
17. Timing of subsidy (how early are DHIS subsidized?)  
18. What do the DHIS need to do to enable them get the subsidy quickly? 
19. How are the DHIS suppose to use the subsidy? (accountability of the subsidy) 
20. Do you extend subsidy to Private Voluntary and Commercial Health Insurance Schemes? 
(Why or why not?) 
21. What is your opinion about the benefit package (adequate, inadequate and why?) 
22. So far what is the percentage of enrolment of the country and is this what was anticipated 
(are you on target and if not on target why)? 
23. What are your views on how NHIS could be restructured to make it possible for more 
people especially the low income groups to join? 
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F. Challenges of the scheme 
24. What are the challenges facing the NHIS? 
25. What can be done to tackle these challenges? 
 
G.  Operation of NHIS (questions for the executive secretary of the NHIS) 
26. When did NHIS start operating? (month and year) 
27. What is the organizational structure of the NHIS and what are the various roles and 
responsibilities of the sub-structures of NHIS? 
28. How does the NHIS collaborate with GHS and MOH in the financing and delivery of 
health services? (how adequate is this relationship and what can be done to strengthen the 
collaborations) 
29. Is NHIS independent from political interferences? (How independent and if is not 
independent why?) 
30. How is the NHIC formed (who appoints and based on what criteria?) 
31. What are the duties of the NHIC and how effective have they performed these roles and 
responsibilities so far? 
32. What is the objective of NHIF and how does NHIF work? (Re-insurance and risk 
equalization roles and how effective NHIF performed these roles) 
   
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION AND TIME! 
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Appendix E: Consent forms for all interviewees  
Consent form for SHIELD household survey 
HEALTH RESEARCH UNIT  
GHANA HEALTH SERVICE 
 
CONSENT FORM 
Equity in health care financing 
 
Household Survey-Heads of household 
Purpose: The Health Research Unit of the Ghana Health Services is carrying out this study with 
the aim of understanding the existing health care system differences and looking at the difficulties 
of health care payments at the household level and also looking at the causes of the difficulties of 
health care payments in Ghana. Information that will be obtained from this study will help policy 
makers in the formulation of suitable and fair policies for a more effective and fair health care 
payments system that will impact positively on major diseases like malaria. This study is also part 
of a PhD thesis of James Akazili, a Ghanaian and student of the University of Cape Town-South 
Africa. Issues that would be discussed with you include socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics, health seeking behaviour and health care payments, health insurance enrollment, 
household characteristics, household consumption and expenditure, and household assets. 
 
Procedures: You are being asked to participate in an interview, which will take about 1½ hrs to 
2hrs. I will be asking you questions related to the purpose of the study outlined above over a 
month recall period.  There are no correct answers to these questions.  You are free to answer or 
not to answer.   
 
Risks and discomforts: The risks to you for participating in this study are minimal.  However, 
some of the issues that may be discussed are of a personal and sensitive nature. If at any time you 
do not want to answer questions, you are not obliged to do so. 
 
Benefits:  Your participation in this study may not benefit you directly, but it may benefit your 
household and community in the future.   
 
Confidentiality:  We do not intend to ask you about your very personal private issues. You should 
not feel under any obligation to answer all these questions. On the other hand, if you do wish to 
share your personal experiences for any reason, feel free to do so, the research team will ensure 
absolute confidentiality in whatever information you will provide.  Your name or that of members 
of your household will not be mentioned on any written document.  Nobody will be able to trace 
anything we discuss back to you. 
 
Right to refuse or withdraw: Before our discussion, please understand that your participation in 
the study is voluntary.  You do not need to answer questions or to participate in the research if 
you do not want to.  You can stop participating in this study at any time without losing any 
benefit from any health facility. 
 
 
Do you have any questions? 
Do you agree to participate in this study? 
 
If at any time following this interview you have any questions or would like to speak to someone 
involved in this study, please feel free to contact  the following persons: 
 
James Akazili (Principal Investigator) 
Navrongo Health Research Centre 
Ghana Health Service 
Prof. Diane McIntyre (Supervisor) 
Health Economics Unit 
Faculty of Health Sciences 
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P.O. Box 114 
Navrongo, Upper East Region 
Ghana 
Tel +233 244834435 
akazjames@yahoo.com    
 
Anzio Road, Observatory 7925 
University of Cape Town 
South Africa 
Tel: +27 824962345 
dimc@iafrica.com 
 
Statement of consent 
I have read all of the above or I have had all of the above read and interpreted to me, asked 
questions and received answers concerning areas I did not understand and I am willing to 
participate in this study. I would not have waived any of my rights by signing/thumb printing this 
consent form. 
 
Name of respondent____________________________________________ 
 
Signature/thumbprint____________________________________________ 
 
Certification of individual seeking consent 
 I certify that I have explained to the individual the nature and purpose of this study. I have 
answered all questions that have been raised and I have witnessed the above signature/thumbprint 
on the date indicated below.  
 
Name of individual obtaining consent:_________________________________________ 
 
Signature:_______________________________Date:__________________________ 
 
Witness' Statement 
I have witnessed the verbal presentation of the information summarized on this form to the 
respondent.  The respondent has had a chance to ask questions.   
 
Name of witness: _____________________________________ 
 
Signature:____________________________________Date:____________________ 
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Consent form for FGD (Insured and uninsured members) 
 
FGD-Community members 
 
Purpose: The Health Research Unit of the Ghana Health Services is carrying out this study with 
the aim of understanding the existing health care system differences and looking at the difficulties 
of health care payments at the household level and also looking at the causes of the difficulties of 
health care payments in Ghana. Information that will be obtained from this study will help policy 
makers in the formulation of suitable and fair policies for a more effective and fair health care 
payments system that will impact positively on major diseases like malaria. This study is also part 
of a PhD thesis of James Akazili, a Ghanaian and student of the University of Cape Town-South 
Africa. Issues that would be discussed with you include socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics, health seeking behaviour, health insurance enrollment, household characteristics, 
household expenditure, and household assets. 
 
Procedures: You are being asked to participate in a group discussion which will take about 
1½ hrs. I will be asking you questions related to the purpose of the study outlined above over a 
month recall period.  There are no correct answers to these questions. You are free to answer or 
not to answer. 
 
Risks and discomforts: The risks to you for participating in this study are minimal.  However, 
some of the issues that may be discussed are of a bit personal and sensitive nature. If at any time 
you do not want to answer questions you are not obliged to do so. 
 
Benefits:  Your participation in this study may not benefit you directly, but it may benefit your 
household and community in the future.   
 
Confidentiality:  We do not intend to ask you about your very personal matters and you should 
not feel under any obligation to answer all these questions.  On the other hand if you do wish to 
share your personal experiences, the research team will ensure absolute confidentiality.  Your 
names will not be mentioned on any written document.  Nobody will also be able to trace 
anything we discuss back to you. 
 
Right to refuse or withdraw: Before our discussion, please understand that your participation in 
the study is voluntary.  You do not need to answer questions or to participate in the research if 
you do not want to.  You can stop participating in this study at any time and will not face any 
sanctions or denied any treatment at a health facility. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
Do you all agree to participate in this study? 
 
If at any time following this interview you have any questions or would like to speak to someone 
involved in this study, please feel free to contact  the following persons; 
 
James Akazili (Principal Investigator) 
Navrongo Health Research Centre 
Ghana Health Service 
P.O. Box 114 
Navrongo, Upper East Region 
Ghana 
Tel +233 244834435 
akazjames@yahoo.com   
 
 
 
 
Prof. Diane McIntyre (Supervisor) 
Health Economics Unit 
Faculty of Health Sciences 
Anzio Road, Observatory 7925 
University of Cape Town 
South Africa 
Tel: +27 824962345 
dimc@iafrica.com 
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Statement of consent 
I have read all of the above or I have had all of the above read and interpreted to me, asked 
questions and received answers concerning areas I did not understand and I am willing to 
participate in this study. I would not have waived any of my rights by signing/thumb printing this 
consent form 
 
Name of respondent_______________________Signature/thumbprint_______________ 
 
Name of respondent_______________________Signature/thumbprint_______________ 
 
Name of respondent_______________________Signature/thumbprint_______________ 
 
Name of respondent_______________________Signature/thumbprint_______________ 
 
Name of respondent_______________________Signature/thumbprint_______________ 
 
Name of respondent_______________________Signature/thumbprint_______________ 
 
Name of respondent_______________________Signature/thumbprint_______________ 
 
Name of respondent_______________________Signature/thumbprint_______________ 
 
Name of respondent_______________________Signature/thumbprint_______________ 
 
Name of respondent_______________________Signature/thumbprint_______________ 
 
Name of respondent_______________________Signature/thumbprint_______________ 
 
Name of respondent_______________________Signature/thumbprint_______________ 
 
 
Certification of individual seeking consent 
 I certify that I have explained to the individual the nature and purpose of this study. I have 
answered all questions that have been raised and I have witnessed the above signature/thumbprint 
on the date indicated below.  
 
Name of individual obtaining consent:_________________________________________ 
 
Signature:_______________________________Date:__________________________ 
 
Witness' Statement 
I have witnessed the verbal presentation of the information summarized on this form to the 
respondent.  The respondent has had a chance to ask questions.   
 
Name of witness: _____________________________________ 
 
Signature:____________________________________Date:____________________ 
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Consent form for in-depth interview of DHIS managers 
 
 
In-depth Interview (IDI)-District scheme managers 
 
Purpose: The Health Research Unit of the Ghana Health Services is carrying out this study with 
the aim of understanding the existing health care system inequities and evaluating the burden of 
health care financing and the factors influencing the incidence of health care financing with 
emphasis on the national health insurance in Ghana. Information obtained from this study will 
help policy makers in the design of appropriate and more equitable policies on the 
implementation of an effective and equitable health insurance scheme that will impact positively 
on major diseases like malaria. This study is part of broader project [Strategies for Health 
Insurance for Equity in Less Developed countries (Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania)-SHIELD] and 
a PhD thesis of James Akazili, a Ghanaian and a student of the University of Cape Town-South 
Africa. Issues that would be discussed with you include contribution rates, structure, and timing 
of premium collections, waiting period, quality of care, provider payment mechanisms, 
reimbursement, implementation challenges at the district level and how to overcome the 
challenges and make the DHI more equitable. Data on enrolment levels; amount of premium and 
registration fees collected and disbursement will also be required from you. 
 
Procedures: You are being asked to participate in an interview, which will take about 1½ hrs 
to 2hrs.  I will be asking you questions related to the DHI and how it can be made more pro-poor 
by expanding coverage. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions.   
 
Risks and discomforts: The risks to you for participating in this study are minimal.  If at any time 
you do not want to answer questions you are not obliged to do so. 
 
Benefits:  Your participation in this study may not benefit you directly, but may benefit the 
district and the entire country in the future.   
 
Confidentiality:  We do not intend to ask you about your personal private matters or private 
issues, and you should not feel under any obligation to answer all these questions.  On the other 
hand if you do wish to share your personal experiences, the research team will ensure absolute 
confidentiality.  Your name will not be mentioned on any written document.   
 
Right to refuse or withdraw: Before our discussion, please understand that your participation in 
the study is voluntary. You do not need to answer questions or to participate in the research if you 
do not want to.  You can stop participating in this study at any time. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
Do you agree to participate in this study? 
 
If at any time following this interview you have any questions or would like to speak to someone 
involved in this study, please feel free to contact  the following persons; 
 
 
James Akazili (Principal Investigator) 
Navrongo Health Research Centre 
Ghana Health Service 
P.O. Box 114 
Navrongo, Upper East Region 
Ghana 
Tel +233 244834435 
akazjames@yahoo.com  
 
Prof. Diane McIntyre (Supervisor) 
Health Economics Unit 
Faculty of Health Sciences 
Anzio Road, Observatory 7925 
University of Cape Town 
South Africa 
Tel: +27 824962345 
dimc@iafrica.com 
 
Statement of consent 
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I have read all of the above or I have had all of the above read to me, asked questions and 
received answers concerning areas I did not understand and I am willing to participate in this 
study. I would not have waived any of my rights by signing this consent form. 
 
Name of respondent____________________________________________ 
 
Signature____________________________________________ 
 
Certification of individual seeking consent 
 I certify that I have explained to the individual the nature and purpose of this study. I have 
answered all questions that have been raised and I have witnessed the above signature on the date 
indicated below.  
 
Name of individual obtaining consent:_________________________________________ 
 
Signature:_______________________________Date:__________________________ 
 
Witness' Statement 
I have witnessed the verbal presentation of the information summarized on this form to the 
respondent.  The respondent has had a chance to ask questions.   
 
Name of witness: _____________________________________ 
 
Signature:____________________________________Date:____________________ 
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Consent form for in-depth interview of NHIS headquarters 
 
 
In-depth Interview (IDI)-Officials of NHIS at headquarters 
 
Purpose: The Health Research Unit of the Ghana Health Services is carrying out this study with 
the aim of understanding the existing health care system inequities and evaluating the burden of 
health care financing and the factors influencing the incidence of health care financing with 
emphasis on the national health insurance in Ghana. Information obtained from this study will 
help policy makers in the design of appropriate and more equitable policies on the 
implementation of an effective and equitable health insurance scheme that will impact positively 
on major diseases like malaria. This study is part of a broader project [Strategies for Health 
Insurance for Equity in Less Developed countries (Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania)-SHIELD] and 
a PhD thesis of James Akazili, a Ghanaian and a student of the University of Cape Town-South 
Africa. Issues that would be discussed with you include contribution rates, structure, and timing 
of premium collections, waiting period, quality of care, provider payment mechanisms, 
reimbursement, sustainability of the scheme, implementation challenges and how to overcome the 
challenges and make the NHIS more equitable. Data on enrolment levels, sources of financing of 
the NHIS and amount of subsidy to various DHISs will also be collected.  
 
Procedures: You are being asked to participate in an interview, which will take about 1½ hrs 
to 2hrs.  I will be asking you questions related to the NHIS and how to position it to achieve 
universal coverage by rapidly expanding coverage to the informal sector. There are no correct or 
wrong answers to these questions.   
 
Risks and discomforts: The risks to you for participating in this study are minimal.  If at any time 
you do not want to answer questions you are not obliged to do so. 
 
Benefits:  Your participation in this study may not benefit you directly, but it may benefit the 
entire country in the future.   
 
Confidentiality:  We do not intend to ask you about your personal private matters or private 
issues, and you should not feel under any obligation to answer all these questions.  On the other 
hand if you do wish to share your personal experiences, the research team will ensure absolute 
confidentiality.  Your name will not be mentioned on any written document.  Nobody will also be 
able to trace anything we discuss back to you. 
 
Right to refuse or withdraw: Before our discussion, please understand that your participation in 
the study is voluntary.  You do not need to answer questions or to participate in the research if 
you do not want to.  You can stop participating in this study at any time. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
Do you agree to participate in this study? 
 
If at any time following this interview you have any questions or would like to speak to someone 
involved in this study, please feel free to contact  the following persons; 
 
James Akazili (Principal Investigator) 
Navrongo Health Research Centre 
Ghana Health Service 
P.O. Box 114 
Navrongo, Upper East Region 
Ghana 
Tel +233 244834435 
akazjames@yahoo.com    
 
Prof. Diane McIntyre (Supervisor) 
Health Economics Unit 
Faculty of Health Sciences 
Anzio Road, Observatory 7925 
University of Cape Town 
South Africa 
Tel: +27 824962345 
dimc@iafrica.com 
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Statement of consent 
I have read all of the above or I have had all of the above read to me, asked questions and 
received answers concerning areas I did not understand and I am willing to participate in this 
study. I would not have waived any of my rights by signing this consent form 
 
Name of respondent____________________________________________ 
 
Signature____________________________________________ 
 
Certification of individual seeking consent 
 I certify that I have explained to the individual the nature and purpose of this study. I have 
answered all questions that have been raised and I have witnessed the above signature on the date 
indicated below.  
 
Name of individual obtaining consent:_________________________________________ 
 
Signature:_______________________________Date:__________________________ 
 
Witness' Statement 
I have witnessed the verbal presentation of the information summarized on this form to the 
respondent.  The respondent has had a chance to ask questions.   
 
Name of witness: _____________________________________ 
 
Signature:____________________________________Date:____________________ 
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Appendix F: Table showing some indices use to measure inequities 
Indices definition strengths  weakness  
1 Range 
ratio 
-express a magnitude of 
quantities relative to each 
other 
-ratio of two quantities 
indicates how many times 
the first quantity is 
contained in the second 
-very simple to 
apply and 
understand 
-limited in used because it 
does not go beyond simple 
comparisons of quantities  
-Takes no account of the 
sizes of the groups being 
compared and this can lead 
to misleading results 
2 Lorenz 
curve 
-a graphical representation 
of the cumulative 
distribution function of the 
empirical probability 
distribution of wealth 
-Simple and 
easy to 
comprehend 
-Quite limited because 
certain variables such as age 
and other household 
dynamics are not factored 
into measurement 
3 Gini 
coefficient 
Is a ratio of the area that 
lies between the line of 
equality and the Lorenz 
curve 
-Can be used to 
generate a single 
summary 
statistic of the 
income 
distribution 
-Lorenz curve may 
understate the actual amount 
of inequality if richer HHs 
use income efficiently than 
lower income HHs and vice 
versa 
4 Concentrat
ion curve 
-twice the area between 
the concentration curve, 
and 
the line of equality (the 45º 
line running from the 
bottom-left corner to the 
top-right) 
- it takes 
account of the 
socio-economic 
dimension of 
inequality in 
health (unlike 
the Gini 
coefficient for 
example 
- It reflects the 
experience of 
the entire 
population 
rather than two 
extreme groups 
on the socio-
economic scale 
-has the disadvantage of 
lacking a straightforward 
interpretation 
-it can yield the same 
correlation given two 
populations with different 
health gradients across 
socio-economic groups 
5 Slope 
index 
A linear regression that 
shows the relation between 
the level of health or the 
frequency of a health 
problem in each socio-
economic category and the 
hierarchical ranking of 
each socioeconomic 
category on the social 
scale 
-A reliable 
measure used to 
reflect the 
socioeconomic 
dimension to 
inequalities 
in health 
-sensitive to the mean health 
status of the population 
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6 Robin 
Hood 
index 
(Pietra 
ratio) 
-is the proportion of 
money to be transferred 
from the rich to the poor to 
achieve equality 
-conceptually it 
is one of the 
simplest 
measure of 
inequality 
-Unlike other measures 
Robin Hood index does not 
incorporate a sensitivity 
parameter 
7 Suit Index -Unlike Kakwani index 
Suits’ index is based on 
relative concentration 
curves 
-It plots the cumulative 
proportion of pre-tax 
income against the 
cumulative proportion of 
pre-tax income rather than 
the cumulative proportion 
of population (as in 
Kawkani index) 
The overall 
index fr a tax 
system 
consisting of 
two or more 
taxes is a 
weighted 
average of the 
indices for the 
individual taxes. 
-Because of life time 
income smoothing, 
consumption is a better 
measure which is not 
considered in Suits’ index 
-Gives greater weight to 
departures from 
proportionality that occur 
among higher income 
groups than lower income 
groups 
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